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~ Summary ~ 
This research seeks to establish a foundation for a posthuman theory of politics that permits 
novel and explorative politics for the post-anthropocene. The project is situated within new 
materialist philosophies and pursues its goal through the close engagement with a specific 
type of advanced technology or immersive gaming technology that is played for political 
purposes. The arguments and theories developed throughout the thesis are of a metaphysical 
nature. These claims rework the condition of being and becoming and engage with 
fundamental ontological, ontogenetic and epistemological questions. Addressing these 
questions through the thematic case study of gaming technology allows the thesis to trace 
posthuman bodies and thoughts from their emergence all the way to larger formations that 
affect political practices. In this sense, gaming scenarios are a test lab not only for emerging 
posthuman gaming bodies, but also a new political theory associated with it. As such, this 
thesis is not a gaming critique, but a future-orientated, speculative account on how political 
games, as a technology characteristic of the posthuman condition, can help to work towards 
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~ Preamble ~ 
 










A book has neither object nor subject; it is made of variously formed matters, and very 
different dates and speeds. 




This research emerged out of an undergraduate dissertation for the module “Peace Processes 
and World Politics,” and it was a supervision session with Jan Selby that sparked the initial 
idea. The notion of new technology throws up a raft of images, but two elements stand out in 
the twenty-first century: electricity and Virtuality. Contemporary technology fundamentally 
depends on the speed of electrical transmission and transduction to produce effects that are 
commonly referred to as being virtual.
4
 Electricity is without question physical as it runs 
through technology, the body, even air. It is a fundamental part of what makes up this world 
and, and relation to investigating new technology, it implies very material questions. Virtual 
on the other hand seems to be more challenging and is often talked about in less corporeal 
terms than the electricity that produces it. Furthermore, virtuality prompts profound social, 
cultural, economic and political questions such as revolutions influenced and triggered by 
                                                          
1
 Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham & London: Duke UP, 2002a), 
243. 
2
 Gilles Deleuze, interviewed by Arnaud Villani, La guêpe et l'orchidée: Essai sur Gilles Deleuze (Paris: Belin, 
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social media, cyber-war, and technologically simulated war and peace games. These 
questions often baffle the social scientist precisely because of their virtual, arguably less 
tangible, element. In short, virtual aspects of new technology appear far more problematic 
than technical aspects of programming for example, and make new technology an intriguing 
area of study in and of itself, which amplifies significantly when the political component is 
added to the analysis. It is from this curiosity about the tension between new technology and 
the political realm that this project has emerged. The central working hypothesis inspired by 
this relationship is:   
New technology in the form of immersive political gaming can challenge conventional 
political theory, if it is analysed as a technology of lived abstraction and contextualised 
within a posthuman condition. 
 
The framing of technologies of lived abstraction means treating these games as producing 
experience, life, and reality, but in a way where the “space of a body is really abstract.”
5
 As 
such and crucially, they offer the possibility to produce different, alternative realities and to 
do so by different means. In short, new technology can produce political innovation. Taking 
technology as a political being and becoming (lived abstraction) requires the analysis to leave 
the comfortable realm of the anthropocene and this is a challenge to conventional political 
theory because it rests on the human condition and works within this sphere. The immediate 
implication is twofold: first, a more refined, detailed posthuman condition, body and 
landscape is the first step and implication simultaneously and, second, this can be used to turn 
political theory posthuman and show how in this way it can account for the emergence of 
something genuinely new such as political subjectivity. In this sense the initial challenge is 
actually an opportunity for political theory to reinvent itself along posthuman lines. The aim 
                                                          
5
 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, 177, original emphasis.  
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here specifically is to produce a form of posthuman politics, or more precisely, a conception 
of a micropolitics of the post-anthropocene.  
 
In essence, the project lays the groundwork for a posthuman condition that allows for 
explorative other-than-human/posthuman micropolitics of change and new political 
subjectivities based on the analysis of technologies of lived abstraction in the form of 
gaming. In this sense, it is a defence and development of two things; first, materialism due to 
gaming’s decisive role in producing and theorising novelty. The latter is argued to be absent 
in anthropocentric variants of Western philosophy and political theory, and materialism also 
allows dealing with the concretness of matter that constitutes what is conceived of as humans 
and technology. The investigation of a specific type of technology (gaming technology used 
for political purposes) is analysed on the basis of its material being and becoming. In other 
words, matter does really mean matter in a molecular, atomic and sub-atomic sense, while 
material more generally refers to “stuff” and “physicality.”
6
  The argument as it will unfold 
throughout the project begins by suggesting that the turn to matter is not a positivist move, 
but a metaphysical and political one. In the age of ecological crises, high-tech warfare, 
uncurbed pan/endemics, outer-space warfare or persisting challenges posed by climate 
change, matter matters – everywhere, continuously, and politically.  
 
Second, this project is a defence and development of political games that are another form of 
these matterings. Political games need to be defended and developed in light of their 
ontological status and as a political practice. The argument is that gaming is political due to 
its capacity to defamiliarise and produce different relations and habits. This is why they are 
                                                          
6
 Levi R. Bryant, Onto-Cartography: An Ontology of Machines and Media (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2014), 1. 
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conventionally referred to as ‘games for change’.
7
 Given that intellectual history has always 
struggled with this peculiar matter formation loosely grouped together under the banner of 
‘technology’, the incorporation of games into political training and education is challenging 
because of its other-than-human, machine, and generally ‘unknown’ attributes. The other 
challenge emerges from the fact that as a practice it is often perceived to be ‘only a game’. As 
such games are not considered as equally real as traditional political practices, but instead as 
simulations of the real
8
 and the technologically-mediated games concerned here are even less 
real given their assumed lack of materiality. In short, political games are often discredited 
because they are not proper to traditional human practices and the human as such, but a 
technology that produces virtual effects, which are conventionally considered less real. In this 
sense, the thesis is a defence of matterings against deep-running anthropocentric and 
humanist assumptions that prioritise certain matter formations, mainly those evidencing 
consciousness and with little material ambiguity (which means not technology). Matterings 
refer to concrete, actual bodies and mattering refers to the process of their emergence. 
 
However, this is not only a defence, but also a proposition. It suggests that when leaving the 
anthropocene and working without the human as a referent (framed by humanist and 
anthropocentric ideas of existence) this opens up a whole new world in which being and 
becoming, agency and subjectivity among many other things are indifferent to the human 
condition and thereby open to change. Yet, in agreement with scholars such as Rosi Braidotti 
and Audra Mitchell, this is not achieved by simply rejecting anthropocentric views and 
indeed an approach that is fully committed to a posthuman condition also needs to undertake 
other theoretical alterations, such as expanding if not radically redrawing ontological 
                                                          
7
 See for example this prominent movement Games for Change, http://www.gamesforchange.org/. 
8
 The academic treatment often couches this in theories of the hyperreal as articulated by Jean Baudrillard, see 
for example James Der Derian, Virtuous War: Managing the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainments Network 





 The term “posthuman” (different from posthumanism or post-Humanism) in the 
context of the thesis is not used in the conventional way as a shorthand to articulate, theorise 
and develop the effort to include more-than-humans, mostly in form of objects or other 
species, into the analysis and practice of world politics.
10
 Although drawing on similar 
literature and overlapping in theoretical inclinations, the term posthuman here refers to a 
specific form of being and becoming,
11
 an ontological and ontogenetic unit. The words 
ontological and ontogenetic are highly anthropocentric already and are at times replaced by 
onto-material, as a mix between ontological and ontogenetic, to signal awareness of the 
general anthropocentric aspect in our language. The term posthuman is not without its 
difficulties. ‘Post’ for example can be misleading because it can suggest that due to certain 
technological developments the human is replaced by a posthuman, locating the latter in a 
later stage of development. This thesis argues, in contrast, that the posthuman has always 
existed. As such, even though the posthuman here is analysed and derived through gaming 
technology, the form of life that is described here is nothing unique to the twenty-first 
century. Furthermore, the philosophical project here is also uneasy with ‘post’ as a temporal 
reference in light of the argument that conceptions of time unfolding as past-present-future 
and the teleology and linearity that ‘post’ thereby implies are structures of three-dimensional 
human space-time, which is precisely something the thesis seeks to challenge. Terms such as 
‘non-human’, ‘more-than-human’, ‘transhuman’ or other creative inventions are all 
problematic with regard to the form of life conceptualised here.
12
 Yet, considering that 
                                                          
9
 Audra Mitchell, “Only Human: A Worldly Approach to Security,” Security Dialogue 45, no. 1 (2014); Rosi 
Braidotti, The Posthuman (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), 1-5. 
10
 See for example Erika Cudworth’s Social Lives with Other Animals: Tales of Sex, Death and Love 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) or Mike Bourne’s “Security with Things: The Political Materialities 
and Mobilities of the “Objects” of Security,” (conference paper, Millennium 2012, London School of 
Economics, London, October 20-21, 2012). 
11
 Similar to Rosi Braidotti’s “zoe,” which she used to refer to an expanding notion of life away from the human. 
Even though zoe is different from the posthuman here, the latter also refers to a form of life that is not the 
human as we know it. Braidotti, The Posthuman , 50. 
12
Occasionally these terms are employed when referring to becomings that are not human, but nonetheless 
different to the specific posthuman here.  
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language is one of the most developed tools specific to the human animal (and, after 
conscious contemplation, the second ingredient in this thesis), the four letters composing 
‘post’ are a relatively minor blemish. In short, the use of the ‘posthuman’ is a practical 
compromise and does not stand in the way of analysing political gaming beyond the 
anthropocene. The thesis aims to explore the posthuman world through an investigation of 
game-matterings (as an example of technologies of lived abstraction), which, when analysed 
through a post-anthropocentric lens, enable new forms of the political, the political subject 
and a political theory on a theoretical level. On a practical level, political gaming in the post-
anthropocene allows the development of posthuman methods, analysis and pedagogy, which 
are argued to influence the posthuman landscape.   
 
On a philosophical level, the analysis will oscillate between the theoretical case made for 
matter (metaphysical) and the practical application and significance of this case through 
gaming (political). A philosopher’s weapon is his/her imagination through the method of 
thought experiments and invention. In the same way that Protevi argues that “my approach is 
highly speculative, but I hope the concepts are empirically reasonable,”
13
 it is based on the 
practical marriage of philosophy leveraged through the analysis of particular political games. 
In this sense and to note an important difference, the thesis and arguments are diagnostic, 
deductive and speculative, not deconstructive, predictive or prescriptive. This is because the 
question as well as the mode of investigation is driven by an appetite for innovation and 
change, situating itself within affirmative philosophy and methods, which are “techniques 
which embrace their own inventiveness.”
14
 The rational lies in the priority of augmenting, 
inventing and adding to reality, and, thus, celebrates theoretical and practical innovation, 
irrespective of its scale and reach. The purpose is for the analysis to be pragmatic and 
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 John Protevi, Life, War, Earth: Deleuze and the Sciences (Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2013), vii. 
14
 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, 12-13. 
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productive above all. As such, the project is part of a wider trend to restore the speculative 
philosophy that rejects the assumed requirement for philosophical, especially metaphysical, 
claims having to be verifiable within the human sensorium and palliative of the empirical. 
The wider trend in Western philosophy, especially post-Kantian, was to do away with 
speculative philosophy and it is only in recent years that scholars have sought to restore 
speculation as a philosophical mode of enquiry.
15
 In this sense the thesis places great 
emphasis on speculation because it agrees that this is the origin of theoretical change and 
novelty in the first place.  
 
In view of the philosophical nature of this project as well as the interdisciplinary 
phenomenology of the case to be studied (political gaming) the set of literatures informing 
this endeavour is inevitably eclectic. While the review of literature and engagement with key 
thinkers is immanent to the thesis, there are the following pointers that help to grasp the 
scope of the project. Work in the realms of International Relations (IR) is essential to 
understand not only in which immediate context these games are employed (political training 
and education), but also how this trend fits into socio-politics as well as political economies 
associated with politics and game development. Investigations in the specification of the 
economic aspect in this area, especially with regard to gaming, James Der Derian’s work is 
crucial as it empirically and philosophically connects the areas of peace, war and games.
16
 To 
                                                          
15
 Which lead scholars in and outside IR to identify recent developments in materialist philosophy as “The 
Speculative Turn,” see for example The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism  by Levi 
Bryant, Nick Srnicek & Graham Harman marks a seminal event in contemporary intellectual thought, 
(Melbourne: re.press, 2011). 
16
 Jan Selby, “The Myth of Liberal Peace-Building,” Conflict, Security & Development 13, no. 1 (2013); Roger 
Mac Ginty & Oliver Richmond, “Myth or Reality? Opposing Views on the Liberal Peace and Post-War 
Reconstruction,” Global Society, 21, no. 4(2007); Roger Mac Ginty, “Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the 
Liberal Peace,” Cooperation and Conflict 43, no. 2 (2008); Der Derian, Virtuous War. 
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substantiate these social criticisms other theories will be used by extension such as Jenny 




The question concerning ‘technology’ is informed by computer science and game 
engineering literature, including work John McCarthy and Peter Wright, and Paul Dourish,
18
 
expert interviews, online tutorials and fielding of online programmer fora. Even though it is 
not necessary to be fluent in Phyton, Ruby, Java, or any other programming language, the 
discussion will occasionally dip into the programmer’s toolkit. The exploration of basic 
digital operations is necessary in understanding why technology is not so much an object as 
one among many modes of (producing) reality. Similarly, the project’s commitment to matter 
and materialism implies a naturalist ontology that is grounded in the sciences, mostly drawing 
on physics and mathematics (partly Newtonian, partly contemporary non-Newtonian such as 
Quantum Mechanics,
19
 and Differential Geometry), which will be kept brief, but is 
nonetheless important in order to conceptualise change, the posthuman and posthuman 
spaces. The project also draws upon the philosophical treatments of scientific theories, such 
as the work of Karen Barad, and Ilya Prigogine and Isabell Stengers, for example, who are 
trained scientists as well as practising theorists.
20
   
 
Nevertheless, the majority of literature that informs the thesis and forms its backbone is 
philosophical. It draws on writings in philosophy of technology by authors such as Donna 
Haraway, Bruno Latour and Adrian Mackenzie, and on original works and interpretations of 
                                                          
17
 Jenny Edkins, “Technologising the International: Pictures of Hunger, Concepts of Famine, Practices of Aid.” 
PhD Thesis. University of Wales, 1997. 
18
 John McCarthy & Peter Wright,Technology as Experience (Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2004); 
Paul Dourish, Where the Action Is: The Foundations of Embodied Interaction. (London: MIT Press, 2001a). 
19
 There are over 50 different interpretations of Quantum Mechanics; however, the thesis refers mainly to those 
by Nils Bohr and Heisenberg, unless stated otherwise.  
20
 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Half Way: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and 
Meaning (Durham & London: Duke UP, 2007); Ilya Prigogine & Isabelle Stengers, Order Out of Chaos (New 
York: Bantam, 1984). 
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Martin Heidegger and Gilbert Simondon.
21
 More importantly, the thesis engages closely the 
ideas of Brian Massumi and his work, Parables for the Virtual and Semblance and Event; 
John Protevi’s naturalist ontology as presented in Political Affect and Life, War, Earth; Gilles 
Deleuze’s treatment of “images of thought” in Difference and Repetition, and large parts of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, A Thousand Plateaus and What is Philosophy?.
22
 
These thinkers and their particular works are significant developments of more-than-
human/posthuman materialist philosophy that are indispensable for the defence and 
development of materialism and an in-depth analysis of lived abstraction through 
technological becoming and a posthuman condition more generally. Other works such as Jane 
Bennett’s Vibrant Matter, Manuel DeLanda’s writings or Levi Bryant’s contributions through 
the Larval Subject,
23
 influence the materialist exploration and have an equally important 
status in current debates of speculative realism and materialism. Of particular interest is Ian 
Bogost’s work, which also falls into the category of speculative realism; for example, his 
Unit Operation and Persuasive Games. His work is within object oriented ontology (OOO) 
and, although this is slightly different to the approach in this research, it is regularly 
frequented given that his work deals with video, computer games and political/persuasive 
games specifically. Indeed, his treatment of technological games is unique precisely because 
of his interest in the ontological status and agentic aspects of the technology itself and how 
this changes what games do. His Unit Operation and Persuasive Games offer an abundance 
                                                          
21
 Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York: Routledge, 1991); 
Bruno Latour, Pandora's Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies (Harvard: Harvard UP, 1999); Adrian 
Mackenzie, Transductions: Bodies and Machines at Speed (London: Continuum, 2002). 
22
 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual; Brian Massumi, Semblance and Event: Activist Philosophy and the 
Occurent Arts (Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, 2011); John Protevi, Political Affect: Connecting the 
Social and the Somatic (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009); John Protevi, Life, War, Earth: 
Deleuze and the Sciences (Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota Press, 2013); Gilles Deleuze. 
Difference and Repetition (London: Continuum, 1994); Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia (London: Continuum, 2004); Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari. A Thousand 
Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis: Minneapolis UP, 1987); Gilles Deleuze & Felix 
Guattari, What is Philosophy? (London: Verso, 1994). 
23
 Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham & London: Duke UP, 2010); Manuel 
DeLanda, “Nonorganic Life,” in Zone 6: Incorporations, eds. Jonathan Crary & Sanford Kwinter (New York: 
Urzone, 1992); The Larval Subject is probably among one of the most influential academic philosophy blogs in 
non-analytic philosophy, Levi Bryant, Larval Subject (blog), http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/about/. 
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of detailed exploration and explanation of “serious games” and gaming of tremendous 
philosophical as well as empirical breadth.
24
   
 
Chapter 1 argues the case for games to be taken seriously, as a form of training, a political 
practice and posthuman becoming. A gaming-genealogy and an introduction to the type of 
games and technology at hand clarifies and analyses this recent trend in political training, 
with a focus on peace operations. It carefully contextualises the games in the socio-political 
and economic landscape to show how their political practice fits into their origin in the 
industrial arts, the marketplace as well as a liberal idea of peace operations. Basic concepts 
and challenges ranging from technical clarifications regarding Human Computer Interaction 
(HCI) to more preliminary philosophical concerns about the Cartesian subject or questions 
about agency and consciousness will be introduced in order to lay the groundwork for 
distinguishing a posthuman from a human condition.
 25
 The entry point to this discussion and 
the problematization of the anthropocene is the argument that experience is not a necessarily 
human event. In this sense, the emphasis on the experience of games over the use of them is 
essential in order to develop theories of posthuman becoming. Gaming as a form of 
posthuman experience proves extremely helpful to concretise complex theories and 
arguments within the tangible, imaginable realm of gaming technology.  
 
Chapter 2 continues this line of thought and shows how experience during gaming can be 
theorised in a post-phenomenological way, essentially to matter and materialise experience 
                                                          
24
 Ian Bogost, Unit Operation: An Approach to Videogame Criticism (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2008); Ian 
Bogost, Persuasive Games: The Expressive Power of Videogames (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010). 
25
 The Cartesian subject is endowed with reason and only as such can it constitute a rational and reasonable 
member of a political community. Even though this is just one philosophical representation of being, it is the 
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philosophical legacy is a conception focused around the human being; Andreja Zevnik, “Politics beyond 
Oedipus: An Alternative Ontology of Subject and Law and the Study of World Politics.” PhD Thesis. University 
of Aberystwyth, 2011.  
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literally, rather than treating it as a cognitive human event as it is conventionally done. This 
necessitates engaging with a long tradition of Western intellectual thought, in particular the 
critical treatment of Immanuel Kant’s Philosophy and Philosophies of Phenomenology. The 
exploration will specifically focus on aspects such as theories of reason and mind that are 
crucial to deconstruct and attune in order to allow conceiving of political bodies and 
becomings.  Ones that are indifferent to the human condition and, more importantly, are a 
genuinely new event, thereby paving the way to explorative politics. It is suggested that the 
emergence of the posthuman (body) is the referent for such posthuman micropolitics and 
matters. It facilitates a means to address political issues that operate in a space-time that 
escapes human limits of thought and consciousness. Committed to matter, the emergence of 
the posthuman through gaming experience is stubbornly material, so this chapter blends and 
undoes the categories of the human and technology (subject and object). Philosophically 
intrigued by matter behaviour, the reworking of the body will be micro-physiological. This 
level of analysis is necessary not only because the thesis is fully committed to the material, 
but because it needs to follow a line of investigation that deals with matter rather than just 
using its idea by extension, abstraction or in a metaphorical way. The materials involved in 
this particular context are those of participants in a game, gaming technology (hard and 
software) and the immediate gaming environment.  
 
Chapter 3 highlights the onto-genetic/code make-up of the conception of a posthuman 
becoming and a political referent that is encapsulated in gaming. The argument suggests that 
the architecture of a game not only influences the gaming experience and development, but 
also how the posthuman develops and the kind of political subjectivity and practice to which 
it can give rise. The interest in materiality leads to a focus on the specificity of code and how 
it literally shapes a posthuman body. Whereas game design is mostly analysed in terms of 
xx 
 
content (ideology and theoretical aspects) or pedagogical purchase, the examination and 
arguments set out in the chapter are in contrast driven by the question of how code (that is the 
software of political games) can matter bodies and eventually a political subject. However, 
rather than assuming a hylomorphic power of game design to determine outcomes,
26
 the 
aspect of contingency is problematized in order to expose and detail the creativity and 
novelty these games allow. An important argument and recurring theme in the thesis is that 
creativity is essentially tied to movement of matter as well as the posthuman as a whole. The 
latter will be analysed in different aspects throughout the thesis and in this particular chapter 
the focus on explorative movement and how this is designed, generated and encouraged in a 
game, is fundamental to the question of explorative politics. In this sense game design 
influences how a posthuman body “can act or be acted upon,” which is its capability and, 
therefore, the chapter will analyse design and its impact under the guidance and theoretical 
lens of affect. If affect is understood in this way (rather than in an emotional sense) then it is 
indispensable for the analysis because it is essentially about the question of the potential for 
or to something – potential of emergence, potential action, potential subjectivity and politics. 
Affect matters and it matters through game design. Ultimately, a posthuman body, in and 
outside gaming respectively, cannot ‘be brought to life’ without affect.  
 
Chapter 4 explains how posthuman political subjectivity emerges during gaming and out of a 
gaming posthuman body. Essentially it outlines a political subject/‘agent’ in the making and 
further traces the resonance subjectivity can have. The concept of the body politic is used to 
demonstrate that this is an abstract as well as material process. In addition, the production of 
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subjectivity is treated as a Janus-faced phenomenon in the way that political movements 
happening during the game have material and subjective resonances outside of it in the very 
same way that certain gaming dynamics are indicative of these wider resonances. The idea of 
Janus bends further, for subjectivity continuously oscillates between the human and 
posthuman condition. This is because the emergence of a posthuman subjectivity can 
eventually develop into a human subject. Even though the latter is only an after-effect it is an 
important ‘outcome’ of political gaming. Indeed this chapter is an opportunity to explain how 
and why the posthuman condition is the basis of a human condition and the posthuman will 
always persist above, below and alongside the human and its subjectivity. The way in which 
both exist and persist is through processes of matterings. This chapter traces scales and 
temporalities, from the immediate, ‘small-body’ gaming experience to the long-term and 
civic level. For this purpose the notion of experience will be further theorised, split to be 
precise, in order to provide a model of how to follow gaming’s resonances outside and after a 
particular gaming event. 
 
Chapter 5 finalises the posthuman becoming, showing that life and political life happens in 
all realms respectively, the Virtual and the actual, which is home to the digital and the 
analogue. The claim is that this is crucial in order to broaden the scope of political action 
beyond the anthropocene, which thereby opens up the possibility for alternative political 
formations to emerge. The chapter explores the political dynamics of change that emerge in 
these posthuman/transhuman spaces and temporalities and which loop in-between gaming 
rounds as well as between the different modalities of existence in order to establish an 
ontology of the real in a posthuman world. In the defence of gaming and materialism, it seeks 
to demystify what is conventionally termed the virtual realm and challenge common 
misconceptions that this would be somewhat immaterial, disembodied and a less ‘real’ part of 
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(political) life. By way of contrast, the investigation follows processes of political matterings 
through force and electricity with the purpose of demystifying and familiarising the digital 
realm, high-tech political games in particular, as a very material and real form of political 
practice. More importantly, gaming is a political practice of continuous variation precisely 
because it can draw on so many different modalities of reality and because games can be 
played repeatedly, increasing the possibility of new experiences to irrupt and new 
subjectivities and new concepts to emerge. The chapter establishes that potentialities of 
content are immanent to the Virtual and helps to convey that gaming is an artisan encounter 
that facilitates bringing out new political forms/concepts. 
 
Chapter 6 draws the posthuman cartography to a conclusion and outlines how new bodies and 
subjectivity can be used to articulate a wider posthuman micropolitics that works below and 
above the human condition and Cartesian subject. It offers a vision of a politics that is 
grounded in materiality and applicable to any becoming whether this is through gaming, other 
technologies of abstraction or entirely analogue processes. Through the rehearsal of the 
previously conceived theoretical constructs, the chapter will detail how this micropolitics is 
an active foundation and flexible political model for the pre-subjective and impersonal 
posthuman realm that allows for possibilities of political change. Following the trajectory of 
movement, the posthuman political spaces of lived abstraction will be analysed in a way that 
emphasises that this space, as emerging during gaming for example, allows for continuous 
change and transformation. Continuous variation expressed as movement will be further 
developed through rhythm, which will be used to trace patterns of change and difference in a 
more formalised, yet qualitative way. This is an effort to make rhythmic movement as a form 
of posthuman political expression an essential part of a micropolitics that runs above, below 
and alongside the human subject, which reflects the emphasis on material vitality in this 
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research. To reserve a conceptual place for matter vitalism in this way is imperative given 
that it is the basis of continual variation and novelty in the overall theory. For future analytic 
purposes, the chapter will conclude by flagging three important pillars upon which a 
posthuman politics rests, which can all be found in gaming as a specific practice and 
experience, but are also transferrable to other forms of lived abstraction.  
1 
 
Chapter 1 ~ Game Plan 
 
Introduction 
Gaming/simulation training is a possibility of a new political repertoire and forms part of an 
ongoing process of understanding and developing political theory and practice beyond its 
traditional boundaries. This new emergence needs to be taken seriously, as an opportunity for 
the political and politics to reinvent itself as well as adjust to an increasingly technologically 
ubiquitous world. Yet, making a case for games, understanding why and how they matter, 
goes far beyond a purely comparative analysis of a broad variety of games, different forms of 
learning or political expression and practice. This is because games occupy a unique area of 
study and tie together diverse areas such as programming, pedagogy, politics, international 
relations (IR), neurosciences, geography and computing. This research draws on theories 
from these areas in order to generate a comprehensive, interdisciplinary and unique analysis 
that contributes to the philosophy of technology.  
 
While philosophy of technology (often referred to as technoscience) is much younger than 
other forms of philosophy such as the philosophy of science, the frame adopted here offers an 
original way into analysing gaming and politics in the same breath. Furthermore, 
technoscience allows the thesis to draw on the riches of new materialist philosophies so that it 
belongs to a “growing contingent” that propose that an “active examination of [technological] 
becoming can make a positive contribution to explorations of […] political action.”
1
 
Therefore, what follows is not a games analysis from a strict perspective of IR scholarship or 
political theory, nor is it a case of analysing how politics are ever-present in games from a 
‘Games Studies’ perspective. Crossing disciplinary and scholarly boundaries, this project 
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interrogates questions that naturally span various academic subject areas.
2
 The advantage of 
technoscience as a mode of inquiry rather than a discipline is that it carries a “growing 
sensitivity to the ways in which materiality plays subtle and deep roles in our ways of moving 
about in the world.”
3
 It is precisely these subtle and deep movements that the thesis is 
interested in, arguing that in order to understand the marriage of politics and gaming in its 
complexity and specificity, inquiry needs to turn to “the concrete, to materiality.”
4
 Thus, this 




This chapter will carefully lay out the necessary steps in order to come to terms with gaming 
politics. As such, it is the essential foundation on which the thesis rests and introduces core 
debates that situate the emergence and practice of gaming as training. It starts with a brief 
gaming-genealogy, addresses how games appeared in the political landscape and 
contextualizes these developments within political and economic practices of the Armed 
Services, governmental politics as well as the gaming industry. Given that the project is not a 
political economy commentary on the military-industrial complex (or military-industrial-
media-entertainment network, MIME-NET)
6
, this will remain a short introduction, aimed at 
providing a critical background rather than a deconstruction of the phenomenon itself. With 
regard to games, it is necessary to familiarise the reader with the different categories of 
games that form the thematic case study of a particular type of technology – immersive 
technology. More specifically, games used in the context of training or preparing for peace 
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operations are of particular interest to this research. The introduction of immersive games 
will demonstrate why it is necessary for the thesis as a whole to revisit fundamental questions 
concerning technology and offers an invitation to reconsider questions about political 
technology or technology for politics and the way to go about it.  
 
The chapter will contextualise the research by reviewing debates about technological 
determinism in order to indicate how the study of technology in IR has been traditionally 
discussed and explored. One criticism relating to technologisation will be looked at in greater 
detail as it opens up a variety of questions that the chapter needs to address prior to the actual 
analysis of gaming such as the problem of ideology and the role of political economy in 
contemporary political practices. The chapter will deal with these challenges individually and 
conclude by suggesting that Speculative Materialisms will help to remove existing limitations 
to the analysis of technology in IR, especially those concerning gaming. It will familiarize the 
reader with the materialist philosophy that informs this technoscientific inquiry and 
foreshadow subsequent theoretical unfoldings as well as situate the project in the current 
philosophical literature of Speculative Materialisms and address the ideational elephants in 
the room.  
 
Königsspiel: Politics and Games Go a Long Way Back 
The political games highlighted in this thesis emerged out of military games and simulations 
in the latter half of the twentieth century as first analysed by scholars such as James Der 
Derian in Virtuous War.
7
 There is an intrinsic connection between war and strategy games 
and the genre of political games. Furthermore, the latter have become an increasingly popular 
way of training military and political personal as well as members of civil society. There 
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seems to be a continuing connection between war and political practice, and, in this sense, 
this study agrees with the idea articulated by Carl von Clausewitz that “war is merely the 
continuation of policy [politics] by other means.”
8
 Working on the assumption that war is an 
extension of politics, the connection between games and politics is deeply rooted. War has 
often been simulated by other means through the medium of games. In India, for example, 
there existed a game called ‘Chaturanga’, which is considered the predecessor of chess and, 
unlike previous strategic games such as the Roman Latrunculi, was the first to draw on the 
explicit vocabulary of war and had game pieces representing foot soldiers, elephants and 
chariots.
9
 Whether this was a game for strategy, politics, war preparation or even 
entertainment remains an unanswered question. Games with a connection to war that 
subsequently developed throughout history have become increasingly complex, detailed and 
to some degree aspiring to verisimilitude. The boundaries between games and war have 
inevitably spilled over the edges of the board over time with varying degrees of seriousness, 
from full-size scenario based simulations to small or large-scale enactments. They span the 
trivial or popular boards games such as Risk, to multi-player online games such as World of 
Warcraft, to simulations such as Model of United Nations to the more consequential in the 
form of the Pentagon’s ‘what if’ war games.
10
 While tracing the historic parallels between 
games, war and politics is certainly intriguing, this is not the concern of the present analysis. 
Nevertheless, the question of whether the main purpose of these games was (and is) political, 
strategic, economic or even entertainment has greater pertinence to the present analysis.  
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The study of videogames is an area of contestation and criticism with regard to the 
significance of simulation. Some argue that videogames exploit/ridicule the brutal reality of 
war and mock the experience of actual soldiers.
11
 More recently, however, other research has 
started to focus on how the captivating faculty of games can be used in creative and new 
ways.
12
 Nevertheless, console or computer games are often quickly associated with first 
person shooter games and the impact they have on the threshold to violence.
13
 Surprisingly, 
in the face of such concern, it is somewhat intriguing that an administrative and bureaucratic 
realm like politics was one of the first sectors to adopt gaming as a method and training. 
Arguably, such openness towards political games is due in large part to the longstanding 
relationship between military organisations, strategy and war games. Business and 
management are also among the more progressive sectors of employment with areas such as 




War games are nothing new in international relations and have been used as a training 
method by militaries, especially the US military establishment, the acknowledged leader in 
this area. Today, they have morphed and developed into what is referred to as “serious 
games” more broadly, including non-combatant aspects of communication, decision-making, 
mediation and negotiation.
15
 As they are increasingly focused on soft powers and skills that 
military personnel need to master, the interest from and leap into the governmental side of 
politics was perhaps inevitable. Arguably, it was through the conduit of diplomacy that 
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games training negotiation and mediation built the bridge between games for combatants and 
non-combatants to enable games to make their way into the broader political sphere. While 
large-scale operations by the military, often involving props of actual armoury, left no doubt 
that these simulations were serious and essential training exercises, simulating within the 
political arena was different, however, because it was difficult to move away from the 
perception that they were just games and a form of role-playing. Over time, the addition of 
the word ‘serious’ in relation to games has been part of an effort to justify their use and pre-




Games – Are You Serious? 
The term “serious games” is nevertheless highly problematic, as Ian Bogost suggests. Even 
though adopting the term seemed reasonable and intuitive at the initial stage of this research, 
it is laden with pitfalls. First of all, the proposition of serious takes away from the creative 
and pedagogical leverage ‘non-serious’ and ‘fun’ games have vis-à-vis the self-professedly 
‘serious’ ones. As this research will suggest, the strength of games for political purposes is 
precisely that the element of play and experimentation enables gamers to take daring, yet 
innovative decisions during play. Essentially, this is the origin of their political potential as 
experimentation permits to play and produce difference. In fact, the distinction between 
serious and non-serious is arbitrary given that gamers playing large-scale, multi-player online 
games such as World of Warcraft are very serious about their role-play.
17
 Likewise, children 
playing football in the park can get very serious very quickly about the game’s development. 
Games played by politicians as part of a group activity or problem-solving exercise have 
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failed in the past because participants did not take the game or their role seriously enough, 
despite it being a serious game.
18
 Thus, delineating serious games as a countermovement 
against entertainment games in general “is a foolish gesture” as it eliminates a wide variety of 
games for change.
19
 Therefore, seriousness and impact is contextual and does not depend on 
the game’s intent and design as such. Arguing that games can be contextually serious seems a 
better way of addressing the gravity that game developers seek to give these gaming 
activities. Therefore, any game can be used for a serious purpose. The terms “games” and 
“political games” are used in order to avoid qualifying a specific game prior to its actual 
unfolding. Pre-judging a game as serious before it is played not only imposes the nature of 
the desired outcome of the game, but already shapes the players’ understanding of how to 
approach the game. In addition, and in the context of games played for political purposes, 
serious is dropped because it is exclusionary. There are many games on the entertainment 
end, like SimEarth, or, at the artistic end, Eddo Stern’s Tekken Torture Tournament or Sheik 
Attack,
20
 that would not make the strict category of serious, but are highly political, educating 
and creative. 
 
The emerging trend of games that are played with the purpose to educate, problem-solve or 
train (where the goal lies somewhat beyond the immediate boundaries and rules of the game), 
occupy a crucial intersection between play and politics. Wedding these two areas together is 
innovative and opens up new (game) space for politics to emerge and play out. However, the 
newness of this new political terrain means that the ways in which gaming can be political are 
so far largely unexplored. Consequently, this research aims to tease out how gaming politics 
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is unique, what it enables and the form of game politics it suggests. To focus the scope of 
analysis within the realm of technoscience, the project chooses the thematic case study of 
computer-powered games as an example of new technology used for political purposes. 
  
Technological Games 
The research is particularly interested in immersive games or games that take place in a 
mixed-media environment. This is because the level of ‘Human Computer Interaction’ (HCI) 
that these games involve is particularly high, analytically and politically, and the 
investigation of which will form the backbone to this project. A mixed-media environment 
refers to a game setting that is partly computer-generated involving digital projections or 
smart devices and analogue human interaction. While the human player is always a 
component of the game, the rest of the game makeup has become increasingly technological. 
The aim of these games is political education and training and the development of specific 
skill sets.
21
 This study is also interested in their purpose, or what these games are played for 
particularly within a political and security context, where the latter can range from areas of 
counter-insurgency training, conflict prevention/resolution, stability operations or war-to-
















This depiction (Image 1) from FlatWorld shows that the mixed-media immersion refers to the 
players being “inside” the game and inside the computer simulation. These elements are 
particularly unique and represent a game/training dimension that has yet to be fully explored. 
In contrast to the concept of a board game, where the players move pieces on the board, the 
participants in immersive games are themselves the actual pieces on the board. Additionally, 
the gaming environment is partly computer-based, including not only digital projections of 
either fictional or actual places and digital humans (in this picture a soldier), but also 
technological devices such as the laptop on the table in the far left corner. They are not only 
props to increase the verisimilitude of the game-setting, but the players have the option to use 
them throughout the course of the game. The broken furniture lying on the ground is as 
important as the digital environment, as all of these modes, digital or not, add to the 
immersion of the participants. Judging by their clothes, the participants in this scenario are 
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playing the role of civilians and are equipped with 3D-glasses in order to increase the 
immersion by making the projection jump ‘out of the screen’. The more technical the games 
get, the more digital the environment becomes, and in some games participants wear head-
mounted goggles that make the whole game-setting appear right in front of their eyes. This 
form of training is mostly used by the military as the technology is hugely expensive and also 
it necessitates a considerable amount of prior training before moving into a fully digital 
environment because seeing through the goggles leaves most untrained users nauseous.  
 
Games We Play 
While the explanation of these games may make them seem stranger to us than they are, the 
majority of games is only a step up from the basic workings of computer games and 
simulation training, with which most of the readers will be familiar with. The act of gaming 
itself is so accessible to new participants, because the games are mostly based on everyday 
technology. Many games that are geared at civil society are available online (or can be 
purchased in local stores) and can be played on any personal computer and laptop. Prices for 
those personal games vary within an affordable range and some anthroposophic games, such 
as PeoplePower, are often free of charge to people without sufficient funds. Because games 
like PeaceMaker, Democracy 3 and SimCity are played with an ordinary computer, the game 
flow may not be as smooth as with console gaming or high-tech immersive games. Yet, they 
are sufficiently visualised to create a digital learning environment and to simulate fictional 
and nonfictional political scenarios. Such low-tech games as it were differ from each other in 
the way that some are very simple and intuitive without any written instructions as for 
example Darfur is Dying, while others such as PeoplePower and Peacemaker tend to be 
more text based, giving socio-political and historical guidance for the game task. In the 
former case (and type of games in general) the game duration is very short with a quick game 
11 
 
over, while with the latter type the player has the opportunity to halt the game, think about 
certain moves and come back to it another time. In short, this means strategy in low-tech 
games is either immediate or prompted to be spread out over time, which in itself addresses 
different types of political thinking and planning. What all of these personal games played 
with the help of ordinary hardware and software have in common is that the player 
participates through the means of an avatar and it acting by extension.  
 
High-tech political games vary as well and the more technologically advanced the games are, 
the less they require the mediation of an avatar. Most of the more elaborate and costly games 
are highly immersive, so that participants act within a synthetic environment, but as the 
embodied person they are. This has the advantage of an increased verisimilitude, which 
thereby improves the flow of a game, too. However, this also means that the participants need 
to possess a certain skillset required for the game task, in the way that one can have many 
abilities (physically and mentally) through an avatar that are limited in the analogue. In part, 
this is the reason why fully immersive and high-tech simulations are a professional training 
with limited access. Immersive games can contain tasks such as driving an army vehicle, 
shooting or even flying a fighter-jet and giving medical aid to a wounded person (even if that 
is a dummy). In order for the game to work these tasks need to be fulfilled with at least a 
minimal degree of success for otherwise the game would stagnate. Importantly, this 
highlights that high-tech games do actually require skill as well as thorough preparation prior 
to the onset of the simulation game. That games are much more elaborate and time-
consuming in order to complete the game task explains why they are played less frequently 




Beyond the more technical exploration of these games, there is a noticeable paucity of 
political theory dealing with these developments concerning technological training. This 
research aims to supplement state-of-the-art technology and training with political 
(posthuman) theory to incorporate the new technologically-mediated and mimetic realm of 
the political. While there is an increasing practical academic effort going into the 
improvement of mixed-media environments and how to embed the soldier, politician or aid 
worker better, there is little work that looks at the immediate political experience of the game 
itself.
23
 With more and more American universities offering degrees at undergraduate and 
postgraduate level in “Modelling and Simulation,” games have undergone a tremendous 
technical development within the last years.
24
 In a combined effort, computer-scientists, 
engineers, gamers and game-designer, psychologists and neuroscientists, army personnel and 
social scientists are all turning their attention to making these gaming-exercises as authentic 
as possible as possible, with the aim of increasing the quality of training and learning. What 
James Der Derian once coined the “Simulation Triangle,” referring to the overlap of ‘serious’ 
game design with the videogaming and the 3D security industry, geographically located in 
the vast business parks of Orlando Florida,
25
 but with tentacles reaching out globally,
26
 it has 
turned into a far-reaching network, involving much more than three key players/industries. 
This is an almost unparalleled inter-disciplinary effort, not only including areas of politics, 
but also civil engineering, medicine, child education and advertising. Yet, from a theoretical 
and philosophical point of view there is surprisingly little research looking at the immediate 
political experience occurring in gaming. Ian Bogost’s Unit Operations and Persuasive 
                                                          
23
 See for example work by Randall Spain and Rebecca Mulvaney and their latest paper on “Enhancing Soldier-
Centered Learning with Emerging Training Technologies and Integrated Assessments,” (conference paper, 
I/ITSEC 2013, Orlando, Florida, December 2013). 
24
 In contrast there are only four Universities offering Modelling and Simulation degrees in the UK at this point, 
postgraduate search, accessed July 20, 2014, http://www.postgraduatesearch.com /postgraduate/modelling-and-
simulation-systems/uk/study/postgraduate-browse.htm. 
25
 Der Derian, Virtuous War, 82–83. 
26
 A large majority of the technological and engineering know-how is provided by European subcontractors, 
with Germany and Britain being the strongest representatives.  
13 
 
Games is one of the rare recent and critical treatments of the politics of videogames and their 
potential to alter and produce political subjectivities.
27
 James Ash is also among the few 
scholars who philosophically explore the affective geography in videogames (especially first 
person shooter games), while Jane McGognigal is still an isolated voice who argues that 
videogames are tremendously educational, everyday tools that not only have the capacity to 
teach with ease, but also to make us happy altogether.
28
 These are all tentative investigatory 
efforts focused largely on videogames, but there is very little philosophical attention or 
material devoted to political games, developed for military personnel, politicians and 
civilians. This would explain the obvious gaps in knowledge and lack of synergy between 
scholars working within the Simulation Triangle/Network and researchers looking at its 
political potential. 
 
Use versus Experience: A Different Approach to Technology 
This research, in alignment with the ideas of Bogost, argues that (video)games are an 
expressive medium. As such, it places an emphasis on the importance of the act of playing 
(that Bogost conceptualizes as “procedurality”
29
) of experiencing games. In contrast, the 
Simulation Triangle analyses these games in a rather instrumental way, meaning the way that 
games are used. The questions driving the current research of academics and game 
developers alike, such as Rex Brynen, Sheldon Himelfarb and Steve York, look into how 
gaming can be employed effectively to improve peace operations.
30
 In so doing, the authors 
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adhere to the underlying assumption that technology is used and this entails an instrumental 
treatment of technology, which builds on the notion that “technologies are tools” enabling 
their users to meet certain ends more effectively.
31
 Thus, tools are taken to be neutral in 
themselves and subservient to societies’ needs.
32
 In contrast, this research tackles the puzzle 
of political gaming through experience by problematizing the interaction and boundary 
between the technology and the player and questions the neutrality assumption. Even though 
the project will leave the conventional phenomenological realm behind, it shares common 
concerns as a starting point for the investigation, following John McCarthy and Peter Wright 
in their approach that only the experience of new technology (NT) enables a comprehensive 
study of its impact.
33
 Yet, existing literature in IR only concentrates on the usefulness and 
efficiency of technological artefacts, focussing on objective usability goals and on “assessing 
how useful or productive a [technology] is from its own perspective.”
34
 The disregard of the 
experienced quality of action and interaction is identified as a crucial missing piece in the 
puzzle of how gaming affects micropolitics as well as the production of political 
subjectivities. Only by looking at these aspects is it possible to politically enrich gaming 
experience beyond its current confines of usability.  
 
Furthermore, the proposition is that by approaching experience differently, that is through 
philosophical materialism rather than phenomenology (pragmatism) or rationalism for 
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 offers alternative ways of understanding gaming. It sheds light on how these 
games can be used and can close the gap in political theory (of how novelty occurs). While 
the technoscience approach here is equally interested in the materiality underlying the 
experience of technology, it challenges the separation of mind and matter, the idea of 
intentionality, rationality and that knowing trumps being, becoming and experience. In the 
same breath, the aspect of gaming technology serves to highlight not only the importance of 
experience but also the “current transformation of our experience” with an evident turn 
towards the digital and electronic realm.
36
 Rather than viewing this transformation as a 
change in representation, arguing that due to NT it is possible to model “everything that 
exists in the phenomenal world” by breaking it down into information and by digitally 
reproducing it,
37
 the claim here is not about representation, but about the ability to switch in 
between different modes of experiences such as digital and analogue. The analytical 
challenge increases with the fact that one can experience electronically what previously have 
been traditional forms of experience.
38
 So far, political theory has not caught up with the 
modal plurality of experience, and it is the aim here to close this gap by leaving 
phenomenology and rationalism behind and turning to the concreteness of experience.  
 
The challenge of investigating the potential of political gaming therefore depends not only on 
the factor of the gaming experience, but also upon an investigation of the human-technology 
relation in general. More specifically, the mode of analysis calls the project to revisit the 
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initial question concerning technology dealt with by philosophers like Gilbert Simondon or 
Martin Heidegger. Building on the riches that these works provide, the thesis will pick up 
theories on the role of technology and its relation to our being and participation in the world. 
Even though Heidegger’s phenomenological realm will not be used as a frame of reference to 
analyse gaming experience, his opening claims are essential to establish the importance of 
experience when analysing techné,
39
 juxtaposing it with conventional IR analyses that 
primarily treat technology instrumentally.
40
 In addition, it remains somewhat surprising with 
the critical turn in security studies in the late 1990s and the radical redrawing of the 
traditional realm of security
41
 that when it comes to analysing the role of technology the same 
traditional/rationalist logics are still applied.
42
 In contrast, it is argued that starting from a 
technoscientific position of experience offers different ways of analysing techno-political 
mediations such as gaming technology that are far more attuned to critical studies in IR and 
security. In this light and following in a Heideggerian way, the question concerning 
technology is directly linked to the question of being (and becoming). This means that 
gaming technology is treated ontologically by looking at how it impacts on our way of being-
in-the-world and participating in it. Given the ubiquity of modern techné this is a crucial 
question that one needs to continuously reengage with, especially in the realm of politics. 
 
While the thesis is indebted to Heidegger’s work on technology in order to address political 
gaming ontologically, his separation of nature and technology as well as human and 
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technology (based on a very fundamental subject-object distinction) is problematic contrasts 
this research that seeks a new approach to the technology-human dynamic.
43
 Guided by 
Simondon’s notion of technicity, a key argument developed throughout the thesis is that the 
traditional separation between technology and the human is not only analytically unhelpful, 
but erroneous. This division, a treatment and habit intrinsic to Western philosophy, was 
certainly strengthened through the development of a Heideggerian tradition, which opposes 
techné to physis (nature). This means that the organic forms of nature are self-emerging, 
exhibiting the principle of change within themselves, physis as “arising of something from 
out of itself,” a natural self-genesis.
44
 Posited against such a natural auto-poiesis (self-
creation) is techné, where reason is identified as the external principle of change.
45
 It is 
precisely this division between physis and techné that this research highlights and challenges. 
Experience of gaming technology will be used to break down the boundaries between 
nature/culture and organic/inorganic in order to understand micro-political movements during 
gaming. Importantly, as will be explored, this undoing will go much further than the claim 
that there is no absolute distinction between human and technology.  
 
Skilled Experience: Human Computer Interaction and the Art of Playing 
Humans and technology have always possessed somewhat of a unique, yet highly 
complicated relationship that defies simple categorization, never ceasing to challenge 
academic efforts to come to terms with it. Before uprooting the very idea of the 
human/technology division and exploring what this means for political gaming in the next 
chapter, it is necessary to contextualize modern HCI first. Political gaming is a very specific 
type of highly developed and up-scaled personal technology in the form of the personal 
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computer and console-gaming. The experience of personal technology is hugely different to 
that of large, diffused technological assemblages, like power-grids, networked surveillance 
cameras or technology operated at distance and experienced at a distance such as satellites or 
drones.
46
 Familiarity with the recent history of HCI will help to understand current 
experiences of gaming technology because just as computers have evolved drastically and 
rapidly, so has the interaction and experience with them. Yet, social science research that  is 
interested in this change has tended to focus on improvements in computer technology and 
interphase design, techno-political opportunity and capability along with their subsequent 
bearings on the social realm,
47
 while leaving out the abilities and skills that have developed 
alongside and that are necessary to experience this technology in the first place. In the way 
that to many the everyday use of a knife is natural and almost intuitive, the habitual skillset 
required to use personal technology had to develop in a similar fashion. Not only did 
computer technology develop exponentially, but this was only possible with human abilities 
evolving alongside. Encountering a new personal technology such as the tablet and managing 
to navigate it relatively quickly depends on the development of previous skills, related to 
using computers and/or mobile phones for instance. Training with gaming technology 
fundamentally depends upon individual participants having developed basic computer skills 
throughout their lives. The kind of technological familiarity necessary to provide for a fruitful 
experience is almost intuitive and given that a large amount of soldiers, political personal and 
civilians have been exposed to personal computer technology almost all their lives makes 
their interaction with political gaming technology very intuitive indeed. For example, the 
generation of soldiers training with elaborate simulation technology today already grew up 
with personal smart devices and in a highly technological household. The experience of 
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videogames, computers and tablets is nothing new at all, so that the engagement with them in 
a training context is very ‘normal’ and ‘intuitive’. However, this has not always been the case 
and the use of political gaming could not have come at an earlier stage, for the development 
of these habitual skills needed time to manifest themselves in our daily technological 
practice. The evolution of computer literacy can be summed up in four phases: distinguishing 




The acknowledgment that technological experience has not always been as digital as it is in 
present day helps to support later arguments about the materiality of technological 
experience. While our understanding of computer technology usually involves digital 
systems, this leaves out early analogue computers, which made for quite a different 
experience of technology. These computers were electronic apparatuses that in a hardware 
sense relied on the use of components such as resistors and capacitors with a rigid software 
that could only deal with a relatively small number of tasks. Simple software meant that early 
computer technology was much more task-specific. This is in contrast to present devices 
where it is possible to take pictures, play music and send e-mails and text messages with the 
same device. Early computer experience relied heavily on electronic expertise, narrowing the 
scope of users who got to enjoy computer technology directly. Generally, interacting with 
this type of computer system necessitated a thorough understanding of electronic design, 




Technology as it is experienced today is primarily due to computer programming becoming 
more regularized and standardized and made available to a wide range of machines.
50
 This 
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occurred through the introduction of new programming languages. Programs stopped being 
based solely on numeric forms and away from “the machine language of raw instructions that 
a machine [and only its expert] would understand.”
51
 Instead, it moved to a symbolic form of 
assembly language, consisting of mnemonic codes, which are essentially symbolic 
expressions of machine level instructions that were more easily understandable to a wider 
user group. According to Dourish, it is this introduction of programming language that 
moved computer interaction from an electrical level to a symbolic one, enabling more 
interactive tasks that eventually spread into the textual domain.
52
 Essentially, this means that 
it was possible to communicate with computers in the same textual language that we speak, 
which marked a significant turn in HCI, as it opened up the computer world to non-experts. 
Computers operating in the textual domain made it attractive to sectors outside computer 
sciences, mathematics and physics with the military being one of the first to cultivate the 
newly acquired digital terrain. While the military has always been a significant funder of 
computer developments,
53
 it was now able to make use of it for very specific military 
purposes to harness the computer’s processing power to execute tasks much more quickly 
than humans could. Apart from simplifying the interaction with computer systems, going 
textual needs to be stressed as a significant development as it greatly influenced how the 
interaction between machine and human came to be conceived. Textual interphases with 
interactive feedback loops allowed for a dialogue between human and computer system, 
which was the first proper form of interactive experiences with computer technology.
54
 Skills 
that needed to be developed were primarily linguistic, which brought the idea of “interacting 
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with the machine”, including “conversation” and “dialogue” with technology, to the fore.
55
 
The notion of interaction as dialogue is still dominant within common assumptions about 
computer technology, framing our very understanding of HCI.  
 
Adopting gaming as a training strategy would not have been possible without interphase 
development that not only included texts but icons, marking a drastic transition in the 
experience of technology. As simple as this may sound, it opened a whole new dimension of 
interaction that was now graphical, happening in “a two-dimensional space rather than a one-
dimensional stream of characters.”
56
 Whereas textual interaction resembled a single stream of 
information, composed of the user’s input and the systems output, graphical interaction is 
essentially about the use of space. In other words, the experience of technology became 
increasingly spatial, more-dimensional, by information spreading across the screen, moving 
attention and interaction around on the screen and even from window to window. As a 
consequence, graphical interaction not only made managing information about managing 
space, but also that the human skills required for this interaction needed to become two-
dimensional as well, requiring the person operating the technology to pay attention to 
multiple happenings on the screen, responding to and giving graphical and textual commands 
at the same time.
57
 Human abilities required for such an interactive experience were: 
“peripheral attention” (referring to the ability to register and engage with information at the 
edge of the screen); “information density” (graphical information conveyed more succinctly 
as a picture); and “visual metaphors” such as the management of desktop items, which are 
images of bins, personal computers and filing cabinets.
58
 Matured skills for graphical 
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interaction were absolutely crucial for game-training, as many political games are two-
dimensional and highly graphical such as PeoplePower, Balance of Power or PeaceMaker, 
which are all played with just a personal computer.  
 
In essence, our interaction with computers and technology in general is something that 
depends on skills that had to develop over time and in many ways are culturally mediated by 
growing up in a technologically saturated environment. Technological games would greatly 
fail as a training method if the person playing had enjoyed little exposure to technology 
beforehand. This is a clear limitation with regard to the distribution and reception of these 
games. However, the same argument can be made in respect to education through books and 
required literary skills. What the recent history of HCI shows, however, is that these 
developments cannot be separated from each other: the development of computer technology 
occurs together with human abilities and can only happen in conjunction. In other words, 
while technology is often viewed as something opposing the human, paying attention to 
computer abilities shows that our engagement with such technology is actually socially and 
culturally (if not evolutionary) engrained and driven, in the same way that we grew up to use 
simple technology such as cutlery, a hammer or bicycle. Notably, this makes computer 
technology social and cultural, upsetting the clear-cut boundary between computer 
technologies on the one hand and the nature-culture continuum on the other.  
 
The borders between these two realms are under increasing attack with the emergence of 3D, 
immersive and ubiquitous technology that questions whether a division is viable at all. 
Interestingly, there is no comprehensive treatment of the development of human abilities with 
regards to 3D graphical interaction yet. As such, it points to the challenge of conceptualising 
HCI in the face of immersive technology within the traditional framework of a human-
23 
 
computer distinction. The problem is that interaction with immersive technology is embodied, 
which not merely refers to an experience that is tied to a physical condition or a simple bodily 
experience, but to a “contextualized experience of the body-environment system.”
59
 
Embodiment directly contests the normalized characterization of computer technology as a 
primarily representational medium. Thus, the idea of technology as embedded physical 
interaction tests the commonplace concept of technological action as manipulating abstract 
representations in a computer system.
60
 Put simply, the research will use this absence in 
theory, its struggle and challenge to the current conception of HCI as a starting point to 
unravel the human versus machine problem, thereby laying the groundwork for articulating 
the potential such technological beings (technologies of lived abstraction) have for the realm 
of politics.  
 
Not without Technological Determinisms 
Existing positions within the field of IR with regard to technology prove problematic when 
faced with different technological emergences such as political gaming or social media. Even 
critical areas of IR suffer from a lack of theoretical innovation regarding technology with the 
latter getting an increasingly bad reputation as technology is believed to lead to surveillance 
societies in which its members gradually forget, or unlearn how to communicate in a way that 
holds up to traditional, romantic views of supposedly “real,” face-to-face communication.
61
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In short, technology “has loomed as the bogeyman” in IR “for some 30 years.”
62
 Indeed, one 
of the main theoretical challenges in exploring gaming technology’s potential for political 
training, is to avoid falling prey to conventional techno-determinist views. In general, the 
origin of different emerging determinisms can be located in how each strand accepts and 
deals with the human as an agent and ultimate referent. It is noteworthy, however, that all 
types of determinism are pitched in terms of the human and more specifically in the way in 
which technology impacts on its agency. In short, technological determinism as a theory of 
socio-political change is fundamentally anthropocentric. In view of the posthuman task of 
this research, technological determinism as a conceptual frame in order to theorise change 
and innovation is problematic. This is because the main intention is to conceive of political 
theory based on technologies of lived abstraction in a manner that is indifferent to the human 
condition and that does not perpetuate the human/technology dichotomy. Therefore, 
identifying with either of the determinist options would not help to develop a new argument 
about technological becoming.  
 
Nonetheless, going through the main types of determinism is not only illuminating, but also a 
necessity for an informed philosophy of technology thesis. In addition, awareness of the 
pitfalls in technological scholarship will mitigate the danger of either essentialising or 
instrumentalising technology, which are the two main determinist camps and central to the 
Philosophy of Technology (as a subject area). This refers to instrumentalism more 
specifically – a view point that does not inscribe an inherently deterministic trait into 
technology as such, but sees it as a tool at the disposal of human action. Thereby, change 
depends upon the action that is or is not enabled by technology. This not only implies treating 
the latter as a tool to be used, but also that agency is located within the user, leading to the 
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infamous, “Guns don’t kill people. People kill people.”
63
 This rather popular and by now 
mainstreamed slogan
64
 of determinism simplifies detailed accounts by scholars such as James 
Rosenau arguing that it is “permissive rather than dismissive” to assume a position of techno-
neutrality as it “enables us to avoid deterministic modes of thought in which people are seen 
to be deprived of choice” in the face of modern technology.
65
 Technology cannot be claimed 
to be “good” or “bad” for “nuclear weapons do not restructure forms of international politics; 
the Internet does not lead to democracy, authoritarianism or any specific social outcome. Any 
given object can be used to meet any given set of ends.”
 66
  In essence, the primacy of human 
action that determines the nature of the means.  
 
The assumption of a position of techno-neutrality may seem a neutral position in itself; 
nevertheless, it is actually drenched in implicit assumptions that need to be dealt with 
cautiously as each of them has significant analytical and practical consequences. First of all, 
it assumes that technological objects do not determine a social outcome, change or rupture. 
This makes for a strong argument that is used by weapon lobbyists in national and 
international context respectively, legitimising contentious political decisions.
67
 The second 
implication of the instrumentalist view is equally problematic as it holds that the invention 
and development of technology is not influenced by social context and subscribes to a 
“simple philosophical Realism.”
68
 While a particular set of circumstances may contribute to 
research and development (R&D), “this context does not influence actual scientific and 
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technological findings,” thereby adhering to a pre-Kuhnian understanding of science.
69
 What 
is problematic here is that motivations for and struggles over technological design are 
deemed to be irrelevant. While this instrumentalist view of determinism is certainly useful to 
legitimise certain technological developments, say that of drones, and appears to be common 
among developers and distributers of political games,
70
 this view seems wilfully ignorant of 
historical and social context.  
 
Even though, this form of ‘techno-romanticism’ seems to offer a more attuned understanding 
of the entwinement of technological development and socio-political dynamics, providing an 
almost rosy outlook, it arguably descends from an instrumentalist determinism. The first 
instrumental variant is a strong, rational hold and techno-romanticism is somewhat of the 
metaphysical pendant that is particularly popular within studies of Science Technology 
Society (STS) and the analysis of the techno-social nexus with regard to human agency and 
the possibilities provided by technology. Such positions foster the popular perception of 
computer technology supporting multiplicity and pluralism.
71
 Technologies create and 
maintain online communities and new digital spaces such as Virtual Reality that posit against 
existing social forms. The internet is portrayed and used as a means to pursue individuality, 
personal liberation and collective freedoms. It is popularly believed that in cyberspace people 
can be who or what they want to be, against a duplicitous world in which individuals have to 
conform to artificial social norms and the expectations of others.
72
 Therefore, the romantic 
view holds that computer technology can be fruitfully put to use to aspire to and promote 
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However, at the heart of such popularised techno-romantic instrumentalism lies a dialectic 
catch that is often omitted: digital narratives of transcendence and omnipotence do not really 
address the fundamental analytical and theoretical difficulties with technologies such as 
political gaming or online communities that try to create a holistic order in which anything is 
possible. The fantasy of ‘unity in diversity’ privileges objects and issues that are suitable for 
computer representation and what can easily be integrated into the world of computation and 
cyberspace, at the expense of challenges such as computer illiteracy, uneven access to 
computer systems or alienation from normal, traditional interaction with people. As with a 
rational instrumentalist view, the romantic approach leaves little room to question the socio-
economic and political circumstances within which technology such as games need to be 
contextualized. The first question with reagrd to political gaming always has to start with 
asking who is actually privileged enough to use these games and who possesses the necessary 
technological habitual skills in the first place. In light of this, making games widely 
accessible, based on simple and cheap technology has been a priority concern for game 
developers of political games for civil society such as PeoplePower or Darfur is Dying, 
which either work with basic personal computers or even standard mobile phones. However, 
leaving the context aside the romanticist view seems also blind to the material conditions out 
of which technology arises, rendering it an equally problematic position.  
 
The essentialist variant in the deterministic spectrum enjoys a similarly strong position within 
the study of technology in IR, but is equally problematic for it assumes an intrinsic character 
                                                          
73
 Ibid, 256-7. 
28 
 
to technology. Put simply, technological objects have an essence that influences social and 
political relations and create distinct outcomes. This notion does not come from a coherent 
set of literature, but it possesses two main strands: a romantic pessimist side and an optimistic 
one. In this context, romanticism plays the sceptical role, while the optimists see technology 
as empowering objects. Critical studies in IR, in particular, are often built upon a romantic 
essentialism that pushes for the control if not rejection of technology in favour of returning to 
more ‘natural’ ways of being.
74
 Technology is portrayed as the materialization of an 
inherently detrimental logic that finds its culmination in Adorno’s description “from the 
slingshot to the megaton bomb,”
75
 which surfaces in milder forms in a variety of IR literature 
that understands technological development as autonomous and outside human control.
76
 
While the project is sympathetic to intellectual efforts ascribing life or agency to non-humans 
such as technological objects, the essentialist view is philosophically ruled out on the grounds 
of the very idea that beings in this world can possess an essence in the first place. 
Furthermore, technological essentialism would not hold as a theoretical frame for a project 
that undoes the human/technology dichotomy, even if the primacy is placed within the object 
this time, for the question of the human as referent remains the same.  
 
Nevertheless the latest developments in the question concerning technological determinism 
do not speak to the tasks of this project and make it imperative to leave such rigid debates 
behind. After careful and thorough mapping of different determinisms, and in disagreement 
that technology is either neutral or the material from of some essence, even sophisticated 
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attempts to conceptualize modern technology portray it as “biased and ambivalent” at best.
77
 
While this may be a viable view and happy compromise to analyse a specific set of questions, 
the project struggles to adopt such views based on their implicit subject-object distinction and 
the research does not attempt to justify itself against existing technological ‘schools.’ In other 
words, framing views and questions in terms of “who” or “what” has the agency to determine 
or “what essence” does not make sense for this techno-philosophical standpoint. 
Consequently, by assuming a different philosophical ground, an idiosyncratic, immanent 
position will emerge throughout the course of the thesis.  
 
Questioning Games – The Technologisation Critique 
IR debates concerning the question of technology do not stop with merely identifying 
different techno-ideological positions, though their arguments are not framed in respect to 
either of the aforementioned positions and there is considerable criticism with a strong 
romantic essentialist undertone that doubts, if not condones the use of technology as a quick, 
but depoliticising fix.
78
 Their analysis argues that technologisation is essentially 
depoliticisation.
79
 Technologies such as gaming are particularly vulnerable to such criticism 
as it is a technological aid to deal with socio-political problems, which is why such criticism 
needs to be taken seriously. The views of depoliticisation arise out of a position that conceive 
politics as a realm that is largely analogue and full of unpredictable, authentic human 
interaction, while technology is the material form and practice of instrumental reason that 
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threatens to rationalise and standardise the inescapably volatile and messy human nature.
80
 
Indeed, such criticism is justified in the way that many political game advocates and 
developers approach these games from a game theory perspective that seeks a technological 
solution based on a logic that assumes conflicts as closed mechanical systems, where a 
certain input will also yield predictable output. In this view political gaming deals with not-
peace situations in a highly technical, even clinical way, as an “abstraction that floats above 
politics.”
81
 A necessary ontological clarification at this point, the genre of political games, or 
“games for change,” is not a subfield of game theory and the two are only obliquely related.
82
 
The investigation of these games is not a mathematical analysis used to study decision-




The claim that gaming software has strong quantifying tendencies and political games operate 
on a one-size-fits-all premise is a justified concern that calls for explanation. Simulating 
political conflict and peace operations works purely on the basis of some generalisation, 
which gives the technologising criticism considerable leverage. The concern of 
technologisation is articulated on the level of agents and actions and questions the way in 
which intellectuals engage in situations of crisis and thereby reproduce political oppression.
84
 
The technology turn is received with apprehension as it is characterized as professionalizing 
political practice that simultaneously advocates managerial and technical solutions to social 
issues.
85
 The concern is primarily with the question of politics supposedly diminishing due to 
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an increased focus on the development of technologies that could potentially displace the 
political process itself, producing a form of crisis management that has little to do with 
locally attuned and transformative politics.
86
 It suggests a problem with technology in so far 
as it is seen as a primarily elite exercise, where “traditional” intellectuals and professionals 
with highly specialised knowledge and validating forms of discourse support aid and 
development practices that are insensitive to local specificities. Authors like Jenny Edkins 
and Nancy Sheper-Hughes refer to practices that are planned and carried out by NGOs, UN 
agencies and foreign governments and which contribute to professionalising processes that 
set the parameters for common sense knowledge and political reality on the whole.
87
 
Following this line of argument suggests further that political gaming would be an effort to 
domesticate, socialise and tame the volatile and unpredictable political process itself. The 
factor of messy politics is dealt with in the abstract and in isolation through the “technical 
analysis of the situation [...which] produces various techniques of conflict analysis and 
resolution.”
88
 Closely related to this criticism one could argue that gaming leads “specialists 
or experts to implement a programme or ‘technique’ of relief based on abstract criteria set up 
in advance.”
89
 With respect to the design of political gaming, it is certainly easier to calculate 
and quantify local economic development and turn it into a simulated political/conflict 
scenario than to calculate variables for tribal rivalries, rebel networking or civil unrest. All of 
these possible criticisms are justified and invite the thesis to take a position in the face of 
important concerns over mixing politics with technology. It is an opportunity to clarify three 
main areas: ideology, political economy, and ethics (all of which are implicit criticisms in the 
technologising view).  
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Ideology is the biggest elephant in the room. Ideology is associated with “hidden procedural 
systems that drive social, political or cultural behaviour.”
90
 Rather than being purposefully 
removed from sight, these “procedures” or workings are deemed to be hidden or implicit 
because ideology is supposedly immaterial - the ideo in ideology is there for a reason. In 
distilled form, ideology is built upon the friction between what is classically conceived of as 
the realm of ideas and that of the material world. Indeed, the division between the immaterial 
ideational realm and the material actual one is fundamental to understanding not only the 
notion of ideology, but that of representation, the Virtual and reality and a host of other 
essential concepts in Western philosophy, the critical engagement of which is at the heart of 
this research. This division can be traced back to Plato’s famous parable of the cave that was 
decisive in setting up how philosophical systems would develop thereafter.
91
 His work and 
the ones he inspired contributed to the division of the world into ideas and the material, but it 
also meant that ideals/ideas since then have taken precedence over the material.
92
 From the 
perspective of this influential parable ideas were attributed to the passing agents and objects 
outside the cave (which are the ideals as well), while the material was the shadows that the 
prisoners saw inside in the cave. This implicit hierarchy of what are essentially modes of 
being arguably contributed to downgrading experience as well, for it renders experience into 
a mere act of perceiving the ideals from the perspective of the prisoners. In short, it means 
that the ideal is seen as the structuring device of experience, thoughts and behaviour. 
 
Ideology is the continuation of this structuring process, but in a systematic and larger form 
operating on the level of the polis, society or nation state. It is indispensable for politics and 
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was first used in this context by Napoleon in the French Revolution.
93
 Napoleon labelled his 
critics “ideologues, meaning people who wanted to substitute abstract considerations for real 
politics” and it was from this point onwards that “ideology signified those abstract (rather 
dubious) theories allegedly based on reason or science, which try to map out the social order 
and guide political action.”
94
 Marx’s influential critique of ideology perpetuated the 
ideal/material divide and not only gave ideology somewhat of a negative connotation, but 
also came to be associated with a Marxist and Materialist tradition.
95
 While the term 
underwent conceptual reconstructions by thinkers such as Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althusser, 
Michel Foucault, Alain Badiou and, more recently, Slavoj Žižek all attacking this divide, the 
term has remained in Marxist hands.
96
 Therefore, as in the case of the critique of 
technologisation, ideology is primarily used to confront (neo)liberal forms of politics, which 
leads such scholars to analyse games as materialisations of such politics. 
 
Ideology in Games 
The example of SENSE, one of the first games to emerge in the specifically political realm, 
demonstrates some of the ideological workings that can be problematic if they remain 
unaddressed. SENSE was developed by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) and initially 
stood for “Synthetic Environments for National Security Estimates.”
97
 After only a few years, 
the hard and software of the game was handed over to the United States Institute of Peace 
(USIP), where it has been further developed and used since, now referred to as “Strategic 
Economic Needs and Security Exercise.” As described by its multiple developers, it is a game 
used for training purposes, for dealing with the unpredictable and unthinkable by employing 
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the methods of planning, comparing and mapping.
98
 It is an exercise powered by HCI and 
mediated by socio-political and economic rules and goals. Based on the simulation of 
conflictual political scenarios, the aim is not only the verisimilitude of peace operations in the 
game, but to increase its plausibility outside of the game as well. Thus SENSE is an 
interactive simulation for decision support, information management and exchange with an 
echo beyond the game. The level of technology is “medium” (neither high- nor low-tech), but 
based on significant processing power by involving at least ten to fifteen networked 
computers. While the hardware enabling the game is not hugely complex, compared to fully 
immersive games in a completely synthetic gaming environment, the computer literacy 
required by the players is considerably high, with the participants having to undergo 
substantial briefing before the onset of the game and with a supervisor present throughout the 
game to help in case of problems related to operating the computer software and to facilitate a 
smooth running of the game. The game scenario and tasks are individual for each game 
session, based on actual countries and conflict situations. Participants in a game are usually 
related to that context in one way or another, either professionally or personally. While the 
game was initially developed for US government senior leadership, members from civil 
society, NGOs or a group of students (of any country) can arrange to play SENSE at USIP.
99
 
The game usually lasts from several days to up to a week, with each individual game being 
based on an actual country, conflict scenario, and economic crisis. Each participant plays the 
role of a government official or a member from the industry, private or public sector. 
Furthermore, participants start with a considerable amount of the local currency that they can 
use to buy resources, trade, invest into infrastructure, the economy – literally everything that 
makes and breaks a state. If in debt, participants can apply for loans at the national bank, the 
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World Bank or other credit institutions, each of which is played by participants or sometimes 
by members of the SENSE team.
100
 The research that is put in by SENSE members to prepare 
for a game is immense, thoroughly analysing the countries that the game is going to be 
modelled on, looking at internal workings and dynamics from micro to macro as well as 




The use of political games such as SENSE examined from a procedural perspective indicates 
a striking similarity between games and ideology as precisely such procedures of abstract 
“theories allegedly based on reason or science, which try to map out the social order and 
guide political action.”
102
 Looking at these key terms (abstract theories, reason, science, map 
social order and guide political action), ideology is clearly deeply rooted within games. 
Examining the R&D as well as implementation of games provides more insight into this 
process. In the case of SENSE, developed at IDA and now at USIP, the first institution is a 
research centre with a focus on national security catered to the needs of the American 
military. Thus the idea of stability in respect to peace operations and the politics necessary is 
framed within a “hard power” context, and, depending on the government in office, this 
context oscillates between democratic and republican forms. In the example of SENSE, the 
primacy of “hard” stability demands in peace operations is kept through the designation of 
“Security Exercise,” and once the game moved to USIP, Washington, D.C., economic 
complexity was added, “Strategic Economic Needs,” which in the realm of peace operations, 
aid and development have been addressed through neoliberal reforms.
103
 Given the 
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geographical location of both institutes, inside the US, and the main customers of each of the 
two institutions (both members of the military or government officials), a tendency towards 
American idea(l)s about peace operations is difficult to explain away. The output and work 
by these institutions needs to be carefully contextualised within the geo-political landscape 
they are working in, the customers they are catering to, the funding they receive as well as the 
staff they employ for example. However, this is not to suggest that the work institutions like 
USIP produce is inevitably ideologically drenched or biased and, therefore, to do away with 
the simulation games they produce. Rather this is a challenge that efforts to integrate gaming 
need to acknowledge and overcome.    
 
While it is recognised that technologising criticism and the risk of unwarranted ideological 
dominance in games need to be taken seriously; nevertheless, much of the criticism is 
exaggerated. This is the case with especially technologising arguments because they are 
based on the misleading assumption that games seek to substitute for politics.
104
 However, 
this is not their purpose. Instead, the intention is to increase awareness and understanding 
through an interactive way of learning, based on a simple principle in ‘Theory of Mind’, 
which is to put oneself into the situation of someone else. Thus, while the games operate on 
the level of some abstraction since they can only approximate a specific political context but 




Ideology and Political Change 
Approaching the argument of ideology at the macro-level makes the issue of political gaming 
much more complicated and problematic. One aspect of technologisation is that international 
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politics became abstracted into macro- and micro-economics,
106
 so that the conditions and 
practice of politics are frequently approached and filtered through the lens of global political 
economy rather than through anthropologies of war, political conflict and collective violence, 
for example.
107
 In this light, games such as SENSE (designed to also test certain economic 
decisions with the intention of promoting stability and peace) are seen as a form of neoliberal 
economicalisation. This is by far the strongest criticism to which these games are subject. 
However, this is not so much a problem with gaming as such, but with the wider dominant 
perception of how to deal with political processes amidst regional instabilities, political 
violence and conflict, and war-to-peace transitions for example. In other words, games 
visualise “the logics that make up a worldview”
108
 and at the same time are symptomatic of 
politics that are to a great extent focused on the economic well-being of a country and its 
people. The question and problem is to what extent games are complicit in perpetuating 
conditions in which political action cannot be understood, known and practiced outside of 
economic dominance. This question challenges gaming and needs to be addressed throughout 
the project, especially in the analysis of particular games and the context out of which they 
arise. 
 
The contemporary games for change are aimed at a wide range of political practices often 
with a focus on war/conflict to peace transitions, which in itself refers to a large set of socio-
political practices. The political scope of games is purposefully kept broad in order to show 
that practices aimed at stability and security unfold through various stages are all 
interconnected. With some games aimed at the stage of ongoing war and violence, involving 
national and foreign military and dominating goals of security (traditionally conceived), the 
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main audience for which these games are designed for is military personnel and soldiers, with 
games covering core areas of strategy, staff and soldier communication, practicing mediation 
and negotiation skills, up to more physical aspects of securing territory and persons, or 
getting involved in conflict without having to resort to violence. This is why many of the 
games played by militaries are increasingly focused on “soft” skills – that is information 
management and cultural understanding, rather than shooting exercises. Though digitised 
shooting training is and will continue to be used widely for mainly economic reasons as it is a 
cost a very efficient way of training, R&D with regard to games for change has moved on. 
Furthermore, there is the aspect of maintaining and ensuring stability, which involves, for 
example, upholding ceasefires, usually through lightly armed and quite symbolic 
international/third party military presence.
109
 As in the former case, the focus of game-
training is on communication rather than actual military action. Games in this area often 
involve practicing peaceful border crossings and checkpoint passages. Moving out of the 
military realm and into that of global and local leadership, political operations that feature in 
games cover aspects of official peace negotiations and agreements – or what the UN 
understands as peacemaking – which are local, but with external/international involvement.
110
 
Political games addressing this element simulate actual negotiation scenarios with an 
increased aspect on communication and mediation in particular. Moving along the stages, the 
political repertoire also includes areas of post-conflict reconstruction and conflict prevention 
that involve social, political and economic reconstruction, which can be local, but are mainly 
led by international organisations and legions of foreign consultants.
111
 SENSE, for example, 
is a game that is often used to help with decision-making in this case. Given the focus on 
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local infrastructure and state-building, this is the area of gaming most prone to neoliberal 
biases.  
 
Games as Business 
It comes as no surprise that games too have to be contextualized not only within ideological 
tendencies and practices, but political economy as well. Given that gaming is an 
interdisciplinary and ‘inter-industrial’ enterprise, there are varying interests influencing the 
R&D of games. The fact that gaming is a nascent practice means that it is still costly to either 
develop technologies that support fully immersive games or to develop low-tech games that 
can be distributed for free. The opening statement to one of the first conferences on gaming 
technology for peace operations by Himelfarb could not make this any clearer:  
We’re all keenly interested in finding new tools and technologies with which to 
manage conflict and promote peace, it’s a perennial challenge. But there are also 
these never ending news stories that we get each day about this or that new 
technology and its pivotal role in a conflict. We are astonished, we are as 
astonished as we are delighted […] Now there is the question of course, a bit like 
the elephant in the room, why are we here talking about games and simulations 
and predictive analytics instead of let’s say the Facebook and the Twitter and 
other social media that the news media is so pre-occupied with? And I think the 
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This gives the Very Political Economy of Peace
113
 a new dimension in the way that analysis 
not only needs to include neoliberal reforms that are implemented in the pursuit of peace, but 
that certain strategies are heavily influenced by economic interests that are far removed from 
the actual political context within which these strategies will be implemented. The notion of 
Der Derian’s Simulation Triangle needs to be taken into account at this point as it lays the 
groundwork for analysing how game development is subject to trends in political economy. 
The Orange County Convention Centre in Orlando Florida (OCCC) hosts the annual I/ITSEC 
event (Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation and Education Conference), the world’s 
largest modelling, simulation and training conference that “promotes cooperation among the 
Armed Services, Industry, Academia and various Government agencies in pursuit of 
improved training and education programs, identification of common training issues and 
development of multiservice programs.”
114
  The conference lasts an entire week and is filled 
with lectures, tutorials, workshops, Q&A and exhibition time. As with any large-scale 
conference, the effort, time and money invested into the organisation and execution of the 
conference results in an impressive event, both academically as well as from the tech side. At 
I/ITSEC 2013, like almost every year, nearly every lecture theatre on the first floor was 
rented out for tutorial and panel sessions, where four panels ran simultaneously throughout 
the day, with new panels starting each hour except for lunch break. Following tradition, the 
turnover of thoroughly researched papers and highly polished presentations was tremendous. 
Researchers from all over North America, from the Social Sciences, Computer Sciences, 
Engineering, as well as Cognitive Sciences gathered to discuss the latest progress of “serious 
games” in their respective science, dealing with questions of how they had implemented 
feedback from the previous year, what the users had reported during test phases, what to 
improve and future directions. As attendees and presenters they take the emergence of 
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political gaming very seriously, and there was no doubt among them that serious games are 
the future within this forum.  
 
The View from the I/ITSEC Floor 
Exploring the I/ITSEC exhibition floor for the first time was almost like finding your way 
through a labyrinth. The 195,000 square meters were packed with different booths each 
showcasing another state-of-the-art technology that was crucial for latest simulations in one 
way or another. Having passed the first few, already with numerous free-bees in my I/TSEC 
bag that I got with registration, I remembered Himelfarb’s elephant, that now finally got a 
face. I recalled the prices for booths, $32 sqft inline, $33 sqft corner and $34 sqft for an 
island. I looked at the booths trying to understand that the price was really for square feet not 
meters and tried to do the maths, reaching numbers that left me reeling. Only military and 
academia got a discount on the first 1000 sqft, where the military got away with $500 and 
academia with $1,000. It didn’t come as a surprise that only one University was represented 
on the whole floor and that it was the University of Central Florida (UCF), a leading 
research and teaching hub for Modelling and Simulation. It was at UCFs booth that I held 
most of my interviews, in which every representative from the industry that I talked to 
implicitly or explicitly referred to ‘the elephant’, the gaming business. By the end of it, I had 
no doubt about that gaming had a future, for the sheer economic incentive and dynamic 
behind it seemed overpowering. After days of full immersion and doing endless rounds on the 
ground; trying every simulation and game possible, crashing planes, driving tanks, saving 
lives; speaking to as many developers and military personnel as possible, listening to a 
tremendous amount of fascinating research, sitting through official award ceremonies for 
which I should have gotten my American citizenship, the week came to an end, leaving me 
time to go back and read up on the Simulation Triangle and I/ITSEC in particular, about 
which James Der Derian had to say the following: 
42 
 
The pride and patriotism of the earlier I/ITSEC still flared on occasion into 
imperial hubris and technological hype, but this year’s model was more of a meld 
of corporate steel and glass with infotainment show-and-tell. Envisioning the 
future was still the goal, but enriching yourself and entertaining the stockholders 
en route made for a burgeoning of confessions on the way to Tomorrowland.
115
    
 
The political economy as it plays out on the exhibition floor of the OCCC provides a great 
insight into the dynamics driving R&D of many political games that are at the higher end of 
the technological spectrum. Most striking is the fact that the Armed Services still have the 
biggest input with regard to which direction gaming developments take. Nevertheless, this is 
not always in agreement with what their soldiers or marines on the ground actually need, 
despite the military possessing longstanding relations with contractors such as Lockheed 
Martin, McDonnell Douglas, Boeing, Hughes, Evan and Sutherland, Raytheon, and Northrop. 
These companies are more geared towards producing technologies for ‘traditional’ security 
concerns, focusing on flight simulators, laser technologies or graphics for immersive 
battlefield environments for example.
116
 Shifting to developing software for soldiers to 
practice their communication skills in different cultural settings is not always successful 
(arguably because it is less lucrative), and certainly disjointed from what academics attending 
the convention had to say in their tutorials that happened on level 1 in the meantime. 
Matching what has been said on level 1 to what was showcased on the event floor downstairs, 
the discrepancy could not have been more apparent. While academics were pushing 
development into areas of interactive games with virtual humans for soldiers to learn foreign 
customs and languages, or to be able to digitally simulate conference rooms with virtual 
humans within which long, heated and taxing negotiations were held, the focus downstairs 
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was on more advanced shooting simulations or technological limbs that move and bleed like 
actual ones. It emerged that the problem was not the fact that developing games generates 
revenue for most developers, but the amount of revenue.
117
 The contractors on the floor, 
software and engineering companies seemed eager to provide any kind of technology as long 
as there was a significant return. In short, the catch was not on the behalf of the contractors 
wanting to make a pitch, but rather who had enough revenue to fund these projects.  
 
Technoscience, Political Gaming and Immanent Ethics 
The theoretical development of games for change in this research also explores the R&D in 
closely related areas in order to join the momentum of creating games for the future and it is 
therefore forward looking and speculative.
118
 While this endeavour is not a work on gaming 
ethics as such, there are, however, ethical assumptions underlying this mode of analysis as 
well as ethical implications that come out of it. Guided by Gilles Deleuze’s affirmative 
philosophy, this is not a post-structuralist project, but one that focuses on possibilities of the 
new.
119
 Rather than analysing how concepts and practices of war and peace, security, 
ideology and gaming intersect and can be deconstructed, couched in the language of power, 
this is a technoscience project proposing metaphysical questions (and answers) to: “what is a 
body, in and outside gaming interaction?,” “how is political subjectivity produced?” and 
“where does novelty come from?”. Instead of practicing critique in a conventional 
understanding, the mode of enquiry is wonder. While popular methods in continental 
philosophy are, for example, setting up a dialectic, doubt/criticism or thought experiments, 
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the focus here is on the latter as it emphasises wonder, dwelling and imagination.
120
 Wonder, 
understood in a Heideggerian sense, reflects curiosity towards the new and which in its 
unfolding, although surrendering its originality in the process, will “prepare for a new 
philosophical beginning capable of thinking what was only glimpsed in wonder.”
121
 Thus, 
even though the project sets itself up against earlier claims of technologisation and ideology, 
the inherent ethics here are not those of resistance, but of emergence. Notions of experience, 
production of subjectivity, and expression are fundamental to this ethics.  
 
While the primacy of gaming experience throughout the research would often lend itself to a 
Kierkegaardian aesthetic analysis of the immersion in sensuous experience and the 
consideration of the possible over the actual,
122
 the political demand of these games will 
direct the focus on the ethical. Even if the emerging systems of experience during games 
work aesthetically at times, the scope of the thesis is mostly ethical and political. The focus 
on them is prioritized in order to respond to the challenges as posed by liberal ideology, 
political economy and technocratic practices. In addition, the debate is taken outside the 
parameters of subject-object thinking, thereby making the question of technological 
determinism (where technology is the object and the human the subject) obsolete. 
Furthermore, in contrast to the depoliticising argument of technologisation, the analysis will 
make evident that gaming is indeed a highly political moment, where the political is 
understood as a “moment of openness” and opportunity that is undecided, untamed and 
uncertain.
123
 The analysis of how political subjectivity can be produced anew during the 
game experience will show that gaming does not have to be about rehearsing one-fit-all peace 
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operations and neither does it have to be a representational exercise of perpetuating existing 
narratives, but can act as a productive operation of the political.  
 
Therefore, despite the pressures of liberal ideology, of which gaming is a materialisation at 
the same time, it does not have to work in favour of existing ideological biases. Looking at 
aspects of game design, ideas of affect and the creative responses emerging during the 
immediate act of gaming will show that there is always a possibility of doing things 
otherwise. It does not have to be commonplace that ideological structures set limits to 
creativity. In contrast, gaming is taken as an opportunity to challenge the status quo. Gaming 
can and should be explored as a way of engaging with politics differently, thereby generating 
new political expression and a theory and practice that is fundamentally different to the 




Essentially, the project’s continuous effort to counteract the routinized mental and ideological 
imprisonment through an emphasis on emergence and novelty is driven by a utopian impulse. 
Importantly, utopian here does not refer to the impossible, or near impossible, nor to utopia in 
a conventional sense, where classical utopian texts suggest the realisation of change through 
revolution.
125
 Instead, the utopian impulse refers to the “ever-present often unconscious 
longing for radical change and transformation which is symbolically inscribed in everything 
from culture and daily life to the official activities of politics and goal-oriented action.”
126
 
The impulse here serves to show that political imagination is hostage to its own mode of 
production and that gaming breaks with this process, opening up ways of reimagining. In this 
sense it is not a blueprint or vision of the future (a Utopianism which would be yet another 
form of idealism and ideology), but a method of grasping and pointing out “the limits of our 
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images of the future, and indeed our impossibility of imagining a radically different 
future.”
127
 However, novelty comes with jargon, but according to Bogost the latter is actually 
“a way of laying groundwork for novel production.”
128
 To be precise, the thesis will 
purposefully avoid drawing on post-structural and Marxist vocabulary and not frame the 
analysis in terms of resistance or alienation. Instead, it is believed that the development of a 
new set of vocabulary and concepts throughout the thesis plays a crucial role in the move 
beyond old debates and imaginations towards emergence. 
 
Conceiving the New, Speculative Ontologies and Materialist Philosophies 
Novelty and moving beyond the status quo practically and theoretically does not come with 
merely wondering and new vocabulary: it requires a radical philosophical change. As a 
technoscientific approach (using the notion of experience), philosophical tools are drawn 
from speculative materialism because it offers the means to develop a theory of experience 
that is not predicated on a subject-object distinction, representationalist, hylomorphic, idealist 
thinking and other Cartesian anxieties and dualisms. Furthermore, it allows the thesis to 
analyse and show the production of new political subjectivity and investigate the triangulated 
problem of the Virtual, the digital and the actual (which together is reality) in greater 
complexity. Speculative materialism is a world view that sets itself up against the prominent 
idea in (any) philosophy which sees the world as bifurcated, that is as reality and mediation 
and where reality is only the correlate of the human thought. Accessing this reality has been 
condoned a futile project by philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, who thereby also 
dismissed the idea of being able to do speculative philosophy as making assumptions about 
reality is contrary to the finitude of human thought. According to Bryant, Srnicek and 
Harman “phenomenology, structuralism, post-structuralism, deconstruction, and post-
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modernism have all been perfect exemplars of the anti-realist trend in continental 
philosophy.”
129
 In contrast, the technoscience approach in this research argues for taking 
reality (the concrete and the material) seriously and as a clue to revisit questions about HCI 
and the political. In this speculative momentum, the project is “turning once more toward 
reality itself.”
130
 However, it is not the intention to return to positivism, despite critical voices 
misinterpreting new materialisms in this way. The aim in this work is “at odds with so-called 
‘naïve realism’” and in contrast is interested in finding out what “drastically limits the 
presumptions of thought in its ability to grasp the nature of reality.”
131
 Moving away from the 
suspicion of reality and science that came to characterize much of twentieth-century French 
thought (especially phenomenologist and post-structuralists) and following the work of Gilles 
Deleuze, Brian Massumi, John Protevi and Manuel DeLanda, this research returns to a 
naturalist ontology to map wide-ranging questions regarding reality, the body, experience and 
subjectivity.
132
 Turning to theories that are grounded in recent developments in materialist 
philosophies, such as speculative and vital materialism, will provide the analysis with the 
sufficient tools to distance itself from old debates about HCI which are framed in terms of 
Kantian idealism and access to the phenomenal world.  
 
The interest of this project in distancing itself from forms of idealism is not due to an outright 
dismissal of Kantian philosophy or phenomenology, but grounded in the argument that recent 
materialist philosophies offer new ways of asking and answering questions about 
technological beings and becomings as well as being and becoming technological. It is 
argued that in starting the analysis from a different position that does not take the human and 
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the primacy of the human experience as the centre of analysis, provides theoretical impetus 
and opens up the possibility to go about HCI differently: to think about the human, the 
computer (technology) and interaction differently. This entails seeking an alternative point of 
analysis away from correlationist categories that sustain that “all that exists is some variation 
of mind or spirit.”
133
 Although there are limitations to academic practice and thought in the 
way that reading, writing and theorising is a conscious effort based on language, the thesis 
agrees with Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism that holds that it is nonetheless possible to 
conceive of and work within a philosophical system in which experience does not unfold 
according to a priori categories of the mind and bodily intuition. As the thesis will show 
knowledge is not based on how things appear to us, neither is reality reduced to cognition. 
Novelty in this respect is grounded in an empiricism that contrary to correlationist and 
idealist thinking does not calibrate thought around human being, more specifically, as being 
qua being, but around being qua other.  
 
It is argued that what goes on outside the human sensorium is of more interest to 
technoscience and the politics in gaming than addressing the latter from the point of the 
human or “user experience.” The ontological concept is that of an “asubjective realm of 
becoming” in which the subject and thought are only an embedded “final, residual product” 
of primary ontological movements.
134
 Whether this is referred to as vital or speculative 
materialism or a form of posthumanism is of secondary importance, but the point is that by 
positioning the thesis in contrast to Kantian transcendental structures of reason and rationality 
that supposedly structure human behaviour, a post-human enquiry “offers an embarrassment 
of riches in response to the question of what we might be studying when we study 
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international relations” and technology.
135
 Furthermore, the project seeks to address the 
conceptual challenges that arose out of the emergence of NT that trouble conventional 
understandings of not only IR but the body and technology. It is argued that a posthuman, 
speculative materialist approach offers a way to respond to these philosophical and 
theoretical challenges without dragging “the ideological baggage,” “the bloodless 
abstraction” and “habitual desensitisation” of technology into the analysis.
136
 The 
development of pre-subjective systems of experience are taken as the starting point from 
which to address the body-technology question before turning to the material reality of 
technological experience. 
 
However, focussing on materiality does not imply a reductionism to tangible physicality, but 
to the contrary, is used to argue for the different modalities of experience and existence that 
technoscience needs to start taking into account. Working with an ontology that proposes that 
“all entities are equally real (though not equally strong) insofar as they act on other entities,” 
the thesis follows Latourian “irreductionism”
 137
 in order to overcome symptomatic 
misconceptions of the Virtual, the digital and the actual, in which the former two are often 
claimed to be less real. Current technoscience and IR literature focusing on NT
138
 are 
symptomatic of such a hierarchy of realness that is claimed to be disadvantageous in order to 
understand the technology-body dynamic in gaming as well as other technological 
interaction. While focussing on the ‘incorporeal’ has been a concern of anti-realist analysis of 
the twentieth century as well focussing on “cultural structures, systems of power, texts, 
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discourse, or phenomena in consciousness,”
139
 the present analysis and view point is very 
different from these referents of analysis. Rather than power or discursive practices, the thesis 
is interested in how affective structures that spread across the Virtual/actual continuum and 
across scales impact on technological practices such as gaming and the techno-body dynamic. 
In order to pay close attention to the role of affect, it is crucial to treat the pre-subjective 
realm of the Virtual and the subjective realm of the actual as ontologically equal. So far the 
political has resided in the latter realm and IR theorization has shied away from seeking out 
politics in the pre-subjective, affective realm. Protevi’s intellectual mix of “political 
physiology,” Massumi’s inquiry into political, pre-subjective aesthetics and Connolly’s 
posthuman political philosophy
140
 are among the few works that use the Bergsonian Deleuze 
to explore the political in the Virtual/actual interplay. These authors are not only crucial for 
the task at hand, but the project joins their efforts of researching bio-socio-political events, of 
which gaming is one. Ultimately, subsequent chapters are interested in pre-subjective, pre-
individual, non-conscious/subliminal forms of action and politics found in the moment of 
openness during the gaming experience. 
 
State-of-the-Art Challenges: Consciousness and Agency  
An affective register (and working within it) brings to the fore a few large issues such as 
questions over consciousness and agency, which are problematic for a technoscientific 
inquiry. Speculative materialists’ curiosity about recent scientific development and indeed 
interest in reactivating communication between philosophical and scientific research 
confronts this thesis with problems that extend beyond the scope of the present analysis. The 
notion of ‘non-conscious’ that will emerge in the remainder is different to the Freudian or 
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Lacanian subconscious and far removed from the conscious knowing self. This is not to argue 
that the latter conceptions are discredited, but it is an entirely different level of analysis and 
responding to different sets of questions. Closely related to the problem of the non-conscious 
is that of agency and intentionality, both of which are questionable concepts in new 
materialist traditions and are only worked with implicitly here. Whereas the question of 
political agency has always been a pressing concern in political theory, the concept of agency 
stands at odds with the posthuman condition developed by the thesis. Human agency, as 
commonly conceived, depends on coherent action by a conscious subject; however, in the 
posthuman landscape it is diffused into different matterings, processes of self-emergence and 
workings of affect. Given that the subject, the individual and even the body will become 
undone in this thesis, it would be of little use to situate this theoretical development within a 
liberal and humanist understanding of agency as something possessed by humans (and non-
humans for that matter), as a choice,
141
 as a moral capacity, and as a “willed or intended 
motion […] by a subject.”
142
 Again, it is not to dismiss the validity of these debates and 
aspects of moral behaviour are certainly questions to be asked with regard to the pre-
subjective and non-conscious as well, but it will not be possible to address them here. In 
respect to future research, the project will help to pave the way towards engaging with these 
problems and only work with an idea of posthuman agency in so far as it is guided by 
affective structures (non-local and highly diffused) without the “subject as the root cause of 
an effect.”
143
 As such it is inspired by Karen Barad’s “agential realism” which suggests that 
“agency is about response-ability […and] about possibilities of worldly re-configurings.”
144
 It 
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is suggested that the act of gaming has precisely this agency of possible reconfiguration, but 
not as an intentional, conscious move, but a mutual enactment without an agent per se.  
 
Conclusion 
The chapter sought to map the variegated spectrum that needs to be covered in order to 
commence an investigation of the inter-disciplinary, mixed-modal and altogether challenging 
example of technology such as immersive political gaming. The frame of technosciences was 
chosen based on the argument that this allows the project to focus on technological 
mediations, but from a materialist perspective that is committed to vitalism in matter. It puts 
the analysis into a good position to analyse the category of technology like any other body 
composed of matter. In other words, not only does technoscience provide the necessary 
theoretical freedom in order to increase the scope of understanding and further develop the 
workings of political gaming, but the latter can only be considered within such a minimally 
restrictive frame and conceptual space given that gaming is a complex theme that spans 
different areas of study (indicative of the unique material space/time it occupies) and will be 
analysed in greater detail. Moving through a brief gaming genealogy revealed that games 
have been part of political practices for centuries, but mainly entered the political arena 
because of their value for military and strategy training. The analysis of the latter two aspects 
(the close relation between the development of games and its ties to the Armed Services) 
showed that the military is not only an important funder of political games, but that gaming 
technology needs to be contextualized within the MIME-NET in order to understand its 
various stages of production and the multiple influences shaping a single game.  
 
With the example of specific games and insight into their R&D, it was argued that apart from 
being serious, games are also a political force. As such, the chosen theoretical focus is that of 
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the experience of games rather than just the use of them. This is based on the argument that 
by thinking of games in terms of ‘being used for a purpose’ not only implies their tool-being 
(and thereby certain theoretical positions), but also that this approach misses out on multiple 
dimensions that gaming can draw on as well as effect. Importantly, however, one of the 
unique aspects of the investigation of gaming experience is that this will not unfold according 
to phenomenology and, thus, neither to idealist nor correlationist views. This is an important 
theoretical step that provides the investigation of games with more theoretical freedom, 
especially from Cartesian dualism and dominant subject-object distinctions that dominate the 
analysis of HCI. Furthermore, non-phenomenological experience is something missing in 
speculative materialist writings thus far, and, therefore, is a wider philosophical concern and 
issue in general. Nonetheless, the possibility of experiencing technology needed to be 
contextualised within the tandem-development of computer technology and the 
accompanying cognitive skills necessary to engage with and experience technology.  
 
The discussion of experience as the focus of analysis and entry point into unbundling the 
political phenomena of gaming aimed to show that different theoretical tools and 
philosophical traditions are necessary in order to confront this complex set of issues 
regarding gaming. It calls into question theories of knowledge and how we learn through the 
engagement with technology, how it changes perception and how it affects political education 
and practice in the long run. Yet, these questions cannot be addressed without a grasp of what 
immersive technology is and how it operates. Embedded within such timeless ontological and 
epistemological questions, the initial claim that experience can help to think differently about 
HCI, the bodies of humans and technology in particular, foreshadowed that this analysis will 
unfold along posthuman lines. In this sense the project’s frame of technoscience was detailed 
further by introducing speculative materialist philosophies and how these provide alternative 
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ways of analysing gaming experience without drawing initial dualist distinctions, of 
human/technology or living/non-living and subject/object more broadly. Theorising (gaming) 
experience in a new materialist fashion enables one to think of HCI outside the commonplace 
subject-object division and helps to understand what games and gamers are and how they 
assemble and operate (in and outside the game). The emergence of the new and as well as 
that of a posthuman political subject will be central to the following investigation and in 
order to locate their origin as well as detail these processes a much more fundamental and 
primary reworking of the metaphysical, ontological and epistemological underpinnings of 
political theory is in order. It begins with experience. Certainly, the latter is crucial for this 
endeavour concerned with creativity, exploration and novelty, but in a way that does not rest 
on the human and the human mind as the pinnacle and ultimate referent. The idiosyncratic 
combination of various materialist philosophies provides the thesis with the necessary 
theoretical sway and leverage to pursue the development of a wider theoretical model for new 
political becomings based on techno-political mediations. 
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Chapter 2 ~ Becoming-Posthuman: Intensive Bodies 
during Gaming-Experience 
…there is some comfort in the idea […] of following experience, but following it all the way 
to the end.  




Something happens at around 92 miles an hour. Thunder headers drown out all sound. 
Engine vibration travels at a heart’s rate. Field of vision funnels into the immediate. And 





What moves as a body, returns as the movement of thought. 




The technoscientific inquiry into the technological experience of political gaming and the 
question of how this event gives rise to the new is essentially a non-anthropocentric concern. 
Gaming technology and the act of playing have patterns of motion that work on multiple 
scales simultaneously. They span across the level of the networked political economy of 
games, to ideological questions of the theory and practice of peace operations, but also 
rippling all the way down to the immediate gaming encounter and the very make-up of the 
gaming software. As such, they turn into a complex phenomenon composed of heterogeneous 
force fields. By implication this means that gaming resonates between and across scales, 
thereby affecting stable systems of experience, politics and economics. The task is to analyse 
the politics in games as something that jumps material and temporal scales, but also to 
include levels of analysis that have had very little sway in the study of technology in IR so 
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far, namely the sub-individual all the way down to the sub-atomic. Looking at Human 
Computer Interaction (HCI) at the sub-individual level, however, upsets the very idea and 
representation of the body as well as that of technology. Indeed the question concerning 
games for politics reveals IR’s current predicament: analysis is increasingly intruding in on 
the intimacy, integrity and unity of the sovereign body. This shifts IR discourses on the body 
from a biopolitical analysis of the body as site of contestation to a speculative materialist 
analysis of the body in contestation, literally turning the body into a problematic matter. In 
this sense, the appearance of technologies such as gaming on the political horizon generate an 
entire new set of questions about how techno-politics relate to agency, consciousness, 
morality, experience, knowledge production, the environment/nature and culture. Within the 
parameters of the project and in the pursuit of uncovering the production of political novelty 
through gaming, the chapter will focus on the materiality of the body and technology as well 
as on the production of a thinking body. Therefore, it will work on two levels: first, dealing 
with the concrete material of the body and technology; and, second, with the epistemology 




In respect to the subsequent theorization of how body and technology materialize, the 
argument presented is fourfold. First, the investigation of binaries such as 
human(body)/technology, natural/artificial and living/non-living will highlight that the 
boundaries between body and technology as well as their overarching categories of human 
and non-human, are representational constructs that are out of sync with body-technology 
matterings. Second, ensuing from this position that a distinction between living body and 
technology cannot be made, the research argues that the materialization of ‘a body’ is neither 
human nor technological, but both, (non)(organic) as it were, that is posthuman. More 
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precisely, bodies are natural and artificial at once with boundaries emerging along intensive 
differences of temperature, rhythm and speed rather than representational wholes as captured 
by conscious perception or ambiguous categories of human and non-human. Third, the limits 
of this body do not correspond to the body of the player in a game because it as well as the 
emerging subject are much wider in this case, extending to other player bodies and objects 
within the immediate environment. Fourth, the boundaries of these posthuman bodies are in 
constant flux, continuously extending and contracting.  
 
Conceiving of a different body destabilizes previous epistemologies based on the thinking 
human and rational mind. This creates a two-fold problem for the objective of this thesis. 
Anthropocentric epistemologies cannot address the production of thought or concepts that 
emerge outside the human sensorium, which leaves the processes of learning during gaming 
experience and subsequent concept formation that happen within the posthuman unaccounted 
for. This means that because anthropocentric theories of knowledge place thought and 
conceptual practice inside the human (triggered by the human’s perception and access to the 
phenomenal world) renders thinking into recognition, which thereby prevents conception of 
innovation and novelty. Therefore, by using concrete experience as a starting point, the 
chapter will articulate a posthuman noology that offers the possibility of the new. Deleuze’s 
notion of noology is used here (rather than epistemology) because he sets it up against 
phenomenology, thought that is grounded in consciousness as well as ideology.
5
  This means 
that noology “does not only study what it might mean for a human subject to think; it also 
strives to imagine thought carried to its infinite power, beyond the human.”
6
 Therefore, in the 
context of this thesis it is adopted as the study of posthuman thought. As it is used here it also 
enunciates that it is precisely not an epistemology that subscribes to the initial strict 
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juxtaposition of technê to epistêmê.
7
 This is because the project is committed to a praxis 
philosophy that perceives of the formation of thought as a material movement and can never 
be a “pure theory”, but is always a practice (technê) as well. In explaining how the dualism 
inscribed into anthropocentric epistemologies prevents any form of non-human or posthuman 
thinking, will first highlight the problem of the subject-object split. In a second step, the 
analysis will show how Deleuze in his engagement with Kant’s transcendental philosophy 
develops a thought that does not have to happen within the ‘human mind’. Third, applied to 
the thematic example of the thesis, the chapter will detail how thought then emerges through 
the gaming experience in the posthuman. In problematizing the living/non-living binary as 
represented in HCI debates and the player/gaming technology couplet more specifically, the 
chapter’s goal is to show that experience, thought and concepts can be theorized for the 
posthuman as well and that in so doing possibilities of the genuinely new arise. From this 
position gaming can de-familiarise “habits of thought and representation in order to pave the 
way for creative alternatives,” (something that will be referred to as deterritorialisation), and 
allow for a posthuman subjectivity to emerge.
8
 Thereby the chapter seeks to lay the 
noological groundwork for articulating a posthuman political mode based on pre-subjective, 
immediate engagement and interaction.  
 
Tracing and Chasing Binaries: Concrete Problems, Intensive Bodies, Indeterminate 
Boundaries 
The treatment of technology especially in IR works on the implicit assumption that 
technological objects such as weapons, new information and communication technology 
(ICT) and surveillance technology can be demarcated as material entities. The inherent bias is 
that technological objects are not only stable entities, but that it is only the human, living 
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aspect of life that is challenging to interpret because, in contrast to technology, humans think 
and have minds of their own.
9
 This makes analysis of the social difficult because it is 
complex, hermeneutic and historical.
10
 Furthermore, such a position develops the boundary 
between the inanimate and the living to posit the thinking against the non-thinking. However, 
it is the intention to show that this division is not naturally given, calling supposedly stable 
entities such as objects and humans into question. This is not the first attempt at troubling this 
binary and boundary, for the relationship between the human and machine has fascinated 
philosophers, social theorists and scientists for centuries and is an ever prominent question. 
Indeed, with regard to new technology (NT) such as immersive gaming, the thesis is indebted 




The problem presented by HCI is a “double bind.”
12
 As the example of gaming highlights, on 
the one hand we are diversely technological; yet, on the other hand, precisely such 
technologies have become somewhat of a problem-fetish.
13
 As reflected in the techno-
determinist debates, technological adaptation and mediations are highly problematic. There 
are, however, several problems with how the human-technology relation is discussed in IR. 
First of all, the debates are symptomatic of an understanding of technology that is electronic 
or digital, almost equating technology with higher technology. This is an analytically 
dangerous assumption as it ignores the low-technology dimension and limits analysis of 
technology-human relations in their complexity. In this sense, pens, scissors, cutlery, tools 
are technology too and therefore need to be acknowledged in a complex study of technology. 
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Within intellectual traditions of technology, the latter is conceived of as tools that fulfil a 
function, which makes simple devices such as knives and spears the first technological 
artifacts. Yet, technological debates are rarely focused on low-tech artifacts, such as hair 
dryers, coffee machines or cooking stoves, let alone would one attribute them any socio-
political relevance. The bias towards more advanced technological assemblages is prominent 
and with crucial implications. Not only does it reflect a misunderstanding of simple theories 
of technology, but also the fear of technology threatening the human category in the way that 
technology is becoming increasingly intelligent. Rather dystopian debates about artificial 
intelligence and virtual humans, encapsulated by the highly popularized singularity 
conundrum,
14
 insinuate that the theoretical challenge and aversion to ‘machines’ stems from 
the fear of technology possibly taking on the function that thus far has only been reserved for 
the ‘human mind’ – that is thinking and learning. Essentially, this is an anthropocentric fear 
concerned with the human being removed or replaced as the main agent as well as the 
measure of all things.  
 
In addition, by prioritizing high-technology and the circumstances within which they have 
recently emerged, these debates are treating the human as the constant and natural, while 
treating technology as the new addition to the realm of the social. This is what Latour refers 
to as ‘problem-fetish’ and Daniel McCarthy as ‘the bogeyman’
15
 in which the increasing 
prominence of technology marks a supposedly social disruption as if technology had not 
existed before. Furthermore, this view leaves out that the human – genetically and as 
phenomenally perceived – has gone through evolution in a co-implication with, and often 
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only because of, low-technology such as simple tools without which human development 
would have looked rather different. Therefore, to perceive of technology as something that 
started changing social, political and economic practices on a large scale with the onset 
industrial revolution and as characteristic of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries 
especially, is actually only to focus on a very short time span of the joint development of 
human and technology or more accurately human-technology. Consequently, the question at 
stake here is not only concerned about what the human or human subject is, but also what 
technology is in this co-dependent development.  
 
In order to reconceptualise the human/technological body, the analysis needs to push 
development in Cyborg Studies further,
16
 overcoming its inherent objectification of 
technology. Cyborg Studies, which consists of subjects such as cybernetics and cyborg 
anthropology, is a broad area of study that is largely optimistic towards technology, yet it still 
treats technology as an object. Even though boundaries between human and technology are 
melting into each other, technology started out as something separate. It is only because of 
the assumption that technology had started out as something separate that techno-pessimist 
debates can portray technology as invading or attacking the living human body.
17
 This is an 
assertion that leads many critical thinkers to claim that technology is with(in) us, either as 
extension to or part of the body, so that technology and the human are fundamentally 
entwined.
18
 Regardless of this being seen as either good or bad, the bottom line is that the 
exchange between body and technology is frequent with the pacemaker as the most 
commonly used example. Importantly, glasses are a very low-tech enhancement as well, 
creating a low-tech cyborg as it were. Whether we are being colonized and invaded or 
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supported and enhanced depends on individual theoretical commitments. However, pushing 
this further suggests that this invasion/addition is not simply adding a foreign object to the 
body, but this exchange means that the natural original body does not exist and as such 
technology dismantles the “ideal interiority” and boundaries of the “body and soul.”
19
 This 
first preliminary step of acknowledging that body-technology are co-dependent and 
increasingly complementing each other enables the analysis to treat bodies (‘human’ and 
‘technological’) as sites of complication, encounters and collective processes that turn the 
perceived human body, the human category, into an historical and technical entity. 
  
However, in contrast to cyborg arguments, the body is not seen as a natural, purely organic 
entity that is pre-given by nature/genes and bound by flesh and blood. Therefore, the 
disagreement is over the human as an autonomous sovereign body, whose boundaries have 
been genetically determined during production, then established by birth only to be altered by 
technology later. Instead, the body is seen as a flexible entity that contracts and expands its 
boundaries, but not by ways of letting technology in or out. Instead of the fleshy 
representation that we call human, the limits to the body are not the skin, but are drawn along 
differences of temperature, speed/motion and rhythm. This is in fundamental disagreement 
with the idea of the ‘human’ that possesses a mind and stable matter and mattered boundaries. 
Instead it is turned into an open organism that consist of organic technology.
20
 In the context 
of the thesis question that traces the emergence of the new in explorative posthuman politics 
through technologies of lived abstraction, this proposed alternative view of a body has 
tremendous impact on how to analyse technological experience in the first place. However, 
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such theorization has to develop through several stages in order to get to this posthuman 
body. 
 
Technology ≠ Technicity: Fracturing Technology 
Retracing how technology exists is central to starting to dismantle the human and develop the 
posthuman as well as to understand technology’s share in the constitution of the Humanist 
idea of the ‘human’ and human collectives.
21
 In Du Mode d’existence des objets tequniques 
(the mode of existence of technical objects), Simondon introduces the notion of technicity in 
order to show the indeterminacy associated with technology and that it neither belongs to 
only the human nor to technological dynamics. According to Simondon, technicity “means 
that humans realized that there are different ways of reaching purposes through artifacts.”
22
 
Crucially this binds technicity to function and ensures that it can be distinguished between 
different functions and, thus, degrees of technicity. Using Adrian Mackenzie’s low-tech 
example of a Toledo steel blade and a more mechanic steam engine, these are both artifacts 
with different functions and technicity.
23
 Similarly, contrasting military political games with 
those educational games for civil society or those for political leadership, it is the technicity 
that distinguishes them from each other. Importantly then, ‘natural’ objects, as for example 
organs, do have functions as well, to which Simondon referrs as ‘originary technicity’.
24
 
Further, these functions are all too often artificially, externally influenced. While originary 
technicity serves to open up the concept of the human(subject) by turning organs into 
technical objects, technicity opens up the technical artifact. This implies an important shift in 
the perspective on technology: first, it is not too focused on technical objects as such, but 
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pays attention to the overall operations they enable; second, it highlights the processes that 
break open the categories of the technical object and human, allowing exchange between 
them and to further undo the boundary between them. 
 
Highlighting human-technological collectives in this way allows suggesting different modes 
of existence of technical objects and that these are objects-as-processes.
25
 This diverges from 
that which normally stabilizes the innate technical object. Therefore, technicity diffracts and 
disaggregates technical objects into a “network of references or relays” that includes other 
elements, gestures, practices and institutions so that “technicity cannot be contained in a 
single object.”
26
 Drawing on the simple example of the technicity of the low-tech Toledo 
steel blade, this only comes into existence due to the combination of various processes and 
elements that are non-technical, even organic, as for example the finer-grained composition 
of Toledo’s local choral, the chemical make-up of the water, as well as the forging techniques 
used.
27
 Thus, even simple technical elements such as knives or a stone hand-axe only exist 
due to organic matter organization. Likewise, the make-up of gaming technology can be 
broken down into the diverse materials that come to assemble it. Usually, analysis focusses 
on software, but dissecting its materiality reveals the natural components of high-technology 
that consist of organic and inorganic matter, such as lead, copper, gold, but also, tin, 
aluminium, various types of plastic, as well as organic toxins such as polychlorinated 
biphenyls, polychlorinated dibenzodioxins and radioactive isotopes that literally make 
technology energetic. In short, many assembling parts of technology are occurring in what is 
classically conceived of as nature. In view of the practices and institution that Simondon 
highlights, fragmentation can go even further, so that games only emerge in a networked 
effort of gaming industry, social and cognitive scientists, military experts and political 
                                                          
25
 Originally “object-as-process,” de Vries, “Gilbert Simondon and the Dual Nature of Technical Artifacts.” 
26
 Mackenzie, Transductions, 15; Simondon quoted in Mackenzie, 14.  
27
 Ibid, 13.  
65 
 
advisors. That is to argue that gaming technology consists to a large extent of brain power 
and human labour: a traditional understanding of the human. Through this, Simondon seeks 
to show that rather than separate entities, humans and technology are collectives, a move 
which, in the present context, is used to further upset the rigid boundaries between nature, 
human, and supposedly innate technological objects. Highlighting the collective site of 
technology as well as its natural aspects means that technology exists not only in a 
technological mode, but also in a living one. Simondon goes as far as to argue that technical 
objects exist genetically.
28
 Indeed, the elaborative process of game development – seen as a 
complex mattering of different substances – shows the tension between living and non-living 
processes. Thus, technology cannot be seen as the reduction of the living to the non-living or 
vice versa. Instead, it suggests the “co-implication of the living in the non-living,” or the 
human in the technical.
29
 For Simondon, technical ensembles bring human and technical 
bodies together, by opening up both of them into far-reaching technological processes. 
Ultimately, there is no purely nonorganic, non-living, technical artifact or element and 
technicity exists precisely in the linkage between non-living and living. 
  
The Chicken or the Egg…the Human or Technology? 
The biological human and the scientific nonhuman cannot be taken for granted. Echoing 
Latour’s analysis in “pragmatogonies,” previous claims culminate in the argument that there 
is no plausible way to differentiate between gaming technology and gamers or in abstract 
terms between the living and the non-living.
30
 The starting point is the post-structuralist 
argument of techniques and technology being social because they are socially constructed. 
Importantly, this is not a mere discursive and rhetorical phenomenon, but the development of 
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the human category is heavily influenced by the development of simple technology 
throughout history and there is neither a social nor biological human without the non-human, 
techniques and technology and vice versa.
31
 For example, the living frequently surfaces in the 
definition of matter and the non-living is scattered across definitions of the human subject.
32
 
In the case of gaming this leads to suggest here that the playing body has human and non-
human attributes, but is different from the cyborg argument where this has been a recent 
development because technology is implanted into the body or extending it. Instead, the 
human/non-human entwinement is an interdependent evolutionary practice in so far as “there 
are no two parallel histories”
33
 with regard to technological development and that of the 
human category. But the latter only developed in certain ways due to social skills and 
properties that had been enabled by techniques and technology in the first place, which in 
turn were reimported back into technology to perform more advanced functions. As the 
development of digital skills in the history of HCI shows, human abilities had to develop in 
order for the technology to advance as well so that the one is always implied in the other, 
questioning where the boundary between human and nonhuman then really lies. In other 
words, it is not a case of alternating between the human and the nonhuman object because the 
body is in large part not human as such but a “sociotechnical negotiation and artifact.”
34
 In 
short, it is only because humans and non-humans swapped and still swap properties that both 
exist and even develop.  
 
This (re)importation and swapping of properties suggests then that the usual subject-object 
division is artificial and mainly functioning heuristically. Philosophy of technology, including 
the work of this project, does not need to stick with “the boring alternation between two 
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different substances, one made of matter and the other of subjects and symbols.”
35
 Indeed, 
analysis can only advance if it goes beyond this by conceiving humans, especially bodies in 
general, as being of the same substance living and non-living matter. In the way that 
Simondon’s argument suggests that technology needs to be treated as a partly living 
materialization, so does the human as a non-living, technological one. In the case of gaming 
this suggests that the players are not cyborgs who are enhanced during play through the 
technology that they are experiencing in the moment, but that they come into the game as 
technological beings already. Braidotti refers to this as “‘becoming-machine’” in order to 
undo the dualist frame and to highlight that humans merge with their “technologically 
mediated planetary environment.”
36
 As Latour’s work suggests, this has always been the 
case, so that for the present analysis it is fitting to argue that evolution has always been a 
process of becoming-technology and becoming-human that together form an eco-sophical 




What’s the Matter? Leaky Bodies and Technology that Matters 
The demarcation of the human from technology and vice versa into a mere categorizing, 
discursive practice is an important issue as no clear material distinction can be drawn. 
Further, due to this margin of indeterminacy it is imperative to approach the posthuman by 
problematizing matter itself. While recent political philosophy and social theory has initiated 
the discussion of mattered bodies already, it has so far shied away from the body-matter that 
is technology; hence, these discussions can be pushed much further.
38
 Importantly, this is not 
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a reductionist argument, but the intention is to highlight the vital aspect of matter and that this 
vitality is equally present in the matter that makes up the category of technology. Existing 
debates can be roughly divided into two approaches that split over the aspect of matter as 
formed by discourse and matter as the molecular substance. One approach is most 
prominently articulated in the work of Judith Butler, focussing on the socio-historic 
dimensions of matter and bodies, and the other in DeLanda’s writings,
39
 with a focus on (but 




Given that Butler’s analysis works on the discursive level to understand ‘human’ bodies as 
products of power and, therefore, does not share the focus of this project, it still helps to show 
how bodies (human or technological category) as matter are made to act or perform.
41
 Her 
argument that power “stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity and 
surface” of the body ties into the previous argument of becoming-technology, which 
suggested that the limits of human and technology as perceived in Humanist traditions are 
only sediment and steadied effects of discursive processes rather than actually having 
mattered in this way.
42
 Therefore, the category of technology and the human are actually only 
ensembles of effects that are intrinsically linked to the demarcation of the boundaries 
between the social, human, natural on the one hand and the artificial, constructed and non-
living on the other. This allows making the claim that what qualifies as body matter is not 
pregiven and that the supposedly passive and natural matter is itself only a socio-material 
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Even though Butler’s account is significant in undoing the givenness and neutrality of 
supposedly stable matter in the form of bodies and objects, it cannot be fully adopted as it 
focusses primarily on the human category and does not question what materiality means in 
relation to technical practices. Furthermore, matter’s stabilization is still perceived as a 
primarily discursive process, leaving out actual biological, physical or chemical movements. 
The assertion that matter turns into solid bodies with fixed boundaries once it has stabilized 
prevents any investigation into how bodies are actually in flux, which it is argued is 
especially the case during gaming experiences. In other words, even though for Butler matter 
is dynamic, this dynamism is only the product of “cultural form imposed on the body,”
44
 so 
that her account is still subject to a kind of Hylomorphism, or as Pheng Cheah describes it, 
“hyperthropic productivity” of a politicized and historicised idea of form.
45
 Effectively, 
Butler “reproduces the distinction, if not opposition between matter and form, nature and 
culture.”
46
 Therefore, a strict Butlerian approach to body-matter precludes thinking of matter 
and body beyond the human. However, incorporating Butler’s claims into the thesis’ 
speculative materialist view, which is to conceive it outside hylomorphic terms by arguing 
that bodies can change without their perceived form having to change too, means that matter 
and form are not co-dependent: It is in this way that the analysis can move forward by 
arguing that boundaries of new bodies can emerge in other places. Moreover, it suggests that 
this does not have to happen along binaries of living and non-living. The push to non-
hylomorphic posthumans is confirmed by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak who argues that “if 
one really thinks of the body as such, there is no possible outline of the body as such.”
47
 In 
short, a body is not limited to fleshy representations.  
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The shift away from the hylomorphic human body is a crucial post-anthropocentric move that 
allows redrawing the human-technology unit as an open organism. Perceiving, treating and 
portraying matter as just passive and innate is an anthropocentric agenda. This is problematic 
in so far as it is a neutralization that serves to stabilize the Humanist ideas of and to 
perpetuate an artificial symmetry between humans and nonhumans.
48
 However, that 
organisms were made into human subjects serves mostly as a representational purpose that 
seeks the perception of the body as a whole, making it a closed system, even though it 
depends on energy from the outside. Ironically this only draws the body back into its 
environment as Ticiento Clough correctly highlights.
49
 Luciana Parisi and Tiziana Terranova 
affirm that “the fluids which were circulating outside and between bodies, are folded onto 
themselves in order to be channelled within the solid walls of the organism/self/subject.”
50
 
Arguably, containing the human category within one body serves the purpose of keeping it 
complete and whole, thereby at the centre of the anthropocene and at the top of the hierarchy 
of being. Diffusing the human into its environment would imply diffusing and diluting the 
homo sapiens’ dominance over other species. This is also an important step up (or rather 
below the human) from the type of argument Simondon and Latour put forward, that 
disassembles either technology or the human into far-reaching, relayed networks. Instead of 
Latour’s hybrid of human-artifact, the human body ecologically and physiologically blends 
with technology and environment or, more accurately, was never different from it to begin 
with. Instead of just working on a socio-historical level, the argument moves to material 
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Open Organisms, Dissipative Structures and Self-Organisation 
A close focus on the materiality of a body reveals that the conception of the human as an 
individual organism is untenable. Despite scientific advances in the last century that call to 
update old universal laws of physics, the machinic model of closed systems is still prominent 
and the ultimate reference point in the sciences as well as social sciences and economics. The 
machinic paradigm, also often referred to as machinic materialism, hinges upon closed 
systems that can be controlled to seek “stability, order, uniformity, and equilibrium.”
52
 The 
‘human body’ or technology as contained object is just another instance of this machinic 
world view. While it is not to argue that all systems are open – some indeed are closed, 
especially subsystems – a theory of change, in the present case with a particular interest in 
novelty, needs to turn to opens systems that exchange energy and matter (and thereby 
information). In short, a machinic worldview cannot account for radical social, biological or 
physical change (just to mentioned a few areas).
53
 Thus, entities that are perceived as 
technology or human bodies are actually fluctuating subsystems that are subject to influx or 
outflow at any point. Some of the fluctuations can be minor, while others can cause 
significant reorganization of a body, which in turn can have powerful feedback loops with a 
direction of change that cannot be predicted and neither can its magnitude – “a process set up 
anywhere reverberates everywhere.”
54
 At this “singular moment” large systems (like a local 
or regional ecosystem) and small systems (like a technological body) can either disintegrate 
into chaos or change in structure and organize in higher, more complex levels. Nobel laureate 
Ilya Prigogine, member of the Brussels School that is leading the change in the science 
discourse, refers to this as physical and chemical “dissipative structure.”
55
 Dissipative is 
simply because larger organizational levels require more energy so that small bacterial 
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organization does not need as much when found in yoghurt as those large systems that spread 
across, above and beyond the category of a ‘human’ body or even ecosphere. Importantly, 
within these transitions of change, the new ordering is self-organizing and spontaneous, 
which is absolutely fundamental in order to be able to account for novelty not as pre-
conceived order that is merely imposed onto new systems. Such threshold points are not only 
crucial for novelty, but they are also more frequent than it is acknowledged. The example of 
how temperature can trigger change is telling on a small and large scale. Heat can move 
steadily through a liquid and with an increase in temperature it can in an instance reorganize 
its millions of molecules.
56
 For example, this happens with honeycomb; bees themselves only 
shape round cells and it is only when enough bees are present in the hive, thereby raising its 
internal temperature to 45 ºC, that the cells turn into hexagonal ones.
57
 Significantly, these 
trigger mechanism can happen on any level; scaled up, then what seems a small change in the 
global temperature of only 0.85ºC from 1880 to 2012 has far-reaching, devastating effects 
ecologically, politically and economically, for example.
58
 The point is not only that order can 
collapse into chaos and vice versa, but also that changes are never contained, neither in a 
small open organism neither a large one. Alvin Toffler example captures the spiralling impact 
of open systems can have on the social and the political:  
Imagine a primitive tribe. If its birthrate and death rate are equal, the size of the 
population remains stable. Assuming adequate food and other resources, the 
tribe forms part of a local system in ecological equilibrium. Now increase the 
birthrate. A few additional births (without an equivalent number of deaths) 
might have little effect. The system may move to a near-equilibrial state. 
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Nothing much happens. It takes a big jolt to produce big consequences in 
systems that are in equilibria [or near-equilibria] states. But if the birthrate 
should suddenly soar, the system is pushed into a far-from-equilibrium 
condition, and here nonlinear relationships prevail. In this state, systems do 
strange things. They become inordinately sensitive to external influences. 
Small inputs yield huge, startling effects. The entire system may reorganize 




Crucially, these bizarre changes can happen in any organismic system regardless of size and 
the effects can ripple a long way. Spontaneous and dramatic reorganization of matter 
therefore needs to be taken seriously as a political force, especially when dimensions and 
modalities increase. The digital mode is a very dominant factor in upsetting systems’ 
equilibria because the sheer amount of possibilities encoded into software increases the 
number and variety of possible structures. Changes can also be linked up together, between 
the supposedly ‘innate’ technology and ‘living’ humans, as recent decades of molecular 
biology have found that enzymatic reactions (by inorganic enzymes to be precise) not only 
happen in inorganic matter as well, but do so relatively frequently.
60
 Researchers discovered 
that auto-catalysis (what computer scientist call a positive feedback loop that produces more 
of the same cells) happens along with inhibitory/negative feedback loops and highly 
complex cross-catalytic processes that affect significant qualitative change in matter 
behaviour and organization.
61
 This has tremendous impact in the way that, first, change is 
not contained within one type of organism, but theoretically can mutate across different 
substances which means that change can go ‘viral’, especially in ontologically probabilistic 
microstates and entropic dissipative structures. Second, the catalysis of inorganic enzymes 
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propels the possibility of change. The essential statement is then that the posthuman 
condition and closed organism is a contraction in terms. Therefore, the posthuman no longer 
conforms to the tissue bound human representation or phenomenon of the human subject, 
but is a multi-substance organism that “is open to particles, waves and attractors.”
62
 As such, 
the body is neither neutral nor with pre-given forms, but instead it is in a constant process of 
becoming that is made up of all types of matter with boundaries that are neither fixed nor 
clear-cut.
63
 Furthermore, even solid and static bodies can be or become unstable and change, 
due to being open to exchange with other entities on a socio-historical (Latour’s hybrid), 
material (Simondon’s technicity) and molecular (Prigogine & Stegner’s dissipative and 
complex systmes) level. Thus, the interphase between human category and technology that 




The phenomenon of technology and the human body is instead a case of matter that is 
moving in different accords, implicated in constant becoming and in a much wider post-
biological evolution. Key to understanding the posthuman politically requires a focus on 
materiality: to take the molecular, atomic and subatomic level into account in order to not 
only show that it is an open organism, but also to show the consequences of entropy and 
change that matter implies. These examples not only suggest, but also demonstrate that these 
behaviours are numerous. Support for this is coming from all areas of the sciences. 
Advances in chemical engineering, for example, demonstrate the self-organising qualities of 
fluid crystal (many of which make up proteins and cell membranes, but also soap for 
example). So does R&D in thermodynamics, as seen in matter rearranging itself or melting 
with/separating from other substances due to changes in temperature and acoustic physics as 
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the self-organisation of substances due to frequencies and resonance.
65
 The argument, 
however, is not that of comparison, analogy or metaphor because it is not a case of the 
posthuman behaving like matter. In contrast, it is matter that is implicated in pre-subjective 
and pre-conscious forms of agency, material conditions and their changes that are significant 
in behaviour, patterns and habits. More specifically, matter only designates different kinds 
of intensities captured by various chemical bonds that make up a substance. The atoms 
entering into molecular bonds do come with different energy levels and therefore 
behavioural patterns. Varying intensities are extremely important, however, as these are pre-
individual capacity and affectivity. Affect, as the capacity to act or be acted upon, is 
transferred through molecular changes. Due to organisms being open these possibilities to 
act or be acted can circulate between what are conceived of as closed entities of the human 
or objects. This is part of the reason why agency is diffused and leads the latest research in 
neurosciences to suggest that if there is a phenomenon like the mind, then it has to be 
extended, spreading across the human and object category alike.
66
 In essence, fluctuating 
intensities that imply shifting centres of affect carry the mind and ultimately consciousness 
across phenomenological boundaries. However, this deeply troubles important notions of 
political subjectivity and agency, and also moral and ethical behaviour. Given the impact of 
research and scientific development in the last decades and century for that matter, questions 
about the pillars that make up political philosophy need to be brought up to speed with such 
developments, with a renewed focus on material politics. Reconceptualising the body and 
technology into open systems that can form one posthuman body is an initial step that will 
help articulating a new political agency that sits easily within the scientific revolutions 
underway in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.  
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From Matter to Mind? Mattered Thought and Thinking Matter 
The resonance of a posthuman condition will also drive the study of technology forward and 
into new directions, in and outside IR. Within debates on the posthuman world of becoming, 
open complex systems theory and principles of self-organization are increasingly being 
integrated into IR literature that investigates complex material resonances in the realm of the 
political.
67
 However, the role of the political posthuman body and subject is still missing, 
which is a direct challenge and obstacle to the analysis of political games. This is because 
even though the focus on open systems and organisms is crucial, it only marginally touches 
upon the human category and condition. While neurosciences and philosophy are already 
working in tandem over questions of the extended mind
68
 – which is essentially a posthuman 
concern and a claim that is strongly supported by a theory of open organisms – the struggle 
still seems to be about how the body comes into the equation. With regards to extended 
cognition, academic doubts have led to statements like this: “Although I realise that 
analogies can sometimes be misleading (although seductive) if pushed too far, I cannot help 
but think about the question of the body and what constitutes it.”
69
 This is precisely what is 
at stake here and the missing piece in the puzzle. However, when combined with the open 
posthuman body, there is no reason that thought needs to correlate with the phenomenal 
human body and, thus, cognition can spread with affect across membranes and mineral 
surfaces. What is more, the open posthuman would actually greatly enhance current research 
in and theories of embodied, embedded, enacted, extended and affective cognition (4EA). 
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A posthuman understanding of 4EA is crucial in order to analyse the immersive gaming 
experience given the high degree of embodiment, embeddedness, enactment and affect of 
immersive games. The open organisms of gaming technology, participants and the gaming 
environment can form a posthuman unit during the game with affect travelling across these 
previously individual bodies, to form one gaming entity with an equilibrium of intensities at 
its centre. Affect does not always have to travel across boundaries and intensities do not 
necessarily have to stabilize to form a temporary coherent unit. Nonetheless, provided that 
the gaming experience is successful in generating a movement that beats at the same rhythm, 
or acts at the same speed or rests at the same temperature, for example, then 4EA cognition is 
a very interesting, hugely complex question. To quickly explain what these terms refer to 
using the example of gaming, then “embodied” is the attention on the lived experience and 
lived body of the gamer, but also means that this type of gaming experience is “partly made 
up of extra-neural bodily structures and processes” of the player.
70
 In the case of gaming, this 
refers to the game’s software. “Embedded” is somewhat similar in the way that his/her neural 
system is nested within an organized body and environment, referring to the wider analogue 
as well as digital gaming environment and set-up. Therefore, the behaviour of the gaming 
body cannot be analysed independently of the physical and social environment. Equally 
important for gaming is “enactment” so that cognition is closely tied to the acting and the 
moving body. This is crucial in the way that it disagrees with a model of cognition and 
action-control of sensing-modelling-planning-acting, but already locates all of these steps 
into (matter) movement itself. “Extended”, a very prominent attribute in gaming, treats 
cognition as a wider system that parts of the ‘mind’ in the form of data and information are 
placed or stored in the environment and are constantly recruited from these extended 
locations for action and cognition. This is not only because the game comes with encoded 





cognitive data, but also because data can be added, changed and stored throughout the game 
as well. Another case in point are the low- and high-tech props in games that are dispersed 
throughout the room and are therefore part of the game-setting and environment, indeed the 
gaming hard and software are whole extended cognitive systems in this sense. “Affective” is 
slightly more ambivalent as it classically refers to Antonio Damasio’s critique on Descartes 
who argues that feelings are more fundamental in understanding human behaviour than 
logical thought. In the ensuing research from this initial claim neuroscience has specifically 
focused on measuring and analysing the brain’s responses to affective triggers.
71
 Yet, given 
that affect, as ability to act or be acted upon, was established as a more-than-human 
phenomenon, the focus differs from that of neuropsychology and its primacy on the brain’s 
activity. With regard to cognition, affect is actually the least interesting as it is the most 
anthropocentric one, when it comes to the production of pre-subjective, pre-individual and 
posthuman thought, the 3Es are of much greater consequence. The specific development of a 
theory of posthuman thought will be discussed at length in the second part of this chapter, but 
its materiality as well as the implication of the open posthuman in respect to the 3E ‘mind’ 
need to be addressed first. The materiality of the posthuman mind as it were precedes an 
analysis of the posthuman experience.  
 
Theories of 4EA cannot be readily integrated into the analysis of the posthuman. In view that 
commonplace notions of the mind behold that even if extended, it is unique to one human 
being, which is therefore incompatible with the posthuman condition. This becomes 
increasingly apparent with recent scientific progress, especially in quantum physics. Not only 
locatable in the human, but even inside the head, the mind is believed to be without a material 
existence as such. Despite the fact that theorists point out where it resides, it is nonetheless 
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assumed that it does not even occupy any space, whereas matter does. Notably since 
Descartes, Western philosophy starts its analysis of the theory of mind from this 
perspective.
72
 This alone has caused numerous debates in neurosciences and philosophy 
respectively. This assumption is problematic for the present analysis because it shares, 
perpetuates and enforces the mind/body dualism. The mind versus brain (matter) conundrum 
sparks frequent discussions about whether and how the mind/brain influences processes of 
attention, memory, sense-making, learning, judgement and evaluations and reasoning. There 
is even a designated neurophilosophy (or philosophy of neuroscience) dedicated to the study 
of such issues. Debates started to increase significantly, however, when quantum physics 
unmasked that theories of mind are based on Newtonian physics that “in essence ultimately 
reduces everything to a mechanism of some kind.”
73
 Put simply, it showed that our 
understanding of the world (regardless of natural or social sciences) and personal beliefs are 
assumptions that only make sense in Newtonian cosmologies. Furthermore, the discovery that 
all material systems have the property of the wave-particle duality is in absolute contradiction 
to the Newtonian view that holds that “each system has its own nature independently of 
context” so that matter either behaves like a wave or a particle.
74
 Although this insight may 
seem unrelated to questions of the mind and matter, it triggered research that suggests that 
these new-found properties of electronic fields also contain active information that behaves 
like “the activity of information in our ordinary subjective experience.”
75
 This fundamentally 
troubles the mind/matter dualism, but still supports the extended cognition theory. In respect 
to studying pre-subjective, preconscious forms of politics that emerge through gaming and 
that are conceived from a post-Newtonian position, these are important issues to take on 
board. Political gaming would be futile if it were not for cognitive processes and material 
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technosciences that allow taking the possibility of extended cognition seriously. However, the 
condition of the posthuman as so far outlined and with the persistence on the vital and 
material aspect of all substances, takes cognition out of the anthropocentric frame of 
reference that adheres to the mind/matter dualism.  
 
Posthuman thought as it occurs during gaming lies outside the phenomenal human mind and 
thereby dismisses the implicit argument that mind activity not only has to be human, but also 
immaterial without mass, matter and space. This rests on a twofold argument that first 
suggests that if there is a happening, there is matter, for even intensities consist of at least 
(strings of) energy, if not forces in their most ‘minimal’ form. Second, thought does not equal 
human because even matter outside the category of the human can be thinking. According to 
basic quantum theory, matter behaviour is characteristic off “wholeness, non-locality, and 
organization of movement through common pools of information.”
76
 Whereas wholeness 
describes the possibility of an electron to relate with distant features in its environment
77
, 
non-locality is the possibility of particles that even though very far away from each other on a 
macroscopic scale “appear to be able, in some sense, to affect each other, even though there 
is no known means by which they could be connected.”
78
 This is absolutely crucial, not only 
for the extensions of cognition, but also because it provides a reason why organisms such as 
player bodies, technology and environment can (re)connect. Therefore, the new property of 
non-local affective relations based on force not only frees thought from the human category, 
but also makes it stubbornly material.
79
 As such it can travel affectively across material 
boundaries. It suggests that electric signals shooting through the nervous system are not only 
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the “elementary particles of thought,”
80
 but that this electricity is not just contained within the 
brain and can travel on ‘non-human’ circuits and across the skin and other entities (such as a 
computer or other technology). This again is due to the idea of wholeness. Quantum theories 
of matter argue that there are particle systems in which particles belong to a pool of 
information as a whole rather than depending on each other in pre-assigned relations. This 
allows for creative movement of matter.
81
 More precisely, the pool of active information 
allows for “rudimentary mind-like behaviour of matter.”
82
 Information is not only content, 
but it is chemical, physical, biological and neurological. It is matter, so that thought is in 
matter too. Importantly, this is not a reductionist claim that wants to do away with thought 
and cognition by saying that the mind is simply matter and therefore unproblematic and 
quantifiable. The subtle difference lies in arguing that due to quantum potential even 
electrons have “rudimentary mental poles,” or a thinking capacity of active information.
83
 
Importantly, this provides a way of thinking that neither separates it from the physical aspect 
of reality nor from the material substance itself. Therefore, in the same way that bodies are 
not contained within a human body or objects, so thought is not contained within the human 
(brain), but its information potential is present in every electron. Given that thought is closely 
tied to information with a gradient that rises and ebbs, it is mobile and not stuck in the human 
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Therefore, the posthuman is not only open and mobile, but because it is material it is also 
informational and information is the key to leaving the body(matter)/mind dichotomy behind. 
To speak of embodied information is nothing new in areas of cognitive sciences or the social 
sciences like IR. However, analyses are still framed within the anthropocene and further 
within the Cartesian dualism of mind and matter. The common academic practice of 
separating the two, however, is contradictory as it ironically locates embodied information in 
a disembodied mind. Although it is tempting to internalize thinking even in the form of 
embodied information, informational flow does not have to be contained and can emerge 
everywhere (without always having to be visible or representable however).
85
 Thinking of 
embodied information in anthropocentric Cartesianism vitiates its potential to analyse NT 
like information systems, artificial intelligence and especially gaming. This is because it is 
blind to the embodied, enactive and vital nature of thought outside of the human and cannot 
ask how the (post)human can materialize as information everywhere, how thinking matters 
through electronic circuits and gaming software. The dichotomized analysis of 
body(material)/mind forces the idea of information to disembody the human category, rather 
than extending it. Whereas gaming could be analysed as a process that opens up the players 
and technology conducting thought into projections on multiple screens, letting it travel and 
reassemble through binary code and gaming props, it is instead analysed as a Husserlian 
disembodiment. Due to thought leaving the body via technological information systems it is 
treated as a move towards disembodied pure consciousness because intelligence is happening 
outside the embodied self. Even though there has been a recent trend to reverse this direction 
of analysis, as seen in the social sciences affective turn’s effort to resuscitate the body, this 
happens only in relation to the idea of the human.
86
 Furthermore, and more problematically, 
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the agenda seems to be that of emphasising the importance of the body over the mind, but 
with little to no vigour in overcoming the binary as such and thereby such affective works 
only perpetuates it.
87
 The argument here navigates between these two tendencies by taking 
thought out of the body through the idea of information, but only to embody posthuman 
thought in the ‘environment’.
88
 On a side note, the notion of the environment is somewhat ill-
suited, as the term only designates the relation of the surrounding to the thinking, perceiving 
human as the referent. Terms like surroundings and environment imply only a visual 
cognition of self-related movement. However, given that the posthuman is open and thought 
is mobile, these terms need to be recalibrated to fit with the post-anthropocene. Essentially, 
there is no ‘environment’ in a game as such because the posthuman is in the environment too. 
The latter only emerges as an after-effect on the level of the conscious player as a part of 
cognitive mapping. The game-space that is not a case of environment will be further 
developed as a case of a biogram later on in the thesis. For now, however, there can only be 
an environment outside of the game and the specific posthuman that emerges in it. This 
gaming posthuman emerges out of informational intensities and is thinking mattering. 
Conceiving of information as giving rise to thought and matter allows the inscription of 
thought into moving electrons, which thus generates a posthuman that is not split into two 
different registers of material body and immaterial thought.  
 
Of similar significance, it enables one to think of a life and a body (and ultimately politics) in 
posthuman parameters by working within the speed of molecular and sub-atomic particles. 
The reason why anthropocentric thought struggle to conceptualize other-human bodies is 
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closely related to a conception of change and a lifetime within only one scale, a human scale. 
The human category, nature, technology and all the other anthropocentric subjects and 
objects we have constructed are all embodied information. Stones are embodying different 
mineral or mineraloids and humans are embodying genetic information and so one. 
Importantly, all these embodiments are information flows that are in constant movement. 
There is constant change, rocks, water, organic and technological bodies are all engaged in 
processes of becoming, but it is too slow to be perceived. The anthropocene and the idea of 
the human is based on very slow embodied information. Rocks, wood, metal are in a constant 
state of change, albeit its matter is very slow, appearing to the human eye as static and solid. 
Likewise, our genetic code determining our eye colour seems to be the embodiment of one 
colour. Yet, proteins are constantly synthesising to produce new cells, replacing the dying 
ones, so that eye colour changes considerably over the span of a human lifetime.
89
 However, 
when change occurs outside human time is when conscious thought and analysis struggles. 
Problematically, with increasing speed in the technological age, there are not only 
posthumans and posthuman spaces, but there is posthuman time – one that zooms out over 
centuries and zooms in into the immediate. In other words, technologies of lived abstraction 
jump between temporal scales, accelerating politics and forcing political theory to catch up to 
the non-human speeds of mattering information (a posthuman lifetime).  
 
Thinking-mattering is the necessary step to redraw the boundaries of a body and to be able to 
see how this works in the case of gaming, so that the event, the technology and the gamers 
can under the right circumstances merge into one posthuman unit. This 4EA cognitive unit is 
acting, thinking and experiencing, and it is from this becoming-posthuman that pre-
subjective, pre-individual politics, which can give rise to the new, needs to be approached. 
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The posthuman is the starting point of this form of politics as well as for the new political 
subject. However, though the posthuman’s movement in terms of traveling intensities and 
centres of affect is a more tangible concept to entertain as we possess the necessary 
representational analogies to imagine this idea, outlining how the posthuman thinks (or is 
captured by thought rather) and how it experiences is an endeavour that works on an abstract 
level primarily. It is a constant, somewhat schizophrenic struggle to articulate a process that 
is thought, matter and movement at the same time, while having to draw on language that 
defies this possibility due to its representational and fundamentally anthropocentric nature.  
 
Emergence Through and Beyond Kant: Bildungstrieb in and of the Posthuman 
The creative potential in gaming is therefore closely linked to the political originarity found 
in the pre-subjective that emerges at the molecular and sub-atomic level. The processes that 
give rise to the political are intensities that move according to the information they carry and 
to the dis/equilibrium through which they travel. Importantly, this move is self-assembling 
then, as it is prior to consciousness. Immanuel Kant refers to this process as Bildungstrieb 
(“formative drive”),
90
 with which he seeks to “affirm the uniqueness of the phenomenon of 
organic growth.”
91
 Although Kant’s concept only refers to the nonmaterial and teleological 
drive, the concept is used here nonetheless for it can be amended to fit into a posthuman 
context and also because of its double entendre. While it was originally used as and translated 
into a self-organizational power present in organic organisms, the word Bildungstrieb can 
also mean and translate into “educational drive” or “learning drive.” In this sense it is a useful 
theoretical construct that beautifully captures the double-bind of material and thought 
formation (thinking-matter and mattering-thought) in the same breath. This makes it 
extremely useful as self-organization and -emergence does not have to refer to either mind or 
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the material, but instead can focus on the impersonal, pre-subjective and non-conscious 
agency that drives the posthuman. Analysing the posthuman through Bildungstrieb allows for 
all dynamics of life/form without being reducible to individual powers. Not only is Kant’s 
notion of Bildungstrieb important in highlighting the vitality and creativity in miniscule 
ontological movements, but it also sets the stage to keep tracing the entelechy of political life.  
 
However, the Bildungstrieb of new political life (political thought and the political subject), 
cannot be traced within existing techno-philosophical systems, political theory, or IR. The 
additional technological dimension increases the complexity and void of theoretical tools 
available. This is because Bildungstrieb is something that is rarely looked at in relation to 
technology and politics. Before the original organisation of vital force can be conceptualised 
in gaming, thought and subject formation need to be rearticulated to be suitable for the 
posthuman condition. Even though Kant’s Bildungstrieb provides impetus for the analysis it 
is unsuitable for a posthuman project because his philosophy rests on the premises that matter 
cannot be spontaneous or give rise to unforeseen developments, which is due in large to the 
fact that it is inanimate, and that there is “an unbridgeable chasm between life and ‘crude 
matter’.”
92
 Even though Kant was careful to associate Bildungstrieb with matter, he still saw 
a difference between them because matter for him is dead and could not possibly give rise to 
life. However, knowing now that matter is full of vital information changes the concept of 
Bildungstrieb drastically. Furthermore, Kant saw this drive occurring within organisms that 
are closed and mechanical, working according to Newtonian forces that are universal for all 
physical systems. These are things that need to be adjusted in the quantum age of complex, 
open systems that resonate everywhere. The problem is, however, that most Western 
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philosophy profoundly rests on Kantian transcendentalism and correlationist thinking, 
93
 
which renders it blind to the posthuman as it were, for it is too rigid to conceive of the 
production of the new through 4EA cognition outside the human. Most fundamentally, it is 
very problematic to think of a pre-personal, even impersonal form of experience that does not 
unfold according to pre-given structures of the disembodied, rational mind. However, for the 
political to emerge, there needs to be at least a theory of how the posthuman cognizes, 
experiences and thinks as this is the basis for any subjectivity. In short, it calls for a 




In order to turn Kant upside down in his work Essai, Bergson most succinctly recalls that it 
was Kant who manifested the dividing line between the noumenal and the phenomenal world; 
a division which maintained that one ought to ponder the empirical world objectively.
95
 
Furthermore, this goes hand in hand with the unquestioned premise that thought, experience 
and perception of the phenomenal world only happens within said rational mind.
96
 This 
means that the conscious subject only knows things as far as they are presented to thought, 
but does not actually have access to the thing-in-itself (Ding an sich). Furthermore, in order 
to be able to think at all, the mind needs to imagine things as occurring in time and space and 
it is through this representation that things are presented to the mind.
97
 Therefore, Kantian 
idealist assumptions hold that humans construct their reality according to their perception and 
experience of the phenomenal world, “regardless of whether things really exist in space and 
in time, in some absolute sense, independently of us.”
98
 This implies two things: first, the 
                                                          
93
 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency (New York: Continuum, 
2008); Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek & Graham Harman, The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and 
Realism (Melbourne: re.press, 2011), 4-5. 
94
 Bryant, Srnicek & Harman, The Speculative Turn, 5. 
95
 Henri Bergson, Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience (Paris: PUF, 2010), 5. 
96
 Robert Stern, Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit (London: Routledge, 2002), 101. 
97
 Suzanna Guerlac, Thinking in Time: An Introduction to Henri Bergson (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2006), 93. 
98
 Guerlac, Thinking in Time, 94.  
88 
 
rejection of any absolute from an idealist standpoint and, second, that knowledge cannot 
possibly reach beyond sensible experience and is limited to the perception, rather the 
empirical grasp, of things, since only “divine beings” could obtain knowledge of Kant’s Ding 
an sich.  
 
However, within these empirical boundaries rigorous knowledge is possible, as long as it is 
observable and testable by senses and corresponding scientific laws. Equally important in 
drawing out a posthuman noology is the idea that empirical does not mean objective, which is 
a mistake often made, especially in the social sciences. What empirical means since Kant’s 
Copernican Revolution is that scientific or any other investigation structures the truth of the 
observed, objective world according to given forms of the mind.
99
 In other words, the 
sciences’ “forming, materializing, and measuring activity” – which arguably is a natural and 
necessary tendency for practical interest – is actually just a habit of the mind.
100
 The crucial 
consequence of this position is that it draws a sharp distinction between the material world 
and the observer, which is the perpetuation and intensification of the Aristotelian separation 
between matter and mind. As such, having dismissed the separation earlier, it calls into 
question how knowledge claims emerge then. In other words, this calls for the mapping of a 
posthuman theory of thought, that is noology.  
 
Experience and Phenomenology – a Difficult Break-Up 
By implication, the primacy of phenomenological experience for Kant means that 
transcendentalist philosophy makes it impossible to conceive of novelty, as there is no 
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conception of new experience and new thought.
101
 Kant’s idea of common sense and the 
rational mind confine experience, limiting it to what he calls the possibility of experience.
102
 
In following Kant’s idealism, Western philosophy starts off with the assumption that the 
conscious subject has “synthetic a priori knowledge of certain basic properties” according to 
which things appear to the subject.
103
 This, however, insists on experience always being 
conditioned already. The manner in which Kant’s idealism has structured experience means 
that our corresponding knowledge supposedly cannot reach beyond the phenomenal. In short, 
it can never be new and it will always just be a case of perception. In contrast, the claim here 
is that there must be a way for new things in the world to emerge, for, otherwise, the world 
just is, but is not becoming. In this sense gaming with its focus on different ways of engaging 
with and knowing the world (in miniature), is a test lab as it were. The unfolding argument 
will suggest that when leaving the subjective, phenomenological realm behind and going 
below, above and beyond the human subject (that is the player), experience can be genuinely 
new. Following thinkers like Bergson and Deleuze, who distance themselves from Kantian 
transcendence, this will sketch a posthuman epistemology that can philosophically 
incorporate becoming by opening up experience to novelty and other dimensions of the real.  
 
Considering the posthuman experience as the basis for not only a different epistemology in 
the form of a noology, but also a pre-subjective, new politics is a theoretically twofold task, 
for it must not only engage with the Kantian legacy in Western philosophy, but also rework 
philosophies of experience or phenomenologies. The reason for doing so is not only an effort 
to circumvent Kant’s insistence on the rational mind as a starting point, but also to show that 
these pregiven structures that guide experience result in a representationalist worldview. 
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Deleuze refers to this as “the dogmatic image of thought,”
104
 that is essential to Kant’s theory 
of transcendental ideas, which refers to the correspondence (or correlation in Meillassoux’s 
terms
105
) between transcendental conditions of experience and individual empirical 
experience.
106
 Accordingly, experience takes place when transcendental concepts of 
understanding relate with the empirical. This means that, from a Kantian idealist standpoint, 
and arguably from most philosophical traditions including phenomenology, experience can 
only occur as recognition: the identification of particulars with given universals.
107
 In 
essence, experience always starts from recognition, which is a static treatment of it and one 
that closes experience off from cognition and novel thought.  
 
The focus on experience gains more leverage in this respect as it is not only helps to 
understand modes of learning in games, but it is also the point over which philosophy 
diverges as it challenges ideas of thinking, learning and theorizing. Whereas for Kant 
experience starts with recognition, Deleuze argues that it is triggered by concrete problems 
and that thought eventually ensues from this as the basis of learning.
108
 In the simplest way, 
this divergence is then over the question of whether gaming is just a mechanism to train 
recognition of certain problematic scenarios and to rehearse possible solutions for it, or if the 
experienced game could ever emerge out of a unique problematic setting that generates an 
entirely new set of options, insights and concepts. Using Kant’s theory of ideas, Deleuze 
advances his own understanding of problems and by way of contrast argues that ideas must 
be immanent to experience in order to be truly problematic. Importantly, ideas here are not 
meant in a transcendental and Platonic sense, but are used simply to describe intensities that 
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are in tension, in the form of disequilibrium for example. Accordingly, ideas trigger a unique 
systematic field each time during gaming, which thereby opens up experience and forms the 
basis of knowledge.
109
 The important difference here to Kant is that for him recognition (that 
is experience) only occurs on this level of conscious inquiry, but experience as it is used here 
happens a few steps before consciousness is reached as it “is the opening up of the systematic 
field of empirical inquiry” in the first place.
110
 Knowledge in this sense is highly context 
dependent, relating claims to the ‘empirical inquiry’ in the game. Nevertheless, this is not a 
blueprint or even attempt at some form of universal knowledge. More precisely, the 
important implication for gaming is that it is not something already known or contextualized, 
but in fact it is the engagement with a unique problem that can trigger thought through which 




How this conceptual process unfolds cannot be understood within the dominant 
phenomenological notion of experience. The study of experience as engagement with the 
world and how subjects make sense of it is known as “phenomenology” in philosophy. This 
creates a problem for the thesis insofar as phenomenology rests upon Kant’s phenomenal-
noumenal division so that experience in a phenomenological sense is quite different from 
experience as it is used here, because phenomenological experience also unfolds through 
Kant’s rational, given structures of the un-mattered mind. More generally then, 
phenomenology is a question about perception and how things appear to the human, which 
means it is fundamentally anthropocentric and at odds with the posthuman. To the credit of 
phenomenology it must be acknowledged that it is by no means a coherent philosophical 
tradition. Yet, its individual variants, as enriching as they are for their respective types of 
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inquiry are nonetheless missing aspects that are essential to the pursuit of the new thought 
through gaming.  
 
Concerns over the limits of the dualistic order of mind and matter already surface within the 
phenomenological traditions. The study of experience has already been marked by a tension 
between the abstract imagery of Cartesianism found in cognitive sciences (also known as the 
philosophy of mind among analytical philosophers), as presented by the earliest 
phenomenologist Edmund Husserl, and the interactionist alternative offered by his perhaps 
best-known student Martin Heidegger (simply phenomenology in continental philosophy).
112
 
The primacy of the body-mind split in regard to studying technological experience has led to 
a dominant line of philosophical inquiry that conceives of a unitary concept of the human and 
the machine, where the mind is the software in the hardware of the brain. Cognitive processes 
are studied in computational, mechanistic terms and vice versa. The metaphors attached to 
phenomenological/theory of mind approaches – equating the computer and the brain – are 
very powerful and should be taken with caution. Indeed, since the rise of new technical ideas 
in the twentieth century, especially in computation, the metaphors that are describing 
cognitive processes and contemplation are a mix of mathematics and machinery.
113
 More 
specifically, new psychology and analytical philosophy sought to describe human beings with 
a vocabulary grounded in the metaphors of technologically realizable mathematics.
114
 
Equally, these metaphors prove to be a powerful stock in the social sciences as well, 
informing new research agendas which seek to explore the role of NT in upscaling 
organizational and societal complexities, focusing on the “animation and personification of 
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 This gave rise to an influential dynamic of reinforcement between 
computer technology and the Cartesian view of human nature and thought.
116
 Despite its 
adherence to Cartesian duality and a bifurcated world, Husserlian phenomenology is 
intriguing for its close alignment of cognition and the computer. However, the “thinking 
machine” so to speak, is only ever used as an analogy, there is no move made towards de-
humanizing thought beyond the metaphorical level.  
 
Heidegger rejected Husserl’s phenomenology precisely because it maintained that inner 
mental phenomena are interpretations of sensory impressions to which meaning can be 
assigned.
117
 In this sense, for Heidegger Husserl’s philosophy was merely an “unfortunate 
turn” towards neo-Kantian transcendental idealism.
118
 By way of contrast, in Heidegger’s 
phenomenology the world does not obtain meaning through our perception of it. Instead, 
meaning already exists in the world and needs to be revealed, to become present.
119
 To be 
specific, the “world has meaning in how it is physically organized in relationship to our 
physical abilities, and in how it reflects a history of social practice.”
120
 Therefore, in a 
Heideggerian sense technological interaction, like gaming for example, is a mode of 
revealing meaning, rather than creating meaning. It is a dialectical renegotiation of meaning 
through embodied interaction of situated agents. Whereas Husserl was concerned with the 
question of how we assign meaning to our perceptions of the world, Heidegger asked “how 
does the meaning of the world reveal itself to us through our actions within it?”
121
  In 
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Heideggerian thought action precedes theory and the way we encounter the world – the place 
within which we act is logically prior to our understanding of it.
122
 Although this 
interactionist line of phenomenology is much closer to the present emphasis on the pre-
subjective, there are still inherent problems. For example, for Heidegger subjects are human 
animals that can be distinguished from objects not because humans possess consciousness, 
but because their actions are motivated by concern (Sorge) and circumspection (Umsicht), 
which Heidegger takes to be the ontological premise upon which experience and the human 
subject rests.
123
 Even though Heidegger seeks to establish a non-mentalist subject and way of 
encountering the world in this way, experience itself remains human and subject-centric. Put 
simply, things and humans exist in the world with little conceptual room for a mode of 
thought (sense-making) and the self-emergence of subjects outside the human category. 
 
Therefore, adopting variants of phenomenology is problematic on noological, ontological and 
metaphysical grounds. Indeed it is a split tradition at “the midpoint of two intersections,” 
where for one, phenomenology can be charged with hylomorphism, for it only deals with 
objects, given that “sheer formless sense data” could never be encountered.
124
 This is to argue 
that a world only consisting of objects is intangible and could not be experienced. Second, 
phenomenologists seem to be undecided about the role of phenomena, for on the one hand, it 
is argued that they are united with human consciousness through intentional acts, while on 
the other, a clear distinction is remained as phenomena are treated as end points of human 
awareness “rather than melting indistinguishable into us.”
125
 Thus, phenomenology is riddled 
with a “turbulent structure of objects” and undecided about them being immanent or 
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 As the dominant framework for the study of experience this seems rather 
problematic as it is not clear at all how thought and concepts relate to experience and 
different modes of participating in the world.  
 
Phenomenology’s confusion over these metaphysical issues, especially its treatment of 
reality, will also create future problems with regard to studying the triangulated problem of 
the Virtual, the digital and the actual. The problem is that phenomenology only ever deals 
with the human awareness of objects and the world and has therefore no conceptual room for 
the pre-subjective, and is merely a philosophy of access.
127
 It is unable to conceptualize 
anything that lies outside the human sensorium, restricting itself to the realms of language 
and cognition, which according to Harman means that phenomenology, despite all its 
practical purpose, is in fact idealism.
128
 While there are limitations to a study of posthuman 
experience,
129
 it holds nonetheless that there are “communicative energies” that are 
nonlinguistic
130
 and that there are forms of posthuman democracies that could convene a 
“parliament of things.”
131
 Whereas a speculative conceptualization is not discouraged by 
practical obstacles to a posthuman political techno-ecology, phenomenology stops right there, 
the conscious human subject that is caught up in a stale split between reality and appearance.  
 
New Systems of Experience: From Transcendence to the Transcendental  
In order to conceive of experience in distinction to idealism and phenomenology it needs to 
be reversed, so that thought has to be understood “as occurring in and through experience, not 
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 It is the simple suggestion that both develop in tandem and because of each 
other. Secondly, in order to flesh this out further ‘the subject’ needs to be problematized as 
well. Whereas the beginning of a new experience is claimed to be pre-subjective and 
nonconscious, it will eventually capture the subjective consciousness. The crucial distinction 
is that according to Deleuze experience is always an experience of the new in which the 
subject is always transformed. In contrast, Kant’s subject is supposedly self-identical and 
remains as it is even during experience.
133
 Arguably, in Kant, the relation of the subject to 
itself is static because the empirical subject correlates exactly to the transcendental one.
134
 
However, Deleuze’s notion adopted here is a critique of the transcendental conditions in 
which the subject can actually never reach complete correspondence with the empirical with 
the consequence that its internal relations are always in motion and never complete.
135
 
Furthermore, the transformation of the subject happens when the field of empirical inquiry – 
that is the problematic field or the system of experience – opens up.
136
 Added to the argument 
that experience is never complete, the subject can always be transformed anew.
137
 This is 
identified as opportunity for gaming experience, as it provides a window of openness for 
political subjectivity to be transformed or be produced anew altogether. 
 
Producing a System of Experience; Producing the Individual  
For a posthuman gaming experience as technology and through technology to be able to 
provide for alternative political subjectivities, it cannot be an ordinary experience of 
recognition and instead needs to be pre-individual and pre-subjective, happening outside of 
human consciousness. If experience emerges out of a concrete idea-problem, rather than out 
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of a classical subject-object encounter then experience can be impersonal, pre-subjective and 
nonconscious, that is posthuman. Traditionally, experience is conceived of the conscious, 
sensual first-person human encounter of the objective world around him/her. In the context of 
gaming this means that the player encounters different objects within a gaming scenario and 
due to matching it with previous experiences, knowledge and sensual data makes sense of 
this encounter. This anthropocentric view of experience is untenable after having undone the 
human category, which means that experience has to be thought of independently of notions 
such as the human sensorium, consciousness and control. The question of experience is 
therefore not about who is encountering what in which way and how he/she is making sense 
of it, but rather how a problem-idea emerges, unfolds and comes to constitute a posthuman 
subject. However, understanding posthuman experience has remained a philosophical 
challenge so far, and arguably this is because experience is treated as a primarily cognitive 
and sensual process, rather than as the non-agentic production of the new due to a concrete 
idea-problem. Speculative literature, especially in vital materialism, has started tackling 
issues such as agency, subjectivity and causality, but remains largely silent over what 
experience is in a posthuman context. The few attempts to date are either purely abstract, 
tracing experience back to its pre-individual origin in ideas, but remain committed to the 
human as the referent of experience or they bring in a more-than-human or non-human as 
referent, but then in their explanation rely largely on phenomenological philosophy, mixing 
materialist with phenomenological accounts.
138
 The latter is particularly problematic not 
because it is using phenomenology in parts, but because in so doing it is reversing the post-
anthropocentric move by anthropomorphising the more-than-human by filtering it through 
phenomenological experience. In contrast, the intention is to outline an approach that 
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balances both, a model of experience that does not start with the first-person encounter of an 
object, but where the individual (a posthuman can act as an individual) is only the product of 
experience rather than the initiator of it. Second, and more importantly it needs to show how 
this form of experience is not a case of recognition, but can give rise to something genuinely 
new. The argument is that “there just ‘is’ experience, without subjects or objects, inside or 




In getting to the conceptual point of a posthuman gaming experience, it is not enough to 
merely diffuse the human and redraw it as a posthuman. Overcoming the subject-object 
division necessitates an ontology of immanence and a move towards the transcendental. 
Assuming that the posthuman is a unit that is shaped by intensities such as speed and 
temperature, then this unit nonetheless appears as an aggregation of individual humans and 
objects to the perceptual eye. However, in order to understand the posthuman and the non-
division between subject (gamer) and objects (game software, game setting and other 
necessary electronic and non-electronic objects), this conscious, perceptual view, that is sense 
data, needs to be dropped. The unique systematic fields triggered by ideas are fields of 
experiences, so that in individual cases of an experience it can be thought of as an evolving 
system or field. In contrast to the Kantian notion of a system, in this philosophy it is not only 
treated as open, but also as arising out of the indeterminate, “a movement we can conceive of 
by means of an idea.”
140
 Furthermore, multiple systems can exist alongside and with each 
other without forming a unity or whole. Importantly, such a system or field of experience has 
no outside, there is no transcendence. Instead, the relation to this field is transcendental, that 
which is directly experienced.
141
 In contrast to Kant’s insistence on the element of 
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transcendence in experience, the transcendental field of experience does not attempt to reflect 
or represent that which is outside of experience,
142
 because there cannot be an outside due to 
everything arising from the “plane of immanence.”
143
 In the same way that there is no 
separation between mind and matter, according to which the former transcends the latter in 
order to represent an external material world, there is neither a material nor perceptual 
outside. In theory, understanding a gaming experience cannot be done through the eyes of an 
outside observer. So instead of having two separate planes, “the plane of immanence locates 
the being of the subject as well as the being of an outside world on the same plane: a plane 
that consists solely of impersonal and pre-individual elements of thought and experience.”
144
 
More importantly, the plane of immanence is not immanent to something or someone and it 
cannot be put into opposition of something that is assumed to exist externally or prior to it.
145
 
To do so would unavoidably reintroduce the distinction between the subject and the outside 
world, it would also resuscitate the illusion of transcendence. Therefore, immanence has to be 
understood as immanent to itself and nothing else. Following Deleuze’s transcendental 
empiricism, a posthuman and a posthuman politics has to start with experience as such 
without the a priori distinction of internal-external and subject-object. In other words, the 
whole world in its being and becoming arises out of the same plane of immanence, different 
bodies are merely spikes on the plane that surge up at different, perhaps sometimes 
overlapping coordinates. Formation is rising and falling at its own rhythm as part of a 
continual becoming-body and becoming-world. Therefore, rather than melting the subject and 
the object back together to reverse Kant, we have never been separate in the first place. It is 
misleading to think of technology as having developed in contrast and detached from 
humans; it is equally misleading to think of technology as part of us or to anthropomorphize 
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it by saying that technology is like us. Instead, the category of the human and technology are 
merely structuring devises operating at an abstract level, rather than a material one. Drawing 
a separation is a cognitive, visual and conscious move, but does not say anything about 
reality as such. It is argued that subject-object division is an anthropocentric conceptual 
crutch to structure experience and consciousness in retrospect, and that there is the possibility 
that experience unfolds otherwise among collective bodies. However, this is not a dismissal 
of the utility of this conceptual crutch, but rather a disclaimer that the subject-object dynamic 
is only ever an internal conscious relation. So if one was to speak of ‘objects’ as such, it is 
only at the conscious level of the subject, which means that the objects conceptually 
produced are also the objects a subject, and only that subject can know. In part this is based 
on the difference between Kant and Deleuze. For Kant the conditions for possible objects are 
located in the transcendental, self-identical subject, whereas Deleuze located them in 
experience itself because subjects are products of experience.
146
 Objects are a further 
construct as an effort to understand experience and make sense of the world. In this sense, the 
question of subject-object or empirical cases for that matter is actually a problem of an 
individuation process of a subject through experience. According to this, to understand the 
process of the production of new subjectivities has to begin with an inquiry into how a field 
of experience is produced. 
 
Intensive Differences as the New Skin 
The abstraction of the materiality of the posthuman into the conceptual level allows for the 
intensities that shape bodies to be thought of as intensive differences. Intensities themselves 
are composed of attractors or elements that are in reciprocal relation.
147
 Because intensities 
create an idea-problem they are also the pool from which a system of experience can emerge. 
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However, at this point the status of this experience is still Virtual, which means it is not 
actualized yet. As long as it is not actualized the internal relation between the elements can 
change to other asymmetrical forms. Therefore, “intensities are implicated multiplicities, 
‘implexes’, made up of relations between asymmetrical elements which direct the course of 
the actualization of ideas and determine the case of solution for problems.”
148
 The reason 
why intensive differences are so potent in setting up problems and thereby driving 
actualization is that these are intensive and not extensive properties. Whereas extensive 
differences such as length, area or volume are divisible, intrinsic differences are continuous 
and do not change even if the quantity changes, as for example pressure and temperature.
149
 
The importance, however, is not that intensive properties are indivisible, but that a change 
could only ever be in kind (not in scale) and that during such a phase of qualitative transition, 
the element is losing symmetry and changing its dynamic. There is, however, also an aspect 
of stability to these changes in the way that when brought together intensive properties “tend 
to average themselves,” resulting in moments of stability, which can be either short or long-
term.
150
 Yet, the key here is that intensive differences spontaneously drive moments of 
change and that the direction of this change tends toward equilibrium; systems seem to seek 
stabilization. Intensive difference can be seen as a system of dissymmetry of difference that 
has potential energy.
151
 It is this potential energy produced through intensive dissymmetry – 
individual potentials that Deleuze often refers to as singularities – provides for the onset of 
experience. Ultimately, “difference is the sufficient reason of change to the extent that change 
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tends to negate the difference,”
152
 thereby producing a continuous dynamic that drives reality.  
In short, a change in intensity is a change in the problem itself that creates for an entirely new 
potential field of experience itself.  
 
This is why the conditions of possible experience and internal subject-object relations are not 
found in Kant’s transcendental subject, but rather in the behaviour of intensity (which can be 
framed as the transcendental conditions if one wants to speak in these terms). However, these 
singularities cannot be known empirically and it is only the difference it produces that can be 
experienced and known.
153
 Furthermore, the production of a system of experience not only 
follows from the Virtual to the actual with intensity being the “sufficient reason,”
154
 but it is 
thereby also the process of becoming-individual, individuation. The form that ultimately 
becomes perceived as individual posthuman or even phenomenal human has to undergo this 
process so that the opening of a system of experience is also the opening of a theatre of 
individuation.
155
 This individuation process is far from what human imagination is possible to 
understand given that this is the becoming of a posthuman and not that of a representational 
human. The changes and dynamics involved in individuation are not that of a human 
development. To highlight this contradiction of unrecognizable distortion and becoming-
individual, Deleuze draws on embryology to understand this course: 
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There are ‘things’ only an embryo can do, movements that it alone can 
undertake or withstand […] The destiny and achievement of the embryo is to 
live the unliveable, to sustain forced movements of a scope that would break 




This product of the forceful theatre of individuation or what Deleuze calls the larval 
subject,
157
 is not an actual individual posthuman yet. The larval subject undergoes these 
experiences of movement as it becomes an individual and important for the posthuman 
condition is that the larval subject is not a human subject, but “wherever there is synthesis or 
contraction, there is a larval subject undergoing this contraction.”
158
 Accordingly, this is the 
production of a body without image and representation, there are few mental images that 
consciousness can draw on to recognize this process. Novelty lies precisely in its 
unrecognizable, unprecedented faculty. Furthermore, becoming-individual cannot be 
understood within the normal frame of reference of what a body looks like, can or cannot do. 
This is where the mattering process parts from Aristotelian hylomorphism as there is no 
usual, normal, common or ordinary form of the body as such; neither is it given by the 
soul/mind, but depends on the movement of singularities each time. There is no teleology in 
this process, no set steps or shapes of a body that individuation approximates. The posthuman 
is not an accidental form that deviates from a pregiven form of the body. In contrast, the 
individuation of a body and subject is like a dice throw each time. In this way, a field of 
experience opens up due to singular points on the plane of immanence that undergo an 
actualization process. In part experience then always starts in the Virtual and is not an event 
of the phenomenal or actual world only. It is precisely the indeterminacy and potentiality that 
characterizes its beginning that offers the possibility of change.  
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The field of experience as individuation process that unfolds from singularities into the larval 
and then the individual shows that experience is essentially a problem playing out and 
triggering a response.
159
 As such it is an actualization in one particular way, but does not 
actually exhaust or entirely represent the problem. The significance herein lies that even 
though experience is only one particular response to an already singular problem, it 
nonetheless highlights the plenitude of potential and possible responses that the one emerging 
individual still carries with it. That is to say, as much as an emerging body is one 
actualization, it is also the entire spectrum of non-actualized responses that gives it its sense 
of openness, indeterminacy and possibility to transform.
160
 What Deleuze refers to as virtual 
and actual “half”
161
 in an individuating body is therefore identified here as the locus of the 
new and that this novelty emerges through and in form of unique fields of experience. 
Crucially then, experience’s attributes of becoming and originality are what makes gaming 
such a key pedagogical development, since its modus operandi is experiencing – over and 
over again.  
 
The possibility to repeat the game does not mean that the same experience can be repeated 
however. Indeed, it is precisely the point that it cannot be reproduced and neither can the 
same individual body be produced again.
162
 This is “perspective” in experience, which means 
that different gaming rounds are not a different view on the same gaming-scenario, but they 
are essentially different experiences that gave rise to different bodies. In essence, systems of 
experience cannot emerge outside the individual that developed as the solution to a problem, 
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“each series tells a story: not different points of view on the same story, like the different 
points of view […], but completely distinct stories.”
163
 This is because it is not a question of 
access as a phenomenological standpoint would suggest where there would only be different 
points of view on the same experienced object. To compare it to Kant, according to which 
different points of view based on the same experienced object can eventually be brought 
together additively, forming a unifying plane, like a puzzle that makes sense when all pieces 
have been put together. This is based on the premise that it is the same experience, but also 
that the system is closed off. In contrast, this research suggests that diverging experiences (or 
stories and their respective bodies) exceed the unity of a single field and even larger system, 
yet they can still coexist.
164
 In fact, it is precisely due to excess of their multiplicity that they 
do not converge into one.
165
 In the context of gaming this means that not only are there 
always entirely different experiences and gaming bodies, but also that there is not a totality of 
experience that can form a static solution as such. In this way there is no ideal outcome or 
unity that could be aspired to, forming a template that is then rigidly implemented in a 
technologised way. Different systems of experience cannot be added together to form a 




This outlines the beginning of non-dogmatic posthuman thought that characterizes gaming, 
for it does not presuppose and insists on a natural harmony between thought, experience and 
truth as in the version that results in a unifying plane of knowledge. Harmony in the dogmatic 
image of thought consists of the assumption of set (identical) faculties of objects that can be 
experienced and recognized, the transcendental condition of the subject and the possibility of 
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error when objective faculties are mistaken, but which can be corrected by adding more 
views and which essentially yields in a truth (even if approximated). Non-dogmatic thought, 
however, does have very little to do with truth in a conventional sense of an innate 
disposition. Instead thinking is primarily a creative act, rather than a production of truth that 
is some kind of abstract generality.
167
 Presubjective gaming experience is precisely premised 
upon thinking as a creative rather than recognising process. Doing away with the static, 
transcendental and rational human subject takes away the possibility of recognising, so that 
difference and novelty is no longer subordinated to “same” and “similar.” Principally, 
posthuman thought is the reverse of anthropocentric thought from repetition with difference 
to difference with repetition. This produces and structures individual bodies in a way that 
these can be transformed or affected. 
 
Ordinary Experience, Sensation and Involuntary Thought – Rupture Through Gaming 
Non-dogmatic thought is uncontrollably volatile. Given the absence of consciousness and 
effort in this form of experience means that posthuman thought is not an intentional act and, 
thus, cannot be initiated, controlled or monitored by the subject. What bestows posthuman 
thought with novelty and ‘freedom’ (the permanent virtual half of an individual body) 
translates into contingency in life and in the game in particular. This also means, however, 
that new experience does not always have to enter consciousness. Due to the fact that it is 
essentially a play of intensities, if these are not intense enough as it were, new experience 
happens below the threshold of consciousness. This leads Deleuze to argue that thought is 
involuntary, that bodies are forced to experience and think.
168
 Whether in general thought or 
gaming, this means that “things will continue to make sense in an ordinary way, according to 
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our ordinary empirical judgements so long as nothing happens that disturbs it.”
169
 The 
ordinary experience of an individual body can only be disrupted if it is confronted with 
something unrecognizable which in so doing will alter the body as well due to changing 
intensities. Arguably, one of the few identifiable general aims of games is then to 
continuously confront the previously individual playing bodies with something new, 
extraordinary and unrecognizable, which has so far not been part of the political/thinking 
repertoire. Therefore, gaming fundamentally depends on a rupture in the ordinary. 
 
Interestingly, this rupture or shock to ordinary experience will necessarily be sensible, to 
which Deleuze refers as “sign.”
170
 The sign itself is ‘perceived’ as intensive difference by the 
individual, but as something unrecognizable for which the previous, ordinary subject does not 
have any system of meaning. The breaking point of ordinary experience and the unfolding of 
a new experiential field occur when sensibility tries to grasp this new appearance but fails to 
do so because the sign only appears as difference or movement.
171
 However, this happening 
cannot be thought of in terms of a subject looking at something and not recognizing it, as it is 
not a conscious act of contemplation based on the gathering of sense-data. In contrast, 
sensation here deviates from its understanding in experimental psychology and analytic 
philosophy that treats it as sense-datum linked to the perception of a stimulus and passive 
sensory input constituting ordinary experience.
172
 The posthuman cannot perceive in a 
conventional sense. Furthermore, even though perception is of use in subject areas concerned 
with conscious phenomena, it is a mechanism that only works within the human sensorium 
(the animal sensorium to be precise). Furthermore, perception only refers to the second-order 
movement of data gathering that is intrinsic to a basic first empiricism, and which is based on 
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a stoppage of a movement, a pause to consciously reflect.
173
 In going below and above the 
human subject, sensation here is different to this stimuli-response model and in contrast to the 
ordinary use of perception, sensation marks passage, movement and continuity in pre-
subjective experience.
174
 This means that the entire struggle to fit the sign into a familiar 
sensorium and meaning happens outside and prior to conscious rationality. The rupture 
happens at a proprioceptive level of the posthuman. Generally, proprioception as one’s own 
perception is not tactile perception, but refers to the “sensibility proper to muscles and 
ligaments” often affecting adjacent organs and muscles. Adopting and adjusting this concept 
to the posthuman, from proprio to praeter, to include thinking matter is the registering of 
forces on a posthuman’s temporary boundaries. The difference is that posthuman prae-
ception cannot treat sensation from the perspective of a sentient being. Sense exceeds the 
physiological capacities of the human and animal species by far. For example, it must include 
that of a technological-becoming as well, so that for example a computer system registering a 
force on its firewall could be a case of posthuman sensation. More specifically proprioception 
of the posthuman can be thought of as a web that spans across its body in movement and that 
absorbs unrecognizable encounters on the body’s surface, which change its equilibrium. If 
this intensive difference upsets the equilibrium experience opens up, which is the rupture to 
ordinary experience, so that the body is forced to think. The argument then further suggests 
that gaming is the posthuman body under constant attack of ‘outside’ forces. Elements and 
attractors of the gaming software, which are differences in programming, the sign, generate 
differential movement that upset the posthuman player’s equilibrium. This player has yet to 
grapple with the coding difference, which is settled as an unfolding system of experience of 
the new. It is the generation and circulation of signs as well as this struggle for meaning 
during experiences at which gaming aims. 
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As a consequence, experience always “begins with sensibility,” which means that gaming is 
largely about posthuman sensibility.
175
  Because the conscious relationship to objects is that 
of simple recognition, which happens in the ordinary sphere or already established 
knowledge, the sign cannot be a simple object in the game, but something “contingently 
imperceptible, that which is too small or too far for the empirical exercise of our senses.”
176
 
Yet, the object of experience can emit signs when it becomes distorted so that it reveals its 
virtual half.
177
 Therefore, the sign exceeds human senses and empirical, ordinary 
experience,
178
 and has to be understood as a hint during empirical experience when new 
intensity comes into relation with the posthuman body. This reiterates that experience cannot 
be initiated by the subject, since there is no subject prior to the new system of experience and 
because experience can only arise anew from the sensible and not from a concept, since the 
latter only belongs to the subject. Significant for pre-subjective politics is the idea that 
concepts are not static and persistent and only subject to modification, but something that 
develop out of a unique experience and that it is unique to the newly emerging posthuman 





If the initial passing sensation triggered by the sign meeting the posthuman is the onset of 
experience, then the latter essentially begins with an encounter. It is this encounter – the 
synthesis of different intensities as the formation of a relation – that then “forces thought to 
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occur and to pose a problem.”
180
 This is a forceful encounter because experience and thought 
begin contingently and not because of the nature of the subject. This further contrasts 
phenomenologists and Kant as well as other philosophers such as Plato and Descartes who 
view thinking as the natural condition – in other words, that we naturally tend to think.
181
 By 
way of contrast, the posthuman condition argues that thought only occurs when it is forced to, 
so that “the natural state is not thinking” and that thought does not move in its own accord or 
freely.
182
  Hence, what Deleuze refers to as learning as contrasted with the possession of 
knowledge as the “generality of concepts or the calm possession of a rule enabling 
solution”
183
 and what game developers seek to enforce through game design only happens 
through the encounter. This leads to two crucial conclusions: first, because of self-emerging 
intensities the encounter depends on chance, which means that there is only involuntary 
thought; second, any system opened up only exists as potentiality before the encounter.
184
 
Not only with respect to gaming and experience is this a crucial moment, but for the political 
in general. For example, Louis Althusser located the origin of politics in the void which pre-
exists atoms, and where life emerges with atoms encountering each other as the beginning of 
political life as well.
185
 This premise of “aleatory materialism” is shared here, which also 
means that gaming is not a means for predicting the future, as it is itself more open and 
uncontrolled than predictable. The encounter, however, can only be managed through the 
careful design and regulation of contingency in the game’s architecture, but there is no 
guarantee of new experience emerging per se. Similarly, gaming and learning as a contingent 
process also means that there can be no set method for learning either – at least not in a 
                                                          
180
 Batra, “Experience, Time and the Subject,” 127. 
181
 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 175. 
182
 Batra, “Experience, Time and the Subject,” 133. 
183
 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, “Objecticity” here indicates that the problem is not subject, but not 
completely objective either, since it does not occur independently of the subject. 
184
 Ibid, 175. 
185




Cartesian way that it could be determined a priori “how reason should be used in order to 
achieve knowledge.”
186
 The only way the posthuman can learn, or is forced to learn, is 
through constant playing in this context, simply the continuous engagement with 
unrecognizable problems.  
 
This essentially renders gaming an apprenticeship in a Deleuzian sense, which precisely 
refers to learning by continuously bringing together points of ‘our’ body with other elements 
to form a problematic field.
187
 These intensive, prae-ceptive contact points reinforce that 
learning is not merely a cognitive process, which is perhaps one of the biggest contrasts to 
phenomenology and usual gaming “philosophy,” because both focus on perception in order to 
make sense of and learn about the environment they are in. However, not only the notion of 
experience, but also that of learning goes beyond cognition for it also necessitates the 
engagement with elements of something else, “a matter of penetrating the Idea.”
188
 For the 
posthuman condition this means that “learning always takes place in and through the 
unconscious,”
189
 or much rather in a pre-subjective flow and that existing concepts cannot be 
used to grasp the new. Therefore, innovative conceptual practice is not only a side effect of 
new experience, but an essential step in dealing with the unrecognizable sign, the rupture to 
the ordinary. The catch is that because experience begins with the encounter of an idea-
problem (intensive difference) that can only be grasped by the individual, which only comes 
into existence at the end of individuation and the experiencing process, the conscious 
individual, that perceives his/herself as a human, can relate or think the idea only 
retrospectively – “thought must follow the path of experience in reverse.”
190
 This means that 
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the conscious gamer experiences objects as already ordered with the system and it is 
impossible from this conscious position to point towards the origin or any development of the 
system of experience and in learning. In short, the “conscious subject arrives late to the 
‘scene’,”
191
 so that the conscious player can grasp the game only in retrospect, after 
experience and learning have already taken place.  
 
Nonetheless, the reason for the encounter being identified as political is not only because it 
opens up experience, but because the struggle to grasp the unfamiliar sign can generate new 
contextual meaning. In the light of gaming’s largely practice-based and interactive mode of 
engagement, newly triggered systems of meaning “can appear as a new kind of engagement 
with things or a new set of practices.”
192
 New habits and affective patterns are a crucial 
aspect to take into account when it comes to the question of the contemporary posthuman 
political subject and how it is constituted. However, this is a case of a teleology that suggests 
that more gaming experience would result in a better and new skillset, system of meaning, 
and political behaviour. The only prediction that can be made about a higher number of 
gaming rounds is that the chances of breaking with ordinary experience (that is the status 
quo) are higher. Due to involuntary thought precisely not being a case of recognition, but the 
encounter of the disturbingly unfamiliar, this rupture is the irruption of novelty.  
 
Even though sensation and the encounter are aleatory does not mean that the ensuing 
experience is chaotic. Given the factor of contingency a sign may or may not open up a 
system of experience, but if it does experience will develop and be organized.
193
 According to 
Deleuze, there are two steps to the progressive development of a system of experience where 
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differentiation (with a “t”) comes before differenciation (with a “c”).
194
 The former indicates 
the development of an idea-problem, whereas the latter describes the process by which the 
system of experience can then be produced for the subject. The second step is the movement 
through which conscious objects are produced on the level of empirical experience. Batra 
explains that for example, we perceive objects as already possessing certain attributes such as 
colour, because empirical experiences are always already structured according to colour or 
other familiar features.
195
 This linguistic and conceptual distinction is important in showing 
how an idea arises within experience (differentiation) in the posthuman and how the 
conscious subject comes to see this as an already ordered experience which is the 
actualization of the system of experience (differenciation).
196
 It is the second step in which 
4EA in a conventional sense comes in and takes over in structuring gaming experience. 
Crucially for the conceptual practice within the realm of gaming for change and peace, it is 
only after a system has opened up and structured itself that is can be explored, and one way is 
to generate concepts. This is because concepts articulate empirical cases and their relation to 
a systematic field. Empirical objects that emerge out of the production of a system and 
structured experience can be investigated and known through according 
idiosyncratic/singular concepts. Significantly, concepts depend on experience and new 
concepts can only arise out of new experience, which adds to gaming being an experiential 
and creative activity, the training of the conceptual.  
 
Flow of Experience in a Body without Organs 
Even though the emergence and structuring of fields of experience has been discussed in 
abstract terms, this still applies to the concrete body that defies the separation of mind and 
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body/matter, given that these movements all happen on the plane of immanence.
197
 To sketch 
this plane and the movement on, in and through it in diagrammatic ways, pre-subjective and 
pre-bodily forces are then seen as non-linear vectors on this plane. Elements and attractors 
that can create idea-problems are conceived of as dots and are scattered across a vector. From 
this perspective, temporal proximity, overlapping and crossing of these vectors result in a 
shared individuating process, which is a unit of various elements that are usually attributed to 
either the human or the technology. In this case it is the encounter that gives rise to a 
posthuman body in general and it is also the encounter that can generate new experiences and 
thereby change the posthuman. Given that these vectors are all impersonal and pre-individual, 
it is impossible to identify in which individuation a vector is going to be part of. Indeed, the 
vector’s virtual attributes (dots) hold all of the possible worlds and could give rise to an 
infinite number of different experiential fields and, thus, bodies and subjectivities. 
 
For the case of gaming and to keep the example manageable, the movement on the plane 
could be broken down into three essential vectors, that of gaming technology (A), gamers (B) 
and the mixed-media environment (C). These vectors are brought into close proximity due to 
the onset of the game. Given that all of these three are not fixed – neither internally nor are 
their boundaries – but are in constant flux and always in a process of becoming, they are 
continually ‘reshuffled’. If these vectors (A, B & C) meet, overlap or intersect – that is 
encounter each other – their elements/dots are shuffled in a way that individuates one unit, 
which is made up of elements that previously belonged to vector A, B, or C. This only 
happens however if the encounter is strong enough to upset individual equilibria, which is to 
break with ordinary experience. In view that only the dots of those vectors close to the 
encounter will be involved in the individuating process, means that the vectors cannot simply 
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be added. Thus an encounter between the three, with a possible thought, experience, 
body/subject emerging out of that, is not simply A+B+C, but a haecceitic mix of the three. 
The way in which they organize themselves, depends on the intensities they bear and the 
posthuman body grows therefore in rhizomatic fashion. The posthuman body will continue to 
grow and persist in this way until a new individuating process is triggered by a new 
unrecognizable sensation that is encountered in the course of the game. This is why the 
posthuman has to be thought of as flow and mobile, even though it is on a plane, but its 
vectors move in unimagined swirls rather than linearly, on a plane that has infinite 
dimensions. Arguing that this posthuman body flows does not mean that it is in constant flux, 
however, but that it is always open to re-engage in new becoming, which is precisely its 
potential to impact upon the political – conceived of as the moment of openness – in a unique 
and unexamined way, that is in a non-recognised way.  
 
In sum, this dynamic of the posthuman can be visualised as seen in the following images that 
outline intensities coming together and dispersing depending on the experience produced 
during the encounter.  In many ways the series of images could represent one gaming round 
of multiple players coming into the game, meeting each other as well as other participants. 
Acting as the conscious subject and still distant from others as well as the ‘technology’, the 
scenario is still very representational. However, with the onset of the game, intensities of the 
bodies come into proximity, eventually encountering each other. If the gaming experience is 
intense, that is unfamiliar enough, synthesis of the intensities can occur and the previously 
separate bodies can move as one dynamic. This does not have to be a permanent 
arrangement, so that bodies can separate again, to either engage in other becomings outside 
the game or in a new gaming round. Importantly however, when the posthuman breaks up 
into several individual bodies again, these are not identical to the ones that went into the 
116 
 
game, but different becomings altogether. Similarly, even though subjects are separate when 
they walk into the game, they are already posthuman-becomings before that as encounters 
happen all the time. It is not the case of posthumans coming about only during gaming, but 
the theory is that this happens more often during gaming, due to affective game design and 
that therefore political gaming has considerable leverage and can be developed in that 
direction more strongly. However, the ontological and noological processes that were outline 
occur everywhere and all the time, while reading a book, watching television, playing sports.
   





Going through the images from top left to bottom right (with the top left picture being 
number one and the bottom right number nine), the purple strokes represent intensities that 
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flow, and, in the case of the game, these flow in a more channelled way due to the game’s 
architecture. Different colours represent differences in temperature, rhythm or speed for 
example, setting intensities apart from each other. Moving in rhizomatic fashion, these can 
converge, which marks the opening of new experience. Image six, seven and eight show that 
within this new system of experience the posthuman moves as one unit before eventually 
breaking up into smaller individual bodies again. 
 
Given that this moving posthuman unit is the response to a virtual idea-problem, it can be 
considered a spontaneous, non-representational solution. 
199
 Therefore, becoming-posthuman 
highlights the struggle of mattered-thinking/thinking-matter to find a solution to the 
unrecognizable and extraordinary. Importantly, this suggests that solutions to a problem – be 
they of political or any other nature and regardless of whether they are in or outside a game – 
do not statically exist a priori in an idealist realm, but emerge alongside the development of a 
problem. Adopting and adjusting Deleuze and Guattari’s term, “machinic phylum” is used to 
denote immanence of a problem to the gaming process. The latter is essentially co-dependent 
“matter in movement,” “that is in flux, in variation, matter as conveyor of singularities and 
traits of expression” that gives rise to problem, experience and solution simultaneously.
200
 
Such “traits of expression” are “emergent properties” that arise in material systems and are 
those synergetic attributes that individualize the whole posthuman as something different 
than the sum of its parts.
201
 Based on this, gaming is identified as “[semi]-spontaneous 
transformations.”
202
 It is important to reiterate that even though the machinic phylum is 
somewhat of an abstract reservoir it is not a platonic realm of ideas, but a contextual, 
immanent dynamic and is unique to the system of experience. Hence, the machinic phylum is 
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a “source of spontaneous order” in a new system.
203
 As important as the play of intensities, 
the machinic phylum is creativity and variability, thus, part of the new. 
 
The machinic phylum is particularly important with regard to the utopian impulse, because 
even though it might not be a “guarantee of freedom,”
204
 it is a way of experimenting with 
various destinies, turning gaming into a test lab for political alternative futures and for a new 
political subject. The flow and mutability during gaming are essential in opening up rigid 
structures of subjectivities and static bodies, allowing for new subjectivities and bodies to 
emerge that are considered lines of flight. More specifically, the game in its unplayed state 
might be regarded as formless, yet the conditions of possible syntheses of intensities are 
already there, given that even though intensities are approaching infinity, a part of them 
(those on vector A to speak in abstract terms) are nonetheless restricted by gaming 
software.
205
 This is why transformation in the context of gaming are semi-spontaneous 
experimentations of reality, but by design. Generally speaking, gaming starts as an 
undifferentiated field that given the positioning and movement of the players – who in and of 
themselves are different intensities as well and together they are a tempo-spatial distribution 
of embodied information – undergoes a series of syntheses (shocks and struggles), each of 
which produces new intensities as a continuous movement of becoming-posthuman. Thus, 
the gaming software does not have to include an entire blueprint of a larger posthuman body 
or the eventual political subject, but only enough stimuli or constraints for self-organization 
processes to take place. This means that before new experience, the posthuman gaming-body 
only exists Virtually. This also means that the game can generate a larger posthuman body, 
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but in fact each individual vector (players, technology and environment) are entangled in 
posthuman-becoming even before the onset of the game, much like even smaller post-eco-
sophical systems.
206
    
 
The point here is that while posthumans are emerging everywhere where there is new 
experience, this is such a complex, always half-Virtual process that it cannot be perceived, 
fully controlled or even represented as such. Although Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the 
‘Body without Organs’ (BwO) is different from the posthuman, it is still a useful metaphor 
that helps to imagine this imageless and representation-less posthuman, in the way that the 
BwO is a body that is not “defined by the form that determines it” and that it is neither 
determined by “substance or subject nor by the organs it possesses or the functions it 
fulfils.”
207
 Instead, a posthuman 
 
body is defined only by a longitude and latitude: in other words the sum total of 
the material elements belonging to it under given relations of movement and 
rest, speed and slowness (longitude); the sum total of the intensive affects it is 




Therefore, a body must be thought of in affective rather than representational terms, as 
“affects and local movements, differential speeds.”
209
 More specifically, it is not of interest or 
even significant what a body looks like or to try and force the posthuman into a representable, 
idealised unity and whole (as the human category), but much rather to understand and know a 
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body through “the forces that intersect it and the things it can do.”
210
 In this sense, 
posthumans do not have a set “interior grid of organs”, but are a “temporary product of a 
larger exterior mapping of forces”.
211
 This exterior mapping is the game’s architecture.  
 
Conclusion 
The chapter has sought to map a posthuman life and body. This endeavour was grounded in 
the argument that only through reconceptualising being and becoming is it possible to make 
sense of ‘a life’ in the technological age and to articulate the political, the new political 
subject and action. This metaphysical journey began by problematizing the human body and 
technology. Not the body as a construct of discourse, nor the body as a product of power, but 
simply the body as bound by skin. Set up as a binary, with enforced material and mental 
boundaries, man versus machine has long been the episteme within which life and politics is 
understood and practiced. With the help of technicity, the human and technological categories 
were opened up, relaying their bodies (that of the player and gaming technology) into the 
various materialities, practices and norms that assemble these entities. Treating the ‘human’ 
and ‘technology’ as socio-historical constructs rather than fixed material entities deeply 
troubles the dichotomy between them, along with those of the human/non-human, living/non-
living and natural/artificial. Moving further than Simondon’s argument of the co-implication 
of the living in the non-living and that there is no absolute distinction between the human and 
technology, the path to the posthuman sees the human as “sociotechnical negotiation and 
artifact” itself,
212
 which mainly serves representational purposes and is of use to the 
conscious subject.  
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The birth of the posthuman lies in the move to open systems and a life determined by affect, 
so that boundaries emerge along intensive differences in temperature, speed/movement and 
rhythm. The posthuman condition is blind to hylomorphic bodies having form and that 
change happens through and is reflected in form. Furthermore, the posthuman frees itself of 
fleshy representations in acting as a thermodynamic agent, guided by flows of energy and 
forces, embedded in complex systems and occasionally flirting with quantum speeds that 
tears its boundaries and spreads it out into the open, above, below and far beyond the human 
body and subject. Without its own organs or image, the posthuman is embodied information 
that moves at different speeds. It is in its slow and more stable form when caught by human 
perception and consciousness. As such, the posthuman is pre-conscious, impersonal and pre-
subjective, with a Virtual and actual half, moving through and engaging in the world not 
through perception but prae-ception and at constant ‘risk’ to fall apart, that is into 
disequilibrium and smaller intensive units.  
 
Despite being prior to consciousness the posthuman still thinks – is forced to think – through 
experience. In fact, it liberates experience from idealist and phenomenological vestiges, 
making thought fall out of the anthropocene and into matter. Mattered-thought and thinking-
matter as the extended ‘mind’ of the posthuman is the basis for differing intensities to 
encounter each other, forming idea-problems that upset stable equilibria and break with 
ordinary experience. These signs cause rupture out of which the genuinely new can flow. A 
shock to the open system is the origin of novelty, giving birth to new systems of experience 
that are not rehearsing recognition, but are aleatory dynamics that grow out of the plane of 
immanence in rhizomatic fashion, defying being separated into material and immaterial, mind 
and matter. The posthuman’s Bildungstrieb is neither teleological nor resulting in stable 
systems. While it is part of the individuation process that moves through the larval state and 
122 
 
produces a conscious body in the end, the outcome of this double articulation differentiation-
differenciation from the Virtual to the actual is unpredictable as there are no transcendental 
conditions. The posthuman moves in its own accord, its thought is non-dogmatic.  
 
The posthuman condition of fluid information that moves between solid and soft states is 
precisely the potential for lines of flight in gaming. Stripped bare, gamer body and subject, 
gaming technology and setting are just intensities carrying information (attractors and 
elements) that can be reshuffled in a unique way, if encounters, as allowed for by the game’s 
architecture, break with ordinary experience and systems of meanings of stable subjects. As a 
test lab, political gaming is not only the mimesis of the birth of the political, but crucially is 
itself this moment of openness. It is only in the pre-subjective, impersonal posthuman that 
this moment is truly open to political innovation and in a position for a new political 
subjectivity to emerge, one that is not forever caught in the alternation between subject-
object, mind-matter, human-nonhuman. Indeed, immersive gaming is posthuman-becoming 
in the post-anthropocene in which algorithms are wild and valued for their native intelligence 
as present in every quark of matter. The seduction of gaming is its mode of interaction and 
experience, which is the opportunity and conveyor of singularities and the new.  
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Chapter 3 ~ Affective Game Design: Playing with 
Contingency and Movement 
Concepts must be experienced. They are lived. 




This chapter works more closely with the notion of affect and its analysis to explore the 
elements of game design that are implicit in the production of the gaming experience, the 
posthuman gaming body and, eventually, political subjectivities. There is unavoidably at this 
stage a gap between the project’s noology that details how a posthuman body is forced to 
think in and outside the context of gaming (and during this process is reshuffled/transformed) 
and the actual mechanisms that allow for this involuntary thought during gaming. The 
complex gaming architecture is an essential point of analysis as it builds the basis for wider 
posthuman political subjectivities that eventually emerge out of the impersonal thought of 
games. However, even though involuntary impersonal thought cannot be predicted and 
initiated from the conscious position of a subject, thought and experience in gaming is 
influenced even before the onset of the game through the very nature, design and purpose of a 
game. Nevertheless, despite every thought retaining its virtual half and therefore a degree of 
freedom,
2
 it would be erroneous to assume that thought is completely free in its actual 
movement, for it is subject to wider configurations of coded material possibilities and limits 
in the game, which are themselves heavily dependent on a “sprawling, vastly complex 
aggregation of human-machine-nature assemblies.”
3
 In this sense, game design is not only 
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absolutely crucial for the immediate gaming experience but also tremendously influential to 
posthuman political subjectivity and therefore needs to be taken beyond merely 
acknowledging and analysing the leverage of programming, user-friendly interphases or 
game-plans. Game design takes a new meaning in a posthuman condition, forcing the 
analysis to look at diverse and unusual elements: movement is enabled, guided and 
channelled, asking questions about space, rhythm and speed. Issues that game design and 
development are usually concerned with are questions such as how game space is filled and 
propped up, which accessories to use and what digital worlds should unfold in front of a 
gamer when playing a video game. However, these issues reveal little of significance in/for a 
posthuman condition. Instead questions about how game space unfolds, how attention is 
triggered in the posthuman or how the immediate gaming experience plays into a posthuman 
decision-making process are much more significant to the present line of inquiry. Yet, there is 
little literature engaging with game design in this way. Apart from Ian Bogost’s writings that 
use French materialist philosophies in order to reveal the unique and expressive power of 
video games or James Ash’s analysis of affective dimensions of digital interphase-space there 
are disappointingly only small amounts of research on affective tracing and mapping of 
games.
4
 As a consequence, the affective dimension of games is rarely used in general and in a 
political sense more specifically.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold and it focuses attention not only on the affective 
architecture of games, but also on the theoretical and practical purchase of theorizing, 
designing and using games as plays of affects. The primacy of affect is a complex tribute to 
the vitality of game design based on the project’s speculative materialism and its newly 
conceived ontology of living material and vibrating matter. The aliveness that was reinserted 
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into the previously innate category of technology through the notion of the posthuman 
suggests that if gaming technology is (partly constituting) a living posthuman, its design 
needs to be analysed in vital and energetic terms. Accordingly, treating a game and its design 
as alive opens up a multitude of new opportunities to politically engage with games and 
conceive of it as part of an emerging political subject. Consequently, an analysis of affect in 
game design is much more than detailing how the posthuman is forced to think through 
various game strategies, but it is a call to apply this vitality to existing and future games. In 
this respect the immediate challenge for affective gaming architecture lies in programing for 
discrete encounters that trigger involuntary thought, subtle movements, and posthuman 
configurations, “but in ways that newly reaccess the infinities of experiential potential, 
discrete and continuous.”
5
 The balance that affective design needs to strike is that between 
encouraging without forcing that promotes emergence without construction. Design seeks a 
balance of variational continuum that allows for creative freedom in games in order for new 
political subjectivities to emerge. In this sense, game design is about so much more than 
coding for verisimilitude and representational scenarios. The emphasis on affect is a 
posthuman way of understanding games and their design, the analysis of which will begin by 
making a general case for affect in IR and in relation to gaming technology in particular. 
Although affect has enjoyed increasing popularity and attention in the social sciences, there is 
nonetheless a need to explain in greater detail what affect is, how it is treated in the literature 
and its analytical purchase. 
 
In order to build a foundation for affective game design and gaming, the chapter will continue 
by problematizing plays of contingency. This is the immediate demand of creating a sense of 
openness and window of opportunity (the political) in the game that thereby allows for lines 
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of flights, whilst keeping the game focused on political tasks. These are technical, 
philosophical and pedagogical concerns that impact upon how game space unfolds and how 
the posthuman plays out. Apart from fascinating technical forays into programming, 
developing ideas of posthuman space and movement are crucial to affective game design. 
These affective gaming dynamics need to be put into context with regards to conventional 
games and simulation parameters of ‘success’ and ‘failure’, the role of scripted events, event 
intervals, contrasting affects/emotions, and how these are amplified and modulated. 
Oscillating between and often marrying technical and philosophical concepts, the chapter 
aims to show how successful affective game design can constitute a political event in the 
course of a game and upon which new subjectivity hinges. This posthuman moment will be 
developed into the Techno-Political-Event (TPE) arguing that this is what is at stake in 
gaming, and what should be the aim and focus of games for change. This is due to the event 
being the moment of indeterminacy that allows for lines of flight, but also because it is the 
moment of captivation – the capture of forces and attention. More specifically, the purchase 
of gaming with regard to ordinary political training lies in its power to captivate, based on 
theories of “flow experience.”
6
 The chapter will examine how flow experience is present in 
games as latent affective structure that is triggered by captivation.  
 
Careful not to instrumentalise affect beyond gaming necessity, this chapter will conclude by 
discussing how affective states in the posthuman play out as “affective programmes” for the 
political subject to come. The argument is that these programmes are carried over into the 
human realm in the form of bodies politic. Even though the latter is the subject of the 
subsequent chapter, the argument presented at this stage introduces ideas of “habit” and 
“milieu” into the discussion of game design, as their mechanisms are affective and resonating 
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most prominently in a body politic later on. Lastly, the affective gaming posthuman 
contextualized en milieu will give way to a posthuman pedagogy based on gaming.  
 
What Use Is Affect? 




Twenty-first century challenges, whether inside or outside gaming, call for new ways of 
analysing and responding to political phenomena. In this light, it is no surprise that affect 
frequently surfaces in contemporary political theory. To echo Clough, critical theory turns to 
“affect as a focus of analysis” when challenged by world events of on-going and increasing 
insecurity.
8
 If these events are evidence of a continuous transformation in politics, economics 
and cultures, then “affect may be registering a change in the cofunctioning of the political, 
economic, and cultural” – or the “social” according to Massumi.
9
 Indeed, the first thing that 
the analytical lens of affect suggests is that the increased use of new high-technology for 
neoliberal politics and economics have created the conditions for “radically new ways of 
manufacturing and articulating lived experience,”
10
 with political games being a strong case 
in point. In this way, the affective component is not only part of techno-political practice, but 
a necessary component to understand these new modes of politics. Using affect helps to tie 
together various and greatly diverse problems and challenges associated with political 
gaming, such as their political economy, ideology but also highly technical questions. In 
short, the strength of affect is that it cuts right through multiple registers.  
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The particular strength of affect for this work is the agreement with the project’s noology 
because it is non-conscious, pre-subjective, unqualified, intensive and asignifying.
11
 Using 
affect in a Spinozist sense, and as developed by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari most 
prominently, neither affect nor affection refer to a personal feeling, but distinctly to “a 
prepersonal intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to 
another and implying an augmentation or diminution in that body’s capacity to act.”
12
 
Therefore, it cannot be used interchangeably with feelings or emotions. Being more than just 
mere pedantry, there is a sharp distinction between affect, which is pre-personal, and feeling 
as sensation, which is personal and “biographical,” and emotions, which are social, often 
even collective.
13
 Not only are feelings and emotions subjective and often reflective 
processes, but by implication these are deemed ‘human’ and based on conventional 
phenomenological understandings of experience. Similarly, when evaluating gaming 
experience this happens through a human vocabulary by drawing on the realm of emotions. 
This is not a possible register to think with regard to the posthuman. Instead of assuming 
emotions which are proper to the already established subject and are derivative, qualified, 
conscious and already meaningful,
14
 affect is still untamed and, thus, traverses subjects.
15
 
Therefore, emotions are derived from nonlinear complexities of affect
16
 and belong to a 
subject that appropriated affect.
17
 This makes affect better suited for the posthuman condition 
of gaming because it is not a case of recognition and representation, in contrast to emotions 
that are phenomenological, representable and representative. Helpfully, scholars already 
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started using affect in more-than-human ways, by arguing that new technologies (NT) 
“produce affective bodily capacities beyond the body’s organic-physiological constraints” 
and that affect “inserts the technical into felt vitality.”
18
 Therefore, intensive flows of affect 
cut across various bodies.  
 
Affect can be thought of as being the glue that binds various elements together because it is a 
Virtual state but also a key player in the actual, for it directly guides experience towards 
subjective emotions. It is the vessel that crosses the gap.  In this way, and derived from 
Deleuze’s engagement with Spinoza, affects are defined as “‘becomings’ or capacities to 
produce emergent effects,”
19
 and, therefore, affect is incipient action.
20
 Often affect is 
equated with intensities as seen in Massumi’s work. However, the view here is that affect is 
one step further than intensity, yet one step short of full action and therefore the in-
betweeness. This is becoming and as such affect highlights and supports the idea of the body 
in constant flux, stressing gaming’s “dynamic interactional ontology”.
21
 Therefore the 
posthuman is greatly shaped by affect in its process of individuation from the Virtual through 
the larval to the actual. Even of more importance for game design and the ensuing argument 
here is that because of affect’s in-betweeness – melting the Virtual and actual, the abstract 
and concrete – games are actually interactive maps for shaping bodies and, hence, 
subjectivities. As will emerge more clearly throughout this chapter, affect is important 
because games are one of the most vivid examples of the production of the posthuman and 
posthuman subjectivity and these two productions are linked through affect as well.  
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Affect and Games: A Powerful Mix 
Affect lays bare that political games are not only a pedagogical tool for training and 
representing peace practices, but that these games are primarily sites of meaning and 
subjectivity formation. As such, games are affective productions, alterations and 
manipulations of posthuman-becoming.
22
 This is due to affect being the outcome of an 
encounter that increases or decreases the posthuman’s capacity to act or be acted upon, which 
makes gaming an affective event.
23
 One characteristic that was identified with regard to the 
emergence of the posthuman is that when the gaming experience is extraordinary enough, 
previously separate posthuman bodies (consciously perceived as human, gaming technology 
and environment) melt into one posthuman, which means that the affective gaming encounter 
is triggered by the game space as much as it is by participant bodies or gaming technology. In 
other words, there is a strong connection between the space and the constellations of affect.
24
 
Due to affect being Virtual before it gives rise to individuation, it is assumed that game space 
is in excess of affect, which according to Shaw and Warf is “‘spilling out’” onto the player.  
Although in agreement with this argument, it needs to be refined in the way that the spilling 
and affecting only happens if the encounter marks a rupture in ordinary experience and that 
this rupture is triggered through scripted and simulated contingent events. This means that 
games need to be thought of as having affective pressure points or latent triggers that if 




Importantly and in contrast to conventional analyses of game design, these triggers do not 
have to be visual or auditory. Whereas it is nothing new to speak of trigger or threshold 
events in games that when reached activate other events, such analysis is usually framed 
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around the conscious gamer who digitally, through an avatar, moves through the course of a 
game, perceiving the scenarios presented to him/her and who then actively makes choices 
based on the rapid cognitive assessment of the game space. Designing games based on this 
model needs to be adjusted. This does not render sound or graphics in games obsolete, much 
rather it suggests that proprioceptive and especially prae-ceptive levels of analysis need to be 
introduced, looking at how movement is created and channelled or different types of 
movements and motion. In this respect, especially those games that are highly dynamic 
and/or set in a 3D environment (digital or analogue) are fascinating and important because of 
their kinetic dimension. This means that games should be analysed in kinaesthetic terms as 
well.
 26
 The kinetic dimension as introduced by affect has two crucial implications. First, it 
makes game design that much more complex, offering an abundance of new ways of thinking 
about and using game space. Beyond the immediate task of understanding design and 
designing in kinaesthetic ways, this opens up opportunities to push design in a pedagogical 
way towards kinaesthetic learning.
27
 Gaming is already decentring the dominance of static 
learning that favours types of intelligence that are solitary (intrapersonal) and logical, because 
games are a primarily visual, auditory, aural (auditory-musical) and social way of learning. 
That gaming is very conducive to these learning styles has long been recognised and 
pedagogical research in this area is considerable.
28
 The argument is, however, that the role of 
affect and the actional learning type can be theorized and explored much further by 
developing affective game design. However, in comparison to these other types of learning 
that start being reflected in gaming more prominently, the kinaesthetic aspect is the hardest to 
design for given that restricting decision-making through restricting movement is much more 
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forceful than restricting audio or visual cues. This leads to the second implication of the 
movement dimension: carefully designing possibilities of movement through the 
management of contingency in the game. Of course, contingency is reflected in decision-
making in games more generally and not only in movement, which makes it arguably one of 
the most crucial factors in the design and experience of gaming. To master, manage and 
engineer contingency will necessarily determine the experience of a game and everything else 
that unfolds from it. 
 
Plays of Contingency: Designing, Engineering and Managing Affect 
Generally speaking, game developers seek to create the potential for positively affective 
encounters during the course of playing.
29
 Transferred to games in the political realm it can 
be argued that these are supposed to be learning encounters – an increased training effect in 
political understanding, practices or skills. This is achieved through the elusive working of 
complex mechanisms, events and transmissions of affect. Given that games work with the 
element of surprise and the unknown, participants to a game usually know very little about 
the game scenario as such. Even if they are informed about the political context of the game 
(sometimes with time and resources to prepare), how developers script the game is something 
disclosed and can only be encountered and experienced through playing. This means that 
while participants can run counterfactuals, imagine what may happen and plan for 
eventualities, when it comes to the actually playing participants have to improvise. Critically, 
this unpredictability applies to the participants but also to those who run and oversee games, 
so that game design is due in large part to the careful management of contingency. And 
contingency, understood as the “unexpected, the random, the singular, the unrepeatable, or 
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  splits even further – not only does it refer to the unpredictability of 
spontaneous decision-making, but more importantly, game design is predicated upon 
producing contingency as well.
31
 Contingency is doubled in this sense, it has a Doppler effect 
(Doppler-contingency). 
 
Doppler Effect: Controlling and Producing Contingency with Contingency  
Going through it in reverse, the second type of contingency happens on behalf of game 
developers and is the unknown designed into the game and its power lies in the fact that it can 
influence decision-making in highly unexpected ways that have the potential to temporarily 
upset old habits, preconceived ideas and ideological beliefs. This is based on game studies 
more generally, where even gamers who start off playing with a highly detailed game plan 
are thrown by a game’s development in a way that slightly or significantly changes their 
subsequent gaming behaviour. However, this depends on designing contingency into the 
game as the unknowable and unpredictable participants of imagination. While this is certainly 
not a criterion of most political games yet, the following analysis of contingency is based on 
the premise that contingency would benefit gaming in the way that it can trigger innovative 
political thought, by upsetting old belief systems. In the area of peace operations participants 
to a game often enter with rather strong political beliefs or official opinions and even if 
relatively open to the unknown factor in games, given the serious context of most political 
games, there is a stronger professional commitment to adhere to official political positions. 
Given that player bodies are relatively solid dissipative structures it takes a significant 
amount of energy (forceful encounter) to break open participant bodies and systems of 
ordinary experience so that participants are open enough to engage with the new. This is 
precisely where contingency is attacking the body and it is argued that contingency through 
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motion and movement offers added opportunity to meet the trigger points of a transformative 
encounter – the chance moment, the political as it were. Accordingly, the argument and even 
suggestion here is that the design of games for change should increase its focus on managing 




The two types of contingency (with the second referring to the unpredictability of how 
participants will respond to scripted events in the game) are co-dependent and the challenge 
is to anticipate player contingency through scripting contingent events. However, the fact that 
players decisions depend on many different factors does not mean that this type could be 
controlled by merely limiting available choices, as this would counter the explorative 
learning that these games seek to promote in the first place. It is not as easy as to assume a 
hypodermic model of gaming power, where gaming technology is able to ‘inject’ the 
preferred message or ‘right’ decision into the participants.
33
 Although this “determinative 
power” should not be underestimated
34
, designing contingency is a fragile process and prone 
to failure.
35
 Anticipatory manipulation of decision-making contingency that seeks a kind of 
‘doing without thinking’ is constantly countered by the creative responses of the players. In 
other words, decision-making contingency cannot be managed through pre-emption. To the 
contrary, to keep players engaged and attentive, the game has to offer “openness and 
performative play of contingency and chance.”
36
 Of course there are very basic political 
games, such as Against All Odds or Darfur is Dying,
37
 that are more restrictive. However, in 
defence of these games, it should be mentioned that these have a different intention and work 
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on a representational level trying to convey what the refugee and human trafficking 
experience is like. Even though such games are interesting and important, the chances of 
novel political thought seem slim as the choices in the game are very limited and do not 
foster thinking outside the box. However, this is not the games’ intention. In comparison, the 
explorative and creative contingency is an important variable in games like Will Wright’s 
SimCity or SimEarth, which provide the gamer with a high degree of decision-making, 
especially because it is a scenario and world-building exercise. Such game structures that 
prioritize contingency could be applied to immersive games too. This would propel 
unpredictability, surprise, and the singular, as the design would equally prioritize both types 
of contingency, which renders game structure and game course highly fluid and amendable. 
Indeed increasing gaming contingency allows for a higher degree of interactivity. Therefore, 
game design is to a large extent an art of simulating contingency.  
 
In comparison to the unpredictability associated with the behaviour of the participants, the 
levels of contingency in the gaming software and hardware need to be affectively engineered. 
Within the limits of digital code, game designers can trigger a range of dispositions in the 
players – such as fear, anger, mercy or benevolence – that can lead to certain affective 
decisions.
38
 The interplay of these two types of contingency fundamentally troubles “the 
division between the agency of the software programmers, the agency of the software, and 
the agency of the user.”
39
 More precisely in the context of the theoretical frame here, it is not 
surprising at all – given the pre-subjective workings of games – that there is no active, 
independent decision-making on behalf of the player. Even more, it could be argued that the 
conscious decision is an illusion in a posthuman context anyway. This is because the 
                                                          
38
 Ash, “Architectures of Affect,” 656. 
39
 Martin Dodge, Rob Kitichin & Matthew Zook, “How Does Software Make Space? Exploring Some 
Geographical Dimensions of Pervasive Computing and Software Studies,” Environment and Planning A 41, no. 
6 (2009): 1291. 
136 
 
interplay and indeterminacy is precisely the point where a new posthuman emerges because 
‘autonomous’ decision-making spreads across various elements and entities that are part of 
the posthuman without image. In turn, this means that affective game design determines to a 
large extent how the gaming posthuman can take shape – that is, how it can affect and be 
affected. The interplay of contingencies are then another case that highlight the co-
dependence and indeed inseparability of gamers, the game’s hard- and software as well as 
gaming environment. 
 
Playing with Contingency – Undoing the Gaming ‘Environment’ 
Gaming contingency is compounded by the fact that political games are usually multi-player 
games. The unpredictability of contingency is what gives these games their alluring quality 
and what is desired by the designers even though it makes developing a game’s architecture 
so much more difficult at the same time.
40
 This is because games display a dynamic that 
triggers a “powerful self-generating logic” and “a space of problematisation,”
41
 because it 
neither solely depends on design nor the gamer. As soon as games commence they become 
inherently unpredictable and unquantifiable. It depends as much on the designer and the 
software as it does on the player and action can only be understood as a part of the 
posthuman. In this sense, the posthuman’s action is subject to the culmination of 
contingencies because it increases or decreases its capacity to act or be acted upon. 
 
Designing and playing with contingencies is intimately tied to problematizing the gaming 
‘environment’.
42
 Given that the environment collapses into the posthuman together with the 
gamers’ bodies, how contingency impacts upon the posthuman gaming condition will be 
easier to understand by problematizing game space. The key is to think about space not in 
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strictly Euclidean terms or perceived physical space, representations of space (mental space) 
or lived, social space.
43
 Instead, in a posthuman condition space is conceived of as movement 
and speed; the spread of temperature and the resonance of rhythm as well as differences in 
software coding and programming. The latter is of particular importance because it 
demonstrates that game space is partly made up of designed and codified rules of engagement 
rather than designed spatial graphics. For example, game space can emerge out of specific 
rules that allow players to engage with one another or which impact upon their (speed of) 
movement. It arises out of the tension between contingent analogue behaviour in response to 
coded affect, creating a net(-space) between various elements of the posthuman. Even though 
the software is “using digital quantitative states governed by computational rules within the 
game’s database,”
44
 how the space then eventually unfolds is out of the hands of designers 
because this development is spontaneous, volatile and irregular and, therefore, highly 
qualitative and lived rather than quantitative. Essentially, space is affective coded structure 
and with regard to movement this means that the posthuman cannot possibly move through 
game space as though it would be moving “through a predefined level with a set destination 
in mind.”
45
 Instead the posthuman moves by way of expanding and contracting through 
rhythm, speed and temperature. Crucially, when in motion the posthuman is “its own 
variation” of “its own nonpresent [Virtual] potential.”
46
 This means that the posthuman is 
continual variation that is increased by plays of contingency.   
 
In stressing the connection between contingency and space in games, this dynamic needs to 
be conceptualised as unfolding in multiple dimensions. While it is of no immediate necessity 
to be able to picture how this movement occurs in a space that has more than three 
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dimensions and that hits the limit of human thought with regard to the overall project of 
chasing the new this needs to be pushed nonetheless as “the idea that we live in Euclidean 
space and in linear time excludes reality of change.”
47
 Being able to imagine and design in 
conception of non-Euclidean space and geometry can help to tailor possibilities of change 
better into a game. Even if challenging to thought and ways of digital representation we need 
to start understanding change as metric curvature in n-dimensional space that goes beyond 
three-dimensional imagination, which is precisely the space of posthuman movement in and 
outside of gaming. Needless to say that our view and representation of the world has moved 
on from a flat surface and flat pixels to two and then three dimensional spaces. Particularly in 
light of very recent scientific advances in our knowledge of the existence of more than three 
dimensions, it is imperative to start imagining and theorising a becoming-world that has 
moved into more-dimensional spaces. One way of doing so is through variational non-
Euclidean geometry and happen on very large down to infinitesimal small scales. The crucial 
point is that each minute movement in gaming is triggered by designed affective contingency 
and contingent response carry variation. In this sense the space that is produced through 
gaming is qualitative because it is lived abstraction based on more-dimensional movement. 
These are logics of transition that now can be captured and perpetuated by technology. 
However, these new logics of change and movement have yet to enter proper analysis that 
does not rely on what is humanly representable for it defies any diagram and escapes 
language. In brief, while gaming dynamics can be represented in 3D spaces and forced into 
linear models, when games are played they produces Doppler-contingency that can only be 
understood through new qualitative topologies. Importantly, these can be run easily with the 
gaming technology and while being inside code they are still part of the posthuman body as 
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change only switches in its mode. That is to say change and movement is happening in a 
different mode, but it is nonetheless moving as continuities of variation.  
 
Encouraging and Channelling Movement: Gaming Rhythms  
Referring back to the previous sketch of the posthuman as three non-linear vectors 
intersecting (as occurring on/in the plane of immanence), the posthuman’s movement can be 
influenced through various game variables. Based on the theory developed here, this is 
because these variables will become part of the posthuman and affect its movement directly, 
not as an external force as impact or diversion, but in form of internal intensities that put its 
body under tension and in torsion. It is hypothesised that these torsions can be abrupt, 
whenever affective trigger points are encountered in the game, which implies immediate 
change in form of expansion or contraction of the posthuman. An important advantage of 
immersive games is that movement is even less restricted, which applies in physical empirical 
space of the perceivable environment as well as the depth of space created by code. 
Especially in contrast to commercial entertainment games, movement is even more freed up 
due to political gaming not being restricted by standard parameters of success and the need to 
win in order to continue with the game, which already prescribes a more or less teleological 
movement into the game. The aims in games for change are much more multifaceted, which 
implies a greater variety of non-linear movement.
48
 Indeed, if one was to put it into terms of 
“successful gaming” then the parameters are that of increased learning, which in these games 
fundamentally depends on exploratory movement. In turn this means that a too rigid game 
architecture is made up of restrictive elements that impairs with movement and thereby runs 
the risk of pre-empting trial and error scenarios. This further complicates game design as now 
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variables have to influence movement and provide for contingent encounters while allowing 
for exploratory movement-space to emerge.  
 
Applying theories of how exploratory movement is designed in highly advanced first person 
shooter (FPS) games can help to create learning movement in political games as well. Even 
though players in FPS games move digitally in the form of an avatar, the movement of the 
avatar is very similar to that of participants going into an immersive game. The key to this 
movement, which at the same time is the strength of immersive games, is that they allow for 
back and forth movement. Accordingly, gaming-maps are designed to foster continuous 
movement (irrespective of whether this may be backwards) in order to increase the chance of 
contingent encounters.
49
 The challenge is to generate an atmosphere as well as a plenitude of 
optional movements in which players feel comfortable enough to make encounters that can 
be either beneficial or detrimental to progress that has been made in the course of the game so 
far.
50
 Because games aim at providing a platform for political actors not only to test certain 
approaches to peace operations, but often to find alternatives in the first place, game 
developers need to build in the possibility of ‘failure’ on the part of the players. However, 
this and creative movement as a condition of alternatives is rarely explored and capitalized in 
political games’ design. Therefore, the suggestion here is that if political games are to be 
pushed in their development, relevance and impact, it is necessary to increase attention on 
and possibilities for contingent, explorative, daring, learning and innovative movement in 
games. 
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The difficulty is to design games in a way that they encourage calculated risk without being 
too risky.
51
 Put simply, how can participants be brought into a situation in which they can 
make a ‘good judgement call’ about a possibly risky situation. It is expected that behaviour in 
the game is slightly more daring, yet it should not be unrealistically bold or dangerous and 
opt for strategies that would seem unfeasible outside the game and in actual political 
contexts. The aim is to encourage authentic, movement/decision-making that tests feasibility 
and imagination. However, to trigger such a natural flow of motion requires stimuli that work 
on an affective level. To be exact, fixed game plans and rigid instructions are not likely to 
inspire this kind of movement. The very idea of ‘having a game plan’ over-emphasises and 
pays too much attention to the fact that one is about to play a game or enter a simulation in 
the way that “skilled pianists can find their movement restricted or paralyzed because they 
have concentrated too much attention on their fingers.”
52
 In other words, it is precisely the 
ease of play that is the significant leverage of games as it can help to inspire less restricted 
and more creative engagement with otherwise serious, difficult and perhaps even daunting 
tasks. The key is to prompt non-conscious and spontaneous, but not too impulsive behaviour, 
which is then exposed to the new. An example of successful game design would be one that 
culminates in increased creative encounters of movement that is breaking with ordinary 
experience and cultivating shock to thought.  
 
It is argued here that for participants to be open enough to be ‘shocked’ occurs through 
affective variables that channel movement, such as change and surprise, rather than through 
strategic game-planning. The scenario of the posthuman unit coming to a halt because the 
game plan designed for a stop at a certain point of the game (in order to make a decision for 
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example) is entirely different to a scenario in which the posthuman halts because of surprise 
or other sudden changes in the game play that prompt or require a spontaneous decision. 
While both scenarios look the same – as in moving/stopping/deciding/moving on – the 
learning-movement is qualitatively different. Indeed only the latter is qualitative movement, 
authentic and thus with a much higher potential of being innovative. Further, the course of 
action after this encounter is naturally contingent. Decisions will then depend on, as well as 
foster, context-dependent creativeness, appropriate responsiveness and flexible adaptation – 
what John Sutton refers to as “open skill” or Reeves at el as “contingent tactically oriented 
understanding.”
53
 Therefore, change in movement seeks “regulated improvisation,” which, 
however, is unpredictable since every choice or decision involves a potential win or loss.
54
 
The logical consequence of this insight is that the increased repetition of a game allows for 
more experimentation and more learning-movement that is different each time given that 
games are “exhaustively possibilistic.”
55
 This also plays into the hands of game designers as 
it is through repeated testing that contingency is rendered ‘visible’ and that it can be better 
understood and directed.
56
 It is the engagement through repeated play of the political – which 
is the posthuman’s differential movement – that allows conceiving of political practice and 
subjectivity anew. In effect, this means that political gaming is contingent difference with 
repetition.  
 
Continual variation is very difficult to design/manage and creates a problem for developers 
insofar as there are no certain parameters as to how to strike the fine balance of openness and 
open-endedness in a game as well as to maintain its value of reproducibility. Game design, 
ultimately, needs to stay loyal to the aim of a game and the political commitment it arose out 
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of in the first place, which is learning and training. As such, its analytical and learning value 
needs to be guarded, to avoid it becoming over-shadowed by the act of gaming itself. The 
natural flow of movement needs to be encouraged and give a sense of open-ended 
development.
57
 Yet, the difference and repetition of games cannot paint an overall picture of 
sheer randomness and that ‘anything can happen’. If various testing and training sessions do 
not offer the possibility of transferring the new experience to analogue political practices then 
the game loses its pedagogical purpose, strength and uniqueness. This is why designers speak 
of simulated contingency when referring to games, as contingency is not a carte blanche for 
taking the political purpose of games less seriously. In short, feasibility and authenticity need 
to keep contingency in check.  
 
The Dilemma of Winning 
The finesse and subtlety of managing contingency applies equally to important issues of 
establishing a game’s parameters of success and failure,
58
 especially where the primacy of 
explorative movement to increase learning and through the play of contingency takes away 
attention from conventional gaming goals and the importance of ‘winning’. What counts as 
success cannot be predicated upon whether the political goal in the game is achieved, but on 
the basis of the creative responses of participants.
59
 Therefore, movement in the game can be 
arbitrary at times, even without any ‘progress’ at all. Whereas in commercial video games 
success and winning, in loose terms, is pinned upon a sense of progress developed through 
forward movement, this is not necessarily the case in political games.
60
 Furthermore, what 
would be considered failure in analogue political practice can mean success in the context of 
gaming because of the mere fact that movement sought alternative practices. Arguably, there 
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is less teleology inscribed into political gaming than in their commercial counterpart, given 
that ‘failure’ is an accepted from of learning in these games. Hence, ‘failing’ in the game 
cannot be considered a failure as such, since it can still achieve the generation and practice of 
political alternatives, thereby stretching political imagination.  
 
Specifically with regard to contingent movement, success seems to depend a great deal on 
designing and weighing up contingencies without letting chaos reign over the game. The 
suggestion here is that success occurs when contingency, as reflected in the posthuman’s 
movement, awakens curiosity and fosters desire for exploration, creativeness and 
improvisation.
61
 Success through contingency needs to encourage a ‘free’ flow of decision-
making that is oriented towards trying out alternatives that are either deemed too ‘risky’ to be 
tested in an actual context, or that have not even been thought of prior to the game. Similarly, 
failure then is not determined by not being able to meet certain targets or goals. In essence, in 
terms of learning movement, it is much more detrimental when players encounter ‘no 
options’ in the game, which forces the posthuman to halt in a way it would not otherwise. 
Failure then is when designers pre-empt decisions and dynamics by designing out 
contingency and by reducing the unknown. To put it simply, ideally affective game design 
seeks innovation and innovative movement above all, which is ultimately the parameter 
against which it can be judged.  
 
These preliminary parameters through which the performance of the gaming posthuman and 
the outcome can be evaluated have to be adjusted according to the different logics of 
particular games. Given the multitude of games that can have highly individualised goals and 
rules of engagement, the learning movement varies accordingly. For the purpose of 
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exemplifying this, the analytic distinction is redrawn not between high and low-tech, or 
immersive or 2D, but between games that are either designed for a wider audience and, thus, 
need to be applicable to many conflict scenarios, for example, and the more costly and 
therefore highly specialized games that are tailored to one specific audience and one pressing 
issue or conflict. This distinction is drawn for two connected reasons. On the one hand, the 
more specialized games are still very restricted with regard to ‘success’ in a conventional 
sense because, in most cases, they are based either directly or indirectly on actual conflict 
scenarios. This means that the games start off with a known conundrum and offer of different 
game strategies that closely simulate those options available in the actual political realm. If 
anything, options are restricted in the way that they all seem plausible to those designing the 
game. On the other hand, the games for a wider audience start out with the very idea that 
literally thousands will play this particular game and therefore developers try to cater to a 
much wider imaginative capacity already. Furthermore, these games are played with a less 
immediate need to solve the puzzle, as in comparison to games that are played by political 
leadership specifically in preparation for peace talks or a referendum, for example. A case in 
point is the 2011 South Sudanese Independence Referendum, which had been professionally 
simulated (with scenarios designed and sold by Sentia Group, Inc.
62
) multiple times prior to 
actual negotiating talks, where the need to end the game with a feasible solution was 
indisputably very high.
63
 Going back to games for a wider audience and comparing three 
different games, A Force More Powerful (AFMP), Antiwargame and Tekken Torture 
Tournament (3T),
64
 is revealing with regard to how the posthuman moves through these 
games and as to what success is or can be. To begin with AFMP, its purpose is to teach 
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aspects and strategies of nonviolent resistance. Even though it directly arises out of the 
Kosovo context, it has the more general aim of peaceful civil protest and overcoming 
dictatorship as a united civil front. Due to the designer’s affinity with Western interests, it 
received considerable financial support and political, strategic advice from the West.
65
 
However, the games’ context and source of funding is not the focus here, but much rather that 
it seeks to generate movement (even if through an avatar) in form of the local momentum of a 
people who need to organise themselves in the face of a leader who rules by means of 
structural and physical violence. The difficulty of the game design in this case is that of 
reproducing the socio-political temptation and moral-personal struggle of adopting easier, yet 
more violent, forms of resistance rather than the perhaps lengthier option of going through 
official processes of careful planning and coalition building in order to overthrow the 
oppressive regime. Focussing on this immediate task of generating dynamics that explore 
different non-violent strategies over an easier, quick violent fix that upsets the power balance 
in the short term, the game’s contingency is precisely about this difficult balance. On the one 
hand, the game undoubtedly wants to promote non-violent solutions over others, yet any 
obvious move and restriction towards such solutions not only pre-empts decision-making, but 
also means that the game would lose its analytical and pedagogical value of generating a skill 
set that is transferable to actual situation of oppression. Nonetheless, this trade-off should not 
overshadow immanent dynamics arising out of the game. Contextualised within the present 
analysis this suggests that the main aim is to generate flow that lets the participants explore 
for themselves, even if this runs the risk of regression by liberal-democratic standards. This is 
not to imply that the outcome suggests that a violent strategy is the better one, but that in 
educational terms it is important to have the possibility of trying out this option and to be able 
to simulate what the consequences are. Despite not closely following liberal norms, such a 
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gaming strategy would still provide for invaluable insight that would not have been possible 
otherwise. In the same vein, even though AFMP is criticised for occluding global political 
forces, often suggesting strategies that align closely with the rules and interest of the free-
market that can rush in in the wake up political upheaval and revolution,
66
 there is always a 
margin of indeterminacy and contingency that leaves room for creative responses by the 
posthuman, generating gaming dynamics that escape liberal doctrines.   
 
In contrast, Josh On’s Antiwargame counters this political incompleteness of games like 
AFMP or America’s Army by showing the complexity and connections between seemingly 
disconnected and atomic socio-economic and political matters.
67
 Played from the perspective 
of the American President, drawing on stylised depictions of the White House and Pentagon, 
the gaming problématique is that of war against terrorism. As a critique, On problematizes 
the US response to terrorism and the politics this response is based upon by letting the gamers 
play American politics.
68
 While AFMP works on a holistic model that suggests a unitary 
logic to confront intricate political problems, Antiwargame is almost as detailed in its 
political elegance as, for example, SENSE, which is run by the US Institute of Peace. 
Because of its sophistication it should not be compared directly with AFMP, as the audience 
it addresses is broad, but not the same as AFMP’s and with entirely different intentions. What 
can be compared however is the dynamic and movement they create. Due to AFMP being 
based on a holistic logic, momentum picks up quickly in the game, so that once the player 
decides on a strategy, violent or nonviolent, the decision-making process should be fairly 
straightforward. This is not the case in Antiwargame and the very game is based upon abrupt 
movement and constant break in flows due to interconnected issues putting obstacles in the 
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way of decision-making, with clashing ideological, national, international as well as personal 
interests.
69
 In other words, the political difficulty, the arduous process of making decisions 
that fit multiple interest groups while being “just” (according to whoever’s ideology) is 
produced as gaming experience that unfolds through interrupted movement that in this way 
creates the rhythm of the game to which the posthuman beats. In this sense, the rhythm of 
movement is closely tied to the overall gaming experience.  
 
However, learning through movement does not prescribe or even suggest a linear or 
teleological movement, and, indeed, movement can have all kinds of unconventional 
rhythms. Eddo Stern’s anti-war games can be read in this way and exemplifies learning 
through rhythmic movement quite well. In contrast to AFMP, Antiwargame and almost any 
other political, peace or anti-war game, Stern’s games do not work on the basis of letting the 
players explore alternatives to otherwise violent conflict resolutions and peace talks. To the 
contrary, his anti-violence, anti-militarism and thereby peace efforts are conveyed by 
confronting the participants with the sheer brutality of war, unadorned, not stylised or 
glorified in any way. In one of his games, 3T, the participants wore arm-straps that 
transmitted “bracing but non-lethal electrical shocks in correspondence to the injuries 
sustained by their onscreen avatars.”
70
 Notwithstanding the strong message this sends to 
games that play with the alluring qualities of violence, the factor of movement here comes 
out in a very different way. While the game depicts highly dynamic scenes, new experience 
in this case does not develop through continuous movement at all. Much to the contrary, the 
participants are often incapacitated and not able to react at all, not able to hold their joystick 
to navigate their avatars because their arms and hands cramp up, which arguably can be seen 
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as the replication of muscle fatigue of actual fighting scenarios.
71
 In terms of movement, this 
means an absolute hold until participants manage to recover. Even though rhythm is slow, it 
can be argued that learning experience is high. Unless participants have played this electrical 
game before, this seems a one-off and entirely new gaming experience that is literately 
working with the encounter as shock to thought. As one observer has noted, “they are so 
horrible and gruesome; it makes you never want to pick up a gun or support violence 
again.”
72
 Exposing participants to levels of physical discomfort and promoting a way of 
learning through physical impact is debatable in itself. However, the factor that is important 
here is that learning is happening through rhythmic movement that is highly interrupted, not 
regular or teleological, yet results in taking the participants out of ordinary experience.  
 
Comparing the three games and the learning rationale underlying them, AFMP works on a 
simple basis of trial and error, with a relatively linear flow of movement that is forward 
directed. The fewer the interruptions the steeper the learning curve. Antiwargame disagrees 
with this holistic order and the political incompleteness of games such as AFMP by offering a 
procedural gaming experience in which the player often has to take decisions that may seem 
illogical at first, but that thereby problematizes the obscure yet “causal ties between business, 
war, and civil unrest.”
73
 The decision-making process fosters a syllogic movement of the 
posthuman, playing with the idea of incompleteness of information when taking decisions 
and the trans-posthuman resonances this produces. Entirely different to these two experiences 
is that of 3T because decision-making, inaction and coherent movement seem to have little 
significance in the game itself. Arguably, the logic and learning experience of the game is 
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that of highlighting the importance of movement and interaction by interrupting and, thereby, 
preventing any meaningful behaviour of the posthuman. Therefore, movement is not only 
crucial in tracing the encounter of the new and learning in games, but also highlights that 
‘winning’ or being successful is not dependent upon achieving objective goals in the games. 
 
In contradistinction to the majority of commercial games, completeness of rounds and 
success are only secondary, often less interesting, in political games in the face of the 
learning experience throughout the games. In fact, the motivation of showing how politics 
doesn’t work is quite frequent, if not popular, amongst political games and often used to 
criticise dysfunctional political practice.
74
 The logic of games is that of the impossibility of 
‘winning’. Games that subscribe to this logic play on wider political conditions and political 
processes, contrasting individual action and influence with a political system, policy 
procedures, or situations of war and conflict. Especially since 9/11 there has been a 
significant response to George Bush’s War on Terror in form of “‘you-never-win’” games, as 
for example New York Defender and Kabul Kaboom.
75
 While it is problematic that 
‘impossibility’ already implies a certain type of outcome, the ‘you-never-win’ genre still 
epitomises that parameters of failure and success are entirely turned upside down in these 
political games and need to be calibrated for each individual game according to logics in 
rhythmic movement and learning experience.  
 
Gaming as Techno-Political-Event 
The level of critical political commentary in gaming not only asks about how and in what 
ways this influences the production of a new political subject (which will be dealt with in 
greater detail in the following chapter), but also if and how politics are already being played 
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out through gaming. Gaming as movement and rhythm that determines learning experience 
refers to the movement of the posthuman as a whole. Once the posthuman emerged in its 
temporal gaming form it is a movement that constantly oscillates between the pre-conscious 
and conscious. That is to say, the posthuman subject falls in and out of becoming depending 
on whether new experience occurs during gaming and how often this happens. This means 
that the specific posthuman political subject that emerges out of primary movements in a 
game is in a state of constant becoming and possibly un-becoming. This becoming in games 
is a process or plurality and innovation that is “creative” and “generative” and therefore 
associated with the event in a Deleuzian sense.
76
 Even though the preceding analysis has 
(implicitly) theorized posthuman emergence in line with the theory of the event, it is helpful 
to draw out gaming as event more strongly here. This is because the theory of the event 
highlights more clearly the strength and importance of gaming as political becoming in the 
way that political subjects during gaming “are in the being-made.”
77
 Furthermore, 
conceptualizing gaming as event in a Deleuzian way has the advantage of making aleatory 
movement an immanent aspect of gaming in general. In line with the event, the TPE arises 
out of a contingent mix of forces, indicating the “immanent and chaotic nature of the 
world.”
78
 However, the event is more than the spatio-temporal realisation of a state of 
affairs
79
, or merely referring to a certain happening in gaming, but it is a “unique instance of 
production in a continual flow of changes.”
80
 Turning gaming into a TPE is a strategic move 
in order to establish gaming as movement, change and becoming on a theoretical level. 
Events for Deleuze function in contradistinction to representation and are, thus, the reversal 
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of Platonism in the sense that the idea of an essence of things is removed and replaced by the 
event (a doing and happening), which is always unique.
81
 This is important for the TPE as it 
is characterized as generating immanent meaning rather than working upon an already 
established theory of the political. Of more significance even for the present purpose is that 
the theory of the event is part of the structuring process of experience. While experience 
originates out of a movement that cannot be divided along lines of subjects and objects as it is 
pre-conscious, the level of the event is the transition from the pre-subjective to the subjective 
that thereby produces immanent objects that are known by the subject.
82
 This means that the 
TPE describes the in-between from the point where systems of experience reach their 
“critical point” (trigger points of temperature for example) resulting in “fusion, congelation, 
boiling,”
83
 which results in a product that can then be known empirically and consciously. 
Alfred North Whitehead succinctly and beautifully captures the dynamic of the TPE. “Events 
are lived through, they extend around us. They are the medium within which our physical 




This means that “everything is event,”
85
 or in context of the gaming environment, the players, 
the technology and the experience at the same time. It is a truly immanent movement that yet 
results in an experience that can be known phenomenologically at the level of consciousness. 
Given that affect was identified earlier as occupying the same gap and facilitating movement 
across it, gaming can be seen as an productive event. In a few words, it is this complexity of 
experience and the event’s affirmative and productive power that renders gaming into a TPE. 
Ultimately, a game is then a continuous succession of events and it is always a case of 
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becoming-posthuman and becoming posthuman political subjectivities. As such it is a mix of 
forces that is aleatory, always unique and immanent. Importantly, gaming defies a political 
essence as such, or an ideal form of politics as seen in the three examples, but instead turns it 
into an event, a process, which according to Whitehead is experience above all. 
 
However, the TPE is still distinct from the event as such, for it is mediated by design, so that 
some events during gaming emerge contingently while others are pre-scripted as possibility. 
The TPE in many ways is a symbiosis of control and the uncontrollable at the same time, 
presenting a fascinating mix to the present analysis. The TPE includes series of scripted 
events and strategically placed affective intervals throughout the game, which control the 
thresholds of an event, at times keeping the game in states of inaction, as for example in the 
case of 3T. Due to technological design’s thresholding ability the event becomes interactive 
by interfacing affective capacities into the course of the game and thereby modulating the 
event itself.
86
 Therefore, the TPE is a “world-producing technoscience fiction” that creates 
and experiments with open, self-organized systems of experience.
87
 The way in which this 
happens is primarily through scripted events, which are carefully placed throughout the 
game’s programmed, possibilistic map. Whether a player encounters the trigger points of 
events is unpredictable and depends on whether or not a player moves past a certain point or 
makes a certain decision, and in so doing activates a “pre-scripted dramatic moment to 
occur.”
88
 Scripted events are the designer’s means to control contingency which is why they 
are used carefully in order to avoid producing a game structure that is too dominant. While it 
is a designer’s initial desire to alter a game in this way,
89
 scripted events have to be used with 
caution in political gaming for they present significant power to influence the kinds of 
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problems that can be encountered, at what stage of the game, and, ultimately, what can be 
experienced and known. Therefore, scripted events play a significant role in altering the 
motion and development of the posthuman and subsequent subjectivities. In the way that they 
can make for a whole new experience of the unknowable and unimaginable, their regulating 
effect can on the other hand run the risk of pre-empting scenarios as well.  
 
Even though scripted events run an ideological risk in this way, they do fulfil an important 
practical role in game design. In order to prevent the game getting ‘out of control’, that is to 
stay focused on the political motivation that inspired the game in the first place, scripted 
events are placed throughout the scenario in terms of intervals which is an attempt to 
modulate effects. The spacing of these events is a delicate task as too many scripted events in 
succession in a short period of time would only create puzzlement and impede the learning 
experience. This is because every scripted event can theoretically give rise to a new system of 
experience, which creates a problem in so far as high numbers of scripted events lead to the 
simultaneous production of new systems that would impair one another and literally tear the 
posthuman apart. It should be noted at this point that while the rupture to ordinary experience 
is essential for learning, it is not the intention of games to constantly shock the participants. 
Rather than overloading, the idea is to release signs (the shock to thought) in a way that these 
can develop and resonate, and do not get overridden by the next experience. Accordingly, this 
necessitates time, so that intervals of scripted events create a rhythm and tempo, according to 
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Affective Events: Generating Rhythm and Tempo 
Designing TPEs becomes more technical in the way that the rhythm and tempo of the 
posthuman-becoming and the becoming-subject does not only depend on scripted events but 
also on mechanisms such as amplification, modulation and bandwidth. Paying attention to 
these techniques is important because even though designers can never fully determine the 
affect a particular programme or software produces, this is the only way in which they can 
“attempt to narrow the possibilities for the kinds of affective responses that are generated.”
91
 
Even though these terms may seem rather technical and only marginally theoretical they do 
however influence movement in very significant ways. Importantly, games are ‘written’ with 
amplification, modulation and bandwidth making up part of the jargon.  
 
Zooming in on what happens after the encounter and how experience is allowed to unfold, it 
is arguably amplification that influences the posthuman’s development significantly.  To be 
precise, it allows designers to “produce a larger possibility space”
92
 and thereby determines 
the range of movement and engagement of the posthuman. This refers to little clues (rules) 
throughout the game that allow the player to engage with the environment (rules of 
engagement) and open up contingent space for action. Computer games in general have a 
great capacity for emergent action due to their complex sets of rules, and political games 
capitalize on this as well in order to multiply contingency through amplification. Going into 
technical and programming details, the term amplification signifies a change in the amplitude 
of a signal and “amplifiers usually operate by moving an input signal through a transfer 
function to create an output signal.”
93
 The input signal can be altered because of this so that 
the amplitude of the signal can be increased or decreased. On the level of the sign then,
94
 that 
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which the participants may encounter, amplification can draw on a variety of signals, such as 
colour and sound. This will be perceived (prae-ceived) as pre-subjective intensities, only to 
be registered later on as an experience that is structured according to such phenomenal 
features. The reason why this is important for gaming is that affect can be modulated through 
the means of amplification, functioning like as a filter with regard to what will appeal to the 
senses.  
 
Further down the development of a new system of experience it is through modulation that 
gaming can be influenced on a contextual level.
95
 Closely tied to and building upon 
amplification, it refers to variation, inflection or adaptation and Ash adds that modulation not 
only changes affective states – as for example from positive to negative – but that it is also 
used to maintain a particular affective state for a certain amount of time in the game. This 
suggests that amplification combined with modulation are essential in order to transduce pre-
subjective affects and affective changes to subjective feelings. In the same way, modulation 
can be used to keep the game in something like a stalemate, by preventing or pausing the 
translation of affects, thereby often slowing down movement, for example. This process ties 
amplification and modulation to movement and, thereby, to the rhythm of the game. As such, 
they are yet another crucial addition to the programming toolbox that facilitates the 
management of not only the motion and movement of the posthuman, but also the circulation 
of affects and the tempo of gaming. However, affects cannot be simply transmitted in this 
way, but have to be modulated and amplified within a specific bandwidth.
96
 This is because 
affect exists “outside of simple determinative relations of cause and effect.”
97
 This builds on 
the claim that it is impossible to tell a priori which attractors of intensities (dots on vectors) 
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are going to enter into a synthesis. Affects are only a step further in this shuffling on the 
plane of immanence, which means that it is impossible to determine and pick which affect is 
going to be translated. This leaves affective design in a situation where the amount of affect 
can be tempered through design, but not which affect specifically.
98
 As the term implies, it 
determines the width of affects released into the course of the game.  
 
Tying this to the rhythm of the posthuman, the effect of affect is better understood as 
resonance instead of outcomes. According to Connolly this means that  
 
causality…morphs into energized complexities of mutual imbrication and inter 
involvement, in which heretofore unconnected or loosely associated elements 
fold, bend, blend, emulsify, and dissolve into each other, forging a qualitative 




This further complicates the management of affect in gaming because designers not only 
have to work with the double contingency, but also with the resonance of affective states. 
Because of the posthuman’s indeterminacy, affects cannot be simply circulated throughout 
the game, as this might overwhelm the participants and create a sense of the game being out 
of control. This is a major challenge in game design more generally, where the margins of 
successful and effective design depend on small degrees of differences in amplification and 
modulation determined by bandwidth. In avoiding overstimulating the players, designers 
might use too few variables, leaving the participants unaffected and in ordinary systems of 
experience, failing to generate a new one. In this respect the mechanism of bandwidth is 
crucial as it aids the process of amplification and modulation. According to Ash, designing 
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affective games that operate within an optimal bandwidth is one of the most costly aspects in 
computer game design. Equally, the concept of bandwidth is essential in determining how 
the game and a new posthuman can take shape and are played out. It is through the 
combination of amplification, modulation and bandwidth that posthuman affective states are 
triggered and managed.  
 
All of these mechanisms appear within scripted events, so that these events can either limit 
the duration of negative affects that the gaming posthuman undergoes or prolong positive 
affective states. Depending on the specific gaming parameters, the amount of positive or 
negative affects may vary.
100
 As seen in 3T, negative affects may even be desired and 
essential to the game. Even if not desired, but emerging and circulating naturally and despite 
attempts to control them, negative affects do not necessarily have to be designed out in 
subsequent R&D of a game, as these specific affects are just symptomatic of certain game 
developments, attitudes and internal conflicts. This is where political games and 
conventional commercial computer games differ the most, as political games do not have to 
be enjoyable as such. In games for non-work entertainment, unintentional negative affects 
are usually designed out right away, hence, the lengthy and costly testing and then beta-
phases. For example, whereas affective states such as frustration are kept to a minimum in 
conventional computer games, these ‘irritating’ sensations are actually quite crucial to 
political games. Such aggravated affective states as for example in stalled peace negotiations 
are arguable an affect that is desirable to produce and train in the gaming realm. The only 
impression that needs to be avoided is that of indifference on behalf of the player.  In other 
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The posthuman is usually a product of spontaneous self-emergence and self-organization of 
experience, with the exception of gaming where design can be used to influence affective 
states in this development. This leads to a ‘semi-spontaneous’ process that is particularly 
visible in the posthuman’s movement. Given this affective dimension, the posthuman form of 
life is characterized by “vitality affects” in general
102
 and in gaming these are manipulated 
through design. Importantly, this means that the becoming-world in gaming is not reducible 
to subjective, conscious computer graphics, game decisions, or other phenomenal features 
that serially appear in different locations because of design, but much rather because of 
imperceptible, “affective linkages that bring ‘extremely diverse’ nonlocal differences together 
qualitatively.”
103
 That is affect brings the posthuman qualitatively to life. Participants coming 
to the game (each is actually a complex posthuman made up of worlds of intensities) take part 
in the TPE differentially, thereby merging into one posthuman form of life that is 
“nondecomposable” into the individual parts.
104
 Thus, gaming orchestrates attunement of and 
through affect.
105
 The movement and rhythm games produce can therefore be understood in 
terms of affective atmosphere and affective tonality that are different in each gaming round 
and that make each TPE singular. Thus, a TPE describes a singular moment of political 
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Attention and At-Tension: Connecting Affect and Captivation 
Capitalizing the Sense of Flow 
The workings of affect, the tonality and atmosphere it produces, also creates attention, more 
specifically as this research suggests a physical state of at-tension. This is a crucial aspect of 
gaming in general and political gaming as a pedagogical tool more specifically as it has a 
direct impact on the learning experience and is the factor that sets it apart from other forms 
of training. Importantly, at-tension is created and managed through amplification, 
modulation, and bandwidth, which commercial game design capitalizes upon to create what 
is referred to as flow experience. Even though this type of experience, also known as optimal 
experience, is researched and theorized in reference to the human subject, there are 
interesting arguments that can be applied to the pre-subjective realm as well because flow 
draws heavily on subliminal processes. As such it signifies the “absolute absorption in an 
activity.”
107
 In this way flow is indeed helpful to describe an essential characteristic of the 
gaming posthuman, as experience emerges out of immanent dynamics so that attention is not 
an absorption in an activity, but it is part of this very activity already. Interestingly and 
fittingly, as described in the literature, flow experiences are not necessarily pleasant, which 
supports the idea of negative affective states that translate into feelings of suspense, 
frustration or pain in the game. Indeed, flow is fitting to stress the point of torsion and at-
tension during experience and thereby helps to clarify that gaming, especially when political, 
is not necessarily a ‘fun’ or a pleasant, entertaining exercise. 
 
Of similar importance is the fact that flow experience as articulated in psychology stresses 
the importance of ‘loss of time’, a situation in which the sense of time and duration is 
altered, which point to and supports the argument here that posthuman experience happens 
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in ‘qualitative time’. According to Mihály Csíkszentmihályi the complete absorption in an 
activity makes those who are experiencing lose sense and track of time.
108
 Adjusting this 
slightly, the suggestion is that this is because flow unfolds in posthuman time and space 
anyway, where time cannot be tallied quantitatively. Even on a later subjective and 
conscious level the time and space compression makes perfect sense with regard to gaming, 
given that the scenarios played often do not represent ‘ordinary’ and ‘standard’ time 
anyway. Minutes may represent hours in the gaming scenario or sometimes these games 
even last as long as several days or weeks. What Csíkszentmihályi essentially describes with 
flow, partly through temporal dissociation, is the evacuation of the conscious subject as it 
surrenders to the gaming dynamic and how it is thereby opened up and transformed. Flow 
experience is treated as an affective event within cognitive sciences as well, resonating 
significantly with ideas of the pre-subjective posthuman during gaming, in the way that, for 
example, the gamers’ activities become “spontaneous, almost automatic” and that they “stop 
being aware of themselves as separate from the action they are performing.”
109
 Classically 
flow is triggered by increasing situational immersion, generating a sense of ‘here and now’ 
in which “only a very select range of information can be allowed into awareness,” making 
the subject “lose self-consciousness.”
110
 The interplay of flow through “total involvement” is 
interesting in the way that on the one hand it requires concentration while on the other the 
thinking subject is found to be absent.
111
 Recent studies argue that flow is actually increased 
through interactivity with NT and cognitively traverses embodied subjects and their 
telepresence.
112
 This is significant as it means that flow experience is not placed in the 
unitary, whole and conscious subject. What social psychology describes in this respect then 
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is a form of posthuman experience, where the subject traverses different media, melting into 
subject and activity (the event) at the same time and is embodied in different modes of 
expression.  
 
The Economic Dimension of Affective Design 
Knowing how to produce flow experience during gaming and the way this can be employed 
to improve gaming experience as well as better the gaming outcome, lends itself to be 
exploited in other ways as well. The heightened alertness of the de-subjectified body and how 
it improves learning experience because of complete immersion and absorption in an activity 
has made flow experience very attractive to the gaming industry, including the development 
of ‘serious’ and political games. Considered as the ‘sweet spot for learning’
113
 flow sets itself 
apart from other forms of learning because it is a means to develop, manage and use 
capacities for attention, which according to Bernard Stiegler are breaking down in the age of 
NT, which favour and work on the basis of short attention spans.
114
 In this sense the ability to 
produce and manage attention/at-tension is not only advantageous, but almost the very 
condition of learning in times of increased technological mediations.
115
 However, in contrast 
to the argument that people lose their ability to concentrate in a traditional way, posthuman 
technological becomings just call for different types of attention, those in which the body is 
at-tension with multiple intensities that challenge ordinary experience. Rather than marking a 
lack of attention and motivation to engage with, train and theorize the political, political 
games are actually indicative of new skills that the conscious subject has appropriated as part 
of a development in pedagogy.  Essentially, with increasing social interaction on a daily basis 
due to new and widespread information and communication technology (ICT), experience, 
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and thus learning, has become more interactive as well. Furthermore, the argument that the 
social is increasingly marked by short attention spans has little leverage if experience is 
compressed in time and space as well. When dealing with posthuman time, it makes little 
sense to judge attention in quantitative time. The kind of at-tension produced during flow 
experience is not defined by the duration of attention given to a particular content, nor could 
it be quantifiable in this way. Instead posthuman at-tension during gaming is a “diffused and 
elliptical process”
116
 that needs to be conceptualized as a dynamic that is part of the system of 
experience, the TPE more broadly, rather than a conscious act on behalf of the subject. It is 
diffused because it is an impersonal happening that is determined by stimuli (affect) that are 
spread across the game space. In gaming attention/at-tension and its temporal flux are 




Reflecting upon this critically, the fact that attention/at-tension can be tailored into the 
affective architecture of learning and training environments such as games means that it can 
be manufactured by “articulating lived experience.”
118
 However, if it can be produced it can 
be instrumentalized; and the increased interest in technologies that monopolise attention 
turns the latter into the “newest source of value production under capitalism today,”
119
 which 
draws gaming back into the peace business. On the basis of social reality being increasingly 
organized according to new media fictionality, the monitored, affective design of attention 
reflects a cybernetic relation, not only between the player/spectator and the social, but also 
between the player and the political. In light that attention is turning into a “finite, 
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exchangeable commodity,” it forms the basis of an entire economy of attention.
120
 Since 
political training is technological-becoming it can be argued that it is to some extent tapping 
into and contributing to the economy of attention. Recalling the ‘Simulation Triangle’ that 
spans between political and military personal, private security companies, the gaming 
industry and the academy, now whole companies specialised in testing, quantifying and 
improving the physiological and cognitive basis of digital attention can be added to this 
simulation business.
121
 Given that political gaming largely emerged out of the research 
initiative of governments, militaries as well as independent research institutes puts games for 
change willingly or not at the forefront of an affective economy of attention. However, being 
a symptom of an opportunist momentum should not be used to jump to hasty conclusions. 
Whereas there is an abundance of commercial games where their users literally ‘pay 
attention’, this does not suffice to argue that the technical constitution of attention turns all 
games into a politics of captivation based on the management of affect.  
 
Affective Design: Posthuman Politicians and Pedagogy 
The “dynamic interactional ontology”
122
 of the gaming posthuman, its affective capacity as 
well as its affective at-tension and the physiological-psychological entwinement through 
flow means that not only the TPE, but also the posthuman political body is social, economic, 
political and somatic. Due to the fact that the affective posthuman exceeds the liberal 
individual, affective design of games is thus the effort to influence this posthuman ‘agent’, 
to modulate it and, ultimately, influence the political body. In other words, gaming can be 
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interpreted as the development of particular bodily and somatic memory that is based on the 
affective attunement and exploitation of players’ “tendencies to react to categories of 
events.”
123
 This attunement and alteration in game development is based on the observation 
of bodily experiences that inform a “somatic marker profile,” which indicates how the 
posthuman reacts and moves in and through games.
124
 Through intervals of scripted events 
(that is repetition) these tendencies are fostered and reinforced and later on recycled so that 
somatic-cognitive tendencies to react in certain ways re-enter affective gaming structures. 
Importantly, this means that even though once the game is over the posthuman body ceases 
to exist in its gaming-constellation, these affective registers persist in the bodies that the 
posthuman breaks into after a game. One can go as far as to argue that gaming then seeks a 
‘bio-cultural evolution’ that shapes political bodies and influences their tendencies to react. 
Adopting Protevi’s line of argument here then this is referred to as ‘bodies politic’, which is 
the entwinement of socio-political practices and institutions, and somatic affect that 
reinforce each other.
125
 While the connection of the political and the somatic happen in other 
aspects and on multiple levels, political gaming is one crucial way towards this 
diachronically developing and reinforcing process, which in the case of gaming produces the 
politician-by-design as it were.  
 
Pedagogy and Beyond: New Learning Spaces and Processes 
How the posthuman political subject/body thinks, moves, learns and trains is described here 
as a form of posthuman pedagogy in which movement and at-tension are crucial 
determinates of the learning process. Given that at-tension is action leads to an 
active/actional posthuman pedagogy, based in the present case of immersive and interactive 
gaming. However, tied to action and movement posthuman pedagogy is a local dynamic, 
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that even if the new system of experience can resonate on multiple and far-reaching scales, 
the pedagogy emerges through the local rhythm of movement. Deleuze and Guattari refer to 
this idea as milieu and illustrate this with the following simple example which is indeed 
helpful for understanding initial locally attuned developments of a spatial pedagogy: “A 
child afraid in the dark sings a song to reassure herself, and in so doing establishes a stable 
point in the midst of chaos, a locus of order in a nondimensional space.”
126
 Importantly, 
whether in gaming or emerging otherwise, milieu is territorialising, but not territory itself. 
Based on the dynamic ontology of (game)space that was established, then in the same vein 
milieu is a dynamic not a static, fixed space.
127
  There is only a fluid form to milieus, so that 
these are “ever-shifting” and it is only through code, which is the “repetition of elements” 
that temporary boundaries persist.
128
 This means that the beginning of playing demarcates a 
dimensional area of space-time out of the unformed coded software, which then comes to 
mark a point of stability upon which systems of experience hinge and from which learning 
then can happen. To recall that this “vibratory, rhythmic, and coded material field” that is a 
specific emergence out of a particular gaming action is mattered-thought/thinking-matter, 
then milieu can be seen as the habit of thought of the being-as-becoming, which is the 
posthuman. Habit and milieu are crucial concepts to understand the political posthuman and 
posthuman subjectivity that develops out of gaming dynamics, because habit is repeated 
contemplation in gaming, which thereby makes up the basis for conceptual practice. Tying 
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this to the political body then “we are all ‘contemplations, and therefore habits.’”
129
 Indeed, 
the milieu is the origin of subjectivity, thus, gaming-milieu is identified as the conditions 
that give rise to the political posthuman gaming subject for: “I is a habit. Wherever there are 





Further, if ‘I’ is a habit then a milieu composes a ‘me’, an appropriated subject. In short it is 
“contemplations that make our ‘selves.’”
131
 The strength of gaming in this sense is that it 
perfectly highlights and capitalises that not only milieus are fluid, but also that habits are 
creative.
132
 Describing the onset of the new political subject as habits or differential rhythm 
(patterns of difference with repetition) that constitute a local dynamic in the game, a 
pedagogical milieu, allows for this very subject to be transformed, become undone 
(deterritorialised) or be produced anew (territorialised). And in this sense, the task of 
posthuman pedagogy – Deleuze approaches these issues through the ‘pedagogy of the 
concept’ – is to “analyse the[se] conditions of creation as factors of moments remaining 
singular.”
133
 But “how in fact does one learn […], in what kind of space, in what conditions, 
with whom[?]”
134
 In posthuman gaming pedagogy, learning happens through rhythmic 
movement of mattered-thought/thinking-matter that is pre-subjective and emerges out of the 
gaming experience. These interplays of intensity produce the posthuman and its contraction 
and expansion throughout the course of playing movement establishes the game-space and, 
hence, the space of learning. Because this is a case of rhythmic movement, due to coded 
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differences in the game’s affective architecture, this spatial dynamic is a milieu. The 
conditions are that of at-tension and the whom is singular-plural at the same time, for the 
posthuman is implied multiplicity as well as the ‘I’ as a habit and the future ‘me’ as the 
subject of the milieu and the conscious political subject to come.  
 
Conclusion  
Affect matters. Literally, it matters the posthuman through game design. Even though 
posthuman bodies are self-emerging, in the case of the gaming posthuman, this process is 
influenced to a large degree by a game’s architecture that has been carefully designed 
beforehand and slowly works its affect in the course of the game. This means that affect 
matters in two significant ways. First, as the development of intensities, it partakes in the 
shaping of the posthuman body. Second, precisely because it is a step further than intensity 
means that affect is the transducer from the pre-subjective to the subjective realm, which is 
from the Virtual to the actual. Therefore, looking at game design through the lens of affect, 
rather than, for example technical details in programming or studies on cognitive processes in 
gaming, is more suitable for the technoscientific analysis of the posthuman because of 
affect’s pre-subjective, pre-conscious, intensive and asignifying qualities, but also because it 
leads the way to a posthuman political subject. The strength of affect then is its in-betweeness 
that works in the “dynamic interactional ontology” that was developed for gaming. Because 
of affect’s importance in shaping the posthuman body during gaming, game design and a 
game’s architecture were treated as interactive maps for shaping the body, rather than just a 
coded structure and instruction to a game. However, to design such a map and to then let it 
play out is a vastly complex and difficult task, of which the chapter highlighted significant 
steps that matter most with regard to the production of the posthuman and its ensuing 




To detail and explain the significance of affect in this posthuman-becoming, the chapter 
focused on the interplay of two aspects, contingency and movement. Doppler-contingency 
was identified as the crucial mechanism to carefully guide movement, which is essential for 
the emergence of the posthuman, but also its behaviour in the game. More specifically, the 
argument suggested that the contingency on behalf of the players, decision-making, and 
general unpredictable gaming dynamics, is controlled through designing contingency into the 
game’s structure as well. Arguably, this is one of the few ways in which to ensure a relatively 
natural flow in the game, without the game’s structure being too oppressive, restrictive and 
prescriptive. While this is something that is explored more in commercial games, especially 
first person (often shooter) games, it was argued that plays of contingency to improve organic 
movement of the posthuman would be highly beneficial for the design of political games.  
 
In order for the analysis to make the claim that movement matters through Doppler-
contingency that is affectively designed, game-space needed to be problematized, 
reconceptualised and attuned to the posthuman in the game and as a general condition outside 
of it as well. The gist of the argument suggested that the reality of change cannot be 
understood in Euclidean and three-dimensional space and that representationalist and static 
understandings of space and a body fail the posthuman. Instead it was proposed that the 
temporary body-space of the posthuman is a net of intensity that expands and contracts. 
Precisely this expanding/contracting dynamic is how the posthuman moves. Because 
intensities that enter the posthuman symbiosis are from the participants, the gaming 
technology as well as other parts of the surrounding, there is no conception of a gaming 
environment as such. This means that affect is already immanent to the posthuman. As such, 
affective thresholds in the form of (at-)tension, rhythm and speed can be met/encountered, 
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which then lead to different contractions or expansions. However, this movement is up to 
chance, the eventuality of which is tailored into the game design that then can encourage and 
channel movement. The techniques used to do so are scripted events (that occur in intervals) 
and these events are engineered through amplification, modulation, and bandwidth. The latter 
are mechanisms that influence the distribution of affect in the game, that is the encounter of 
new intensities (information) and are, thus, essential to posthuman formation.  
 
Based on the ceaseless continuing dynamic and variation that the gaming posthuman is, it 
was argued that conventional aspects of failure and success in gaming do not apply in the 
context of political games. Instead, the proposition was made that the flow of movement, new 
encounters, and challenges to old habits are better parameters of performance against which 
gaming can be judged. However, comparing the movement of three different games it was 
also shown that these factors vary greatly from game to game and not only from genre to 
genre or audience to audience. Indeed, the connection between explorative movement and 
learning was identified as one of the most interesting factors with regard to analysing games, 
especially games for change. These conditions for explorative movement are affects tailored 
into the game, so that learning in and through games greatly depends upon a game’s 
architecture and prior thought going into it. 
 
Due to the gaming’s interactional ontology and the continual variation of the posthuman, it is 
relatively straightforward to conceptualize posthuman-becoming as event in a Deleuzian 
sense, where the event describes singularity, the “unique instance of production in a continual 
flow of changes.”
135
 However, this production has limits depending on game design as well 
as its play and context. This means that the political subject emerges differently in gaming as 
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it would do outside of it. Therefore, the theory of the event is attuned to the construct of the 
TPE in order to precisely highlight the subtle play between gaming architecture and 
posthuman-becoming. This is not to argue, however, that this emergence is mere 
construction, as game design does not work on a hypodermic model of gaming power (as it 
was shown by problematizing contingency). In this sense, the gaming posthuman is a 
continuous series of events, which are singular points of experience produced by qualitative 
movement. This movement and therefore the TPE in general arise out of at-tension in the 
game, affecting a posthuman that is more engrossed in gaming dynamics. This form of 
posthuman attention was teased out further with the help of flow experience, which 
encapsulates the tension between the conscious player on the one hand and on the other the 
non-subjective, non-conscious dynamics that happen with the evacuation of the subject. 
While at-tension is important for it creates a difference in intensity and, thus, a dynamic that 
drives movement, this power to captivate can be capitalized. Commercial games draw heavily 
on flow and captivation as emerging economies of attention indicate. It was argued that even 
though political gaming cannot escape these economies, as it is after all a product of the 
simulation business, the advantage and leverage to captivate and create at-tension can be 
channelled into articulating a posthuman pedagogy that is actional and thereby sensitive to 
the rhythmic movement and “ever-shifting” nature of the posthuman. It was argued that such 
an evental, vibratory and milieu dependent pedagogy better responds to the learning needs of 
a political body-by-design that is marked by affective habits. Lastly, going through affect’s 
role in shaping the body provides a better understanding of the way in which gaming and the 
posthuman condition are related and indeed feed off each other. Furthermore, tracing and 
chasing affective architectures of games allows one to go on drawing out the production of 
posthuman subjectivity that emerges through political gaming.  
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Chapter 4 ~ Producing Posthuman Subjectivity 
 
The body without organs is an egg: it is crisscrossed with axes and thresholds, with latitudes 
and longitudes and geodesic lines, traversed by gradients marking the transitions and the 





He who fights with monsters should look to it that he himself does not become a monster. And 






This chapter seeks to expose and explain the process of how gaming as a form of political 
training for various aspects relating to peace operations can fruitfully impact upon, and 
indeed produce, wider political subjectivities. The aim is to outline how thought, experience 
and action become subjective and thereby have direct implications for socially held political 
concepts and how these can materialize. Theoretical constructs and claims previously 
developed in this research offer necessary tools to articulate a posthuman subjectivity and, 
thus, one that is indifferent to a specifically human subject and experience.
3
 More so, this 
means that the approach to political subjectivity parallels that of the physical political body 




Due to the fact that political games are often portrayed as a new strategy for socio-political 
change by designers, developers and users alike requires analysing how the act of gaming can 
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manifest as something new.
5
 This is the reason for tracing and further developing the 
production of new subjectivities. How this change through games plays out on the subjective, 
eventually conscious level, has yet to be articulated for a posthuman condition. To put this 
into a guiding question for the present chapter, this is to ask how gaming as a new posthuman 
pedagogy can actually impact upon the political realm. This research suggests that this 
happens because one can observe newly emerging posthuman subjectivities in gaming that 
can go on to inform wider political notions. Put simply, game subjectivities can resonate on 
much larger socio-political, compositional and temporal scales. Therefore, the intention is to 
outline this emerging process in greater detail with the aim of providing a better 
understanding of how affective game design takes effect, but also how games can be explored 
further to amplify games’ impact.  
 
The chapter will start by introducing the human subject (subject-as-is) and contextualizing it 
in the contemporary dynamics of subject-societal entwinements and help to sketch the 
process of subject formation that gaming sets itself up against. Interpreting Gilles Deleuze 
and Felix Guattari’s collective and individual work with the help of Simon O’Sullivan’s 
commentary, the chapter will develop a process of the production of subjectivity with a 
specific focus on gaming. This is the continuation of onto-material processes and the techno-
political-event (TPE) that started on a molecular and sub-atomic level, so that posthuman 
subjectivity in its initial dynamics is a micro-political subjectivity before it can be grasped 
consciously later on. This later stage will be identified as body politic – which is the 
entwinement of socio-political institutions and practices with material affect that reinforce 
each other.
6
 For analytical and practical purposes this will be divided into different levels, in 
order to show various stages of where gaming can make an impact. In order to get to this 
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point the analysis establishes subjectivity development that starts with lines of flight in 
desiring-production, which is a twofold process. It then moves on to new emerging 
subjectivities called probe-heads, which will be contextualised within wider peace training 
practices. However, this is not to imply that the emergence of posthuman subjectivity (EPS) 
is a linear and teleological process. The outline provided here is a model that aims to support 
future game design and use, as well as our understanding of posthuman forms of training. It is 
not the intention to force the production of subjectivity into rigid steps and it is acknowledged 
that the process is more volatile, unpredictable and aleatory than a reliable causal unfolding. 
Once the way leading towards body politic has been established and different levels clarified, 
Benjamin’s pedagogical theory of the mimetic faculty
7
 will be used to tease out why and how 
this long line of trajectories can be linked up conceptually. The analysis will draw to an end 
with some remarks on future theoretical as well as gaming development.  
 
Introducing the Human Subject 
The “political subject” and “subjectivity” are certainly prominent buzzwords in the 
contemporary study and practice of international politics; yet, their production is rarely 
elaborated. What might appear to be a fairly obvious and straightforward concept when 
approached through humanist, Kantian lenses turns into a much more complex and 
challenging endeavour in a posthuman condition. This further suggests that this endeavour 
needs to be contextualized within a transformative socio-political cartography that is the 
product of the proliferation of a global digital play of affect-by-design on the one hand, but 
also to digital ‘chaos’ and catastrophe on the other. In other words, the technosphere, as 
comprising transhuman/posthuman practices that exceed the initial parameters of the human 
subject by jumping spatio-temporal scales and due to their ever-increasing speed, is still 
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largely unknown and under-theorized. Therefore, the study of the political posthuman subject 
needs to get up to speed and adapt. However, before this can be done, it is necessary to grasp 
the subject and subjectivity in the first place.  
 
The Human Subject as O’Sullivan’s ‘subject-as-is’ 
Notwithstanding that the term subject has been theorized widely, these are largely 
definitional exercises that not only treat the subject as somewhat as a given and 
unproblematic occurrence, but that are also unfit for a posthuman condition. The subject as it 
is commonly used has various meanings and is employed to designate various performances 
of the human category. Ranging from the feudal understanding of the people who are subject 
to a king, to Rousseau’s subject of the citizen, to the consumer subject of contemporary 
capitalism, to the psychoanalytic subject on Freud’s couch – all are different performances 
and practices. The same word serves to describe attributes of the human and how it relates to, 
is entwined with or even produced by its environment, such as authority, the market, friends 
or itself. However, in these more conventional and accepted understandings the subject is a 
given, what O’Sullivan refers to this as the ‘subject-as-is’.
8
 There is no question that the 
acting human can and often does incorporate all of these different subjects. To push this 
further, one is born into and grows up along the trajectories of stable subjectivity markers and 
into social relations, so that a life is always implicitly characterised by being a high school 
student, a citizen of a state and as such is fulfilling social functions and roles.
9
 Even though 
‘subject’ can in some instances assume a similar linguistic function as ‘character’ and 
‘personality’ in the way that it is mostly seen as proper to an individual, the notions of 
character and personality belong to the vocabulary of behavioural psychology, whereas that 
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of the subject is typical of sociological analysis that considers wider, interdependent socio-
political factors.
10
 Indeed, subject and subjectivity within the academic realm have very 
strong political connotations; yet, subjectivity is often treated as sedate, less fluid and prone 
to sedimentation. It is usually the ‘identity’ of a human subject that is supposed to be 
dynamic. This becomes problematic however when looking at political subjects, such as 
individuals and groups involved in peace practices, whether professionally or as part of civil 
society. To be a ‘diplomat’ or a ‘peace consultant’ is a practice that depends on multiple and 
hugely diverse and diffused factors that in a complex, continuous interplay shape what might 
be called a diplomat. The ceaseless continuation of this productive, reiterative process implies 
that a specific as well as general ‘diplomat’ subjectivity is in continuous flux and becoming. 
In other words, becoming-diplomat is not adequate to the concept of the static subject-as-is, 
which is in fact Kant’s self-identical subject.
11
 The idea that a wide spectrum of different 
factors influences this process leads Jason Read to suggest the transindividual production of 
the subject.
12
 Agreeing with this line of argument, it nonetheless needs to be adjusted as the 
posthuman condition that is assumed here suggested that subjectivity is not something that 
emerges out of an individual human body and its engagement with the environment. Instead, 
the trajectory of the subject is that it is seen as the continuation of an individuating process 
that starts with an encounter that gives rise to non-personal thought. The individual and the 
subject are just conscious after-images of these primary ontological movements as it were, 
but neither is it a case of the individual affecting the subject or vice versa. However, in 
agreement with Read’s “trans” then the production of subjectivity is indeed trans-material 
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and trans-body and therefore its analysis has to focus on processes above, below and 
alongside the subject-as-is. 
 
Implications  
Posthuman subjectivity, whether in a political context or not, needs to go against the 
ontogenetic production of the ‘human subject’, and start with the concreteness of the 
materials involved. This concrete and material tracing enables an emergence of posthuman 
subjectivity or EPS that is proper to singular material dynamics, rather than the human 
category, and therefore much more volatile. However, this does not mark the ‘death of the 
subject’ as some sceptics argue.
13
 It is rather the case of (re)incarnation of the posthuman 
subject that shows that subjectivity is an emergent capacity. This has several implications. 
EPS as a dynamic, self-organizing process permits a conceptualisation of s non-hylomorphic 
subjectivity by turning its production into a creative development, enabling genuinely new 
political subjectivities. By showing that subjectivity (and it production) is not fixed, but 
flexible and ever-changing points to ways of how the political subject can be produced, 
mapping a new political cartography. By extension this means that studying the production of 
political subjectivities in peace practices not only shows inherent problems with current 
accounts of peace operations, but more importantly opens up avenues to reconstitute what, 
for example, a diplomat, a soldier, an opposition leader as a political subject may be 
altogether.
14
 Such a notion of subjectivity in line with technoscience and new materialist 
philosophy is “fundamentally disorientating” and uprooting liberal political practices and 
understandings of peace operations.
15
 To see the subject not as originary, but as the product 
of movement and affect of prior matterings also destabilizes traditional philosophical binaries 
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by “mingling effects with cause, material conditions with interior states, and objects with 
subjects.”
16
 In a political sense posthuman subjectivity rejects the bar between the individual 
and the collective by arguing that the individual is inescapably collective materiality.
17
 From 
the perspective of the technoscience, gaming is a fascinating example of the dynamics of 
subjectivity formation. It is optimal in demonstrating how, on the one hand, old, dominant 
regimes and habitual formations of liberal peace keep static liberal subjectivities in place, 
while on the other games are materializing processes for questioning and upsetting such static 
notions and at the same time are also the capacity for new emerging subjectivities. Due to the 
fact that political games can be a series of techno-political-events (TPE) depending on their 
affective design proposes that “such affective-events are the germ of the new world.”
18
 This 
is the utopian impulse and innovative attribute of political gaming.  
 
Reterritorializing Subjectivity: Undoing and Producing Political Subjectivity 
‘Faciality’ and Subjectivity: The Problem with the subject-as-is and Liberal Politics 
The key to understanding and developing a posthuman subjectivity in a way that implies the 
possibility of continual variation requires the suggestion that subjectivity depends on unique 
matter formations and material relations. In essence, the subject is not self-identical: it is not 
a product of its origin, but merely an after-effect of it.
19
 However, the notion that the subject 
does not determine its own destiny is not to suggest that EPS is a form of subjection nor does 
its trans-material character point towards a subjectification.
20
 In contrast, this production is a 
practical and creative organization that is self-emerging (out of the plane of immanence) and 
not a form of subjection since there is no outside force driving its development. Subjection, 
or processes of subjectification in a Foucaultian sense, in peace practices are ways of training 
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through top-down approaches of knowledge dissemination through seminars in which 
practitioners of all ranks are briefed according to the latest policy papers of various 
Departments of Foreign Affairs, research centres and think tanks. This one-way stream of 
learning is based on material that presents official and hegemonic opinion and the latter that 
is subjection through dominant ideological practices is referred to as faciality by Deleuze and 
Guattari.
21
 The argument here is that though gaming runs the risk of passing on ideological 
biases, it also offers more opportunity to engage with content critically and indeed fosters 
self-emerging understandings of peace operations through the variables of play, experience 
and chance. As such, gaming has the capacity to go against faciality. 
 
Faciality, in general, describes the current state of human organisation and it is a mix of 
signification, subjectification, and representation.
22
 In the political context of peace 
operations, signifying means the desire for interpretation to generate general knowledge 
about specific peace practices. It is the constant process of assigning meaning to events, to 
make them fit into certain categories that do support overarching ideological premises. Such a 
signifying regime leads to forms of subjectification upon which practices are established and 
justified. This is particularly apparent in the crossing of specialized knowledge of economics 
and post-conflict state building, peace-building and conflict-prevention that foster a primarily 
liberal face of international politics.
23
 However, these are very narrowly conceived 
understandings of stability and security operations that put strict limits on a political subject 
and confine political action within these limits. Subjectivity must not be seen as arising out of 
an already set content, but out of materiality and material practices that produce singular 
concepts and only then content. The subtlety of this argument needs to be clarified because 
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identifying liberal peace practices as faciality is not the same as to critiquing the content, but 
rather the role this content plays in the constitution of the subject and its subsequent practices. 
As such, there is no alternative way of producing and engaging with political subjectivity. 
Denying faciality in this context means not only denouncing a certain set of practices, but 
also the basis of its constituent processes. In this light, though the example of gaming as part 
of a peace practices is inescapably tied to certain ideological holdings and practices, to 
articulate a posthuman subjectivity is not an ideological criticism, but a metaphysical one. 
Accordingly, to argue that gaming offers the opportunity for different practices and processes 
of the political and the political subject that work against facialization, is to suggest a 
metaphysical alternative. This can be conceived of as a desire to “escape the face and 
facializations, to become clandestine”
24
 and to a large degree as an aspiration for becoming 
rather than being. The “facialization machine” not only limits actual peace practices and the 
political subject, but also becoming and life in general.
25
 In short, facialization prescribes the 
“coordinates and contours that allow the signifying subject to emerge,”
26
 and through the 
development of posthuman subjectivity it will be shown how gaming can partake in enabling 
other forms of political life.  
 
Beyond the Face: Towards Desiring-Production 
Acknowledging the limits of faciality within which current political subjectivity emerges is 
only the first step in the production of alternatives. Criticising and deconstructing the face 
and dominant subjectification is not enough and denouncing how current liberal models of 
secuirty operations constitute values and the political subject does not result in a self-
emerging subject and/or political novelty. Indeed it is still far away from producing 
alternatives and arguably this is because the political repertoire is completely void of 
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posthuman mechanisms that escape representationalist understandings of politics. The 
political process and its subjects are based upon the human body and subject as a referent and 
works within the logic of representation. Reworking the political subject and its constitution 
is a lengthy process. Its elaboration is communicated through Deleuzoguattarian conceptual 
vocabulary and argues that undoing the face in the search for new political subjectivities 
involves active deterritorialization and reterritorialization that are driven by a desiring-
production. In the way that Deleuze and Guattari view this production as the immanent 
production of the world, desiring-production is used here specifically as the driving force of 
undoing and ‘doing’ habits in gaming that work towards new political cartographies. It is 
important to note that desire on a posthuman level can neither be understood in a Freudian 
sense (psychoanalytic sense) nor is it “for an object,” but “desire is the production of singular 
states of intensity […] as multiple cocausal becoming.”
27
 As such, it is the drive of a body to 
produce relations with what it is not itself. However, this social production does not imply 
change: it is only the way in which reality is brought forward. It is the modus operandi of 
change, but also that of the face and the status quo: 
 
It is at work everywhere, functioning smoothly at times, at other times in fits and 
starts. It breathes, it heats, it eats. It shits and fucks. What a mistake to have ever 
said the id. Everywhere it is machines – real ones, not figurative ones: machines 
driving other machines, machines being driven by other machines, with all the 
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The point here is that there is no world without desiring-production. Reality emerges from the 
plane of immanence through the desiring-machine (binary process)
29
 and the synthesis of 
intensities that give rise to new experience is a form of desiring-production can be infinitely 
large or small. It is only at the point of the “fits and starts” where defamiliarisation and 
dehabitalisation, as the possibility to move beyond the face, come in and when desiring-
production can produce subjectivity otherwise.  
 
To be precise, desiring-production entails two structures: first, it involves anti-production, 
which is the first step of rejecting the status quo and second, it involves desiring-production 
itself (forces of attraction that eventually lead to synthesis of the new). The first structure 
describes a ‘disjunctive synthesis’ when the facialization machine is brought to a hold in its 
subjectification process – fits and starts. This is the moment of rupture in ordinary experience 
as it can be triggered in gaming and when the political is opened up. “Everything stops dead 
for a moment, everything freezes in place – and then the whole process will begin all over 
again”
30
 – unless the second structure sets in with desiring-production taking place. This is 
why Deleuze and Guattari argue that in many ways “it would be much better if nothing 
worked, if nothing functioned”.
31
 However, avoiding the vocabulary of dysfunction and 
brokenness, this window of opportunity, the political, can be opened through careful affective 
game design that tailors possibilities of rupture into the game’s architecture. However, it can 
only ever be the rupture to the functioning scenario of liberal peace practices in the game that 
can be designed, but not what gaming scenarios are developing thereafter, nor the possibly 
unorthodox subjectivities this can produce. As anti-production it is only an initiating 
“repulsion of [existing] desiring-machines.”
32
 Therefore, since anti-production can be a part 
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of an existing desiring-machine as much as it can work against it the moment of interruption 
is only an initial sting – “so many nails piercing the flesh, so many forms of torture,” but 
there mere fact of suffering does not put an end to suffering itself.
33
 Eddo Stern’s Tekken 
Torture Tournament (3T) is a good example for its physical poignancy that helps to belabour 
the point. The fact that participants’ ordinary experience is ‘shocked’ through actual electric 
shocks, causing discomfort and pain, does not lead them to think about violence differently, 
let alone act upon it. In this sense anti-production might be best equated with the conscious 
correspondent of ‘raising awareness’. Therefore, the genesis of new production other than 
faciality “lies precisely here: in the opposition of the process of [existing] production.”
34
 
However, if this “non-productive stasis” occurs, then the second structure, desiring-
production, can take place which means that anti-production is not only the germ of new 
political experiences, but also a form of new socio-political production.
35
 This makes gaming 
for its mere capacity to create conditions for anti-production an undoubtedly important and 
potent way of training.  
 
The window of opportunity can only emerge because anti-production is not a conscious 
process. Throughout this process the subject is absent and still in the larval state, to be 
precise. Recalling the process of becoming, where the larval is just one state and where the 
subject ‘arrives to the scene late’:  
 
the opposition of the forces of attraction and repulsion produce an open series of 
intensive elements, all of them positive that are never an expression of the final 






 Ibid.  
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equilibrium of a system [of experience], but consist, rather, of an unlimited 




These successive syntheses of different intensities “produce intense nervous states that fill 
up” the posthuman,
37
 turning it into an expression of objection, which is not an actively 
objecting subject and it turns the posthuman into a line of flight. 
 
The line of flight marks: the reality of a finite number of dimensions that the 
multiplicity effectively fills; the impossibility of a supplementary dimension, 




According to this perspective, without transformation there is no change while there is always 
the possibility for lines of flight,
39
 even in closed institutions with controlled and disciplined 
systems and responses in place,
40
 it is down to the line of flight, the posthuman, to respond in 
a “creative and novel” way, which is to fill dimensions with transformed multiplicities.
41
 
While most responses might unfold in a very stereo-typical way, as for example some of the 
simulation training undertaken by the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), others 
are novel and creative, such as those run by Crisis Simulation for Peace (CRSIP) or games 
like Antiwargame, which prompt the participants to engage creatively and in unconventional 
ways. However, the importance is that regardless of differences in game design and how 
strict some games may be, the mere act of simulation and play can produce a posthuman. All 
                                                          
36
 Ibid, 20. 
37
 Ibid, original emphasis. 
38




 That is because autonomous systems are sufficiently internally complex that directed action could potentially 
trigger internal change; see Humberto Maturana & Francisco J. Valera, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The 
Realization of the Living (Boston: Riedel, 1980), 119. 
41
 Protevi, Political Affect, 36. 
185 
 
games have the capacity to bring differing intensities together, for synthesis to occur, opening 
up new systems of experiences. In short, every game has mechanisms for affective registers 
of events, but is the line of flight that has to emerge and only that can generate new 
behavioural patterns. Triggering is not mechanical but dynamic, and lines are not rigid and 





Desiring-Production: Fine-tuning the Techno-Political-Event 
In the light that “everything is event,”
43
 EPS is also an event. More specifically, it is part of 
the TPE which is an aleatory series of becomings. The subject and subjectivity is nothing but 
“the self-occurring form of the event.”
44
 The strength of gaming is that the subject and 
subjectivity are always in the making and constantly producing themselves, given the 
continuity of the TPE. Yet, this does not mean that the subject is at the centre of this 
production. To the contrary, it is the TPE itself while the subject remains forever decentred 
without any fixed shape given to it by the states through which it passes.
45
 Revisiting the 
rhythm of games, at its epicentre is the event, which is “the point of attraction and repulsion, 
a pulsating centre, around which the subject endlessly loops.”
46
 These endless loops are then 
a “veritable grid of becoming” that can be established in a game and that provide the basis for 
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Although for practical purposes the term ‘the subject’ is used (almost as a short script for a 
never-ending process and dynamic), there actually is no ‘the subject’ as such.
 
The TPE makes 
this quite clear, as there is only ever an event of the subject, a process of a subjective form, 
which is “the dynamic unity of an occasion of experience.”
48
 Strictly speaking, there is no 
subject as such, let alone one independent of the event, but there are only moments of 
subjectivity that capture the subjective potential of lines of flights. Therefore, the TPE as the 
production of subjectivity is in fact itself “a subjective self-creation” and subjectivity is a 
“unity of movement,”
49
 but still dynamic and fluid for it is a “unique instant of production in 
a continual flow of changes.”
50
 Such a change in turn is the idea of desiring-production and 
fittingly describes the move against faciality.  
 
To further characterize ‘the subject’ in a posthuman context and as exemplified by gaming, it 
is an event of non-personal thought.
51
  Given that thought is not contained within the 
representation of a human body, means that subjectivity is not containing thought – there is 
no interiority.
52
 Players of a game do not live through the TPE, the latter constitutes them. 
Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari, Meillassoux argues that thought happens outside in the 
“great outdoors.”
53
Adjusting this slightly suggests that non-personal thought takes place 
across various bodies before it captures more stable categories of a subject.
54
 It is only at a 
later stage in the process of the veritable grid of the posthuman that the becoming-subject is 
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captured by the thought that was generated prior to it. From this perspective, if anything, 
there is a subject-of-thought of a particular instance. This means that an emerging gaming 
subject is constituted through a trans-body thought process and not through a co-constitutive 
interplay between human body/subject and its environment.  
 
Furthermore, this particular instance of the subject-of-thought (the subject) is the folding of 
the infinite (chaos) into the finite (thought).
55
 Gaming remarkably exemplifies this struggle of 
the fold from chaos to thought. Even philosophy strives for order through conceptual exercise 
– “philosophy wants to save infinity by giving it consistency.”
56
 This means that a subject in 
gaming is one way of ‘making-sense’ of it all. Once attempt to bring order to experience, the 
unknown and struggle (establishing a milieu). Whereas the TPE itself is aleatory and 
contingent, the emerging subject is geared towards a more structured conceptual personae, 
generating conceptual, actual and knowable political subjectivities.
57
 Non-personal thought 
goes on to operate as concepts (order) through the subject, eventually losing momentum and 
settling as a conscious subject (even subject-as-is). Therefore, the posthuman is a temporary 




On Infinity: The Virtual in Subjectivity 
The posthuman and subjectivity emerge from the Virtual, a ground that is ontologically 
unstable, heterogeneous and unfixed, holding in it the entire world.
59
 Drawing on new 
sciences and quantum theory, Guattari calls this unstable ground Chaosmosis, and it is from 
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this that subjectivity emerges.
60
 Guattari’s essays in Chaosmosis, ‘The New Aesthetic 
Paradigm’ and ‘Schizoanalytic Metamodelization’ look at the specific interphase of the move 
from the Virtual to the actual,
61
 which is an important phase to trace in order to understand 
EPS. Guattari establishes a bridge between the Virtual/infinite and the actual/finite and 
argues for “the existence of a certain type of entity inhabiting both domains” which are 
“transversal entities” that imply that being and subjectivity are not pre-given and that the 
actual form is not “operating as some kind of container for life (or for ‘all the possible 
modalities of being’).”
62
 This traversal entity highlights that subjectivity is self-crystallization 
out of the formless. The process that builds the bridge between the virtual and the actual is 
called “machinic being.”
63
 This machine, drawing from the machinic phylum, is a machine of 
self-organising entities (such as the posthuman) that like a Janus-face looks and operates in 
two directions – towards the virtual and the actual.
64
 Guattari identifies the non-discursive 
realm as the Virtual, whereas the “discursive finitude” is the actual.
65
 As O’Sullivan rightly 
points out, the precise nature of these two operating faces is unclear; the only thing that can 
be said about them based on Guattari’s writings is that they are connected through speed. 
Pausing here for a moment, then there is an argument to be made that gaming operates at a 
faster speed and, thus, EPS than other forms of training. The argument that new media and 
NT are ‘faster’, speeding up time is not new. However, this is not so much because these are 
‘technologies’, but because they are conducting thought faster.  Indeed, gaming transduces 
thought from the Virtual to the actual at posthuman speed, which it was argued is precisely 
gaming’s strength.  Based on Pascal’s writings, Guattari argues that the Janus-face “moves 
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everywhere at infinite speed because it is at all places and whole in each place.”
66
 Thus, 
during the movement of the posthuman it is impossible to pin down how and where the faces 
interact, it is a “continuous coming-and-going at an infinite speed […of chaotized 
complexions…] within the same being-non-being [the posthuman].”
67
 As in the 
conceptualization through quantum theory, the interplay between the Virtual and the actual 
flairs up in various places and the connection between them is not causal and direct. To the 
contrary, it is a “chaotic zone where they lose their extrinsic references and coordinates, but 
from where they can re-emerge invested with new charges of complexity.”
68
 However, 
gaming is just one instance of chaosmic folding of subjectivity, quantum theory has been 




Chaosmosis based on quantum causality further supports the idea that the production of the 
posthuman and that of its subjectivity is not a linear progression from Virtual to actual nor 
does it oscillate between the two. The relation is not as straight-forward as from chaos, 
nothingness, infinite, larval and Virtual to order, being, finite, subject and actual, but “it 
rebounds and interrupts […]; it is relative chaotisiation in the confrontation with 
heterogeneous states of complexity.”
70
 In this way, Guattari can be used to stress moments of 
subjectivity as well as their fluidity – in this sense subjectivity is a continuous folding-in 
process. This relation and bridge is crucial since it is the locus of innovation, yet the 
momentariness of subjectivity also means that it counters innovation settling as more stable 
subjectivities. Not only does the infinity of the Virtual allow for the proliferation of new 
subjectivities (with no pre-established end to this process), but it also implies the off chance 
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of auto-production of subjectivity to actually come to full fruition. In the way that the status 
quo can be interrupted, so can crystalizing subjectivities. Speaking in terms of intensities then 
some encounters are simply not strong enough to develop as and stabilise as slower 
subjectivities. Apart from the process of EPS, it is important to understand this bridging 
between the Virtual and the actual in order to fully appreciate how new subjectivities can 
emerge. Guattari’s insight offered through Chaosmosis and Schizoanalytic Metamodelization 
is important to understand a crucial aspect of the production of subjectivity. On a 
philosophical level it would be impossible without the Janus-faced bridge to understand how 
the two structures of desiring-production connect and work together. On a theoretical level, 
without the infinity of the Virtual and the folding-in of the Virtual and the actual, it would be 
impossible to grasp why there is always a chance for a new emerging subjectivity. On a 
practical level, without Guattari’s quantum approach it would be impossible to see how 
subjectivities have no determinable origin, how they can assemble and disassemble at an 
instant. 
 
Gaming as the Desiring-Machine at Work 
In order to contextualise the present philosophical argument, it is worth applying conceptions 
of EPS to concrete examples of simulation games. CRISP is one of the organisations that 
stands out in this sense, not only due to their unique and creative approach to game design, 
but also because of the participant testimonies of their games. While CRISP games are 
technologically low-key, including standard technological devises such as televisions, 
personal computers and mobile phones, the whole game setting is fully immersive (often 
games last for a week), which is an optimal test-lab for the experimentation with 
subjectivities. Arguably, the games designed by this grassroots organisation are so effective 
because they prompt the participants to play the opposition and to fully live through that 
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experience; that is to be the opposition and to become-anew in the process; to think, feel and 
act like them. This is a challenge that can potentially be perceived as a thread to individual 
identities that mocks the sincerity of local political problems, individual stories and worries. 
The idea of arguing for the other team is simple in theory, yet in many contexts of conflict 
this is a daring move. Game design that seeks EPS needs to strike a fine balance of play that 
allows for conditions of experience that let participants grow and learn – rather than having 
them in a classroom scenario and pass down knowledge – without emphasising the element 
of play too much and thereby run the risk of ridiculing participants concerns at stake.  
 
Probe-Heads: Experimenting with Subjectivity through Gaming 
Whether games are technologically low-key or high-tech, they demonstrate the emergence of 
the posthuman, the dynamic it generates as well as how this dynamic can potentially lay the 
ground for a new subjectivity to emerge. This process and particular instances of it are further 
identified as “probe-heads,” which are a reaction to faciality and result out of desiring-
production; they are “positive deterritorialization and creative flight.”
71
 As such, probe-heads 
are a successful instance of a game that results in anti- and desiring-production, as well as 
stronger, longer moments of subjectivity. Given that probe-heads are, therefore, processes of 
lived experience they are not ready-made heads or better heads, they are different heads 
based on “inventing our own faces, or rather our own heads.”
72
 In this sense, probe-heads are 
not criticism as such, but rather a form of productivism and it is only the product that is a 
lived critique as it were. Essentially, probe-heads are transformation through exploration and 
experience. 
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Indeed grassroots gaming proves to be particularly effective in challenging individual 
subjectivities as well as the larger mechanism of subjectivity production. Faciality in many 
cases is historic and rooted in traditions and ideological practices where the element of play 
can challenge beliefs that partake in perpetuating political problems or conflicts in very 
simple, yet effective way.  In comparison to gaming it appears that many conventional 
stability and security strategies are actually part of faciality in a way that these efforts have 
often been more symbolic and discursive rather than generating political and social impact.
73
 
Under the banner of liberal politics, cooperation is often nothing more than domination in 
disguise.
74
 Critics argue that the grinding machine of large initiatives such as the Folke 
Bernadotte Academy, the Cairo Regional Centre for Training on Conflict Resolution and 
Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) or UN, World Bank or IMF supported collaborations often 
involves little more than a “continuation of war by other means” within a “makeover fantasy” 
of international politics.
75
 Even though smaller organisations often lack financial support, the 
advantage of the grassroots level is that political training and practices can play with and 
promote alternative ways of approaching the political through new ideas and methods. 
Precisely because these organisations such as CRISP do not have to report to an overriding 
international initiatives and do not have to fulfil standards set out by funding bodies, they can 
actually circumvent conventional liberal politics. yet, gaming and simulation is often tohe 
only way of inspiring new thought and ideas in participating groups, without being too 
imposing, intrusive and ideological.  
 
Looking at the way in which grassroots game-initiatives work together with funding bodies 
as well as members of society who are the participants in their games, how research for 
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games is conducted locally and how games are designed demonstrates that efforts to trigger 
the production of probe-heads is neither ‘rebellious’ nor a top-down approach, but an 
immanent dynamic. The way in which anti- and desiring-production actualise is through 
different associations and relations that work within, through and beyond socio-political and 
economic dynamics not aggressively against them. Deleuze and Guattari suggest countering 
the faciality-machine with a more pre-signifying, pre-subjective and “essentially collective” 
system
76
 that “involves specifically non-human becoming and a different relation to the 
world”
77
 and analysing grassroots gaming efforts it appears that they precisely make this 
move. In other words, playing with existing subjectivities, uprooting them and putting the 
participants in situations that are collective and that describe something entirely new. Games 
are about disrupting existing ways of organisation from within that organisation, by including 
participants that thus far have perpetuated the status quo and faciality. Anti-production in the 
way that it is traceable in games is about new systems of experience that rupture habits by 
action, movement and practice, not by aspersing or denigrating them. Offering the 
opportunity for a dynamic to emerge that is different to existing habits and systems of 
meaning is different than suggesting this right from the beginning. In short, probe-heads 
emerge exploratively through a new system of experience. In addition, while conditions for 
anti-production can be contingently made available through game design, desiring-production 
is up to chance, given that once the game starts, the designers and game supervisors will not 
intervene anymore. This suggests that probe-heads are an immanent, explorative, and 
contingent dynamic emerging out of possible new systems of experience. this also means that 
producing new subjectivity is not about education of right and wrong, better or worse, nor is 
it the goal of a game that participants leave a simulation thinking in terms of good and bad.  
The goal of games is not that participants judge a situation differently than before, but that 
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they leave the game as something different than before. This supports the idea of probe-heads 
that are neither pre-determined nor necessarily ‘better’, but emerging out of singular gaming 
dynamics that do not subscribe to a teleological idea of game development. Second, the goal 
of a subjectivity that is different, rather than educating the subject to judge better, therefore, 
supports the idea of probe-heads as a transformation based on lived experience and 
exploration, emphasising the process of “inventing” probe-heads and lived criticism by 




However, it often takes more creative game design and alluring qualities of fictional play that 
are possible in games for explorative movement dynamics and invention of new probe-heads 
to occur. Interim steps in games are often necessary to help to carry along this dynamic. 
While standard game and simulation procedures worked relatively well in most cases; 
occasionally unconventional game design strategies are necessary to help players to abstract 
themselves from their own reality. These plot strategies are often described through the 
aesthetic index that is geared at a particular user experience with specific goals (in this 
case).
79
 In this case the aesthetic goal is abstraction from reality and avoiding political 
deadlocks. This can be done for example by creating a game that simulates a conflict that is 
set in the future. The scenario for SIMVISION (simulation by CRISP), for example, is 2025, 
yet bears similarity with “the regional conflicts and territorial issues between the countries of 
South Caucasus,” so that participants can make the transfer without being too attached to the 
set-up and story itself.
80
 Apart from country names and fictitious identities, the game design 
in this case does not prescribe very much. The very fact that it is set in the future opens the 
way for going beyond faciality and for anti- and desiring production to take place. For 
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example, Rex Brynen’s annual peacebuilding simulation game Brynania run at McGill 
University draws on precisely the same strategy.
81
 This means that even though a game 
‘only’ simulates the face encapsulated in specific conflict scenarios and individual histories, 
for example, this is still ‘too close to home’ as it were, standing in the way of new probe-
heads. Therefore, the design strategy to tailor a scenario that is similar but not the same as the 
conflict background of the participants is a significant step in order to help participants to 
leave their own reality for the duration of the game. In this sense, it appears that, in order to 
produce new subjectivities, the method of simulation and gaming, which is claimed to be 
already the very mode that escapes the sticky mechanism of subjectification, sometimes 
needs to be further improved by further abstracting from the conflict scenario, and thereby 
removing the participants from their own history, memory and Erfahrung (lasting and 
memorable experience). 
 
Productivism as Creative Flight 
Playing a political game and creating probe-heads is one step, making the gaming experience 
last as a productive experimentation and moment of subjectivity is a different challenge, 
however. While games can provide the participants with new insight and understanding, this 
is just the beginning. The new subjectivities that emerge out of games are in fact “the 
platforms for other, perhaps even stranger modes of organization and subsequent 
deterritorialisations.”
82
 The formation through which this happens was previously identified 
as body politic. This analysis and perspective suggests that gaming is a form of experimental 
productivism. Developed from Massumi’s writings on “productivism,” it argues that the 
focus lies within “processes as such and not on the static conception of some constructed 
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 In this light gaming should be analysed as an inventive experimentation and auto-
production.  
 
The chaosmotic emergence of subjectivities from game design and binary software codes is 
precisely such a creative self-emerging process. Read almost as science fiction, Chaosmosis 
produces worlds beyond ‘this one’, beyond the face and inventing new terms for it.
84
 There 
are few boundaries to the level to which the players can take a game. Using a metaphorical 
aid to think about this, it can be argued that the participants are merely given clay and a few 
tools to work on it. In fact, they are part of the clay themselves and have the possibility to 
form into multiple entities or to then reform and stretch into other shapes. In this sense 
gaming is a possibilistic auto-sculpting. The clay does not necessarily have to harden so that 
its constant movement describes continual experimentation, production and becoming. Yet, it 
has to be considered that games do only run for a certain period of time, from anything as 
short as 10 minutes up to an entire week.
85
 In the case of games like PeoplePower or 
Antiwargame it might be the case of a few hours each day in a longer continuing process. The 
point at which the game stops, however, is when the clay starts to harden (matter becomes 
slower and settles). That fact that it is difficult at this stage for encounters to trigger change 
(reaching thresholds of intensities suggests that anti- and desiring production have a more 
potential-prone relationship with dynamic bodies. However, more entities can spiral from 
these initial gaming movements and temporary posthuman shapes and moments of 
subjectivity, in the way that thought does not come to a halt after the game. The role players 
took on and developed into might have lasting after-effects that continue to drive desiring-
production. Such a contingent outcome of a game can then spark larger bodies politics. 
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From Probe-heads to Bodies Politics 
The end of a game marks only the end of an experiment and explorative movement in a 
particular place and constellation of the posthuman, but not the end of thought and 
subjectivity. The posthuman gaming body will disburse for the parts to re-emerge elsewhere 
as a different posthuman body. Subjectivity, however, does not have to follow the same 
trajectory, as its carrier, that is its mode of continuation, is different. This marks also the 
crucial difference between the posthuman body and its subjectivity, in the way that the latter 
can go and split in its own way.  This is where Latour’s different modes of existence come 
into play in the way that when new subjectivity splits from the posthuman at the end of the 
game it changes modes of existence, as from digital to analogue for example.
86
 Essentially, 
lasting moments of new subjectivity are lived in and outside the game. Even though the ways 
in which the posthuman splits and the modes in which subjectivity develops and effects are 
largely unpredictable, there are patterns of post-game becomings, continuing and developing 
the system of experience as it were. Apart from the inevitable personal memory (Erfahrung), 
participants pass this on orally and thereby perpetuate the gaming experience – the probe-
heads that will be the platform for other, even ‘stranger’ becomings. This lead game 
developers to further explore the mechanism of the ‘training of trainers’ through gaming, 
which is just as important as the actual game. This is because a large number of participants 
to more complex simulation games are locals from conflict areas who attend seminars in 
order to teach the methods they have learned. Therefore, the probe-heads in the game are not 
the only heads that are produced, it is not the only time when participants invent their own 
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faces, but they also set the stage for other subjectivities to come.
87
 In this sense games as 
processes of emergence and TPEs fulfil an ethico-aesthetic function of the creative 
production of new subjectivity that continues long after the game has finished.  
 
However, even though these continuing developments are not so much determined by game 
design anymore, the mere fact that game developers more often than not also have 
commercial interests – and even at the grassroots level are tied to the liberal and economic 
constrains of their donors – influences the developing subjectivities. Therefore, probe-heads 
are often produced from within the capitalist mode of production and from the same 
materials.
88
 Accordingly, the ethico-aesthetic is concerned with participation in the world and 
the change of it, not to withdraw and separate from it altogether. Games offer the players an 
opportunity to participate in the world and thereby both are transformed. Importantly, it is 
only through this creative participation in and with the world that EPS is an innovative 
process. EPS in gaming that leaves the subject-as-is behind is a creative experiment of living 
against the strata that bind us.
89
 It is productivism, becoming (to become-other) and it is to 
become-world. In this light, the posthuman is a way of life, a transformative proactive and its 
subject’s modus operandi cannot be anything else than experimentation in the world. Apart 
from the productive aspect this experiment is pragmatic, because the speculative subject does 
not emerge out of knowledge, but through concrete and material practice. 
  
Body Politic: Posthuman Bodies, Their Subjectivity and the Political 
The project’s commitment to technoscientific materialism makes it conducive to drawing on 
ideas of body politic, especially from the point when the posthuman subject(s) leaves the 
gaming realm. As with desiring-production, body politic continues to describe subjectivity as 
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process. Even though it is possible to talk of a body politic during desiring-production 
already, its analytical leverage is most useful at a more developed and later stage in EPS. The 
strength of this concept lies in the fact that it is able to investigate other aspects of the 
political subject beyond conventional political theory and the subject-as-is, because it 
captures the emergent character of political subjectivity – “that is, the embodied/embedded/ 
extended” – on different compositional and temporal scales.
90
 Body politic is the moment 
when the probe-heads become new habits and political (consciously usable) categories – the 
new system of experience working regularly and ‘normally’. Body politic is initiated by 
gaming, but resonates and take its full shape long after the game has finished. It describes the 
moment when bodies develop new patterns of behaviour. Not only are bodies politics 
embodied through transindividual and psychological dimensions, they are also embedded in 
multiple and overlapping socio-political relations with other bodies politics, relations that are 




Personal, Group and Civic: Jumping Scales of Bodies Politics 
The analytical purchase of body politic is that it provides a helpful systematic and conscious 
model through which EPS can be known and used, rather than just theorised. By taking care 
not to standardize and categorize the aleatory nature of becoming, the body politic 
nonetheless provides a lens for understanding and applying emerging subjectivities. Based on 
Protevi’s work that structures body politic to understand the political through the somatic, 
EPS can be characterized to have certain compositional and temporal attributes.
92
 If a body 
politic emerges in desiring-production, then the conscious, human level of this is somewhere 
between the individual and the group. Speaking in conventional political terms then it can be 
argued that its effect is still ‘limited’, as it does not regulate any human material flows nor 
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does it have considerable impact upon policy making so far. This is not to deny the impact a 
sub- and pre-human body politic can have, but in terms of the regulation and 
institutionalisation of peace operations it is human scale of bodies politics that matters. 
Accordingly, the point of the subject entering consciousness is when the concept of body 
politic becomes most useful.  
 
In view that posthuman subjectivity is conceptually known by the human as body politic 
implies that the latter emerges out of and is implicated in trans-body, posthuman 
physiological and psychological somatic dimensions. According to Protevi “they are 
embedded in multiple and overlapping socio-political relations with other bodies politics, 
relations that are themselves also physiological and psychological.”
93
 Protevi distinguishes 
between personal, group and civic bodies politics, which differ in their compositional and 
temporal scale. In his model he differentiates between the first and the second-order 
compositionally as well as temporarily. For example, first order body politic happens at a 
personal level with a short temporal span that usually stretches only to punctual events. In 
contrast, second-order bodies politics for Protevi take a group or even civic composition and 
can have mid- and long-term effects. Examples for mid-term are habit and training whereas 
development and history are long-term. While there are certainly many similarities between 
the bodies politics that evolve out of gaming, Protevi’s models needs some fine-tuning here. 
Even though the author argues himself that these categories are only analytic tools rather than 
concrete boxes into which subjectivities are pushed, the view taken here is that the 
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Compositional  
  
  Personal Group Civic 
Temporal Short term RCA* Encounter Revolution 
 Mid-term Habituation Subjectification Administration 
 Long-term Development Custom Institutionalization 
Image 1: Temporal and Compositional scales of bodies politics; *“Neural events on the 




The process of desiring-production and EPS, as well as the posthuman condition more 
generally, differs the most with the first and second-order distinction in Protevi’s sketch. 
Protevi sees the individual as the source of the first-order body politic. Here, however, it is 
the posthuman which differs greatly from the idea of the individual or human. It is 
acknowledged that Protevi has unconventional views about the individual, the subject and 
humanity itself;
96
 yet, it is still restricted by anthropocentric ideas and not speculative enough 
to be useful for this thesis. Whereas it is agreed that a first-order body politic in the form of 
the posthuman is “at once social and somatic, embedded and embodied, connected […] in 
both physiological and psychological dimensions,” it is not seen to be “individuated” as in 
the representation of an individual human body. Instead, it materializes along the synthesis of 
intensities such as temperature and rhythm and can therefore be much wider or smaller than 
an individual. Breaking down body politic to the posthuman level means that patterns and 
behaviour of the posthuman actualize as intensive processes that have the power to disrupt 
previous patterns – as in a move beyond the face. The emergence of new systems of 
experiences is then similar to Protevi’s argument that individual body politic can trigger the 
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“construction of new attractor layouts.”
97
 As such it can take effect short-term 
(synchronically) or long-term (diachronically). That gaming aims at both is seen in an 
immediate gaming dynamic that can break with the status quo in the game, and also have a 
lasting after effect in the participants. The synchronic effect would be, for example, in cases 
of decision-making in the game, the movement of the posthuman into new, unknown 
directions. In short the synchronic can materialize as the unforeseen event in the game.  
 
Despite the disagreement with Protevi’s compositional distinctions between individual and 
group of a body politic, there is particular merit in the third order, the civic body politic. This 
is because it describes effective and affective subjectivity at work. Due to the fact that the 
posthuman body as developed here can be larger or smaller than an individual, yet never 
simply an individual nor a sum total of such in the form of a group, the first two scales are 
adopted as one that describe political behaviour in gaming that is impersonal and short of the 
civic. Whereas this first level describes the production of subjectivity on a smaller, 
synchronic scale, the civic level demonstrates what subjectivity does or can do especially as a 
political force. It is this political compositional scale that games aim to have effect on in the 
long-run. It is speculated that if a TPE and the affective behaviour it creates last long enough, 
this very patterning of new subjectivities can indeed go beyond the customary political face 
and become institutionalized.
98
 In this case, the civic level of body politic would be the 
actualized and formalized ethico-utopian impulse that triggers and drives explorative 
micropolitics in the first place. The transition from synchronic to diachronic and from the 
level of the posthuman to the civic is crucial in order to understand how affect that circulated 
in the game has after-affect/effect outside the scope of the game. Walter Benjamin’s 
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pedagogically inspired writings on the mimetic reproduction, Erlebnis and Erfahrung, help to 
explain this process of how subjectivities come to last. 
 
Making Things Last: Connecting the Posthuman Experience to the Civic 
In the simplest terms, Benjamin distinguishes experience into first/second and third body 
politic in a temporal sense, which is useful in showing how gaming experience has 
synchronic and diachronic dimensions. While Benjamin works this mainly on a personal 
scale, it can nonetheless be applied to the posthuman composition for he draws a distinction 
in (temporal) scale, not in kind. This distinction is absolutely fundamental, not only in 
understanding how experience develops on a cognitive and conscious level, but also for the 
conceptual link that explains how affects in a game generate affects outside the game (post-
affects as it were). This link is vital in order to better understand how newly emerging 
subjectivity in the game can resonate onto a larger scale. The emergence of larger 
subjectivities conceptually known as bodies politics begs the question of why it is that the 
experience of the new in gaming can have such a powerful affective impact upon civic bodies 
politic. In the pursuit of this Benjamin’s notion of experience (Erlebnis/Erfahrung) and the 
mimetic faculty will be rehabilitated. 
 
After the Game: From Mimesis to the Mimetic Faculty 
Viewing gaming experience as a Benjaminian mimetic faculty is crucial in order to 
understand why gaming is not just a mimesis, simulation and parody of reality, but is 
authentic and political to the core. In this light, gaming is the first part of a twofold process, 
that is the first Erlebnis of the emerging political subject that can develop into a body politic, 
rather than being a mere copy of the latter and due in large because of its mimetic pedagogy. 
Debates around the use of NT for political purposes, whether this is gaming, social media or 
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other use of ICT, is often framed around questions asking for their status of reality and 
eventually downplaying the technological interaction to mere ‘virtual simulation’. As seen for 
example in the technologising debates, if anything then the use of NT is a technocratic fix 
that is depoliticising, as in it is a practice further and further removed from the political. 
Nevertheless, this is a misleading way of addressing and questioning the issue. Instead of 
asking the implicit question of whether or not the political is at risk, it may be better to ask 
where the political is, if it is not in the traditional realm anymore. The short answer to this is 
that in the case of games it lies precisely in the act of gaming, which makes the mimetic 
faculty political and therefore into a political posthuman pedagogy. 
 
To unbundle this further, the first part of the argument is that gaming (whether high or low-
tech) is a highly modern case of a mimetic faculty. This claim is in part based on Benjamin’s 
mimetic faculty which is an analytic process in pedagogy that he derived from the classical 
philosophical concept of mimesis. Arguably any investigation into gaming and simulation 
needs to reflect upon these practices in the light of imitation, representation and copy which 
are all encompassed by mimesis. Needless to say that the term mimesis is theoretically 
elusive and broad in Western thought. The great majority of thinkers conceive of mimesis in 
quite Platonic ways as a process in which an ideal is imitated or even copied.
99 
More 
specifically, in a traditional sense, mimesis is about “nature that culture uses to create second 
nature, the faculty to copy, imitate, make models.”
100
 It is perfected to the point where the 
representation may emulate the character and power of the original.
101 
In addition to 
representation and imitation, the Platonic view holds that mimesis is inauthentic, deceptive 
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 Thus, it is inferior to the original or ideal, and so forms of representation 
never live up to the original. The underlying assumption of such classical view is that one has 
to reach beyond representation in order to get to the “real”. Such a charge has been put 
forward numerous times against simulation games and it is the basis of the technologising 
argument as well. Especially in the contemporary socio-critical literature (often used in) such 
as the work of Jean Baudrillard, Paul Virilio and Umberto Eco implicitly draw on the 
assumption of technological mimesis through concepts of imitation and copy. This is often 
adapted by IR’s neo-platonic strand, for example, by François Debrix or in earlier work of 
Cynthia Weber.
103
 However, if gaming was mere imitation, then the political affect in gaming 
would not exist, nor would there be a chance of post-gaming affect in the form of bodies 
politics. 
 
The political in gaming can be restored, nonetheless, and this is based on different traditions 
in the intellectual development of mimesis. By contrast, the Aristotelian tradition marks a 
turn away from such a hostile conception of mimesis and views it as a mediating aspect of 
human experience within the world. However, this view still holds that mimesis is essentially 
about imitation.
104
 The work by Rousseau and Lessing further develops mimesis towards 
individual creativity
105
 and it is especially in the twentieth century that mimesis obtains a 
relational aspect. Due to the works of Benjamin, Adorno, Girard and Derrida, mimesis is 
viewed as a social practice and intrinsic human property crucial for interpersonal relations.
106
 
Especially Benjamin and Adorno focused their work on mimesis as adaptive behaviour that is 
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prior to language and enables humans to assimilate themselves to their surroundings through 
play.
107
 Mimesis must not be understood as an intrinsically human concept or behaviour, but 
as a practice it is helpful in teasing out the adaptive, transformative behaviour – that is the 
redesign of new affective patters – in a realm that is prior to language and arguably the 
subject. In this way mimesis carries affirmative and enabling (affective) aspects that are 




Benjamin’s temporal distinction of experience, into Erlebnis and Erfahrung, is crucial in 
order to understand and make the connection between affective gaming experience from 
synchronic first/second order to diachronic third order bodies politic and how this is political. 
Erlebnis literally means “living through” and is temporarily restricted to an event, here a 
TPE. It has a strong affective component setting patterns for subjective appropriations in the 
form of emotions. Out of this lived experience emerges Erfahrung, which is a learning 
process spurred by Erlebnis. According to Benjamin, Erlebnis creates awareness while 
Erfahrung marks a gain in knowledge. Translated into a posthuman condition, this means that 
Erlebnis is the break in ordinary experience and the encounter with the unknown, while 
Erfahrung is Erlebnis becoming conscious and the overall development of this new system of 
experience in the form of subjectivity and a more stable body politics. Erfahrung is often 
seen as the reflective experience that is memorable, or, in Benjamin’s words, “the [conscious] 
philosophical structure of experience” of the prior affective Erlebnis.
109
 Ultimately, the TPE 
is Erlebnis on the first/second scale of body politic and develops into the subjective 
Erfahrung on the third civic scale. Interestingly, English does not allow making this 
distinction linguistically, as both terms translate as experience, but are fundamentally 
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different in terms of their affective state and development. Therefore, Benjamin’s split notion 
of experience allows investigating how affect travels and evolves through different 
compositional and temporal domains.  
 
Of equal importance, a Benjaminian analysis also allows for an emphasis on these developing 
experiences as body political Erfahrung are material subjectivities and not only discursive 
constructions that are introduced after experience has taken place. Furthermore, even though 
these subjectivities are representable, this is not the main way they are working their affects. 
It was Benjamin above all who problematized the tyranny of twentieth century 
discursive-representationalist reasoning by insisting on the irreducibility of embodied 
experience and his parting from hermetic linguistic ontology, which makes his approach 
particularly suitable for the purpose here.
110
 Due to Benjamin stressing non-linguistic forms 
of experiencing in his mimetic faculty of Erlebnis and Erfahrung helps to belabour the point 
of non-representational bodies politics that is committed to the concrete experience. This 
matters because gaming is precisely not a case of textual learning and practicing peace. More 
specifically, the mimetic faculty of gaming is the experiential correlate to what Wlad Godzich 
describes as “our culture’s incipient return to a curious post-historical form of preliteracy.”
111
 
Benjamin identified this as a turn from semiosis to mimesis. In this sense Benjamin’s 
mimetic faculty is an initial move away from highly anthropocentric ways of experiencing 
and learning towards the non-representable. In so doing he outlines aspects of subjectivity 
formation that have their centre of original encounter in the pre-subjective realm. Yet these 
resonate on other compositional scales. A good example of this is the trainer of trainers 
scenario, what started out as pre-subjective Erlebnis of the posthuman at the level of 
first/second order body politic in a particular game, turns into Erfahrung and is passed on as 
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such on the civic scale by the trainers to local communities. Ultimately, it is only Benjamin’s 
theoretical split of experience into Erlebnis and Erfahrung that shows how the pre-subjective 
realm, the first/second and third scales, which are increasingly subjective and conscious, are 
part of the same dynamic, but just on different temporal levels. In short, bodies politics work 
only because affection is split into Erlebnis and Erfahrung. 
 
Furthermore, the affective trajectory of subjectivity through Erlebnis/Erfahrung is a form of 
‘sense-making’. After all and despite the necessity of philosophical endeavours, the purpose 
of gaming is learning and, thus, understanding and taking away lessons.  Importantly, sense-
making as an affective, and not only subjective, process works across various registers – for 
example, virtual, intensive and actual. According to Protevi, sense and sense-making have 
“three aspects: sensibility, signification and direction.”
112
 Sensibility here refers to openness 
and the ability of systems to be open to and engage with the world. However, since it only 
describes the attribute of being open and the possibility of being affected, sensibility is a 
virtual aspect above all. Therefore, bodies politics are first of all open systems in the world 
and as such they can be affected. Second and importantly, bodies politics establish 
signification about the political, in this case peace practices, for their body-subjectivity. This 
is an intensive process since it happens through continuous syntheses of various intensities 
that generate thought. Given that thought always has a virtual and an actual half means that 
signification cannot be only virtual or only actual, but intensive. In affective terms this means 
that signification happens after the move beyond the face and is implied in a new subjectivity. 
As such, it is still non-conscious and pre-personal. It is only at a conscious level that 
signification is the registration of change in one’s own perception of and outlook on things, 
here the outlook on political practices.  
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At a third stage, bodies politics establish a direction for action – needless to say that this 
aspect of sense-making is crucial for the re-engagement of the political. The explorative 
learning through the play of simulation games enables participants to test various scenarios, 
which will ultimately leave them with a sense of direction of where to take their non-violent 
protest and efforts for conflict resolution. Its main aim according to the designers is not so 
much the understanding of peace or peace operations, but acting upon subjectivity once it has 
emerged.
113
 Yet, the possible action still often depends on or is interfered by the social 
grammar and syntax. Necessarily, the civic level of body politic is constantly going against 
faciality, or residues thereof, that is surrounding it. The perpetual engagement with the 
embodied face of other bodies politics is a continuous interplay of deterritorialization. In a 
positive scenario, games can have the impact of changing allowable patterns in the socio-
political makeup of peace operations, which means that the dynamics that started sub-
atomically resonate fully and work on the third level. Such a case of reterritorialization 
“settling forth the potential of a new game” is an effect of political games that does happen 
outside or independent of the act of gaming.
114
 Put differently, games set up affects that 
trigger intensive encounters outside of the actual simulation as well when different bodies 
politics encounter each other. They create the conditions for further Erlebnis and Erfahrung 
to occur. Therefore, games for change are a form of strategic training that involves the 
creation of new bodies politics and therefore belongs to the third, directional aspect of 
affective registers.  
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A Dystopian Footnote 
Even though the main intention of political games is change and education through the 
promotion of creative thinking and exploration, this is not always the case. The 
technoscientific analysis of EPS was discussed in speculative-affirmative fashion, in 
accordance with the affirmative philosophy of Deleuzian materialism; as such games for 
change were probed for their capacity to produce new political subjectivity and to produce it 
otherwise. However, there are certain gaming cases that need mentioning because they are 
working precisely on the opposite logic, where the games seek the evacuation of the subject-
as-is, erasing old habits and behaviour, but preventing the emergence of new ones. A case in 
point is ZIF’s Hostile Environment Awareness Training (HEAT) an emergency security 
exercise run in collaboration with the German Armed Forces. Protevi explains this with the 
example of extreme cases of rage or mass panic that trigger an evacuation of the subject in 
favour of an automatic response. Arguably, the HEAT course is the active effort to create 
conditions in which the subject is erased in order for an embodied affect programme to act 
independently of the previously existing subject. Even though there is still affect, it remains 
non-subjective. The conscious registration of ‘danger’, reflected in emotions of puzzlement, 
panic and fear are subjective emotions and cognitive processes that the simulation seeks to 
erase, or least postpone. While it is not the point here to argue that this is ‘bad’, as there is in 
certain instances an essential need for peacemakers to react in this way in the field, it is 
certainly a type of political training training that prevents new subjectivities from emerging, 
by actively preventing conditions of engagement with the new. There is still a shock to 
thought and rupture to ordinary experience (a quite drastic if not dramatic Erlebnis), but the 
gaming exercise does not leave room/time for this to develop into Erfahrung until much later 
after the simulation. This is yet another way of affectively engineering behaviour and 
designing the peace practitioner body. Essentially these simulation games as offered by ZIF 
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are a more institutionalised affective training that arguably have significant impact upon what 
the future peace and security practitioner ought to be like. While this is not intended as 
dystopian foreshadowing, it is continuation of the initial warning that was issued in defence 
of gaming against technologisation claims, whereby game design and use is always caught in 
a Nietzschean reiterative scenario of gazing into the abyss. 
 
Conclusion 
The chapter detailed that gaming can have wider political impact because of its affective 
capacity to trigger the production of new subjectivities. As such it was shown that it is not 
only a tremendous pedagogical tool for politics, but occupies a very interesting and important 
phase between the pre-personal, pre-conscious and the conscious, subjective. Therefore, EPS 
is constantly oscillating between these two realms and thereby building an essential bridge 
that is necessary for gaming to have impact. The analysis began by making the case for 
studying subjectivity based on the argument that the question of the modern political subject 
is one of the most pressing issues in contemporary politics. Not only does this necessitate an 
understanding of how the subject and subjectivity are produced in the first place, but this 
insight is essential because only then is it possible to produce alternative subjectivities and to 
produce them otherwise, here through gaming. Importantly, it can only be a genuinely new 
subjectivity, and not a case of re-production that is based on a representational logic, if it is a 
production/emergence of subjectivity that works within a posthuman context, that is to say, 
one that does not hinge upon the human as a referent.  
 
Circling in on this process, it was argued that this productive development starts with lines of 
flight and that there is always a possibility for these lines to emerge, regardless of how rigid 
and strict institutional setups or political systems may be. The latter was identified as part of 
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faciality, which describes human organisation, in and outside the political realm. In the 
twofold process of desiring-production (consisting of anti- and desiring-production), 
deterritorialisation (anti-production) is the first step towards a move beyond the face. In other 
words, the emergence of alternative political subjectivity needs an initial trigger. This initial 
trigger is the encounter and ensuing TPE in gaming. The argument that subjectivity emerges 
out of primary onto-material movements is important as it means that subjectivity (although 
turning conscious eventually) will remain connected to the Virtual and, thereby, to an infinite 
pool of potentiality.
115
 This was used to argue that subjectivity can be novel and not a case of 
reproduction. This is where EPS becomes innovative and creative, rooted in the creativity 
allowed for in and by gaming – philosophically this was outlined as reterritorialization. 
Therefore, games are identified as desiring-machines that produce probe-heads, which are 
creative flight and build the platform for further alternative developments. 
 
These highly complex processes were demonstrated in great detail with the example of the 
simulation games run by CRISP, which illustrated the interlacing and overlapping dynamics 
that exceed the individual, but that are not a mere group phenomenon. Indeed, aspects such as 
triggering lines of flight (affective design), enjoyable as well as frustrating gaming 
experiences (flow) and post-game evaluation all play into formations of new subjectivity, 
which are not just the addition of individual experience, but a unique haecceitic mix – a 
posthuman subjectivity.  
 
What is more, the method of “training of trainers” through simulation games led the chapter 
to introduce different scales of bodies politics, the analysis of which was based upon 
Protevi’s understanding and work in this area. Distinguishing between temporal and 
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compositional scales the chapter settled on a synchronic first/second level body politic of the 
posthuman body and a diachronic third level of a wider, civic scope. To substantiate the 
claim that all these dynamics can be linked with each other and are co-dependent, Benjamin’s 
notion of the mimetic faculty was rehabilitated, which also allowed strengthening the idea of 
posthuman pedagogy. Indeed, his initial separation of experience into synchronic Erlebnis 
and diachronic Erfahrung finalized the analysis by showing how experience develops along 
temporal levels and into subjectivity. It further highlights that experience oscillates between 




Chapter 5 ~ Between the Virtual and the Actual 
Have you ever had a dream, Neo, that you were so sure was real? What if you were unable to 
wake from that dream? How would you know the difference… between the dream world and 
the real world? 
Morpheus, The Matrix 
Introduction 
The question of reality in the face of emerging technologies is arguably one of the most 
challenging to tackle. A great deal of the difficulty stems from the misunderstanding that 
emerges out of very simple problems concerning terminology and concepts. Especially when 
it comes to high-tech operations such as immersive simulation games, it is all the more 
crucial and necessary to be clear about what terms like “reality”, “virtual”, “digital” or 
“cyberspace” mean. This is because these technologies are in and of themselves very 
complex and difficult to understand. However, the political interaction with these systems 
makes it even more challenging for academic inquiry. So far, most investigations have failed 
to provide sufficient explanation of the different realms that are represented by the offline, 
online and Virtual world, leaving writings about techno-politics in a haze.
1
 What is more, 
these writings tend to treat reality and cyberspace as commonsensical,
2
 even though they are 
fraught with illogical assumptions and confusion about the Virtual, the digital, the actual, the 
analogue and the real.  
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It is the intention of this chapter to problematize and explain these different terms – realms – 
in order to investigate the impact of games for change. In the pursuit of this, the analysis will 
draw on a broad spectrum of examples ranging from everyday life scenarios to high-tech 
design to cinematography and political games in order to reflect widespread common 
misconceptions when it comes to reality. It will be argued throughout that the same false 
logic has so far been applied to the analysis of political-mediations, as seen for example in 




One of the main arguments of this chapter is that political games are located between the 
Virtual and the actual. This is why the chapter will also show how the different realms relate 
to each other, apart from the conceptual exercise of clarifying the terms. Due to their crucial 
position, games will be identified as topological transducers that help to bring reality forward 
and foster the new. As primarily productive and creative technologies they act as what is 
referred to as “open-ended-reality studios.” The process of “reality-in-the-making” is 
complex and will lead the chapter to analyse how sense and sensation come into play in this 
process, what happens to memory while playing these games and how continuity is created. 
The aim of investigating all these different aspects is to show how complex the production of 
reality is and that games are located and working at a very crucial point of this process – in 
fact as the transducer from the Virtual to the actual. While the Virtual had been introduced 
briefly as an undifferentiated realm that can give rise to any present and future, the actual is a 
concrete instance of one of these potential scenarios. The actual is material. It is a specific 
mattering of a Virtual potential. It is the realm of being. 
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Misconception One  
Online activity is largely conceived of as happening separate from ‘real’, tangible life and 
this separation manifests through language. 
 
Despite pursuing a PhD in International Politics with a focus on technoscience, I was not 
surprised to find out that my text/chat vocabulary was not up to speed with most recent online 
language. In a conversation with a friend I first heard about the acronym ‘irl’. An 
abbreviation for “in real life” – three seemingly insignificant letters that highlight one of the 
most prominent problems not only in the contemporary study of technosciences, but modern 
life more general. Searching ‘gamer’ online forums for more explanation revealed a host of 
similar acronyms that nicely reflect popular understandings and use of the 
techno/cyber/computer realm. 
 
afrl – away from real life 
lirl – laughing in real life 
mirl – meet in real life 
rlf – real life friend  
 
These are acronyms are being used when people talk with each other online in order to speed 
up communication. Other common ones are ‘btw’, ‘tbh’ and ‘lol’.
4
 This language can be used 
during online gaming, a simple chat forum for people with shared interests, online dating 
sites or simply Facebook. While the acronyms are not necessarily group or user specific, the 
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scenario and underlying assumptions seem to be similar each time they are used: two internet 
users writing to each other, and separating their computer-online interaction from their 
personal interaction or reaction at the time.  
 
Misconception Two  
Apart from being separate, digital worlds, commonly referred to as cyberspace, are 
perceived to be less real and more dangerous. 
  
Inspired by the recent UN Women campaign that used the world’s most popular search 
engine Google to reflect public opinion on gender inequality,
5
 the screenshots below do the 
same with regard to ‘cyberspace’. It simply uses Google’s auto-complete feature in order to 
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Whereas all comments provide enough impetus for discussion and analysis, the statements 
that stand out in relation to the topic of this chapter are “cyberspace is its own jurisdiction”, 
“…a dangerous place”, “…a black whole” and “…not real”. This is because they too 
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exemplify the separation of cyberspace (internet or technical domain more broadly) from 
what is commonly referred to as ‘real life’, which is often just the analogue realm. 
 
Misconception Three  
Regardless of context, reality as a concept is often misunderstood and treated as something 
that either only exists as a perceptual phenomenon in our minds or as something one has to 
be suspicious of.  
 
In large part this belief is reflected and perpetuated through the entertainment media. 
Therefore, the following dialogue between the movie characters Neo and Morpheus from The 
Matrix was chosen for it epitomizes pop-culture understandings of the nature, role and effect 
of new technology and cyberspaces on the one hand, yet branches out into critiques of 
common conceptions of the real on the other. (Sections in bold are of particular interest and 
importance to the present analysis.) 
 
Morpheus: Try to relax...this will feel....a little weird. 
 
As Morpheus guides a coaxial line into the jack at the back of his neck, Neo screams and 
makes a few other disturbing noises. 
 
When he opens his eyes, he is standing in a totally white place. His hair is back, and he is 
wearing different clothes. 
 
As Neo spins around a bit, trying to see what is going on, Morpheus appears in front of him. 
 
Morpheus: This is the construct. It is our loading program. We can load anything from 
clothing, to equipment, weapons, training simulations, anything we need. 
 




Neo: Right now....we’re inside a computer program? 
 
Morpheus: Is it really so hard to believe? Your clothes are different. The plugs in your arms 
and head are gone. Your hair has changed. 
 
Neo puts a hand to his head and touches his hair 
 
Morpheus: Your appearance now is what we call residual self-image. It is the mental 
projection...of your digital self. 
 
Two chairs appear in front of them, and Neo reaches out to touch one. He runs his hand 
along its back. 
 
Neo: This....this isn’t real? 
 
Morpheus looks at him 
 
Morpheus: What is real? How do you define real? If you’re talking about what you can 
feel, what you can smell, what you can taste and see, then real is simply electrical signals 
interpreted by your brain. 
 
A television appears in front of the two chairs, as Neo sits down in the chair beside 
Morpheus. Morpheus picks up the television control and turns it on. 
 
Morpheus: This is the world that you know. The world as it was at the end of the twentieth 
century. It exists now only as part of a neural-interactive simulation, that we call the Matrix. 
 
Morpheus turns to Neo 
 
Morpheus: You’ve been living in a dream world, Neo. This...is the world as it exists today. 
 




The sky is an endless sea of black and green bile. The earth, scorched and split like burnt 
flesh, spreads out beneath us as we enter the television. 
 
Morpheus: Welcome.....to the desert of the real...We have only bits and pieces of information, 
but what we know for certain is that some point in the early twenty-first century all of 
mankind was united in celebration. We marvelled at our own magnificence.... 
 
Neo looks confused 
 
Morpheus: .....as we gave birth...to A.I. 
 
Neo: A.I. - you mean Artificial Intelligence? 
 
Morpheus: A singular consciousness that spawned an entire race of machines. We don’t 
know who struck first - us, or them. But we know it was us that scorched the sky. At the time 
they were dependent on solar power and it was believed that they would be unable to survive 
without an energy source as abundant as the sun. Throughout human history, we have been 
dependent on machines to survive. Fate, it seems, is not without a sense of irony.  
 
Neo stares at Morpheus, with his mouth open. 
 
Morpheus: The human generates more bio-electricity than 120-volt battery and over 25,000 
BTVs of body heat. Combined with a form of fusion, the machines have found all the energy 
they would ever need. There are fields...endless fields, where human beings are no longer 
born. We are grown. For the longest time, I wouldn’t believe it...and then I saw the fields 
with my own eyes. Watch them liquefy the dead, so they could be fed intravenously to the 
living. And standing there, facing the pure horrifying precision, I came to realize the 
obviousness of the truth. What is The Matrix? Control. The Matrix is a computer generated 
dream world, built to keep us under control in order to change a human being into this. 
  
Morpheus holds up a battery to Neo 
 




Neo: No....I don’t believe it!! It’s not possible. 
 
Morpheus: I didn’t say it would be easy, Neo. I just said it would be the truth. 
 
Neo: Noooo!! Stop!! Let me out!! I want out!! 
 
His eyes snap open and he thrashes against the chair, trying to rip the cable from the back of 




This dialogue highlights the notion that there is a separation between ‘real life’ and ‘real 
living’ and that what happens in a computer generated environment is detached from this 
realness and not authentically real.
8
 This distinction between the real and the digital is 
highlighted in all three examples and it is supported by using spatial imageries to enhance 
this separation, for example “a dangerous place”, “a black hole”, “away from real life”, 
“computer generated dream world”. Such imagery is powerful in perpetuating this perceived, 
artificial divide. To use spatial metaphors is nothing new and since the spread of personal 
computers and the internet the use of metaphors to describe and demarcate this other place 
has been frequent: for example, second frontier, Western Frontier and even Feudal Society to 
substitute the metaphor of ‘cyberspace’ itself.
9
 According to Olsen using metaphors for this 
dangerous “black hole” serves the purpose of familiarizing the different and strange through 
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The examples showcase a dystopian view of this other, non-real place (“dangerous”, 
“control”, “we marvelled at our own significance”) and the digital-real dichotomy also lends 
itself to techno-romantic views of unity, transcendence, pluralism, liberation and progress 
online or in simulations.
11
 Whether dystopian or utopian, the technological realm is treated as 
a different place that is separate from daily reality.  This poses profound challenges to social 
relations and the legal framework that binds them in particular societies. The issue of adultery 
on social networking sites and virtual reality games is a case in point and highlights the legal 
difficulties.
12
 Given the common perception that technological worlds are different from 
everyday life aggrieved, spouses were never able to petition for divorce on the basis of digital 
adultery (cases that had been reported frequently in relation to Second Life). Yet the question 
is still why cheating online is seen to be less serious/real than cheating offline, at least from a 
legal perspective. This goes back to a fundamental question posed by Lene Hansen with 
regard to political games that interrogates the difference between an experience and a 
simulated experience.
13
 It is not the intention to argue about whether or not husbands and 
wives should have been found guilty in these cases, but merely to highlight that the realm of 
technology is perceived as ‘not real’ and separate from the life humans are leading offline.  
 
An adherence to this view quickly causes problems and by merely looking at the Second Life 
cases it appears that relationships (romantic or platonic) that emerge out of digital interaction 
are seen to be ‘unreal’ and ‘unauthentic’, until the ‘real’ offline encounter (mirl). In essence, 
in order to be able to qualify as real there has to be a material encounter; hence Neo’s claim 
that his experience is not real because there is no materiality to the Matrix. Yet all the cues to 
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start unravelling the riddle of the digital and the actual are right there in the line from 
Morpheus: “What is real? How do you define real? If you’re talking about what you can feel, 
what you can smell, what you can taste and see, then real is simply electrical signals 
interpreted by your brain.” While this is not a definition of reality, but rather approximating 
an understanding of the actual, Morpheus’ statement opens up a line of research into 
questioning the status, nature and dominance of the real/actual. It also demonstrates other 
theoretical challenges, namely the misinformed equation of the real and the actual.  
 
In the illustrated examples there are several misconceptions that are often lumped together in 
the analysis of technology. The first is that the digital realm is separate from reality. Second, 
digital, electronic and technological is referred to as virtual or virtuality. Third, reality is the 
same as actuality and materiality. The Google auto-search and chat room acronyms portray 
an assumed separation of virtual/digital and real spaces, and while the Matrix dialogue points 
the viewer towards questioning the givenness of reality, it still assumes that cyberworlds are 
lacking physicality/materiality. The analytical confusions have several repercussions that 
hinder academic inquiry into Virtuality. Equating Virtual with digital and real with actual 
prevents any fruitful analysis of reality.
14
 The implications for this project are then that 
political action misses out on a great deal of ‘space’ for manoeuvre because its reality is tied 
to the offline, sensible and corporeal realm. Whether high or low-tech, political games have 
often been criticized as extravagant and expensive tools that do not really impact upon ‘real-
life’ politics. There has been some progress toward accepting online social media as a 
political force since phenomena like the Arab Spring; nevertheless, this is still different for 
immersive environments for training purposes. Ultimately, this chapter faces the following 
challenges: first, to demystify terms like, Virtual, real, actual and digital; second, to show 
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how these realms come together in gaming technology and, third, how in turn gaming offers 
political leverage. 
 
Butterflies and Techno-Romances: Conceptual Challenges of the Digital and the Virtual 
The digital is not intended to be a representation of reality, but an expression of it. The digital 
as representation of reality seems to be by far one of the biggest myths about the internet and 
other digital environments. Since Plato, Western thinking and intellectual traditions have 
always been based on logics of representation, which became dominant and the “dogmatic 
image of thought.”
15
 In this sense, it is not surprising that techno-events are believed to be 
and do the same – to digitally represent aspects of ‘real’ and material encounters. Recent 
debates by designers about the emergence and popularity of skeuomorphism is a case in 
point.
16
 The battle is between flat design and a more ‘realistic’ design referred to as 
skeuomorphism, which is the digital representation, visual or sound, of a ‘real’ object. So for 
example, smart phones make use of imagery like calendars, clocks, sun and clouds, maps and 
cameras to indicate that the particular icon will open the according function of the phone’s 
operation system.
17
 Phone cameras will make a sound to make us remember the original 
noise of a manual camera, while the shutter sound indicates that the touchscreen is locked – 
just to make the locking a bit more ‘real’. The increasingly realist representation by smart 
phones is impressive to say the least, yet, it points toward the very assumption that the 
calendar, message or alarm programme is less real and just a digital representation of the 
‘original’ – the material. This also suggests that there seems to be a need for symbolic 
representation to support ‘realness’ and the existence of things.  The question is then why is 
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the intangible, digital calendar seen to be lacking in reality compared to a material calendar 
book. For all that can be said, the only difference is that data is stored differently so that the 
electronic version uses bits and bytes, rather than ink and chlorophyll. Including the previous 
examples as well, what seems to be the problem is that the familiar and habitual grounding of 
daily, social and political in the physical facticity of and through human bodies is changing 
fundamentally and this is causing theoretical challenges that have thus far not been dealt 
with.
18
  This leads Andrew Murphie to argue that what we seem to grapple with, personally, 





It can be claimed that technologies of lived abstraction like Virtual Reality, smart phones, 
online gaming or simulation technology challenge common assumptions about being in the 
world and the reality of it. By offering ways of interaction without physical proximity and 
bodily movement these technologies inserts ontological doubt. For example, the modern, 
slightly stereo-typical, online romance with someone yet unknown, troubles the very old, 
romanticised and offline notion of love.
20
 Furthermore, cyberspace and the internet have 
always been known to question the variables of distance and time and add metaphysical 
complexity. Technology brings out the immediacy of possibility and change, thereby putting 
an end to previous ideas of “stable bodies and fixed states of affairs.”
21
 The culmination of 
this suggests that the digital is far more than just representation. Even though cyberspaces 
and VR have undeniable mimetic qualities, mimesis is much more than merely a depiction of 
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 because mimesis and cyber technologies are first and foremost productive.
23
 
Ultimately, the digital technologies of lived abstraction such as games mark a move from 
representation to operation.  
 
In general, the discussion and investigation about reality has always been a touchy topic: it is 
often associated with a more relativistic approach and ‘everything-goes’ attitude. Brenda 
Laurel notes correctly that “the use of the word ‘reality’ in the singular belies a certain 
cultural bias.”
24
 In many ways, it seems easier and more acceptable to talk about the 
computer virtual (digital) than reality itself because of the belief that computer worlds are just 
a representation of reality. The reasons for this belief are multiple, cultural, psychological and 
philosophical. What stands out most is the fact that new technologies lower territorial 
thresholds in terms of distance, time and speed. Essentially, computer chips topple centuries 
of the static notion of reality that hinges upon vision, position and the senses. Arguably, 
because it appeals less to the human senses and operates at different speeds than what we 
have previously been used to, new technologies are therefore perceived as subordinate to the 
real. Hence, what really is at stake here is the amplification of technology. This suggests then 
that rather than representing reality, what technology does is to “merely actualize, in a new 
formal series, an older [V]irtual machine, which could be called the world.”
25
 This is why 
technology is an expression of reality, as a way to produce and transduce it, to bring it 




This leads to the second misconception that needs to be dealt with, namely that the digital is 
often believed to be separate or even antagonistic to reality. This is the next argument and 
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description of the digital that will help to delineate it from the Virtual. The previous 
assumption that the digital lacks reality had the consequence that this electronic realm also 
got the reputation of being a counterpart to the actual – almost a rival. Statements like 
“cyberspace is everything” and movies such as the Matrix, Blade Runner, IRobot, Total 
Recall or Twelve Moneys nourish the almost apocalyptic view that the digital is an ever 
increasing counter force to reality that is constantly threatening to overtake the real/actual – 
and in case of The Matrix actually does. Academia often buys into the view of technology as 
a threat to the real and the “dark side to an Enlightenment”.
27
 Apart from empirical studies, 
the theoretical projects on technology are mostly informed by a Baudrillardian suspicion and 
warning a la Virilio, suggesting that the imagery created by new technology, the ‘copy’, takes 
over the ‘real’ and original.
28
 It is crucial to get away from this conception, however. The 
digital as rival force only results in false dichotomies of digital vs. actual and Virtual vs. 
reality. Furthermore, to acknowledge that the digital is actually part of reality as well as the 
actual, rather than a rival, enables one to fully participate and act in reality.  
 
The digital can come in many forms: it can refer to cyberspace (Internet and the World Wide 
Web); it can refer to entertainment computer games (offline or online); it can refer to 
quotidian e-mail exchange and activity on social media websites; it can refer to immersive 
technology such as war and peace games; it can refer to artificial intelligence and virtual 
humans and it can refer to the use of smartphones, tablets or ebooks. What all of these 
examples have in common is a form of programming that is based on binary codes (0 and 1) 
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as well as hardware and software that are powered by electricity. The last two factors 
(software and electricity) are what cause the digital to be portrayed as such a mystified space 
and phenomena. Both are imperceptible to the majority of people (who do not possess 
expertise in programming) and to most of the senses that are constantly engaged by the 
human to consciously grasp actuality. While electricity is still the easiest to be felt and 
represents a shared characteristic of bodies and machines, the lack of vision, smell and sound 
triggers the idea that that codes and electricity would be somewhat of a second order reality, 
implying a hierarchy of reality determined by the senses. Yet, this idea of actuality 
determined by our senses is misleading because it neglects that “there is a strange and 
mysterious world that surrounds us, a world largely hidden from our senses” and “like 
everything to do with reality, it’s hidden from sight.”
29
 Simply, there is a world beyond the 
human sensorium. Murphie’s explanation of Deleuze’s example of pleasure and pain in The 
Fold further highlights that the bodily perception in form of the senses is not the best 
approximation for reality or at least that a whole other reality imperceptible to the senses is 
lost in this approach. Consider the scenario of a needle digging into flesh – the pain perceived 
describes the movement of something pointy and sharp into a relatively solid surface, the 
skin. The clue here is that pain is not a material object but rather the somatic interpretation of 
the movement of an object.  
 
Two arguments can be drawn here. First, any moving object that does not encounter a sense 
organ will not be considered as real. This view was first criticized by scholars such as 
Graham Harman in his Guerrilla Metaphysics and inspired writings under the banner of 
Speculative Realism and Object Orientated Ontology, such as Ian Bogost’s work on video 
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games that the research draws on extensively.
30
 Second, a view on reality that is based on 
what can be sensed implies a human-centric hierarchy of ‘being-real’ that ranks reality 
according to the level of the perceivable material impact on the human senses (rather the 
subsequent conscious awareness of the impact). Going back to the interpretation of the needle 
event, pain can be broken down into electric signals that travel from the pain receptors in our 
skin to our brain. In the brain these electric signals jump across synapses, triggering a 
response, that is transported back to the area of infliction via electronic signals and result in 
the body responding by, for example, moving away from the object that caused the pain in 
the first place. To be blunt, the electricity that vibrates throughout bodies is no different than 
the electronic signals that power a computer, smartphone or any other technology. 
Furthermore, there is even reason to believe electricity can jump across different circuits.
31
 
The question that remains is why it is that there is still a distinction drawn and a hierarchy 
implied. This goes back to the idea that, since Kant’s Copernican Revolution, intellectual 
history has treated the empirical as though it were the objective.
32
 The electric scenario just 
outlined describes precisely this confusion.  
 
Massumi’s elaboration of “force” in “The Palliative of the Empirical” demonstrates this more 
clearly. The conceptual challenge lies in the fact that force is unobservable and that the 
human senses can only detect force-effects and “not even Newton saw gravity.”
33
 To be 
precise, force is a “set of invisible, untouchable, self-renewing conditions according to which 
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certain effects can habitually be expected to appear.”
34
 Thus, the feeling of pain caused by the 
needle is nothing more than the cognitive registering of a force. More generally, perception 
by the senses, be this vision, touch or any other intermodal form, is merely a force-effect and 
not the force itself. Therefore, conscious experience is a force-effect. Interestingly, 
throughout intellectual history and philosophy, force-effect came to be seen as ‘more real’ 
than the force itself, simply because force is infra-empirical and imperceptible to the senses 
while its effect is not. Furthermore, sensual perception is the event of force that passes into 
the “added reality of the empirical” so that every intermodal experience is the passage from 
“an unrefusable (and unobeyable) complex limit-tension, through hallucinatory grounding in 
objectivity, to existential flight,”
35
 which is commonly called ‘reality’.  
 
Three points can be drawn from Massumi’s proposal. First, his elaboration confirms that 
common conceptions of ‘reality’ miss most of reality. Second, if force describes a passage, 
then force is a happening, a doing, a “verb” or event.
36
 Third, the empirical is the phase shift 
in a perceptual event of the passage into a force-effect. Fourth, if the empirical is a perceptual 
event, it is not as stable and closed as it is often assumed for it depends on the constant 
renewal by iterations of force. If anything, the empirical is entropy and only temporal closure 
and stability of formed perception. Thus, the empirical is as passing as the cross-sensual 
reaction force-effects trigger. If the force is strong enough, the sentient experience of the 
needle pain becomes so prominent that the force-effect results in “localizable interactions 
between formed organs and object,” that is we move away from the needle, close our eyes if 
the sun is to bright and hurting our eyes, or take our hand off the hot stove.
37
 This is the point 
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when experience becomes “determined, objectified and empiricized.”
38
 In conventional 
terms, it is only this passage into empirical appearance in the form of sensual perception 
where experience enters the ‘real’ – ironically. This leads Massumi to claim that the 
empirical is palliative; it is simply a realm of side-effect.
39
 This is not to say that the 
empirical is not real, or actual to be precise. But, the empirical that we base our realness on is 
actually just one part in a complex process and, thus, “a beat in a rhythm.”
40
 The intention is 
merely to labour the point that the empirical cannot be used as parameter for the real on its 
own and that to do so would be quite misleading. Furthermore, the intention for academic 
investigation and philosophy is to reconsider the basis of reality – as daunting as this task 
may sound. Yet, this is crucial for any political action, especially that of technological-
becoming like gaming, which is why the next section will reconsider the ‘realness’ of binary 
codes and electricity.  
 
“A Crazy Little Thing Called Physics” 
It is important to remember that a philosophical inquiry into the digital, the actual and the 
Virtual, as part of reality, is not merely a lofty and conceptual exercise. It is as much a 
philosophical approach to reality as a theoretical one and it is also a material approach that 
cannot do without the bio-chemical and physical make-up of the world, or the universe for 
that matter. Given the technoscientific study of immersive technology and its commitment to 
the concrete and material, the analysis’ focus will be on physics. From a theoretical physics 
perspective things in the universe are made up of particles and energy.
41
 Energy can be seen 
as intensities and because of differences between them things happen, on a small and large 
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scale respectively; from reactions between atoms to those between large systems.
42
 Following 
energy is challenging and to put it in simple terms, there are two types of energy: potential 
and kinetic. Potential energy is the energy of an object at rest, waiting to be turned into 
kinetic energy, which is the energy of an object in motion. This applies to large objects such 
as rocks, planes or planets and infinitely small particles such as atoms, molecules and grains 
of sand. For example, thermal energy is a case of atoms moving rapidly. In contrast, potential 
energy can be referred to as stored energy of an object in a physical system. This difference 
between potential and motion energy is crucial and, equally, vibration and waves play a 
significant role. The idea of the posthuman as composed of vibrational motions and waves 
that can be charted as vectors
43
 suggests that the posthuman body emerges out of a new 
encounter of potential and kinetic energy present in the game, which is the event of different 
intensities reacting (TPE) and then resonating and vibrating at the same speed and frequency. 
In physics such systems are called harmonic oscillators. More specifically, and tying this 
back to energy, string theory shows that within such a system the most fundamental objects 
are made up of “tiny little strings of energy that vibrate.”
44
 In theoretical physics more 
generally vibration is often referred to as mechanical waves and such waves transport energy, 
but not matter, from one point or region to another. Importantly, this is better thought of as 
transferral of energy as one molecule passes on its energy to another – in water or air for 
example – rather than travelling with that energy. The example of a wave in water is ideal 
because it illustrates that energy is being passed on by the water molecules in the ocean. The 
water actually only travels a short distance, mostly up and down, whereas the energy is being 
transferred all the way from the initial point of the wave to its crest and further. Up and down 
displacement is referred to as amplitude and it describes the movement of a posthuman 
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gaming entity in the form of vibration and rhythm.
45
 There is also wavelength that is the 
distance from one crest to another. Frequency is used to describe the velocity of a wave 
(speed). All these units matter in the way that they can be used to describe not only the 
movement of the posthuman, but also the behaviour of sub-entities such as electricity 
(electromagnetic waves). It is useful to note that waves or strings of energy vibrate in ways 
that are so minute that they cannot be perceived themselves, but only their effects. Strings of 
energy are not only fundamental to understanding the materiality and ‘realness’ of computer 
worlds, but also the very make-up of posthuman bodies.  
 
Going back to the initial conundrum of why force effects are often being considered more 
real, particularly in the digital realm, the case of electricity is most easily explained as it is a 
form of energy that results out of charged particles in an energy potential. At the stage of an 
energy gradient the energy is still potential; it is not kinetic yet. Using the example of The 
Matrix with human bodies being used as batteries that power the digital world, the energy 
that the bodies hold is potential and only when the batteries are depleting themselves is it 
possible to talk of actual energy. The depletion describes the passing of energy out of the 
bodies, so that, in simplicity, (kinetic) energy describes a form of particle movement. Related 
to this, the change of particles’ movement is defined as force (this is a change from potential 
to kinetic energy by force).
46
 Essentially, this captures Newton’s second law of motion, 
which says that force is equal to the change in momentum of an object and in this case 
electro-magnetic particles.
47
 Importantly this means that energy and force are what makes 
matter vibrate and corrugate and are therefore the most fundamental units to movement 
regardless of the scale of movement. Essentially, this makes electricity a specific form of 
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movement based on energy and force, which means that electricity is a fundamental unit of 
reality. It is the interplay of energy and force that causes force-effect/perception. 
Accordingly, everything that is powered by electricity is literally particle movement, and, 
therefore, not only material, but very real.  
 
Looking at the other variable, binary code, this is a more complex step. Codes and software 
can be intimidating for the non-expert and different programming languages are sophisticated 
and challenging. Yet the level this analysis is concerned with is the computer itself and how it 
can produce a ‘virtual’ world and games based on codes. This code system is called binary 
because it does not draw on all digits from 0-9, but it only works with 0’s and 1’s. The 
numbers merely signify the state of ‘on’ or ‘off’. This is for the simple reason that essentially 
a computer, with all the magic and mysterious cyberworlds that it creates, consist of electric 
circuits that can either let electric energy pass through (on) or not (off).
48
 As an electric 
charge that is passed on through these circuits it is like a wave, which is why it is also 
referred to as an electric current or electric wave.
49
  Despite the sophistication of political 
games and other digital, supposedly intangible, phenomena, we are still dealing with energy 
in the form of electricity that powers the digital. In other words, because of electricity and 
code the digital is material and as ‘real’ as it gets. There is nevertheless an underlying 
assumption that perceiving something supposedly ‘organic’ is more real that perceiving 
digital images. This relates back to the first misconception, of the electronic realm being less 
or not real at all, and the digital image tricking the human senses. But here is the question. 
What is the difference, biologically and neurologically, between looking at an actual tree and 
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looking at the digital image (2D or 3D) of a tree? Ostensibly, there is none. While the digital 
image may fail to give off smell (there is technology that can produce scents), the processes 
of perception are exactly the same. Yet, viewing something that is digital tends to be ascribed 
a lesser degree of reality, highlighting a very strong and long-standing bias when it comes to 
the question of reality in the digital age. Despite knowing better, the intangible is still at the 
lower end of the spectrum of reality than things that can be experienced tactilely. Again, this 
highlights the confusion of materiality that is perceivable to the human and actuality as 
reality. 
 
The Virtual and the Digital: Similar, But Not Quite the Same. 
The confusion about the equation of the Virtual and the digital is arguably one of the greatest 
obstacles to understanding both realms, technological mediations and techno–becomings such 
as games and reality in general. The relationship between the Virtual and the actual (that 
includes the digital), apropos technologies of lived abstraction, helps to understand why the 
digital and the Virtual might be confused in the first place. The Virtual and the digital, in our 
case simulation games that present the unknown, share some traits and hold multiple futures 
that are yet to come and the crucial difference between them can be summed up as easily as 
this: whereas the digital realm is possibility, offered by all the possible combinations of 
coding demands, the Virtual is the realm of potentiality, which is infinity. While a game can 
generate multiple futures that the gaming code allows for, the pool the Virtual draws on is 
limitless, the indefinite plane of immanence. Thus, it is a case of digital possibility versus 
Virtual potentiality/infinity. This distinction will be clearer after an introduction into the 
Virtual and it is essential to understand this difference as it explains why the digital and the 




On Soap Bubbles and Salt Crystals: What is the Virtual? 
50
 
Given the techno-dystopian hype that writings and films such as “Simulacra and Simulations” 
and The Matrix et al have created,
51
 when talking about the Virtual, virtual or cyber worlds, 
the image that pops to most minds is the one above, or at least similar to it. These are better 
thought of as digital, electronic or computer generated environments. These are not rivalling 
worlds or realities, but merely different forms of interaction and modality – electrical to be 
precise. Nor is it the case as in The Matrix that this form of interaction is taking over and that 
our bodies are merely dormant husks or batteries. The Virtual is so much more; it is pure 
immanence that holds all the potential to let utopian impulse become true. This will become 
clearer when characterising the Virtual in the following section. A good starting point to 
formally introduce the Virtual is Michelangelo’s parable for the Virtual. As one of the first to 
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mention the realm of the Virtual, he chose the example of crafting his marble sculptures to 





Talking about his art, Michelangelo said that all his sculptures were already there in the 
marble, each shape, position and expression was held by the solidity of the stone. All he had 
to do was to uncover it, extract it, and present it.
54
 This is a perfect entrance into 
understanding the Virtual, as it holds any possible future in it already, all that needs to happen 
is the actualisation of a particular one. 
 
On Infinity and Emergence 
The problem of the Virtual can be approached from a material point and Deleuze uses 
thermodynamics as a context for articulating the ontology of the Virtual. According to 
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Deleuze’s adaptation of Henri Bergson’s work, the Virtual is best understood as a couplet 
with the actual and with intensities as the transducing element between the two realms.
55
 The 
intensive processes are triggered by differences such as in electromagnetic charge or 
temperature and this difference creates movement. In this intensive process or movement, the 
Virtual can be described as difference. To be precise, it can be thought of as “a purely 
differential field, composed of differential elements, differential relations, and 
singularities.”
56
 In contrast, the actual is an arrangement of stable substances with extensive 
properties and as such it is locked into conventional behaviour patterns.
57
 However, this is not 
to imply that the actual is order and the Virtual is disorder. The latter is not to be interpreted 
as undifferentiated chaos, but rather the virtual is a set of “‘Ideas’ or ‘multiplicities’ that serve 
as regional ontologies, laying out the many ways in which society, a language, an animal and 




The difference with Michelangelo’s marble block is that the Virtual is not a container in the 
way that it would be closed off or as in the case of the marble block that the size of the 
sculpture is determined by the size of the block. The fascination with the Virtual is due to its 
infinity and, hence, the indeterminate futures it holds. In short, “the [V]irtual is the 
transformation matrix for systems.”
59
 As such it holds infinite ideas and these spread 
throughout the virtual via self-differentiating processes, or differentiation.
60
 Differentiation 
with a ‘t’ was distinguished from differenciation with ‘c’ which is the process of the 
actualisation of an idea, the move from the Virtual to the actual.
61
 The infinity of ideas and 
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the manifold forms that can emerge from it leads thinkers such as Deleuze and Guattari, 
Massumi and Protevi to speak of the Virtual as having topological features in the way that it 
allows for continuous variation through deformation and transformation of one state and 
shape to the other . 
 
The process through which these emerge, their actualisation or differenciation can be thought 
of a ceaseless folding of the Virtual into the actual. This also means that there is no clear 
division or border between the Virtual and the actual (the infinite and the finite), but rather a 
fold or, as Massumi suggests, “a structure [the actual] is a regularized infolding of an aleatory 
outside [the Virtual].
62
 Let us unbundle what Guattari has to say about the Virtual/actual-
weave: 
 
It is by a continuous coming-and-going at an infinite speed that the multiplicities 
of entities differentiate [actualise] into ontologically heterogeneous complexions 
[the actual/finite] and become chaotised in abolishing their figural diversity and 
by homogenising themselves within the same being-non-being [behaviour 
pattern/actual]. In a way they never stop diving into an umbilical chaotic zone 
[…] where they can re-emerge invested with new charges of complexity [in a 
word ‘change’, or newly emerging experiences and patters]. It is during this 
chaosmic folding that an interface is installed – an interface between the sensible 
finitude of existential territories [actual] and the trans-sensible infinitude of the 
Universes of reference bound to them [Virtual].
63
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What Guattari describes essentially is the production of reality through the continuous folding 
of the infinite into the finite. Furthermore, it highlights that this point of folding is where 
change can emerge. This moment was identified as the locus for newly emerging, alternative 
subjectivities as well or the break away from faciality. To recap this creativity in the 
production of new actualities, patterns and, eventually, subjectivities, is what Deleuze calls 
the “event,” here the techno-political-event (TPE) specifically. Therefore, it is important to 
stress that the Virtual and the actual are in constant contact, in order to understand how any 
form of action, including gaming, can produce change. Furthermore, the idea of a folding 
process is crucial in order to prevent the perpetuation of the bar between the infinity and the 
finite. In addition, the fact that ideas are immanent to the Virtual and stabilize in the actual 
does not mean that the Virtual would be a transcendent realm above the actual. To the 
contrary, it is the very ground of the actual. More importantly, the process of differenciation 
is non-hylomorphic (self-organising and self-emerging) as there is no conscious drawing on 
ideas from the Virtual. Folding is an essentially self-dynamic process. To illustrate this, in the 
case of Michelangelo’s example he assumed that the shape of the sculpture was already 
inherent in the marble and that it was not him who determined the form. He was merely the 
one who facilitated the actualisation of that sculpture. A small difference needs to be added 
here. In this project’s ontology of the Virtual the form of the actualisation is unknown until 
the moment of differenciation. Ideas are constantly shuffled and take the form of attractors 
and intensities. This is why the Virtual is also seen as potentiality or where potential is a 




All that the Virtual is not: Possibility and Probability 
In order to further explain this idea of the Virtual as potential, the analysis starts with the 
Hegelian method of approximating what something is by describing what it is not. In this 
sense, the Virtual is not possibility. This is yet another popular misconception because the 
Virtual holds all the possible futures. However, a serious game holds all the possible futures 
for a particular game as well. So what is the difference here? If the digital is a codification 
based on zeros and ones, then essentially this is also a form of quantifying the possible, so 
that this codification or “digitization is a numeric way of arraying alternative states so that 
they can be sequenced into a set of alternative routines.”
64
 Thus, the working of the digital or 
electronic realm is the combination and the systematization of the possible, which leads 
Massumi to argue that “the medium of the digital is possibility, not virtuality.”
65
 However, 
that does not mean that the digital and the Virtual are not in relation to each other, they share 
a special connection indeed. What this highlights again is that the Virtual and the digital need 
to be looked at and analysed in conjunction. Yet academic analysis and socio-political 
practices respectively have to be careful to not merely equate the digital and the Virtual. The 
key is that the electronic realm is only connected to the Virtual through the analogue: 
 
Take word processing for example. All of the possible combinations of letters and 
words are enveloped in the zeros and ones of ASCII code. You could say that 
entire language systems are numerically enveloped in it. But what is processed 
inside the computer is code, not words. The words appear on screen, in being 
read. Reading is the qualitative transformation of alphabetical figures of speech 
and thought. This is an analog process. Outside its appearance, the digital is 
electronic nothingness, pure systemic possibility[…] The digital is sandwiched 
                                                          
64
 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, 137. 
65
 Ibid, original emphasis. 
243 
 





The same can be said about immersive games. Without the act of playing, these games are 
nothing more than code that only comes to full fruition through their analogue reception of 
playing. Thus, the analogy of digital gaming being sandwiched between the Virtual and the 
actual perfectly portrays the crucial role that the digital plays as it is the medium through 
which differenciation/actualisation takes place, located right in between the Virtual and the 
actual. Contextualized within Human Computer Interaction (HCI)/becoming-technology this 
means that digital technology is at the very heart of the folding of the infinite into the finite. 
Contextualizing this further, gaming technology is right at the intersection of two modalities, 
Virtual becoming and actual being. Moreover, not only does it facilitate the move, it also 
transduces virtuality into actualities faster than older technologies of the world. Therefore, it 
is more important to analyse technology on the basis of what it does rather than looking at 
whether it is inherently good or bad.
67
 Coming to the same conclusion Murphie continues to 
argue that digital technology is neither progress nor disaster, but merely the increased ability 
to operate and translate the Virtual.
68
 Expanding on this productive relation between the 
Virtual and the digital, what is the Virtual then if it is not possibility? As potential, it is the 
multiplicity of possibilities. It is insensate and immanent. It is the reserve of differenciation or 
qualitative transformation of every event. And every event is the unfolding of the unfelt 
Virtual in the sensible analogue through the digital. In other words every TPE is the locating 
and situating of the Virtual within digital technology. Its force appears only as a potential 
drive and can only be felt as the possibilities that unfold from it, as varying effects in a game, 
the sense of option and openness that is generated within games. The digital is exhaustively 
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possiblistic and limited – it belongs to the order of the finite. But the Virtual as potentiality is 
infinite.  
 
The question at this point is how the potentiality/infinity of the Virtual relates to the finite 
actual. How can differenciation through technology be conceptualized in a way that it makes 
sense in the context of political games? Put simply, what is the role of these games in the 
actualisation of Virtual eventualities? The fact that gaming allows for the repeated playing of 
the same problem is used to argue that it thereby offers the possibility of topological 
transformation. Topology and topological design are a case in point of the connection 
between the Virtual and the actual. Take the example of the coffee cup that turns into a 
doughnut shape (torus) as shown in the image below. 
69
 
The cup can be transformed/deformed into a doughnut shape without being cut or glued, by 
creating a dimple and progressively enlarging it while shrinking the whole in the handle. This 
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type of transformation is called homeomorphism which is the most basic topological 
equivalence. The relation between the topological transformation and the static figure is the 
same as between the Virtual and the actual with technology as the driver of the deformation. 
Further, to illustrate the point, a game (a particular software) is the cup in this case. The form 
is given already, it is definite.  Yet, there are an infinite number of static figures that could be 
extracted from one transformation, since in Euclidean space it holds that between any two 
points regardless of how close they are to each other, lies another definable point.
70
 Thus, 
during a transformation the figure runs through an infinite number of static forms so that it is 
not itself determinate, but determinable.
71
 This geometric “superfigure always falls between 
Euclidean points” and “recedes continuously into the between” or infinity. Therefore, even 
though a given game is possibilistic because it is code and thus finite, the forms and 
transformation it offers can be thought of as topological movements that despite running on 
pregiven trajectories (from cup to doughnut) passes through infinite forms and states. This 
transformation/differenciation/movement from the Virtual to the actual is technologically 
driven, which is why the possibility stored in a game can be said to potentialise. In this way 
digital technology “carries a [V]irtual centre of self-varying experience across the running of 
code-bound routines.”
72
 This is how the Virtual and the digital are in constant connection and 
why it would be detrimental to perpetuate the belief that they are the same. This directly 
relates to Murphie’s previous argument that technology is about translating the Virtual. In 
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Not without the Analogue: Conscious Movement on the Gamers 
The movement from the Virtual to the actual highlights that what happens in the actual is just 
as important as the Virtual pool of potential futures. The main attention that was given to the 
Virtual in this chapter by no means implies that the effects gaming has on the actual are of 
lesser importance when it comes to changing and improving existing peace practices. Indeed, 
both realms are necessary to bring reality forward, for the latter is nothing more than the 
Virtual and the actual in tandem, the continuous folding of the two. Thus, changing peace 
operations necessitates an understanding of the Virtual and the actual, the latter including the 
digital and the analogue. Because the Virtual is inaccessible to the senses and can only be felt 
as effect in the actual, the analogue, offline realm is all the more important. In fact, as it was 
argued before with the example of word processing, digital technologies have a connection to 
Virtual only through the analogue reception.
74
 Furthermore, in a political sense, the analogue 
is crucial, not only because it is the realm in which concepts materialize and where effects 
can be felt, but also because it is a realm of choice. Hypertext is a case in point. Internet wary 
academics label it totalitarian in the way that all the possible links are programmatically 
prearranged in the architecture of the World Wide Web.
75
 Political action online is very much 
a politics of the possible and it is important to pay attention to such criticism and be cautious 
of the structural inequality of Internet and technology.
76
 The same criticism can be made for 
political games as well, since it is a case of possible futures prearrayed in the gaming 
software. However, what these criticisms fail to note is that programming is only half of the 
story, because the “digital always circuits into the analogue.”
77
 In essence, while the mode of 
existence of the digital is actual, in an electronic bit and byte form, its effect can also be felt 
in the analogue. In short, the posthuman exists across the gap, it is Virtual and actual at the 
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 meaning that it has an actual, felt presence. Furthermore, the political comes to 
full fruition in the digital’s offline effects on the posthuman and its emerging subjectivity. 
The freedom from ‘totalitarian’ coding comes with the openness of analogue reception in the 
posthuman. This puts the posthuman in tension, between its coding architecture and the 
creative responses that precisely such coding triggers. To recall, this tension triggers 
posthuman movement (a way of expression), a self-dynamic of expansion and contraction. 
Because of the analogue reception, this self-dynamic does not unfold strictly according to the 
game’s designed logic due to the intensities that are brought into the equation by gaming 
environments and gamers. In this dynamic the forces that come together and that provide for 
entirely new and unpredicted gaming outcomes and concepts are the co-presence of 
alternative and possible states of software code and the gamers action, the “serially 
experience [of] effects”, their accumulation “in an unprogrammed way.”
79
 The different 
vectors come together “in a way that intensifies, creating resonance and interference patterns 
moving through the successive, linked appearances”, expressions and concepts.
80
 This does 
not mean that first coding happens and then the response, but rather describes a back and 
forth dynamic, a co-presence in different modes of being and becoming.  
 
The analogue process in the game, that is the conscious movement of the gamers and their 
communication, is already an enveloping figure of thought or, in other words, “there is no 
thought that is not accompanied by a physical sensation.”
81
 Meaning that once an idea-
problem emerged in the Virtual, there will be an actual and analogue effect to it. These 
effects do not have to be lasting and always trigger the new, or even subjectivities, but 
nonetheless fold through the actual. For example, it can range from an increase in heart-rate, 
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to raise of an eyebrow, eye movement, to actual speech and body movement. This interplay 
between the Virtual and the actual, through the digital and the analogue, is where the 
potentializing effects of the flow from infinity to the finite come in; however, it also 
highlights the analogue aspect of felt reality and the play on the sense, which is a challenging 
territory.  
 
The Slippery Road to Posthuman Sensation and Human Perception 
The idea that judging reality according to the senses are obsolete parameters, does not mean 
that senses are unimportant altogether. As the conscious registering of force-effects they are 
indeed a crucial part of actuality and subjectivity and essential in the folding process. It is 
worth the time to look into how infinity eventually ends up circuiting into sensation in order 
to better understand how gaming technology transduces the Virtual into actual sensation. 
 
First Sensation: Event-Space 
Going back to the movement of the posthuman, agency is dispersed so that it is not the player 
that is acting, but rather he/she is part of the action. The game has as much or little agency as 
the playing field, the immersive 3D environment or the player. The reaction/action of the 
player is only an actionability of the posthuman that partly flows through the body of the 
player, but not an individual, separate, agentic action as such. A change in the game is not an 
expression of the player, but of the overall game and the player’s body is a point of 
expression among many others. Before flowing into subjectivity the player is a material 
channel for intensities that move from the Virtual to the actual in the first place. Therefore, it 
catalyses the TPE.
 
The point of expression is a transducer of change of a local physical 





 Two crucial points can be drawn: first, a change in the game releases new 
potential from the Virtual into the game that entirely reorganizes the field of potential 
movements. Second, “the players, in the heat of the game, are drawn out of themselves” and 
therefore there is no self-conscious player or “the player must let his trained body synthesise 
his separate perceptual impressions into a global sense of the intensity.”
83
 Massumi goes as 
far as to argue that the players as the channels for transformation are picking up the potential 
“as in an immeasurable but actionable degree of intensity affecting the polar continuum of the 
field”
84
 and suggests that rather than the player sensing, it is the player that is sensation for 
the game. This is taken to be an essentially posthuman form of sensation. As sensation the 
player is then channelling potential into local action. More importantly, sensation is the mode 
in which potential is present in the perceiving body. This posthuman sensation means that the 
posthuman in its pre-subjective state, the player is nothing but a flow of sensation. Thus, it is 
only during EPS where sensations become subjectivised and registered as a sensual 
experience.  
 
However, the argument that players are withdrawn from their previous subjectivity in the 
course of the game and are merely a flow of sensations does not mean that players are only 
bio-physical entities. Reflex and impression are much more: they are a medley of “shards of 
intentions and conscious memories,” “shimmers of reflection and language” that mostly 
influence game preparations.
85
 Split by different sensory channels, these shimmers enter the 
field of perception of the players and thereby affect the game as well. In simple terms, they 
are another vector in the equation/collision on the plane of immanence. Thus, “a 
heterogeneity of levels contract into [the posthuman] from which they reissue in an action – 
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in a unity of movement through which their multiplicity is singularly expressed.”
86
 Sensing 
potential and reissuing action, the players are transducers in the game rather than subjects in 
it. In many ways, potential (the Virtual) is also the space of the game, not only the net of 
movement markers of the posthuman. From this perspective, the potential in the game 
(potential movement) is a variable to judge game-space against, rather than quantitative units 
of square meters. Every move in the game is a particular actualisation of the potential, an 
event. Therefore, game-space is event-space that is the event-dimension of potential, a 
dimension of relationality of intensities, forces, and elements.  
 
Second Sensation: The Use of Human Perception – the Advantage of Mixing Up 
Senses 
The strength of immersive technologies and gaming is that it is multi-modal for human 
sensation, not only drawing on one or two senses as it is the case with more traditional 
Human Computer Interactions (HCI) such as 2D computer or console gaming. While vision 
always seems to be the more prominent one, it never occurs alone. Even the most 
monosensual activity plays on all sense modalities and vision is always contaminated by 
other senses, any sense experience is already mixed. Gaming draws on all senses and makes 
use of the mixing of senses by providing a synesthetic field of sensation and learning 
experience. Arguably, some of these sensual experiences are simulated sensations, which 
makes for a fascinating sensual encounter. For example, seeing a rock plays on tactile 
knowledge of a rock and instantly triggers associations of firmness. One does not have to 
touch the rock in order to imagine what it feels like. This is based on past experiences of 
touching and movement. The interesting point is that gaming triggers such associations 
through vision, so that the process that happens at the sight of something solid happens at the 





sight of a digital image that presents something solid. Even more interesting is what 
chemically happens in the brain to have this association is the same as what happens at the 
sight of something materially solid. It is important to remember at this point that the image of 
the stone is no less real than the perception of an analogue stone – images are matter too and 
belong to the same order, the actual. The only difference is their modality, one is analogue, 
the other is digital. That is the only difference. To speak in conventional terms, they are both 
real.  
 
This leads to the idea that vision has taken up an important tactile function, which Deleuze 
terms “haptic” and is the embedding of another mode function in vision.
87
 This provides 
gaming with a wealth of synthetic experience and associations, since a pool of tactile 
experiences can be triggered through vision. That means that experience and learning can be 
multiplied in the game as compared to offline games. A quick example would be the cultural 
and stability training simulations that soldiers go through to practice their communication 
skills. The environment that is created approximates verisimilitude and offers much more 
than just practicing dialogue. The experience becomes so full and rich because of the digital 
props integrated into it. The sight of a blurry, watery layer hovering above the ground as 
though one were in the desert; the perception of sweat on the forehead of one’s interlocutor 
and the visual feast of outdoor fruit stores selling exotic fruit all trigger sensations of warm 
weather, dry air, and the burning sensation of sun on one’s skin. All this can be transmitted in 
an instant. No lengthy descriptions are necessary, all the player has to do is to skim the 
parameters for a couple of seconds. The world and sensation that unfolds in front of him/her 
by merely playing on the soldiers senses is abundant. It only needs a few clues to trigger such 
a reaction and more. Depending on the imagination of each individual soldier, there is no 
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limit to the creative continuation of the initial haptic experience. Massumi identifies the 
embedding of one sense in the other as phase-spaces and argues that these spaces co-function 
as differential attractors governing self-intensifying fields of experience.
88
 Systems of 
experience have a self-dynamic that is intensifying and the interrelating of sense is believed 
to increase the learning experience through detail and providing a more lasting after-effect. 
Connecting the posthuman sensation with conscious human sensation means that it folds in 
and out of the Virtual throughout the game. First, there is only the sensation that flows in the 
game and in and out of the player, and, because the latter is still in a larval state, the player as 
well as sensation are without subject. After subjectivity formation the mixing of phase spaces 
triggers conscious reflection that feed back into the game. This feedback loop is essential in 
the players’ creative use of a particular game or simulation. Crucially this dynamic is only 
complete because of the analogue reception after expression.  
 
The Body-Event: Harmony in Movement 
The relationship between physical states, sensations, and their conscious reception and 
interpretation needs to be clarified further. The posthuman arises out of and exists in a state 
of physical tension that is caused by different intensities constantly encountering each other, 
and the flow of experience it passes into often enters consciousness as a less enjoyable 
experience.
89
 It is important to note, however, that attributes of physical or psychological pain 
does not mean that a game is in a constant state of unease, struggle, bitterness or conflict. 
Although these secondary sensations can be amplified by mixing senses, even with tension 
there can be harmony according to Deleuze and Guattari, which comes in many forms.
90
 The 
crucial point is that dissonance and tension are not the same as disharmony. Indeed 
                                                          
88
 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, 158. 
89
 As seen in the example of 3T and general neuro-psychological studies of flow experience.  
90




dissonance is important and does not necessarily have to be resolved.
91
 According to Deleuze 
there is harmony between dissonances and, for example, pleasure and pain are usually 
intrinsically connected.
92
 Theodor W. Adorno held similar views of music, in the way that his 
compositions are mostly perceived and described as disharmonic and unpleasant by the 
inexperienced ear. As described in The Fold the harmony lies in the dance or melody between 
contrast and differences
93
 or in other words, to move in and out of pleasure and pain. In fact 
each counterpoint is “spilling over its frame and becoming the motif of another such that all 
of Nature becomes an immense melody and flow of bodies.”
94
 This beautifully sums up the 
movement and dynamic of the posthuman and the self-dynamic of intensities and dissonances 
that drive its progression. Thus, the interplay of dissonances describes an interactive harmony 
of vibrating matter across the gap from the Virtual to the actual and sensations that fold in 
and out of each other. Murphie argues that new technologies have the rare capacity to 
transduce such melodies, precisely because they are located between the Virtual and the 
actual and what these melodies describe is continuous folding between the Virtual and the 
actual.  
 
Gaming as Continuous Variation: Event and Experimentation 




Gaming produces reality, but in a very specific and distinct way in the form of continual 
variation. Hence, when viewing reality in a posthuman condition, the TPE is productive 
continuity between the Virtual and the actual, but so that the end always marks the beginning 
of new difference. It is especially the case with personal games such as Antiwargame that can 
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be played over and over again. This stands in contrast with simulation games that are longer 
in duration, but are usually run just once such as those games offered by CRISP. Even though 
they equally emerge from the Virtual and unfold in the actual, the mode of continual 
difference after the game has finished can only happen through conscious reflection, carried 
by a new subjectivity and practiced through a body politic. In contrast, shorter games that are 
not institutionally run, but available to the individual, such as Antiwargame, A Force More 
Powerful, PeoplePower and Against All Odds can be played ad infinitum.  In fact, their 
strength lies precisely in the fact that they can be played over and over again. The end of a 
game marks the reshuffling of possibilities and thereby creates conditions for different 
actualities. More precisely, every end of a game marks the beginning of a new one with all 
the possibilities for an entirely new future and arriving at the beginning summons yet another 
TPE. It is important to remember here that the parameters for failure or success are different 
when it comes to political games, since the intention is to encourage problem-solving, 
learning and creative thinking.
96
 This becomes more apparent in the light of Herberger’s 
quote, so that winning is really only about the continuation of play, which in turn 
“necessitates a learning curve of losing through movement first.”
97
 In other words, the 
incompletion and imperfection of ‘losing’ is the very condition for continuity. What could be 
interpreted negatively, as failing to create conditions of security, is actually only the chance 
to produce reality anew. “Game Over” is the very precondition of continuing, trying again 
and keeping the posthuman’s continual variation. This leads Jamie “Skye” Bianco to argue 
that “productive continuity becomes the process and object of play, and losing then becomes 
winning [as] more time(s) to play.”
98
 What is important in this circle of loss and what makes 
serious games different to other forms of losing is that losing or incompletion in this case has 
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nothing to do with imperfection or causing psychoanalytic paucity of some sort. Losing in 
political games is different in the way that it achieves quite the opposite, actually becoming 
the fullness of memory in movement of “that which has already happened – that which is 
both materially and perceptually present as actuality and that which is virtually to come.”
99
 
Close circuit losing is close circuit movement, a constant looping from the Virtual to the 
actual. Therefore, as long as there is movement there is continuity and as long there is 
continuity there is winning.  
 
Furthermore, continuity is the only way to actualise the Virtual, where the bridge between the 
Virtual and the actual has to be crossed constantly in order to perpetuate reality. Bianco uses 
Run Lola Run to illustrate this point and indeed the example works well to belabour the point 
of continuity. In the movie, Lola, the main character, gets three runs/rounds to complete her 
task. As long as she is running, the game is still on, and each round reaches out to different 
Virtual futures, a play on the butterfly effect. If she ‘fails’ to reach the ‘goal’, the game 
reboots, she runs again, continuously actualising the Virtual – running symbolising this 
movement from the Virtual to the actual, and movement constituting the playing field. 




And at the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 




The return to the beginning is fundamental not only because it is yet another chance to create 
the new, but because a finished game is the return to the same coordinates where the players 
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started, it is a familiar place but with new material conditions. We arrive at the same place 
but know it for the first time. The material remains from the previous round are like an 
energized, embodied memory, so that a round in the game is both the same and new each 
time.
102
 In other words, the course of a game accumulates temporality, which acts as a history 
for the future at the beginning of each new round, at the same material coordinates, but not 
under the same material conditions. The familiar and old becomes new as difference with 




Undoing Memory as Learning Process 
What stands out in gaming, especially in contrast to other forms of learning and training, is 
that it does not have a linearity inscribed into it. Despite the game design, the level of 
contingency is very high in gaming, depending on the creative responses of the players.
104
 
The double looping between the Virtual and the actual as well as between different rounds, 
which change conditions but not coordinates, is a force of disarticulation. This happens on 
two levels. First, attempts of the previous rounds are either undone entirely or used only 
partly. The scents of memory are reshuffled to be used in the next round, but in different 
constellations and scenarios; rebooting acts as disordering of the known to increase the 
newness in the rounds to come. Furthermore, this breaks the linearity in EPS of and through 
the game. To illustrate this and for the sake of simplicity, if gaming were a narrative, there 
would be no story line that unfolded singularly and linearly. It is not only a case of one round 
and the posthuman emerging rhizomatically. It is also about linking up various rounds in one 
game can be conceived of as a rhizomatic collage/montage: an amalgamation and growing of 
sensate movement of past rounds, their inherent histories of unmatched futures and Virtual 
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energies unfolding in the present.
105
 The second disarticulation lies in the capabilities of new 
gaming technology itself. Digital two or three-dimensional environments that have been 
created in the game can evaporate or change at an instance, leaving the player at the same 
coordinates, but in an entirely different environment and/or scenario. Arguably, old notions 
of the stability of one’s environment are undone through digital environments. Inhabiting 
computer worlds lies beyond the human comfort zone of linearity and stability, by promoting 
disordering and ephemeral environments.  
          
106
 
The images above attempt to visually represent this non-linearity and active disordering of 
memory and the environment through gaming. While the individual elements are familiar to 
the viewer, the arrangement of them is strange and unfamiliar to say the least. Trying to 
represent a rhizomatic fashion, the images express the familiar as the new, through 
disordering, reshuffling and displacement. Given these characteristics of gaming, the 
argument is that the attraction of the TPE is its promise of probability, coming and 
compassable futures, a genealogy of forward thinking through undoing the familiar and 
habitual. Game design is crucial in this effort to remember to forget what has been ordered 
and structured in the immediate round before, and to forget chronology, dismissing linear 
narrative tendencies privileging accumulation and teleological ideas of progress.  
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This active forgetting goes further requiring players to temporarily forget their past, at least 
selectively. This is the challenge for game design and the strength of gaming, its capacity to 
undo the player as a historic subject and with it notions of prejudice, personal loss, even 
hatred. This can be seen in official reports by CRISP detailing the experience of the 
participants who started living “outside of [their] suit.” 
107
 The moment of the participants’ 
memory can actually only be long enough to open up to new virtual multiplicities and enable 
new futures. These memories cannot persist or dominate the game, however, as this would 
stand in the way of working towards alternative political futures. Through repeated close-
circuit gaming, players can be taken out of their personal history and personal chronology is 
collapsed with the emergence of a new system of experience and new posthuman, merely 
leaving tatters of memory. If anything, the only sense of posthuman memory during a game is 
latent as possibility coded into the game’s architecture, a form of digital memory waiting to 
be triggered and played. This awaiting, unformed digital memory (at the expense of personal 
memory) is apparent in trans- and multimedia environments of political games, which 
includes digital and analogue props in order to trigger certain memories and reactions. The 
objects are placed carefully in the same way as digital appearances are carefully designed into 
the gaming software. Often working through haptic, these props (whether digital or analogue) 
are placed strategically, not only to trigger secondary sensation, but also to disorder and 
displace personal memory.
108
 Arguably, the temporal loss of memory, at least selectively so 
that personal bias does not stand in the way of gaming dynamic, is a necessary part of the 
evacuation of the subject in order for the new subject to emerge.  
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Open-Ended-Reality Studios: Games’ Posthuman Dreaming 
Being-made and Becoming 




Gaming technology’s ability to matter images and initiate imagination through mattered-
thought/thinking-matter adds to the riches of this technology that can be cultivated more to  
open up possibilities of alternative political futures. Political games are claimed to be 
experiments with images of reality in posthuman space and time. At the intersection of 
technoscience and politics, gaming for political training or education is the “mediated capture 
and release of temporalities, force, and complex matters in order to produce affect, extra-
anthropocentric perceptual speed, and modular control.”
110
 In agreement with Bianco and his 
interpretation of the cinematic-event and other mediated digital environments, gaming is 
identified as reality-by-design, as well as reality-in-the-making.
111
 The realities created in 
each round of gaming make futures without any loyalty to the past or personal memory, and 
this is precisely their strength. Rupture in ordinary experience, personal memory and habit is 
crucial not only for EPS, but also for new temporalities and actualities to emerge out of the 
game. The affective forces of the game and the vibration of different matters at the same 
speed in the form of a reality experiment forms a new political aesthetic, one that engages 
these fast, intensive material, digital and Virtual dynamics. Indeed, political gaming 
technology is a way to critically and constructively engage with forces by designing affect 
and movement that intensify and alter energy in a system of new experience.
112
 The TPE as 
reality-by-design and –in-the-making expresses an affective aesthetic that goes beyond digital 
narratives, but fosters new conceptual and material political cartographies by offering to 
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creatively produce realities through gaming. In short, gaming folds Virtual capacity into the 
morphogenetic, charging matter with power and distributing affect, contingently and 
programmatically, across multiple topographies and temporalities.
113
 There is no single 
trajectory in this speedy productive and creative materialism. Ultimately, the application of  
Bianco’s model to the present analysis means that political games create modular, interfaced 
techno-socialities that open up slow and rigid liberal humanism (faciality) onto variable new 
subjectivities.  
 
Posthuman Imagination and Dreamtime 
Apart from the political and practical aspect of creating reality through the TPE, gaming is 
also an invitation to dreamtime and journeys of imagination. The creative material dynamism 
captures the player, providing space and time, away from daily routines and duties, and for its 
body to be captured by the unthinkable thought and the unimaginable. Fitting the posthuman 
condition, gaming for political purpose is a way to update traditional ways of reflexivity and 
problem-solving grounded in philosophical and historical inquiry, to 2.0 practices, necessities 
and specificities via digital playtime and thought-experiments. As becoming-concept event, 
game-dreams seek to bring alive unimagined theoretical as well as practical inventions and 
interventions that can live across different scales of posthuman organization, intension and 
duration. To design for and play the politically unfamiliar is an the effort to capture “the 
transient”, hidden fantasies that so far have remained “blind spots in the mind” and unthought 
scenarios beyond political habits.
114
 At the point at which the surface tension of stable bodies 
does not hold anymore, and new systems of experience emerge, posthuman imagination 
occurs, giving way to new socio-political aleatory futurities. Thus, posthuman imagination 
transduces the Virtual potential into the actual via playful encounters in the form of gaming, 
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thereby slowly integrating the unconscious, former larval non-conscious into analogue, 
conscious materiality. In this manner, games produce constellations of bodies that bear the 
capacity to think difference and that can be modulated at any point through the TPE. These 
latent futures are multiple-scaled, organismic, yet technologically rhythmic compositions of 
micro-matters, variable speed and signals that are ever evolving in volatile systems of 
experience, “summoned by the [V]irtual”.
115
 In the open-ended reality-studios of games, 
political imagination unfolds according to the rhythm and vibrations of the posthuman 
beating to the sound of war, noises of conflict, sight of injustice and injury, scenarios of 
stalemate and hostility, circulating affects of fear, grief and desperation. In almost dialectical 
nature, alternative political futures characterized by hope, political opportunity, social novelty 
and economic prosperity emerge out of the “precision of realist simulation.”
116
 It seems that it 
is precisely this juxtaposition, at the end of the human subject’s comfort zone, at which 
novelty then begins. 
 
Conclusion 
In the pursuit of mapping an ontology of reality that fits the posthuman condition, the chapter 
started by clarifying the deeply rooted confusion and equation of the digital and the Virtual 
on the one hand and reality and the actual on the other.  Furthermore, it was not only the 
intention to show that the digital and the Virtual are different things, but also that the digital 
is an intrinsic part of actuality. These are crucial steps in relation to techno-political practices; 
similarly, to argue that the digital and the analogue are both equally important and equally 
real parts of the actual brings a fresh perspective to IR debates as well. The case for the 
‘realness’ of digital phenomena was made on the grounds of simple Newtonian physics, the 
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physics of the anthropocene, which is the realm within which the digital shows its effect and 
within which games are played. The exploration in physics led to the distinction between 
force and energy movement as well as the conscious registering of their effects. The latter is 
commonly referred to as human perception and it is argued that digital phenomena are 
equally real in so far as they are the workings of force and energy. It was shown that what is 
usually referred to as reality is human sensation and perception of these force effects, but that 
these are only secondary, subjective and conscious after-images of force, energy movement 
and other plays of intensity. This initial distinction was used to draw out the materiality and 
physicality of the digital realm, to belabour the point that the digital is just as real as the 
analogue, offline realm and that therefore any claims about a hierarchy of realness – and by 
implication judgements about the impact digital technologies can have – need to be 
questioned. This clarification and claim is essential in order to fully appreciate phenomena 
like political gaming and to integrate them into daily political practice. 
 
The chapter explored the Virtual and characterised this realm by arguing that it is not inferior 
to the actual realm, but actually fundamental for the production of reality and one’s conscious 
experience of it. Not a platonic sphere of ideas, it still is an infinite pool that holds all 
particles to make up any future. These persist in an unformed state, not as fixed ideas, but as 
intensities that can form idea-problems that then can be actualised, that is transduced to the 
actual. One means of transduction is through technologies of lived abstraction like gaming. 
The fact that the digital (gaming) and the Virtual work so closely together in the way that 
digital technologies are located as transducers or abstract machines right at the gap between 
the Virtual and the actual, is why the digital and the Virtual are so often confused and why 
this needs to be stressed especially with regard to gaming technology. This implies also the 
fundamental role that games play when it comes to the emergence and actualisation of 
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alternative political futures. However, it is important to be clear that digital technologies do 
not share the Virtual’s infinity and potentiality. Instead technologies are finite and 
possibilistic. Therefore, not everything is possible with (gaming) technology, but they can 
help in transducing multiple futures faster and in different, creative ways – continuous 
playing and rebooting of a game is a case in point.  
 
Grounded in the Virtual and transduced by digital technology, gaming is still an occurrence 
of reality as a whole and therefore does not work without the analogue. Indeed it is only due 
to the ceaseless interplay between the Virtual and the actual that reality is produced, change 
occurs and gaming makes sense. Given that gaming is important for and geared at the 
conscious Erfahrung of target players, the chapter highlighted the role the analogue reception 
of the players takes. The task that gaming as a digital practice fulfils is the continuous folding 
of the Virtual and the actual through the analogue, specifically first and secondary sensation. 
It is an intrinsic connection between the Virtual and the actual in contemporary peace 
practices that opens up the realm of the Virtual so that actual political practice can be affected 
by continuous variation.  
 
The precise working of this productive continuity was explained with the Virtual/actual 
looping that repeated playing represents. Whether losing or wining, the game needs to stay in 
motion (harmony in movement) in order for change to continue. Importantly, this change has 
no teleological trajectory given that the players start from a similar, if not the same, position 
once the game resets. Yet even though they find themselves at the same coordinates, they 
enter the game as difference, with different material conditions. Repeated play was therefore 
identified as undoing memory, of slowly defamiliarising the players with their own past. This 
and the looping dynamic are, hence, seen as difference with repetition within which political 
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games are open-ended reality studios, where the TPE is reality-in-the-making. More 
specifically, this being-made and political-becoming in gaming is due to its ability to matter 
images and imagination, while working on the basis of mattered images and imaged matter at 
the same time. Consequently, gaming allows for material imagination and posthuman 




Chapter 6 ~ Infinite Erlebnispolitik for a People-Yet-to-
Come: Movement, Space and Rhythm  
 
I think that only daring speculation can lead us further and not accumulation of facts. 
Albert Einstein 
 
We can no longer afford to view games as separate from our real lives and real work. It is not 
only the waste of the potential of games to do real good – it is simply untrue. […] Games 






The present chapter seeks to draw out a posthuman political space and foundation for a 
posthuman political theory. The close analysis of political gaming, as an example of 
technology of lived abstraction, has allowed the thesis to develop substantial theorisations 
about technological-becoming in a posthuman condition. It turns attention to the idea of a 
general infant posthuman politics for a people yet to come and necessarily this is a theoretical 
outlook based on differential, abstracted experience in political games. It fits within a notion 
of an affirmative political philosophy that enables innovative ways for the study, theory and 
practice of posthuman political becoming, particularly the interaction with creative 
technology. As debates about technological determinism indicate, the fear of technology 
looms large, especially inside academia.
2
 If anything, the political space and theory 
developed here is an effort to show that viewing technology as external and as a threat to the 
human realm is ill-conceived. Instead it suggests that if analysis starts from different 
assumptions such as the posthuman, this will allow for a novel and inventive engagement not 
only with technology, but also the political and alternative political subjectivity. Therefore, 
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undoing and redoing Human Computer Interaction (HCI) along posthuman and speculative 
lines not only paints an entirely different ontological landscape that greatly impacts upon the 
way academia studies the role of new technology (NT) in IR, but also enables genuinely new 
political spaces, temporalities and practices to emerge.  
 
Erlebnispolitik (politics of lived experience) is the name that captures this posthuman politics 
(based on the reconceptualization of gaming) because this politics rests on lived experience, 
Erlebnis (in the game). In addition, this term highlights the importance of a life in experience, 
technologies of lived abstraction and politics alike, given that it contains the root of the 
German word for life (Leben). Developing this micro-posthuman politics is necessary 
because, after having undone stable notions of the human, phenomenological experience, the 
subject-as-is, political subjectivity and, last but not least, reality it is impossible to draw on 
any existing conceptions of politics. These concepts are fundamentally marked by the human 
condition and only work within these parameters. While a new political conceptualisation as 
suggested by this research are initial efforts and tied to the relatively small scope of gaming, 
it is nonetheless argued that the development of materialist Erlebnispolitik can offer more 
leverage when it comes to social change that is not in reference to or caused by the human 
subject. As such, it is joining existing attempts that have been made by philosophers such as 
John Dewey, Louis Althusser and Bruno Latour to draw out a politics of the molecular and 
the more-than-human. However, in contradistinction to these efforts, and expressed through 
the technoscientific commitment to the material and concrete, it is also argued that there is 
much more at stake than just ontological clarification. This is because it is argued that the 
problem lies precisely in the fact that it is not a case of either/or (either human or posthuman). 
Nor is it a question of a politics for things as different from a politics for humans. Instead, the 
challenge is to cater for both: a politics that works for the posthuman condition but is 
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connected to the human nonetheless. After all, the category of the human is the conscious 
realm where judgement happens. In short, Erlebnispolitik is a continuous looping between a 
posthuman and human condition.
3
 However, in order to get to a point from which 
Erlebnispolitik can be articulated, the analysis of a posthuman people has to overcome 
practical issues: of a posthuman political space that is non-representational; and a modality of 
this space that is differential so that it allows for expression and change. The question of how 
these efforts can be structured needs to be considered in order to allow for untamed openness 
of the political, yet at the same time both of analytical and practical value in the everyday.  
 
The crucial question concerns that of integration. In the political realm games are one way to 
incorporate posthuman practices into peace operations and security practices. Yet, this 
integration is impaired and cannot be lived to the fullest given that the philosophical and 
theoretical integration is still missing, which is due to unhelpfully strict adherence to 
categories of technology and the human. Integration therefore needs to outline the strange 
horizons that political gaming can offer.
4
 Despite the structured and organised articulation of 
a posthuman politics, this is by no means intended to put a rigid theoretical architecture in 
place. Instead Erlebnispolitik aims to provide a working model for the study and experience 
of techno-political becoming. In the pursuit of developing this model the chapter will first 
upgrade the thesis’ conception of game space to a political level, which is essential given that 
game space in the present context is the realm of posthuman politics. This political space will 
be theorised as gaming biograms or the expanding and contracting movement of the 
posthuman but as micro-political dynamics. Furthermore, based on the argument that 
posthuman gaming opens up multiple other dimensions, it is imperative to rearticulate 
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political space to include n dimensions and thus more room for political practice and 
manoeuvre.  
 
This posthuman political space is where Erlebnispolitik unfolds and the chapter will continue 
characterising it by teasing out its fundamental pillars, namely desire, utopian impulse and 
rapid capture/at-tension. It will combine these concepts in the form of a working model and 
an active foundation of Erlebnispolitik for the political practice of a posthuman people yet to 
come. After an outline of change and variation on biograms and an Erlebnispolitik that can be 
situated on/in this biogram, the chapter will proceed to highlight concrete manifestations of 
this politics through the analysis of gaming movement. The latter will not only provide a lens 
of analysis, but it will also be identified as a principle posthuman way of political expression, 
thought and participation in general. The example of motion analysis will show that new 
high-tech practices call to re-evaluate the human, but that these offer new ways of evaluation 
in themselves. This is important as gaming as a form of posthuman pedagogy necessarily 
implies a new articulation of posthuman analytic as well as methodological tools.  
 
The close analysis of motion and movement will lead the chapter to draw a political 
posthuman portrait of lived experience and lived abstraction based on the rhythm of 
posthuman gaming movement. This section deals with Erlebnispolitik depending upon the 
tension between theoretical and tempo-spatial abstraction on the one hand and immediate and 
concrete gaming experience on the other. The ensuing argument will show that gaming’s 
dynamic of lived abstraction is crucial in undoing facial subjectivities as well as reversing 




“Strange Horizon:” Self-Variation Continued
5
  
Erlebnispolitik is unique in the way that it is a highly localized and specialized form of 
politics that hinges upon a very short time frame and relatively small game space. Building 
on the theme of continuation and change (continued change), this section will further theorise 
game space in terms of variation that allows for political change. Two main themes are 
important for this task: experience and movement. Political gaming is a movement-
experience and while experience is important for the emergence of the new,
6
 movement is 
crucial to establish space.
7
 The coming together of various intensities into one attractor field 
to form the posthuman through a complex process of individuation was thought of as vectors 
that intersect on the plane of immanence. However, given the posthuman dimension of 
experience, a two or three-dimensional diagram would not suffice to represent this space. For 
a game space conception to fit a posthuman condition, change and the primacy of pre-
subjective, non-personal experience needs to reflect this lived and dynamic aspect of the 
gaming event. Therefore, the space that political games generate is conceptualized as 
biograms.
8
 A biogram is a space that emerges with mattering dynamics and self-organising 
bodies; it does not exist prior to posthuman bodies. In view of this, it is helpful to think of a 
biogram as a spatial event that is inseparable from the posthuman body, which is an event 
too. In this way the biogram reflects that the divide between the category of technology and 
human (usually referred to with dichotomies of organic/nonorganic, living/nonliving, 
human/nonhuman, natural/unnatural) is undone. For this reason the “bio” refers to the gaming 
technology as much as it does to the player. It is important that the whole game space is not 
perceived as any less natural than other spaces, neither is it any less real.
9
 Inversely, space is 
technological at the same time that the players, whose becoming, short and long-term, has 
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been influenced and shaped by technology are technological.
10
 Game space is essentially 
hybrid. 
 
Furthermore, the hybridity of the game space leads the research to suggest that the biogram as 
a spatial situation or event collapses the boundaries between internal, external, public and 
private space. This works on two levels. First, there is no physiological boundary between the 
players that correlates with the perceivable skin and conscious representation of a human 
body during the game.
11
 The only boundaries emerge along intensive difference and are ever-
shifting. These are imperceptible to the conscious eye and on a conscious level the 
boundaries between players is collapsed too. To be precise, personal and private space can be 
seen as subjective constructs. The minute the subject is evacuated, becomes undone and 
redone due to flow experience, subjectivised conceptions of internal and external space fall 
away as well. This results in a game space without fixed (human and social) boundaries, 
which is extremely helpful for the dynamic of the game. The only borders of ‘identity’ that 
exist in the course of the game are the ones suggested by the game design, which asks the 
players to enact certain roles. However, these role-boundaries are already part of the game 
space due to software coding and not an obstacle to the game dynamic as older, personalised, 
subjective limits would be. Furthermore, these roles have no fixed boundaries either, only 
preliminary indicators that leave the development and performance of the character open, so 
that their actions and reactions are up to the players and the dynamic of the game. 
Nevertheless, this is not to say that the player is completely dominated by game design, space 
and its dynamic. Given the Doppler-contingency, the players’ creative response to their roles 
and task is equally contributing to the biogram.
12
 Therefore, a biogram is a conception that 
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primarily allows for creative movement in the game, which, due to the analogue response of 
the players, removes limits and restrictions that existed prior to the game. 
 
Furthermore, in view that the posthuman body is inseparable from “lived abstractness,” it 
cannot be understood in any other way than in topological terms,
13
 which necessitates a body 
space that is abstract and allows for a conceptualisation of topological figures and 
transformation. The biogram is precisely this topological and abstract body space of the 
posthuman. The posthuman is a mattering process based on the encounter of different 
intensities that form relations based on desire and as such, it is in constant movement (of 
matter) and therefore needs to be conceptualised in a body space that is equally mobile. In 
mathematical terms, the biogram needs to be “non-Euclidean” which is a ‘temporal’ space as 
it were, one “that cannot be separated from its duration due to a transitional excess of 
movement.”
14
 In light of the fact that the biogram is dependent on movement, it arises from 
the position of the posthuman and is neither prior nor exterior to it.
15
 This is why the biogram 
is also argued to be a suitable spatial construct for newly emerging systems of experience as 
these equally depend on mattering and movement. In this sense, the biogram is the necessary 




The creative strength of this spatial conception is due to the fact that it allows for topological 
movement and transforming mobile metric bodies. Building on the argument that gaming can 
be thought of as producing/differenciating actuality by means of topological transformation, 
the posthuman itself can be thought of as topological movement. That is, as a moving entity 
that can change into other forms without having to change in its composition and content. To 
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speak of topological movement and dynamics is nothing new in Movement Studies, where 
space is seen as the volume that results out of the field of relations by connecting the points 
of the outreaching body.
17
 The only difference here is that it is the outreaching posthuman 
that constitutes this movement-space. Labanian movement theories relate directly to this 
chapter and the thesis more broadly as these are interested in showing how inner, personal 
space folds into the outside, which closely aligns with the idea of posthuman emergence.
18
 
Furthermore, the factor of rhythm and vibration have been identified as crucial aspects in the 
way the posthuman moves. Laban takes the same interest by incorporating intensive elements 
such as light and sound into his conception of harmonic movement space of the body.
19
 Not 
quite undoing the boundaries between the aforementioned dichotomies he still seeks a space 
that goes beyond the conceptual limits of the traditional kinesphere of the moving body by 
finding movement properties in any form, organic or inorganic.
20
 The posthuman’s 
movement space leaves behind precisely these conventional limits and in doing so opens up a 
(new way of seeing) space.  
 
Every Game Has a Silver Lining: Movement and Regenerating Possibilities for Change 
To conceptualise game space politically matters for two reasons. First, political games 
viewed from a posthuman condition are an access to more space that exceeds conscious 
dimensions that can be explored for political purposes. Second, this space is creative because 
it has the capacity for transition and continual variation.
21
 This is because the relational net-
space between the points of the outreaching posthuman can be conceived of as a metric space 
that is argued to be able to undergo topological transformation. To be precise, this space is a 
                                                          
17
 Rudolf von Laban. Choreutics (London: Macdonald & Evans, 1966), 10; Nicolas Salazar Sutil, “Rudolf 
Laban and Topological Movement: A Videographic Analysis,” Space and Culture 16, no. 2 (2013): 174. 
18
 Salazar Sutil, “Rudolf Laban and Topological Movement.” 
19
 See expansion in Chapter 3; Salazar Sutil, “Rudolf Laban and Topological Movement,” 175. 
20
 Kinesphere was conceptualized by Laban himself who defined it as the “space which can be reached by easily 
extending limbs,” it is often referred to as “zone of reach;” Laban, Choreutics, 60. 
21
 Salazar Sutil, “Rudolf Laban and Topological Movement,” 180. 
273 
 
metric figure according to Riemannian geometry, which in the most basic terms is a metric 
composed not of flat surfaces, as in normal geometry, but of manifolds and sub-manifolds 
that are curved, twisted and folded.
22
 Bernhard Riemann, a former student of Carl Friedrich 
Gauss, developed a geometry for non-Euclidean space, so that it can be performed on curved 
surfaces.
23
 The images below are examples of Riemannian metrics and the posthuman 
movement space inspired by Laban’s movement theories is argued to look similar to the 
depictions.  
  
               
24
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To picture this further, various participants geographically come together in the space and 
time of a game, the points of their outreaching limbs, technological objects in the immediate 
gaming environment and other gaming equipment are all points of the outreaching 
posthuman. One snapshot capturing the posthuman movement where all these points are 
connected would then generate a metric figure as depicted in the images above. With 
movement these points change their position so that the metric figure changes. However, 
given that the body of the posthuman has not changed in its composition, but only in its form, 
turns the posthuman’s movement into topological transformation. To be precise, the 
posthuman’s metric movement space is a topological manifold that can have n dimensions. 
Seeing movement in this way makes it possible to conceive of n possibilities of change and 
continuation. This does not mean that this space always does change ad infinitum, but that it 
has the potential to do so. Recognizing this potential that topological metrics (and crystalline 
forms) allow for is important because it makes visible possibilities for change visible, 
development and learning where others do not. This is because the metric posthuman can 
generate n topological solutions merely by variation, rather than having to rely on external 
vectors (additions in the form of other intensities) to seek out alternatives. In other words, 
gaming situations that may be deemed a dead-end in a human condition in which the 
‘subject-as-is’ is taken to be the main agent are not in a biogram view. In essence, there is 
already an implied multiplicity within the posthuman in the form of a Virtual topological 
solution that can always give rise to new shapes and new dynamics. This is a crucial feature 
of this political space as it enables Erlebnispolitik to remain open to transformation and the 
new. Stressing topological movement as political space in this way means emphasising that 
there is always possibility to ‘move on’, which implies a logic of continuation and change. 
More specifically, the posthuman during gaming is generally high in tension (at-tension even) 
due to the multiple, varying intensities that are brought to the game. This may be due to the 
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players’ analogue reception of the gaming software, which are their different thoughts carried 
into the game or initial tensions and intensions between participants. These are 
dynamospheric tensions and actions that drive the production of reality. This means that 
game development (essentially motion and movement) that may have moved in an 
unfavourable direction (metric figure) has always another form it can change into as long as 
tensions translate into movement, so that unsuitable game choices do not have to mean stasis. 
Laban identifies emotions, psychological and corporeal factors as the driver of such 
movement. Yet in the posthuman view of this thesis these are all affects in one form or 
another. Thus, building on and adjusting Laban’s kinespheric model, where spatial movement 
is driven by subjective emotions, this suggests that topological transformative movement is 
affective. Therefore, affective tensions are not only the building blocks of matter, scientific 
theories of growth and crystalline formation of the posthuman, but also fuel specific moves in 
the game. Looking at the continuity of the posthuman’s movement space, where the initial 
starting point is that of Laban’s kinespheric space conceived through topological metrics, aids 
this research by highlighting the movement that a posthuman body is capable of and the 
potential of change that this implies. The latter is what makes gaming and its spatial event 
political. In short, gaming opens up potential space of political action or Erlebnispolitik. 
 
Sketching Erlebnispolitik 
The strength of Erlebnispolitik, as witnessed in gaming, is that it acknowledges and fosters 
the Virtual origins of political life, and, thereby, enables the politically new. In contrast to 
most political conceptions (which are set on the Aristotelian idea of a polis of actual 
communities and that have a particular size and material existence already) Erlebnispolitik 
starts on a much lower and unformed level. The concept of the political even in writings by 
the New Left, post-structuralists and feminists/queer theorists start in the actual. Although 
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these works go down in scale, the type of politics that each suggest does not go below the 
individual neither do these attribute political leverage to the Virtual. There are some efforts 
that go above, below and beyond the subject, such as Protevi’s Political Affect. However, 
these do not go below the human body, but only the procedural subject. Similarly, recent 
research in security studies follows experience all the way down to personal, singular, 
ineffable experience of an individual or goes beyond the subject-as-is to include the more-
than-human towards a worldly conception of security; yet these efforts still remain either at 
the level of the subject or in the actual realm.
25
 While there are philosophical models like 
Louis Althusser’s “aleatory materialism,” often referred to as “materialism of the encounter,” 
and an increasing number of work by Speculative Materialists and Realists such as DeLanda, 
Protevi or Connolly that draw out the molecular origins of the political, these efforts are still 
quite rare and criticised for drawing too much on abstraction and the natural sciences. 
However, gaming’s capacity of abstraction can have considerable theoretical purchase with 
regard to political existence given that abstraction can be lived – in the present case as gaming 
experience. Furthermore, going below the subject and the human body is the only way 
leading to the politically new.  
 
Erlebnispolitik as a new political engagement is different from post-structural efforts towards 
new politics. Post-structuralism in and outside IR sought a critical and post-metaphysical 
politics.
26
 Of course, such endeavours cannot be summed up in one homogenous effort. Yet, 
important pillars for the post-modern project, such as Jacques Derrida’s Spectres of Marx or 
Michel Foucault’s The Order of Things converge over several aspects. In broad strokes, these 
crucial figures problematize the difficulty of becoming the post-metaphysical subject that has 
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no law other than the law he/she must give him/herself, yet they seem to accept the aim of 
Kantian politics of “freeing the polity from concepts of human nature from which positive 
norms may follow.”
27
 In suggesting that the human is no longer the privileged being that due 
to reason can order the world and dominate nature, they propose that humans are actually just 
part of an evolving process. The new logic that post-structuralists proposed was that language, 
for example, was not taken to be representative of prior order and reason anymore, but rather 
a way to create order in the first place.
28
 Language and power would recurrently take centre-
stage in the post-structural project, along with deep criticism of “truth” and “knowledge”. Not 
to dismiss these efforts or minimize their crucial role in the development of intellectual 
history in any way, the arguments and assumptions put forward all extend an anthropocentric 
enterprise (implicitly or explicitly) by starting with the human. Taking the example of 
language as a structuring process that yields power, deconstructivist politics seek to undo such 
systems of power that are based on discursive practices and then go on to suggest alternative 
ones. Yet, the problem is that deconstruction only goes as low as the subject and remains in 
the realm of the actual. Furthermore, the very concept of power also only operates in the 
realm of subjects. For this reason, Deleuze and Guattari took a few steps back, going beyond 
and below the subject by speaking of desire rather than Foucaultian power. Based on the 
argument that desire is taking to be the drive of a body to produce relations toward what is not 
itself, means that it is, therefore, also the genesis of systems (one should note the ethical 
component that is thereby attributed to desire).
29
 As simple as it seems, this was a crucial step 
as it changed the whole approach and focus; it was not about deconstructing systems 
anymore, but about the genesis of them. Accordingly, in setting out to create entirely new 
political beings and political-becomings in the present research, speculative Erlebnispolitik 
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starts at a very different point and from quite different assumptions than recent post-structural 
approaches.  
 
Gaming as the basis of Erlebnispolitik is, therefore, right at the heart of this political process. 
Erlebnispolitik can be structured and illustrated with the conceptual aid of double-articulation. 
Double articulation refers to the formation of geological, biological and even social strata. To 
be precise, the first articulation always concerns the selection of materials out of which a 
stratum will be synthesised; that is the material an object selects in its self-production or 
organization.
30
 Through this articulation the materials will also get their statistical ordering. In 
a second step, articulation involves expression, which refers to abilities and qualities that the 
new, larger scale object comes to embody. This does not refer to linguistic expression, but 
material expressvitiy such as colour, texture, movement, sound, geometrical forms and other 
qualities through which geological and meteorological entities can express themselves.
31
 
DeLanda’s account simplifies this: 
 
The synthesis of sedimentary rock proceeds by the sorting out of pebbles of 
different size and composition, an operation performed by rivers that transport 
and deposit the raw materials at the bottom of the ocean. The loose 
accumulations are then cemented together and transformed into layers of 
sedimentary rock, that is, of an entity with emergent properties not present in the 
component pebbles. Then at a different scale, many of these emergent rocks 
accumulate on top of one another and are then folded by the clash of tectonic 
plates to produce a new emergent entity: a folded mountain range like the 
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Himalayas or the Rocky Mountains… What really matters is not to confuse the 
two articulations with the distinction between form and substance, since each 
articulation operates through form and substance: the first selects only some 
materials, out of a wider set of possibilities, and gives them a statistical form; the 
second gives these loosely ordered materials a more stable form and produces a 
new, larger scale material entity… the first articulation is called 
“territorialization” and concerns formed materiality, the second one “coding” 




The present argument is that emergence of posthuman bodies, as outlined with the example of 
gaming, is captured by double-articulation as well. The first articulation describes the self-
emerging process of the posthuman through experience, the second articulation that of a 
larger socio-political strata, which was referred to as the emerging posthuman subjectivity 
(EPS) that results in a larger scale of bodies politic. Through experience materials are 
selected, which are intensities from the gaming software, participants and objects from the 
immediate environment to form attractor layouts.  
 
In contrast to structuralist, modernist and post-structuralist conceptions of the political, the 
claim and difference here is that materialist Erlebnispolitik begins with the first articulation 
not only with the second. This is not to suggest that these other accounts are not interested in 
formative processes, but rather that the conception of the political always hinges upon the 
latter articulation; to be precise, the very end stage of the second articulation when a subject 
has already been formed and reached consciousness. This creates a problem for politics of 
change, however, because it has no conceptual room for the claim that all entities that 
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populate the world, from mountain ranges and buildings to bodies and institutions, “come into 
being through specific temporal processes that affect both their materiality and their (non-
linguistic) expressivity.”
33
 Significantly, this means that all identities are historical, referring 
to geological, biological or cosmological history rather than human history. Accordingly, all 
entities can be subject to mind-independent change because their very materiality and 
expressivity can be subject to destabilizing processes at any point.
34
 Applied to this project it 
means that deterritorialization and decoding can happen at any point. Agreeing with DeLanda 
and more general materialist claims, this is absolutely crucial for politics as this historicity 
implies that social change is at stake. Trying to effect change by looking at the after-image, 
(the ephemeral, phenomenal world) is not enough and leaves interventions ineffective. The 
problem is that a great deal of post-structuralist political efforts in the form of social justice 
movements have become what DeLanda calls “linguistic idealists,” who stopped drawing a 
distinction between what materially exists and what is mere discourse.
35
 However, it is 
politically impossible to effect any real social change, if the modality of one’s target of 
change is unclear and by only looking at the phenomenological experience of discursive 
practices.
36
 There is a political danger and risk in dismissing materialism on the basis of 
scientific suspicion, while at the same time trying to change what are merely reified 
generalities, such as Power, Resistance, Capital and Labour.
37
 It is precisely this point where a 
technoscientific account of gaming that is committed to the concrete and material is argued to 
fit in and able to affect difference.  
 
The analysis of and engagement with technology used for politics is where a new materialist 
approach for gaming can make a difference. Paying attention to pre-subjective experience 
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enables a technopolitics that is not framed within ideas of determinism or alienation, which is 
common to IR notions of technology. The political framework needed and generated here 
moves away from implied structures of power within existing understandings of politics by 
assuming nothing but matter movement. Political conceptions based on the human subject 
attached to notions of agency, citizen, sovereignty, or even labour and alienation imply an 
existing natural, essential human condition in the first place.
38
 Again, this is problematic in its 
own right, especially when it comes to the interaction between what is supposedly ‘human’ 
and ‘technology’ and a political sphere that is increasingly marked by their fusion. This 
requires a new political view that focuses on various scales, most importantly pre-subjective 
ones, which “is where philosophers can one day make a difference.”
39
 Gaming as a case of 
Erlebnispolitik is indeed one form this difference can take.  
 
In the way that thought, experience and an emerging body has its onto-material grounding in 
molecular and sub-atomic matter movements, an alternative political conception, a posthuman 
politics, has to start with immanent, molecular and micrological conditions of interactive, pre-
subjective and pre-conscious change as well. Given that the chances for territorialisation in 
the current political landscape are fairly limited, with only deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization being an available feasible option, technologies of lived abstraction and 
their capacity to compose-away are therefore all the more important. Assuming that it is not 
possible to start from ex nihilo, or the Althusserian void, the analysis has to look at what 
drives deterritorialization. It was established that Virtual differing intensities can create idea-
problems that can become actualized as an event. The question that remains asks about the 
essential driver for, first, deterritorialization and then reterritorialization. It is important to 
clarify at this point that this is not a question of active or conscious resistance. It is not the 
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human that can initiate this on its own terms; it will only ever be a residual product of a 
politics, not the origin. In the pursuit of Erlebnispolitik, it is essential to think of socio-
political change other than in terms of resisting power. While power structures are an effect of 
the second articulation, Erlebnispolitik precedes the second articulation. Therefore, power and 
its structuring effects of socio-political fields cannot be the only force that influences 
movements in social, political and economic interactions.  
 
Erlebnispolitik without Power but with Desire  
The crucial difference between a theory of change articulated within the parameters of 
posthuman politics and other forms of politics is that it does not rest upon resistance or the 
existence of an opposition for that matter. This difference goes all the way back to desiring-
production that does not only depend on affect, but that is the driving force of the new, not 
resistance. A further essential factor in this difference between ‘resistance for change’ and 
‘desire that changes’ is that the term desire signifies a fundamentally different creative force 
in contradistinction to its common, everyday use. This creative quality is crucial in order to 
extrapolate what drives onto-material processes of political formation (Erlebnispolitik) given 
that this drive is not placed within an agency, structure or power. Instead, based on a 
Deleuzoguattarian view, desire is argued to be the drive that arranges the socio-political field 
and action. The treatment of desire as driving political force and as theoretically celebrated 
through desiring-production goes back to Deleuze and Guattari’s treatment of Foucault’s 
work and is, thus, a backdrop against the linguistic and theoretical placement of desire within 
academic discourse of sexuality and morality as seen in Foucault’s History of Sexuality for 
example.
40
 The problem is that, for Foucault, desire flows from discourses of Power, whereas 
for Deleuze and Guattari it seems to be that desire actually takes centre stage in the realm of 
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Erlebnispolitik in the way that it is a primary force in the first articulation: “it is not the 
dispositifs of [P]ower that assemble, nor would they be constitutive; it is rather the 
agencements (assemblages) of desire that would spread throughout the formations of 
[P]ower…[P]ower is an affection of desire.”
41
 This is important as it not only increases 
insight into agency and resistance as argued by Bignall,
42
 but also into primary movements in 
Erlebnispolitik, because desire affects the quality of power relations, thus, political relations, 
and not the other way around. 
 
The discussion of desire and the desiring-machine is not referring to a process motivated by 
dissatisfaction and acquisition. Whereas the traditional logic of desire in Western philosophy 
has always associated desire with a perceived lack of something, dating back as far as Plato
43
, 
to Descartes and all the way through to Marx, Freud and Lacan, just to mention a few,
44
 there 
are alternative philosophical treatments of desire that “focus on the motivational force 
[…and] as productive,” as found in the work of Spinoza, Kant, Nietzsche, Deleuze and 
Guattari. This thesis argues that the affirmative treatment of desire is important to understand 
the affirmative nature of Erlebnispolitik. The problem is that in linking desire with 
acquisition “makes desire an idealistic (dialectical, nihilistic) conception,”
45
 which in turn 
means that the ontology of every being and object that does the desiring is necessarily that of 
an “essence of lack” and “associated by needs,” thus, subjectivity is always lacking 
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 The upshot of this is that desire is a process of “passive syntheses” of “partial” 
beings.
47
 However, such a conception is detrimental to the articulation and practice of 
productive politics, because it is a regressive as well as idealist dynamic. Agreeing with the 
theoretical work that overcomes the negativity attached to desire, the underlying idea here is 
then desire is enabling, affirmative and, thus, should be seen as a positive force in a new 
politics.  
 
Reality is therefore actually produced by desire,
48
 which means that desire is the political 
concept for what has been referred to as the gradient between intensities that produces reality. 
The term desire is therefore a political appropriation that helps to characterise Erlebnispolitik. 
Desire is an essential starting point for Erlebnispolitik in the way that every material 
production underlying the smallest and simplest forms of life, the social and the political, is a 
form of desiring-production. Significant in another aspect, this also means that desire is pre-
subjective so that Erlebnispolitik is not generated out of an idealist notion towards unity, or 
sense of whole and fixed identity.
49
 This gives the desiring-production of Erlebnispolitik 
considerable leverage for change, because it is not a result of vested, subjective interest. 
Importantly, this is not to be confused with political dynamics and formations at the level of 
social movements, for example, and their perceived ‘desire’ for change and according 
resistance to the status quo. This is not what is meant here by desire and change; neither can 
perceived, conscious desire be deemed the origin of emerging relations. The act of resistance 
and what retrospectively may be interpreted as emerging out of ‘desire’ happens at a 
conscious level that is far removed from the first articulation where Erlebnispolitik takes 
shape. Instead the primacy of desire turns Erlebnispolitik into an associative process of 
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connecting varying bodies to create new forms of political existence. It is only at a later stage 
of a continuous feedback motion of desire, which spirals through various scales, when it can 
produce and affect associations on the level of a body politic, such as social organisations or 
institutions which are all material developments. Therefore, desire is not only immanent in 
the process of production in Erlebnispolitik, but it is also the “abstract cause of all order” that 




An Erlebnispolitik developed through gaming highlights that desire is the ‘glue’ of diachronic 
and synchronic posthuman bodies, socio-political relations and organizational formations that 
gaming produces. The elements that will come to compose this politics in the process of the 
first articulation are scattered throughout the game design and software, the associative 
bodies of the participants and the local game-space. Desire is important because one of 
Erlebnispolitik’s defining characteristics is that it is volatile and subject to change, defying 
form and content. Once the posthuman emerges it does not automatically stay in this shape, 
but constantly has to be produced. What is an important attribute that allows for 
transformation always to be possible at the same time complicates that moments of 
subjectivity can last. The possibility of change thus comes with indeterminacy. It is only at a 
larger scale of a body politic where subjectivities become more solidified in the form of 
institutions, new practices or policies, for example. The way leading up to this scale is shaky, 
however. The game might not be a significantly different experience so that the posthuman 
only ever witnesses moments of subjectivity that subside once its gaming body disperses after 
the game has stopped.
51
 In short, Erlebnispolitik depends on a constant productive dynamic in 
order to influence larger political subjectivities and formations in the long run. Therefore, the 
elements that come to compose the posthuman are kept in relation with each other through 
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desire, because the latter is “directed primarily at the proliferation of desire. Desire aims to 
produce: this production is itself the process of desire.”
52
 Desire creates more desire and 
thereby ensures a constant production which enables a process of association. This is the very 
dynamic of Erlebnispolitik, which fundamentally depends on desiring-production.  
 
Therefore, desire is the immanent force of Erlebnispolitik, which initiates any material 
production that happens during, and that comes out of, gaming. This is why games are 
“desiring-machines,” functioning to synthesise various elements to create political 
momentum and can affect, if not co-constitute, socio-political organization and practice.
53
 
Importantly, this fusing together does not happen according to any preconceived ideal. It is 
not a case of form following function, in the way that “biological formations and social 
formations are not formed in the same way in which they function.”
54
 In fact, in 
Erlebnispolitik “use, functioning, production, and formation are one and the same process” 
and it is only desire that gives these micrological bodies their tempo-specific use in a bio-
socio-political field. Yet, desire does not represent anything in this case given that is not 
desire as in longing for something, it is merely a drive.
55
 The function of larger assemblages 
such as institutional practices are welded at the level of Erlebnispolitik, where flows of 
energy organise “inclusive disjunctions,” thereby distributing states of becoming and 
aggregate beings in “zones of intensities”.
56
 This is why desire is a particular quality of force 
that generates bodies and characterises relations between them. This qualitative nature of 
desire is in contrast to the quantitative force of power that occurs at the solidified level of 
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already relational bodies and the political force that they exercise upon each other.
57
 Thus, 
desire in Erlebnispolitik is invaluable because it not only disposes political practices and 
interactions, but also highlights that political formations and practices are never fixed and 
given, but always depend on a continuous process of relational production.
58
 This is why 
power alone cannot account for movement and connections in socio-political interactions. 
Apart from desire there are two more characteristics of Erlebnispolitik that describe how 
gaming as a socio-political practice has the pre-subjective inventive and creative capacity to 
transform different, even conflicting behaviour into new political assemblages. Importantly, 
even though Erlebnispolitik shapes up at the pre-subjective level of the first articulation, this 
does not mean that its scope of operation is restricted to this level and that it would be a 
“politics in miniature, nor a single [body] in contrast to a whole,” but instead it is a 
multiplicity of flows that spreads across various scales of bodies politics.
59
 Krause and Rölli 
draw out the contours of micropolitical associations, and their work will be used to identify 
further characteristics of immanent political formations such as Erlebnispolitik in gaming.  
 
Utopia and Erlebnispolitik  
The new political space in the form of Erlebnispolitik fundamentally depends upon the 
utopian impulse, which means that Erlebnispolitik only emerges in virtue of an affirmative 
philosophical take. And it is only through proposing utopian ideas with regard to gaming 
(that is, ideas that are forward looking, imaginative and speculative) that its inherent 
philosophy can become political and, thus, subject to criticism in its own time. The 
interesting aspect of utopian reterritorialization in gaming is that it does not split off from the 
infinite (Virtual), but is nonetheless grounded in a very specific gaming context that speaks to 
immediate political applications (this is because gaming has the capacity of abstraction). 
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Deleuze and Guattari adopt Samuel Butler’s terms of Erewhon for this utopian condition, 
which refers to “no-where” and “now-here.”
60
 It is like a sub-molecular particle that cannot 
be captured because it is here and there at the same time (both abstract and concrete). The 
utopia of immanence in gaming is important because it is the conjunction of a gaming-
specific philosophy and emerging concepts with contextual, political need.
61
 Unfortunately, 
the term utopia has suffered somewhat bad press, especially in the second half of the 
twentieth century. However, this should not distract from its theoretical purchase. 
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the utopian impulse here does not refer to a 
historically situated and lodged ideal striving towards ‘perfection’, the better place. It is 
merely used to describe the connection between the philosophical and the political through 
the realisation of change; not through revolution, but through the pre-subjective emergence of 
the new.
62
 Whereas becoming designates this drive on a pre-subjective level, the term utopia 
is more encompassing of larger scales so that it is applicable and intrinsic to Erlebnispolitik. 
Furthermore, in order to tease out the development from imagination and dreamtime in 
gaming to Erlebnispolitik, the utopian impulse is essential in highlighting the extra step 
towards a politics, rather than just a force in the game. It is therefore an important step 
towards Erlebnispolitik and a fundamental pillar of it. 
 
Politics of Rapid Capture 
Erlebnispolitik has the unique character of rapid capture – that is captivation in gaming – 
which makes it such a rich experience and a particularly timely mode of politics. In fact, 
rapid capture describes many aspects of Erlebnispolitik. First of all, it is the immediate, 
interactive Erlebnis in gaming that captures the posthuman’s attention quickly, similar to the 
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way in which a piece of art captures the viewer’s attention more quickly than reading the 
commentary on that particular piece of art would. Importantly and second, capture is open-
ended because the viewing of an art work does not impose a meaning onto the viewer, while 
the commentary does. In other words, the strength of Erlebnispolitik is that of content 
through the encounter rather than a top-down approach of passing on content.
63
 Third, this 
capture necessarily implies affective materiality, so that forces are caught up in the encounter 
and are readily available to be transformed into something else. For example, not only 
changing bodies or subjectivities are, thus, a political moment, but the captivation and at-
tension prior to their formation is already as well. Fourth, forces being readily available is 
crucial because Erlebnis can be immediately used for civic bodies politics, in the form of 
Erfahrung (memorable experience). Indeed this is crucial as lines of flight that can give rise 
to new moments of subjectivity and Erlebnis in the game come only to full fruition if they 
enter and reshuffle the organizational levels of the civic.
64
 Lines of flight shape a society, yet, 
these lines are molecular, pertaining to the workings of Erlebnispolitik.
65
 But whenever there 
is a “segmented line [of flight], we notice that it continues in another form, as a quantum 
flow”.
66
 While there is reason to believe that Deleuze and Guattari mean quantum in a 
metaphorical sense, in order to explain that with each line there is a gravitational, 
electromagnetic centre that holds together a particular domain, this metaphorical use 
nonetheless portrays nicely that the gaming Erlebnis is a gravitational core of a somatic 
bodies politic and that these energies (quanta) can quickly catch on to larger formations at the 
civic level. The reason they can is due to gaming’s distinct aspect of being able to transduce 
from the Virtual to the actual more quickly, which facilitates not only the production of 
moments of subjectivity, but also assists in extending  these moments beyond the game, 
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creating more stable subjectivities. To capture a civic body politic rapidly is possible because 
the learning experience in the game is affectively more highly charged than analogue 
processes that work at a slower transducing pace. What leads Paul Virilio and Sylvère 
Lotringer to articulate a rather dystopian view and intellectual tradition of technology, due to 
its capacity to produce speed as well as speed as its modus operandi,
67
 is used here precisely 
to the contrary. Gaming technology captures and it captures quickly, putting emphasis on the 
speed of the event in Erlebnispolitik. Ultimately, rapid capture characterizes and is intrinsic 
to Erlebnispolitik in many ways, highlighting that this is a fluid politics, based on relatively 
short and quick gaming rounds, and as such only comes to be more stable and solid when it 
slows down. Finally, Erlebnispolitik is characteristic of desire, utopia and rapid capture. 
 
Turning to the differential structure of Erlebnispolitik shows that its logic of association 
escapes the mode of representation. This is not only because the form of politics is pre-
subjective with one foot always in the Virtual, but also because its structure is not that of 
actual connections of sense data, but rather that of Virtual chains or multiplicities of 
singularities. Furthermore, the utopian pillar influences the structure to be non-identical and 
extraordinary. They simply cannot be compared to the structures of everyday politics. The 
crucial difference is that the contrast between the abstract, immaterial and the concrete, 
material does not apply to Erlebnispolitik. Even though Erlebnispolitik can be abstracted, it 
still arises out of the gaming event and, thus, it is material and immaterial, even organic and 
inorganic, at the same time – that is the posthuman through lived abstraction. Erlebnispolitik 
is an abstract-organic mix that “is inorganic, yet alive, and all the more alive for being 
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 It is apparent that a dualist, representationalist thinking does not further the 
understanding of pre-subjective politics, as one has to think what is deemed contradictory, in 
the way that Erlebnispolitik’s structures are ““mechanical” relations [raised] to the level of 
intuition”.
69
 Mechanical refers to two things here: first, these relations are automatic, as in 
happening without thought; second, there is smoothness of the physical forces of motion and 
movement. Both aspects of “mechanical” facilitate the differential structure of 
Erlebnispolitik.  In a further step then, it is best thought of as an abstract organism with 
structures that consist of lines of vibration with impulses traversing it; a germinal, intensive 
grid that operates on speed that contrasts the slowness and heaviness of representationalist 
politics. This active structure, where structure is process at the same time, is Erlebnispolitik’s 
fugitive mobility that allows for alternative politics. The elements that Erlebnispolitik brings 
together have neither form nor content before they encounter each other and only make sense 
in their association with each other.
70
 It is for that reason that Deleuze treats such 
micrological structures ontologically as “implication, which cannot be grasped in reference to 
actual representation, nor in reference to representational, transcendental figures (such as 
God, substance or subject).”
71
 Association by implication of non-hylomorphic elements 
means that Erlebnispolitik is the possibility of free association without predetermined entities 
in spaces that have been segmented beforehand.
72
 This is essentially the freedom of 
posthuman expression, allowing creativity through movement. Therefore, Erlebnispolitik is 
free of “unified and clearly delimited divisions” in the form of content, but with inherent 
contingent conditions of association and conceptual practices.
73
 Importantly, this means that 
Erlebnispolitik’s structure is anti-hierarchical and non-identical without assigning singular 
                                                          
68
 Deleuze & Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 550. 
69
Ibid, 550, original emphasis. 
70









cases to overarching categories.
74
 In turn, such aleatory, anti-hierarchical structure means that 
Erlebnispolitik is not a normative project as such. While it affects change in existing social 
structures, it does so without prescribing, or suggesting rules of interaction and mediation, 
because the transformations triggered by gaming are subject to un-ordered Virtual intensities 
and gaming contingency. Thus, sub-representative change affects socio-political power 
structures while remaining connected to the Virtual realm and through this keeps its free 
conditions of immanence. This makes Erlebnispolitik a transgression of the given by 
producing an imaginative, speculative politics of experience.  
 
An Active Foundation: Half Virtual Half Actual 
Erlebnispolitik of gaming is a form of politics that carries the philosophical effort to counter 
dogmatic hylomorphic practices into the political landscape. What politics needs at this point 
is a way of organisation that does not rest on production as a transcendent imposition of an 
ordered vision of form onto chaotic socio-political relations. To the contrary, 
Erlebnispolitik’s constant connection to the Virtual – because gaming is the transducer 
located between the Virtual and the actual – means that its forms are only “‘implicit forms’ 
[which] are potentials for material self-ordering.”
75
 However, these implicit forms have to be 
put together (produced out of software code) in the first place in order for them to enter 
negotiations with the posthuman. A pre-subjective politics cannot be based on pure forms, 
but rather variable intensive affects that allow for new constellations. These new 
constellations are based on conditions of possibility of experience, which is why it is an 
Erlebnispolitik; experience is the negotiation process of forms that result in material traits of 
expression that imply new ways of working with and transforming material structures.
76
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Erlebnispolitik highlights that new ways of socio-political formation are not “dreamed up and 
then imposed on a passive matter”; rather they are derived through pre-subjective 
experience.
77
 Erlebnispolitik is the political theorisation of flux of matter, self-ordering 
energy and their attempts at formation/informance, through gaming for example, where the 
latter acts as triggers that when encountered give rise to patterns of self-ordering processes. 





Political Action: Qualitative and Meaningful Movement 
Based on this conception of Erlebnispolitik that unfolds within and co-constitutes the 
biogram, (which is political space, game space, as well as a spatial event of the posthuman) 
suggests that movement and movement space is indicative of posthuman political dynamics. 
Furthermore, this means that gaming movement as ‘Erlebnis-political’ needs to be analysed 
and evaluated qualitatively. The strength of understanding the posthuman body/movement as 
a topological metric figure (as part of a biogram) is that it allows for a qualitative observation 
and analysis of game development, which are in fact Erlebnis-political undercurrents. Given 
that the parameters for failure and success are not simply a question of ‘winning’ a game by 
managing to establish or maintain peace and security, makes the evaluation and improvement 
of gaming development a difficult task. Movement analysis can add a crucial aspect for a 
more attuned, qualitative rather than quantitative evaluation of happenings in political games 
and their politics. Building on the argument that the ‘biogrammatic’ game space is not only 
an abstract, but also biological, ‘vital’ and living space, suggest that it is full of energy, 
intensities and larger forces whose interplay give rise to varying shapes and different 
movements. The posthuman’s expansion and contraction are one way of using the energy of 
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and in this space. Following the biogram’s flow of energy in terms of observing movement 
and seeing how the posthuman’s movement expends and recovers energy according to 
decisions that have been made in the game, is an interesting factor to pay attention to. The 
proposition here is that motion and movement tracking is a useful tool for analysing and 
describing game development because it is qualitative and because it captures the unmediated 
political expression of the posthuman as conveyed in its movement. In light of the fact that 
the posthuman is a form of life that is independent of language and that finds expression 
through movement, it is argued that the evaluation of posthuman expression has to happen in 
a similar fashion. Cognitive and behaviour sciences have already started analysing gamers’ 
behaviour by looking at eye movements, head positions, posture and how much they shift in 
their seats while playing. Even though this is pinned upon the human body and subject, this is 
a similar type of motion and movement analysis as suggested here. Regardless of the scale of 
the game, whether multi-player or not, whether immersive or just single-screen interaction, 
looking at the flow of movement in the game, particularly in terms of harmonious movement, 
contributes to the analysis. Motion graphic technologies can now plot most of the points of 
the various positions that a posthuman (at least its perceivable playing body) assumes 
throughout a game. As a technology that captures movement in 3D space, it is not able to 
sketch an entire posthuman dynamic. Yet it can be used in extension and as an approximation 
of posthuman movement, because it captures more-than-human movement. Here are some 
examples of what this may look like and how the technology behind it works.
79
 Motion 
capture or tracking systems capture points in 3D space by tracking the reflection of light 
through the cameras’ near-infrared sensor. The reflections come from reflective markers on 
objects or people. So far, participants have to wear suits adjusted with markers.  Each marker 
needs to be seen by a minimum of two cameras.  Sets of markers on each limb generate 
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animated 3D characters or movements on screen. This can be used for a wide variety of 
purposes, as large as military training and as small as minimal motion for surgery. The 
screenshot below shows four different markers (blue, green, red and white) over a short 
period of time and the graph shows the blue marker’s position in X,Y, & Z over time.
80
 The 
curve in the 3D view shows the path of the blue marker over previous frames. The cameras 
can capture data at 150-500 frames per second (fps) and up to 10,000 fps by reducing the 
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This means that a whole game can be split up into frames, and a multiplayer game would 
entail considerably more markers. However, taking one frame and connecting all the 
markers/dots would result precisely in the field of relations that Laban was referring to with 
his idea of movement space. The field would look like a metric figure (although here only 
3D). Doing this for consecutive frames (not every frame but selecting one with relative 
frequency) and linking them back together would show the transformation of the metric 
organism as it was shown in the topological transformation from a coffee mug to a doughnut. 
Furthermore, depending on the course of the game this transformation can be either very 
dynamic or slow and it can flow and be harmonious or be interrupted. What is interesting and 
new here is that such narratives would not be linguistic, but rather topological and rhythmic. 
In other words, paying attention to posthuman topological transformation does not only open 
up more space for the political beyond three dimensions, it also allows the inclusion of 
advanced analysis methods that are better attuned to more-than-human spaces by capturing 
expression rather than language.  
 
More specifically, movement analysis enriches the evaluation of games by adding analytical 
markers that escape conventional measurements by paying attention to measurable and non-
measurable variables alike. For example, gaming behaviour and outcomes that may be 
interpreted as setbacks, wrong decisions or failure in conventional qualitative and quantitate 
terms, could still count as a successful gaming experience because the posthuman moved 
easily in a continued flow. The latter could be an indicator of uncomplicated decision-
making, good communication between the participants and an overall natural behaviour in 
the game. Conversely, even though objective standards may have been fulfilled successfully, 
motion analysis could reveal that movement was forced, decisions made too hastily or with 
hesitation. This added insight is achieved by increasing the scope of analysis beyond merely 
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functional action to include what Laban refers to as “shadow forms.”
82
 The posthuman 
moving expression is nuanced for it includes multiple intensities, forces and material 
dynamics that escape conventional assessments. Accordingly, parameters of what is 
successful and what is not differ for each game, which is why standard methods of evaluation 
would fail to capture important yet subtle dynamics of play, such as the minimal motion of 
shifting in one’s seat, slightly tilting forward and looking the other way. Arguably, motion 
tracking and movement analysis is an initial effort to start analysing game-play in a more 
complex way; because it is in agreement with idea of a posthuman biogram, movement 
analysis is a means to analyse gaming dynamics politically.  
 
‘Real Stuff:’ Movement Analysis Applied 
Combining the theories of movement evaluation with instances of simulation games suggests 
that motion analysis can capture dynamics in a game that normally remain unnoticed in more 
conventional methods. Let us consider the simple example of a scenario-based simulation 
(low and high tech respectively) that trains soldiers communication and negotiations skills for 
abroad deployments, in which a trainee would usually practice a certain scenario with an 
interlocutor who plays a foreign soldier, citizen or politician. The interlocutor is part of the 
make-up of the game and would, for example, speak only in broken English with a very 
strong local accent. While such an exercise could be deemed successful when judged by the 
standards set out in training manuals. More precisely, reaching some kind of arrangement 
with a stranger and ‘not arguing’ is not necessarily a successful and productive interaction. 
To the contrary, even though quantitatively one could argue that main targets have been 
reached, this leaves out what was communicated through body language for example. Passive 
aggressive behaviour will not be picked up by conventional methods of analysis, but 
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precisely those can be detrimental to effective communication and trust building. 
Furthermore, standard markers for success will not detect how comfortable a trainee felt with 
his/her task. For example, soldiers could feel very tense throughout the training, shifting 
around in their seat a great deal, exuding nervousness and looking very stern. Nervousness 
cannot only impair communication, but send the wrong signals. Yet, interaction between 
people and in unfamiliar environments is difficult to study by the book. More importantly, it 
necessitates a dynamic form of learning and a dynamic form of analysis too. Even though 
trainees can memorise and tick everything on the checklist, in the eyes of a more experienced 
observer, the simulation can still be ineffective and unsuccessful.  
   
This hypothetical scenario underlines many arguments within this research because it not 
only reveals the weaknesses of traditional ways of training, thereby highlighting the strength 
of the gaming innovation in political training, but more specifically details that objective 
standards of evaluation fail in the face of nuanced movement and that other measures and 
methods need to be in place for this. The argument for the advantage of training with games 
is therefore quite prominent. First, reading a book is insufficient in order to prepare for such 
socio-political encounters and it shows the advantage of a posthuman pedagogy that allows 
for explorative, experimental and experiental learning, which enables for entirely new 
systems of experience and, thereby, political novelty.  
 
Second, it highlights that there are considerable efforts towards alternative ways of training, 
but that posthuman pedagogy is lacking a functional structure. To be specific, the fact that the 
inadequacy of conventional training includes many simulation exercises shows that games 
are training methods already, so that using games and doing so more frequently is not the 
problem as such. What it points to, rather, is the fact that simulation games need to be better 
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integrated into everyday training as well as regular training routines. This means that not only 
do soldiers or political personnel, for example, have to be able to access and train/play with 
games on their own terms or with their colleagues before going into a larger, multi-player 
simulation game, but this also means that games need to be more widely adopted as a 
common way of personal education. More generally, systematic and monitored integration of 
games seems to be a problem of a coherent posthuman gaming curriculum, instead of a 
shortage of games and technology. At present there are personal games used within the 
American Armed Forces, such as America’s Army and the interactive training video 
Machinima,
83
 and there are highly sophisticated personal political games such as 
PeoplePower, the structure and design of which could be tailored to other political and 
military scenarios with relatively little effort. Therefore, successful widespread training with 
games seems to be an issue of bringing different efforts of games for change together in a 
coherent way so that it covers multiple aspects of education and is not just used as a one-off 
training highlight. As an important side note, this would not only improve current political 
pedagogy, but it would include the gamers in the political progress to a larger extent given 
that gaming is highly political for its implied possibility of conceptual practice and 
subjectivity formation.  
 
Lastly, there need to be more qualitative evaluation methods in place to successfully monitor 
performance in games. Verbal communication, even facial expression are not sufficient 
qualitative markers on their own. Aspects of movement and motion matter significantly. Even 
though motion analysis cannot stand alone as analytic method, it reveals additional aspects in 
training assessments. Movement and motion are indicative of unspoken thoughts and 
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dynamics. This is not so much an argument for the need to be able to interpret the unspoken, 
yet expressed, in the interlocutor, so that the acting trainer would pick up on the unease of the 
trainee or the other way around, but for the observer and non-participating trainer to pick up 
on the subtle affects such as those that influence communication in the game. Being able to 
pick up on players’ doubts, insecurities and queries would tremendously improve training. 
Importantly, this goes both ways so that it would not only benefit overall political and 
security training, be this in military, governmental or civil terms, but also benefit the players 
on a personal, subjective level. An important aspect of games is how they benefit the soldiers 
and other personnel rather than what these games would achieve for overall security 
operations. The main focus is often the psychological wellbeing of the trainees and to provide 
a training method and environment that leaves the participant with a sense of being well 
prepared, confident and less nervous about using new methods in a conflict scenario.  
 
There is a crucial speculative remark to be made in this respect where gaming as a 
pedagogical tool and training innovation is identified to be making a significant difference 
that should be explored further. This concerns young soldiers who train with these games. In 
view of the fact that many of the young men and women being educated through the Armed 
Services have not had any previous experience in working abroad, let alone being in combat, 
these gamed scenarios are one of the few ways to actually assess what the deployment and 
the professional world they are about to enter may be like.
84
 Regardless of age, speaking to 
someone from a different language and cultural background in an extremely difficult and 
volatile political situation may well be an unfamiliar task for many experienced practitioners 
(in and outside the military).
85
 Therefore, it is argued that motion analysis picks up on these 
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personal, often subtle and subliminal insecurities during games and that gaming is a valuable 
and optimal strategy to counter these challenges of the known unknown at the same time.  
 
Analysis through Rhythm & Rhythm Narratives 
Analysing games by tracing movement with the help of motion tracking technology can have 
single or multi-player applications and whereas the movement of an individual is certainly 
interesting, the general game dynamic is more important, which would also include the 
movement of interlocutors that are part of the game setting. Even if these movements were 
relatively minimal, motion analysis would be able to track them; giving insight into how the 
gaming entity expands and contracts as a metric figure which can be used to make further 
qualitative evaluations of the game development. The idea of motion tracking in general is to 
pick up what other evaluation methods would miss. This is the case here as well based on the 
assumption that movement can reveal flows of affect in a game that would go unnoticed 
otherwise. As the capacity to act or be acted upon, affect is not communicated through 
systems of language, but expressed through movement.
86
  Therefore, paying close attention to 
movement and motion can arguably provide insight into what and how a posthuman is 
limited during gaming and into possibilities of how its capacity to act can be increased. On 
top of attuning game evaluation, its development and play in this sense, motion analysis is a 
good way to describe the rhythmic movement in the game as demonstrated in the image 
below. Whereas the movement of a nervous trainee (as imagined in the previous example) 
would most likely result in a plotting similar to that in Graph 1 with very frequent spikes, and 
X, Y, Z indicate a lot of motion and movement, the movement of an experienced soldier on 
its own (or together with his training partner) should have resulted in smoother graphs, closer 
to Graph 2.  
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Used in conjunction with other qualitative forms of assessment, parameters for success and 
failure can be further substantiated through motion analysis. Given the activity level of a 
game, the movement can be expected to have a fast, abrupt or smooth rhythm based on 
possible (inter)actionability offered by the game design. In the first instance, this requires 
identifying what type of movement can be expected in a specific game and which type would 
seem most appropriate in order to achieve the tasks set by a game. Such initial parameters can 
help to assess game performance through motion analysis after a game. Therefore, the 
mapping of rhythmic behaviour can offer an alternative way to evaluate game play. 
 
Apart from analysing and mapping, motion tracking has the potential to generate new, non-
linguistic narrative forms that are based on movement rather than language. These game-
narratives tell rhythms of transformation rather than putting words and linear story lines. To 
recall, rhythm is used in a Deleuzian sense and was identified as the patterns of difference 
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that constitute a local dynamic in the game.
89
 Therefore, as an effect of milieu – which is “a 
stable point in the midst of chaos, a locus of order in a nondimensional space”
90
 – rhythm 
narratives trace emerging patterns and habits. Rhythm “is difference, or relation – the in-
between whereby milieus communicate with each other.”
91
 Roland Bogue highlights the role 
of rhythms of the human body where different internal systems and organs (milieus), that 
each have their own periodic repetition, interphase through vibratory rhythm, known as the 
pulse in the human body which is triggered by (but not the same as) the individual repetitions 
in the milieus.
92
 The crucial point here is that rhythm is not cadence or meter, which is 
regulated repetition. To the contrary, rhythm traces the difference of repetition. In other 
words, “it is difference that is rhythmic.”
93
 Hence, it can be argued that the variability of the 
inter-milieu rhythms of the game that can be approximated by motion tracking narrate the 
emerging posthuman subjectivity (EPS). In the example of this chapter, this would include 
tracking the movement of Josh as well as his interlocutor. Matching their movement curves 
against each other, as well as bringing them together as a metric figure, can reveal how 
movement may have picked up or slowed down within one game and thereby narrate 
transformation, variation or stagnation through rhythmic movement. Yet, while focussing on 
rhythm may sound like a quantifying effort of turning away from qualitative accounts to 
computer-based forms of evaluation and narration, it is precisely the opposite. In fact, it is 
extremely difficult to quantify rhythm because it is a “non-metric [intensive] entity,”
94
 and 
can therefore only be analysed qualitatively. Crucially, rhythm narratives therefore offer 
perhaps not an entirely posthuman, but at least a more-than-human way of qualitatively 
retelling a gaming experience.  
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This reveals a twofold meaning of movement in games that can be used to further the 
understandings and interaction across different social, professional and cultural contexts, not 
only the immediate movement in games. In the first instance, movement reveals the way in 
which participants encounter the game, so that their bodily reaction and the overall 
posthuman motion is indicative of affective states that escape the conscious players and 
trainers as well as conventional forms of evaluation. Movement is meaningful (political by 
extension) because it expresses affective states. However, given that movement does not only 
express affect, but EPS as well, suggests that movement has socio-political meaning above 
all. Laban distinguishes between bodily, psychological and social locomotion, whereas the 
latter describes movement across social fields over a longer period of time.
95
 Given that 
gaming is a highly condensed and mimetic socio-political scenario, the locomotion of the 
posthuman is indeed an amalgamation of various gestures and movements that have different 
social origins and meanings, depending on the individual background of the participants to a 
game. The possible encounter of two soldiers from different, cultural, socio-political 
backgrounds as discussed earlier is a case in point. In this sense, it is important to identify 
context-dependent and culture-specific locomotion before assessing overall movement. This 
is due to the fact that the same bodily gestures (one can think here of the space these gestures 
and movements can take up) can have completely different interpretations depending on 
where and by whom they are performed. Similarly, in the games run by CRISP the number of 
different socio-political and geographical influences that are all reflected in locomotion and 
movement is relatively high and, in agreement with Laban, it is argued that these are 
expressed through movement. Therefore, motion analysis is claimed to be qualitative in the 
way that it bears considerable leverage to reveal underlying and subtle socio-political 





currents. In essence, different social grammar and syntax is expressed as the posthuman’s 
movement and movement analysis of gaming would increase the scope of understanding of 
‘social movements’. 
 
Zooming in on Posthuman Rhythmic Movement 
The leverage of rhythm as a material, political event as well as an analytical lens is that it cuts 
across different register and scale, which helps to trace the posthuman’s resonance that is 
generated in the game. While rhythm is perceivable in the human register and on the 
conscious scale through motion analysis and traceable to the level of influence of previous 
bodies politics in the way that movement is expressed in the game, this also works below the 
human subject on a molecular level. This is because rhythm is caused by differential 
frequencies of oscillating and corrugating particles (vibrating matter).
96
 In this sense, building 
upon the idea that rhythm partakes in the process of shaping the posthuman as well as its 
subjectivity, rhythm is a way to characterise the posthuman and its emergence. Due the fact 
that rhythm is different from meter, in the way that the latter is binary and assumes a coded 
form, rhythm is the passing from one form into the other. In light of its in-betweenness “it 
ties together critical moments […] it changes direction,”
97
 and, therefore, it is “the link 
between truly active moments.”
98
 As such, rhythm is the political dynamic of novelty and 
change because it is the in-between of two definable topological points in the posthuman 




 and novel. 
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Movement as the Original Thought 
Motion analysis highlights and stresses the point that very small motions and movements 
during gaming are not conscious efforts by the playing subjects, but belong to the posthuman, 
a pre-conscious and pre-individual dynamic, which marks the development of a pre- and 
impersonal thought in Erlebnispolitik.
101
 This leads to question how movement and thought 
are connected in gaming and their relationship to the posthuman. The proposition has been 
that thought happens at a very initial stage of the emergence of the posthuman and that the 
conscious subject is only an after-effect of pre-human thought. The investigation of rhythmic 
movement provides initial tools to speculate about how posthuman thought influences 
gaming activities. Theorising within a working model of diffused agency, the posthuman and 
subjectivity have been explained as non-intentional and non-agentic processes, which makes 
the focus on gaming movement all the more interesting. This is because if acting thought 
precedes the articulation of thought, then movement is a more primary expression of thought 
than conscious enunciation. Indeed, it is nothing new for neuroscientists of free will to claim 
that humans do not consciously control their movement and that therefore locomotion is a 
more immediate expression of ‘mental activity’.
102
 For the last three decades leading experts 
in the field have conducted experiments that all show that a conscious action is only a 
“subjective referral backward in time,”
103
 indeed there is a gap between conscious acts and 
bodily movement, whereby the latter actually precedes the former. Libet’s example paints a 
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[Which] can explain, for example, why a runner in a race can take off within 50-
100 ms after the starting gun, presumably well before he becomes introspectively 




Experiments have shown that conscious perception of a stimulus, such as the gun shot, is the 
cerebral process of internal awareness and takes longer than 50-100 milliseconds. Therefore, 
the runner starting to move is not a conscious act, as it would not have been long enough for 
him/her to consciously register the sound and then act upon. This suggests that action is 
initiated pre-consciously and that there is a “temporal difference between RP [readiness 
potential] onset and conscious intention.”
106
 In other words, the appearance of consciousness 
is delayed and only happens after movement has begun, so that the subject “automatically 
‘corrects’ one’s conscious perception to coincide with the real time of the stimulus.”
107
 
Crucially, this suggests that one’s mental chronometry structures and linearizes sensation 
recursively and retrospectively puts decision and movement into a conscious chain of actions 
and reactions.
108
 This does means that thought and decisions are an expression of movement 
before consciousness.  
 
This assertion elevates the importance of movement analysis in order to understand 
micropolitics or Erlebnispolitik even more for the practical purposes of analysing learning and 
performance during games. Proponents of movement analysis, albeit in studying performance 
art, started arguing along similar lines by putting forward ideas of “physical thinking” and 
questions regarding how moving bodies think.
109
 Contextualising this claim within the 
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intensive materialist philosophy here, the argument is that movement is an immediate 
expression of pre-individual and pre-subjective thought and movement is thereby the primary 
indicator of the development of a game, a learning process and subject formation. Gaming 
movements are series events of mattered-thought/thinking-matter and as such the 
posthuman’s movement during a game is indicative of its struggle for meaning formation. In 
short, to observe movement is then to observe what is conventionally referred to as ‘sense-
making’.  
 
Posthuman Analysis and Methods 
Thinking-movement contextualised within the posthuman’s movement space (a dynamic 
biogram) highlights the productive, creative (topological) and operational value of games. The 
dissemination of gaming tasks over a variety of media and different interphases produce a 
myriad of movements that all engage conceptual problems in a different, often unique way. 
Movement as creative thinking also proposes that “movement is method” and not only a way 
to analyse gaming performance. If motion and movement is thinking, then allowing for 
movement-space in a game to emerge rather than restrict it, is to permit political thinking and 
the possibility of doing so in a different way. This type and space of thought is therefore an 
essential characteristic of Erlebnispolitik. In short, this suggests that gaming is thinking 
through movement and novelty through unique movement. This blurs the lines between 
analysis and method, so that gaming-movement is productive and analytic at once. As such, 
motion tracking technology turns into an analytical eye that helps to see topological 
transformations of the posthuman’s movement and, thus, is part of gaming continuity and the 
effort for change.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    




Therefore it is argued that taking a radical technoscientific approach towards gaming helps to 
better integrate and foster the change that technologies of lived abstraction introduce to the 
political realm. Massumi urges that we are in need of logics of transformation and gaming 
movement as qualitative topologics is identified as precisely such logic of change.
110
 Up-
scaling more political games to operate through technologies could prove very beneficial in 
order to increase these topologies. There are multiple projects that already seek to twist away 
the use of NT perpetuating pre-existing forms and functions toward “operating directly as 
technologies of emergent experience.”
111
 However, these are mainly in topological 
architecture and art. Yet, the potential to integrate topological technologies into the political 
realm is evident. For example, the Technological Media Lab at Concordia University is 
increasingly concerned with philosophical and practical questions regarding how certain 
design approaches to HCI impact memory, temporal experience and rhythm and in turn create 
rich, creative environments rather than complicated, passive ones.
112
 Such efforts include 
looking at aspects of overarching meaning in movement: how a series of movements can be 
one gesture, but also at aspects of structured lighting, sound as material or gestural sound.
113
 
Importantly, all these efforts are geared at attuning space; in the context of this research this is 
movement-space, which is thinking. This is by no standards a single effort and it seems that 
every progressive media, computing and engineering department is working on how to 
integrate creative technology/technology of lived abstraction in fruitful ways, in and outside 
politics. Institutions such as the Department of Design Media Arts, University of California 
Los Angeles (UCLA), the Institute for Creative Technology, University of Southern 
California (USC) or the MIT Media Lab, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, are all well 
known for their efforts to push technology’s scope of operation beyond common confines, 
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whether this be in the realm of politics, health, economics, civil engineering or psychology. 
Yet, the connection between political imagination and creative technology seems one of the 
more prominent links among all of these research clusters. The theory of new technological 
geometries developed here is intended to complement such efforts to produce new techno-
political landscapes.  
 
These philosophical as well as pragmatic issues are a question of appropriate technology 
finding an experimental, ethico-political frame. In the search for the ‘right’ technology and a 
‘suitable’ philosophical approach, the primacy of Erlebnispolitik remains on the experience of 
and through technology and the bodies that emerge out of such new experiences. In this 
respect, the biogram in the way that it is appropriated here is a “lived topological event” and 
gaming is taken to be an “onto-topological event.”
114
 More specifically, it is the self-
emerging, onto-material moment of Erlebnispolitik in gaming. While this is not all there is to 
politics, it displaces the origin of it and seeks out the emergence of the political in experience. 
In this way the biogram is “experience reaccessing its power of emergence” for its own 
furtherance.
115
 The biogram is not about the game corresponding to or reflecting an existing 
reality, but about participation and possibly the production of new ones (reality-in-the-
making). It is a form of lived and onto-topological engineering where matter is going 
thoughtful in a qualitative modulation. The aim of conceptualising and treating political 
gaming in this way is to stimulate more modulatory and intensely lived learning experiences 
that will unfold in new politics.  
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Abstraction and Difference: Politics of a Life 
The strength of gaming is its implied lived abstraction (with a body space that is abstract) and 
lived experience (expressed through thought in movement). As much as this is a strength it is 
a theoretical challenge at the same time, which needs to be overcome first in order to be able 
to integrate and foster the innovation that gaming technologies can introduce into the political 
realm. The challenge is to ensure that gaming is always abstract to some extent because this is 
what produces and maintains the moment of openness (the political) in the gaming event and, 
therefore, preserves the connection to the Virtual (potential political futures). Affective game 
design, especially aspects of contingency in games, and alternative quantitative evaluation 
methods of motion analysis are means of creating conditions under which it is possible for 
Erlebnispolitik in gaming to emerge and to remain open to change and newness. In essence, 
this is a difficult task of striking a balance between theoretical abstractness and concrete 
experience. Put differently, gaming must be a functional configuration that is able to 
continuously access infinities of experiental potential. What can be said about emergent 
politics in gaming so far is that these are predominantly potential: there are no fixed forms yet 
and modulation is always possible, it is an embryonic politics. On a speculative level, 
gaming’s Erlebnispolitik is the beginning of a rhizomatic trajectory and it will grow up and 
mature to a more tangible politics, but not the way we know it and not in a form that is 
conventional in politics. Such youth (unformed and unrepresented politics) is important, as 
this “is the newness, the “nextness” of what will be again – but already, as it is under way.”
116
 
This infant political process or Erlebnispolitik is not just a form of politics through movement 
(as part of double articulation), but it is a desiring-machine geared at disarticulating the face 
(anti-production/ deterritorialisation) before new politics can emerge (desiring-
production/reterritorialisation). As such, Erlebnispolitik constantly engages in a double-move 
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or undoing and doing. Every game is an effort “against the incursion of discourse, against 
works and obligatory meaning” and “supplementary message,” as a way of 
“defamiliarization” and opposing faciality.
117
 In essence, Erlebnispolitik is about out-treating 
old habits, concepts and ways of thinking. The task of gaming and its politics in search of the 
new is to render the habitual and ordinary strange. This politics, as a form of Deleuzian 
deterritorialization, is a process by which the “familiar is continually decontextualized,” so 
that “what initially sounds familiar always ends up sounding very different from what we 
actually expected. The paradox implicit […is that] what seems strange and extraordinary on 
one level does so only because, on another, it is familiar and ordinary.”
118
 Out of a gaming 
scenario that may seem familiar at first unfolds another, yet stranger, dimension during the 
game. This dimension is grasped through new experience, which is the process of undoing, 
“the emptying of all meaning”
119
 and that sets in motion the making anew as well. Hinging on 
the question of immanence and with an appetite for expression, this suggests that gaming can 
be a completely novel posthuman (informance). Based on the double-move in desiring-
production, Erlebnispolitik’s disarticulating and innovative potential lies in rhythmic 
movement and its spontaneous, aleatory tendencies. The creativity of gaming is based on 
movement and rhythm that is not a static meter but “vivid and alive,”
120
 so full of intensities, 
that it is “intensely imagistic”
121
 creating an “imagery without reference.”
122
 The political 
potential in gaming is enabled by its rhythmic moving capacity that can trigger 
defamiliarisation, which is lived abstraction. In view of the fact that the posthuman’s 
rhythm/movement is vivid, this movement can break with ordinary experience because it is a 
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form of becoming at “its highest degree of abstractive intensity, making it absolutely felt as it 
can experienceably be,” but simultaneously “rendering it excessively non-specific.”
123
 This is 
precisely why gaming carries “a number of image suggestions in its dynamic unfolding,” 
which are potential, unformed still, a state of pure expression.
124
 These are absolutely 
fundamental in keeping open the political moment and ensuring Erlebnispolitik’s connection 
to the Virtual. Despite gaming’s abstract experiences and image suggestions, these can be 
captured to create the new in a concrete and material way provided they are encountered in 
the game. These virtual suggestions burst into the game as experiences and lived abstraction. 
This means that the origin of infant politics is movement’s capacity to abstract and that 
Erlebnispolitik in gaming starts out as a rhythmic motional glimpse of qualitative relations 
and is carried in the form of experiential becoming.  
 
Politics in Gaming as Politics of Life 
The further development of Erlebnispolitik in and through gaming is based on the idea that 
gaming is not only political because of its ability to deterritorialise and defamiliarise, but also 
because it creates conditions for the emergence of qualitative relations. This is claimed to be 
political, ethico-political even. In this sense, gaming is political because it de- and 
recontextualizes relations in such a way that the familiar becomes other. This is a phase shift 
into production and operation, a change from undoing to doing. Hence, given that gaming is 
about translating potential into relations makes gaming essentially about potentiality. And 
“what politics is not about potential?”
 125
 To rephrase this, what politics is not about “forms of 
life in the making”?
126
 This suggests that if gaming is reality-in-the-making (the TPE as a 
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reality studio), then it is equally about life-in-the-making. A life is a being of becoming
127
 and 
gaming is becoming other. Developing this further, if gaming is a mode of becoming, it is a 
mode of existence – one that it is concerned with emerging forms of political life. “Politics is 
about the potential animating forms of life,” which confirms that gaming can be an operation 




The fact that gaming is creative as well as inventive and placing “the problem of lived 
abstraction at the heart of the political” means that gaming is speculative yet pragmatic.
129
 
Furthermore, abstract energy, the primacy of expression, and the importance of movement 
and rhythm intertwine gaming with aesthetics. This is because acts of expression and lived 
experience have become core criteria for thinking the future and a politics to come. 
Importantly, these criteria for thinking politics can be applied to all domains, conventional 
(electoral politics, grassroots politics, security politics) as well as unconventional (gaming, 
protest through art and music, social movements such as Occupy).
130
 Using the idea of 
“politicality” helps to illustrate this.
131
 The crucial point is that these criteria of thinking future 
politics are not about generating ‘the correct answer’, but rather about bringing immanent 
forces of political-becoming to expression. In the case of gaming this means translating 
political-becoming into movement and understanding Erlebnispolitik through movement. 
Lived abstractions are events of politicality, and their forms of expression determine how this 
political potential can unfold.  
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Starting with the notion of politicality and lived abstraction is important as it does not imply 
an already existing subject, as in the case of conventional political models that pivot on the 
human and political subject to begin with. To recall, it is crucial to avoid the assumption of 
the pre-established subject because it prevents new emergence. In order to prevent this, it is 
argued that Massumi’s concept of politicality captures that immanent forces predate the 
subject, thereby allowing novelty and a different, posthuman political subject. The emergent 
character of Erlebnispolitik in gaming is a politics without the subject. Such pre-subjective 
politics are an immanent and imaginative force; it is not about marshalling true and false 
political statements, neither is it about political programmes nor prescribing how things ought 
to be. Politicality is about catalysing “what’s to come, emergently, inventively, un-
programmed and reflective of no past model.”
132
 The mode of action is direct, performative, 
not programmatic, but aleatory and invocative of new relational realities.
133
 In this type of 
politicalness it is not a question about what elements constitute politics, but rather about how 
elements are coming together and about the relations that are being formed. As the analysis of 
gaming has shown, the coming-together of Erlebnispolitik cannot be prejudged but only 
experienced. Furthermore, relational formation only happens through pre-subjective 
experience, where formation/informance does not imply fixity. What Erlebnispolitik as pre-
subjective political formation refers to are lasting encounters,
134
 blocks of affect and 
percepts,
135
 moments of subjectivity. Gaming produces and at the same time keeps together 
these Erlebnis-political moments, the glue is experience. Erlebnispolitik is anything but fixed, 
but has to constantly be produced in the course of the game and is also under considerable 
pressure from forces within an ever-changing environment.
136
 It is a politics that is constantly 
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at-tension as it were. Importantly, the ensemble of the politicality of life as it unfolds in 
gaming has to be produced constantly and is the bare activity of expression; it has “no definite 
direction, no [predetermined] actor, no [set] aim” other than its own intensities that are carried 
into the game by its participants, affective game design and that are present in the game 
space.
137
 For that reason Erlebnispolitik in gaming describes the ceaseless immanent process 





Erlebnispolitik highlights that this form of politics is derived through gaming’s capacity of 
lived abstraction as well as the importance of lived experience (Erlebnis) and life (Leben) in 
the game and in general. Importantly, the development of an Erlebnispolitik is not intended to 
establish fixed parameters of what the political moment in gaming or other posthuman 
becomings have to be like, but rather to initiate a dialogue about the type of posthuman 
politics that mainly work below the level of the human category, yet also resonate on the 
human as well as supra-human scale. It was argued that it is imperative to start talking about 
this kind of micropolitics not only in order to cater to a posthuman audience, but also to 
understand and engage with technological-becoming, especially in the realms of politics. 
Essentially, technologies of lived abstraction such as political gaming make the posthuman 
condition we live in extremely obvious, yet, there is little conceptual space to integrate this in 
the form of a posthuman politics. Therefore, an initiating claim at the outset was that there is 
a lack and demand for theorising the posthuman condition politically. However, this 
posthuman Erlebnispolitik does not happen at the expense of the human or the anthropocene, 
as the latter two will remain important for conventional politics which can be known on a 
consciousness level. It is thus not a question of one over the other. The issue is that of 
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understanding that politics happens outside of these stable anthropocentric categories at 
speeds and in dimensions that escape human consciousness; the latter are nonetheless crucial 
and increasingly undeniable. In other words, contemporary politics is marked by and 
confronted with strange horizons, that when theorised in a posthuman way are actually a 
chance for political theory and political practice to reinvent itself. This reinvention begins 
with conceiving of posthuman space and was articulated here through the development of 
Massumi’s concept of the biogram, which is an n dimensional space that is dynamic, lived, 
abstract and concrete at the same time and not dependent upon space as something that is 
perceivable by the human eye or a static environment within which bodies move. To the 
contrary, space is movement with and of the body and that spreads across (is abstracted into) 
different media and substances; it can jump temporalities and scales. In short, the biogram is 
a spatial event through which posthuman politics play out. 
 
In this view, movement makes space possible in the first place and conceiving space in terms 
of spatial events, spatial movement and metric figures allows extending the theory of 
topological transformation of the posthuman and its subjectivity onto space as well. This is an 
initial and fundamental step in so far as space that allows for change is crucial for an 
emerging posthuman politics that can give rise to difference and the new. As such, this space 
is fundamentally political. It is the space of posthuman micropolitics. This political becoming 
was sketched as Erlebnispolitik more generally and started with the argument that the process 
of double-articulation through which Erlebnispolitik emerges is not a case of active resistance 
to the status quo. Erlebnispolitik is not a reaction against power and is thus not motivated by 
it either. Instead, desire in a Deleuzoguattarian sense was identified to be the driving force of 
Erlebnispolitik. In this understanding, desire is neither indicative of sexual motivations or 
situations of lack and inadequacy. And it is only by understanding desire in this way and as 
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the driver for Erlebnispolitik that the latter can be affirmative (and thus in line with a 
posthuman affirmative philosophy) and the creation of something genuinely new. The 
affirmative modus operandi of Erlebnispolitik was tied into the notion of the utopian impulse 
that characterises posthuman politics as a method of grasping and pointing out the limits of 
political imagination. Importantly, these mechanisms happen at a posthuman speed, which 
was apprehended through “rapid capture” to highlight that Erlebnispolitik through 
technologies of lived abstraction like gaming is an accelerated politics. This is essential 
because it enables political theory to start analysing the immediacy of the moment of 
openness (the political) in gaming. Eventually, desire, utopian impulse and rapid capture are 
important pillars in the active and mobile foundation of a posthuman Erlebnispolitik. These 
are also the distinguishing factors to conventional theory, practice and association of politics. 
In essence, seeking out this alternative foundation of politics enables political theory to set 
itself up against representational, human models of politics and open up opportunities for the 
politically new.   
 
In relation to Erlebnispolitik’s dynamic space, rhythm was identified as differential driver of 
movement. Apart from tying Erlebnis-political change to vibrating rhythm, it was also argued 
that viewing movement and game space in this way provides the option of analysing and 
describing gaming events politically in the form of rhythm narratives. The primacy here is on 
acknowledging and describing socio-political undercurrents through rhythmic movement. 
This suggested that Erlebnispolitik communicates through intensities such as rhythm rather 
than linguistic narratives or political discourse. Movement was further analysed and thereby 
elevated in its importance for Erlebnispolitik by showing how movement is a much more 
fundamental expression of thinking-matter/mattered-thought than conscious reflection. Based 
on examples drawn from neurosciences of free will, the argument was that there is no 
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political agency in the conventional sense during gaming’s Erlebnispolitik. Agency is taken 
to be diffused and an enactment of thought through matter and re-configuration/variation 
based on the net of relational movement that constitutes the biogram. In short, rhythmic 
movement is physical thinking and expression of posthuman political agency. On a practical 
level, and with specific reference to gaming, these parameters of movement, motion and 
rhythm were outlined as qualitative evaluation methods of the gaming posthuman. Motion 
analysis and rhythm narratives are important tools in the concrete practice and study of 
Erlebnispolitik.  
 
Despite practical approximations of Erlebnispolitik through motion analysis, it was argued 
that Erlebnispolitik is constantly caught between levels of abstractness and moments of 
concrete manifestation. In order to preserve its politicalness, games have to be lived and 
experienced one the one hand, yet remain abstract on the other. This is why gaming has to be 
designed as technology of lived abstraction in the first place and only then it is able to 
provide the conditions for posthuman politics to emerge. Therefore, it was concluded that 
techno-political events like gaming are right at the heart of posthuman political becomings.  
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~ Conclusion ~ 
 
This thesis argues that immersive political gaming can challenge conventional political 
theory if it is analysed as technologies of lived abstraction. As such it lays the groundwork 
for a posthuman condition that allows for explorative micropolitics of change and new 
political subjectivities. A politics of change (one that is not a form of repetition) has to begin 
by revisiting and reworking metaphysics. Immersive political gaming offers an opportunity 
for this type of politics because of its capacity to de- and recontextualize relations in such a 
way that the familiar becomes other. Gaming is therefore a political and ethical activity.  
 
The very experience of the world has been identified as the starting point of this research 
because the dualism that informs metaphysics, and subsequent ideas about being and acting 
in the world, go back to inherent philosophical assumptions about our access to the objective 
world. Access happens through human sensual experience that mediates between the material 
realm of objects and the intangible, immaterial realm of ideas. In this way, philosophies of 
access, whether in the form of Platonism, idealism, phenomenology, or even post-
structuralism, divide the world and use experience as the dividing line between the 
experienceable, and, as such, the knowable object, and the experiencing and knowing subject. 
Political games enter and highlight this problem in two crucial and related ways: first, 
Western metaphysics would suggest that, as technology, political games are the object, the 
material thing that can be studied/known; and, second, as technological object and practice, it 
is used to make sense of the world. This sense-making is supposedly happening through the 
phenomenological gaming experience. In other words, during the act of gaming things are 
presented to the players that are then recognised and processed according to the rational 
structures of the mind. In short, the conventional explanation of how and why games educate 
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suggests that this is because games present the player with a puzzle that, due to the player’s a 
priori knowledge of the world as well as his/her mental capacity, can be solved. Eventually, 
this sense-making process will lead to certain understandings about the nature, meaning and 
further applicability of the puzzle (as represented in the game). The problem is, however, that 
in order to make this mediation between the phenomenal and noumenal world work by means 
of experience, Immanuel Kant needed to assume the rational human mind.  
 
This is problematic as experience can never be genuinely new because it is already 
determined to unfold according to structures of the mind. This way of experiencing hinges 
upon the division of the world into the objective realm and that of the mind. Furthermore, 
experience is an essentially human practice, which at the same time structures the living 
world according to the thinking referent: the human centric anthropocene. However, this 
research argues that this way of viewing the world prevents a more complex grasp of it and 
one that can consider, at least conceptually even if not practically, what happens outside the 
category of the human and independent of subject-object relations. Essentially, going beyond 
the human experience and its bifurcated world is a posthuman endeavour. Philosophers and 
theorists pushing these lines of thought, or rather pushing thought along these lines and away 
from the human condition and its centrality, are associated with some strands of 
contemporary French philosophy, and Speculative Realism and Speculative/New Materialism 
more recently. 
 
Therefore, the example of political games is used in an effort to resuscitate materialism and 
its riches to tackle this posthuman endeavour. It combines three fundamental problems of the 
human condition through revisiting the philosophical breaking point of experience: the 
rational mind, the subject-object division and that between the Virtual, virtual and the actual. 
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Arguably the latter (ontology of reality) is a particularly recent problématique in intellectual 
thought because of a world that is increasingly marked by switching between modes of 
existence. The strength of political gaming is that it encapsulates and epitomises inherent 
misconceptions and unwarranted assumptions about metaphysics and it actually holds 
possible strategies to go about it as well.  
 
The first step in this reworking of metaphysics (as relevant for political theory) towards a 
posthuman condition, and Erlebnispolitik more specifically, was diagnostic. Political gaming 
needs to be contextualised in the way it is commonly understood and used in the political 
arena as a tool to innovate current training in preparation for security and stability practices. 
As such, it grows out of very specific political, economic and generally ideological 
circumstances and institutional frameworks (MIME-NET and the Simulation Triangle) from 
which it cannot be detached. However, due to the thesis’ affirmative philosophy, it identified 
gaming’s roots in the market place and industrial arts not as a set-back, but as an opportunity 
for training as well political theory to reinvent itself. In many ways, the strength of gaming is 
that, although it is part of faciality, it has the capacity to generate change from within. Having 
contextualized gaming, the research examines its metaphysical underpinnings in order to 
understand how change can occur. It considered the initial problem of experience, but 
approached it from a technoscientific and materialist point of view by suggesting that instead 
of looking for the onset of experience in the human realm, and, more broadly, that of sentient 
beings, the analysis actually has to go beyond and below the anthropocene. This led the 
analysis to highlight matter behaviour on the scale of the molecular, atomic and subatomic. In 
order to distinguish between different matter, its behaviour was identified as belonging to 
different types of intensities, such as temperature, speed/velocity, pressure and rhythm, and 
these movements were observed more closely. Drawing on theories of self-emergence and 
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organisms having self-organising properties, these matter formations were identified as the 
onset of an emerging body. The theory of particle behaviour not only suggests that the birth 
of a body happens far below that of conceiving a human body, but also that the boundaries of 
a body cannot be drawn along human skin or tissue as found in the animal kingdom in 
general, and instead emerge along differences in intensity. A body can be constituted by a 
pool of particles sharing the same temperature (often this is closely tied to their similar speed 
as well) that ends where it encounters another particle pool with a different temperature. At 
this point, the bodies can merge into a new one or stay separate. Importantly, however, in the 
case of merging, this is a qualitative new body altogether because intensive differences 
cannot be added, contrasting extensive differences. Therefore, the new emerging body is not 
simply the sum of the two merging bodies, but mixing intensities transform into different 
qualitative relations. The thesis suggested that the same applies for larger bodies as well, 
given that the only difference in matter behaviour is in scale not in kind.  
 
This encourages an analysis of the speed at which these bodies emerge and operate, which is 
much faster than the classical ontogenetic production of a human body. In respect to 
possibilities of change, this is crucial. Change, be this evolutionary, ecological or political, 
can occur much more rapidly than human timeframes of change can conceptualise. Given that 
the newly conceived intensive bodies all carry information, these bodies were treated as 
matter information that vibrates at different speeds; so that larger, more stable and humanly 
perceivable bodies are a case of slow information. This intensive body was further elaborated 
by arguing that this emergence is also the emergence of thought. To stress this point, the 
material emergence of a body is the process of emerging thought; it is one and the same 
process and not a case of thought developing parallel to that of a body. In short, thought is 
material, it is intrinsic to matter. This is how the matter/mind dualism was overcome, 
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especially by developing neurophilosophical theories of extended mind theories as well as 
quantum adaptations, to show that thoughts are non-local affective relations of information 
carried and expressed by matter. Importantly, this means that thought emerges pre-personally, 
pre-subjectively and pre-consciously, below the human category and independent of it. It is 
not a case of a subconscious or subliminal process that is nonetheless tied to the human body. 
In contrast, mattering-thought is a process that can occur anywhere because it is the same 
process as the emerging intensive body, which is the pooling of different information through 
interacting intensities. 
 
As a rejection of the dogmatic image of thought that adheres to the dualist anthropocene, 
posthuman thought was further developed by showing how this thought is rooted in the 
encounter of intensities and can develop into new systems of experience. The theory suggests 
that this occurs when the encounter of intensities is so strong that it breaks up old intensive 
bodies, thereby old systems of experience, so that necessarily new ones have to form. This 
literally forceful dissembling of a body and experience is a rupture to ordinary experience and 
systems of meaning. This is a crucial point for several reasons. First of all, it marks the 
difference to phenomenological experience because posthuman experience as outlined and 
emerging in the thesis’ philosophy happens independently of the prior condition of a human 
mind, and it is also more than the mere mediation between the realm of matter and mind. 
Second and consequently, this means that bodies and experience can be genuinely new 
because mattered-thought emerges independently of pre-structured categories of the mind. 
Third, this rupture then is a critical moment of openness (the political) in which anything can 
happen (it is aleatory) because intensities were argued to have a Virtual and an actual half, 
and thereby stay rooted within potentiality/infinity. Lastly, this was identified to be the phase-
space that gaming operates in, in a way that non-conscious gaming dynamics of intensities 
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can feed this rupture, fuelling the production of new systems of experience. These processes 
(referred to by the thesis as onto-material, as they are neither only ontological nor 
ontogenetic, but a combination of both) are nonetheless pre-conscious and non-conscious 
even though they are happening during gaming. 
 
The conditions for these encounters with the potential for the new are partly dependent on 
game design. While onto-material, self-emerging processes happen in open systems and are 
therefore untamed most of the time (Chaosmosis), this needs to be slightly adjusted for 
gaming. It can be assumed that certain intensities are carried into the game mainly through 
gaming software (or game plan in a purely analogue context). Based on the analysis of 
contingency (Doppler-contingency to be precise) it was shown how emergence is still 
aleatory, but only possibilistic rather than potential. In other words, not anything can happen 
(potential), but only some things allowed for by the constellation of the pool of intensities of 
the gamer bodies and that of the game (hard/software, which includes the analogue 
environment). Even though this confines what is produced during gaming (bodies, thoughts, 
experiences, and subjectivities) to the possible, the way in which these emerge is still 
contingent. All of these entities grow rhizomatically, yet in tandem with game design as well 
as the game design being a part of them. This is because the redrawing of posthuman bodily 
borders that are temporarily based on pools of intensities or attractor fields renders the game 
design (as imprinted in the software and hardware of a game) part of a potential gaming 
posthuman. The posthuman condition does not draw distinctions between the human, 
technology, nature and other categories. Provided that the shock to ordinary experience 
occurs, this means that former intensities in the attractor field that are categorised as human 
body can synthesise with those from game design in a new posthuman.  This elevates the 
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importance of game design as well as a game’s final architecture and indeed turns political 
games into an exploratory experiment for emergence. 
 
The analysis of game design with regard to its importance in the production of the posthuman 
revealed that design matters in three aspects: the immediate gaming experience, the 
emergence of a posthuman and its subjectivity. Given, however, that the emergence of 
thought that can give rise to new systems of experience is a chance encounter, the game 
design needs to provide possible trigger points for these encounters. These are essentially 
points at which the intensities can act or be acted upon and these trigger/threshold points are 
affective. Therefore, the process of developing games needed to be analysed in terms of 
affective game design, which is fundamentally about the management of contingency. This is 
not only because a game needs to be designed in a way that it is ‘prepared’ for n number of 
eventualities that increase with a rise in intensities from other bodies entering the game, but 
also because the game has to offer contingency too. For a gaming experience to be as 
untamed and aleatory as possible, this needs to be allowed for by the game design in the first 
place. Such a play of contingencies during gaming and enabled by game design was analysed 
through movement, arguing that movement in the form of expansion and contraction of the 
posthuman is indicative of plays of intensities during the game. This is essentially a question 
of whether contingent threshold points are encountered and ordinary experience is broken, or 
whether these affective points were missed out or too subtle to trigger the emergence of a 
gaming posthuman. Accordingly, these suggested different parameters of failure and success 
in political games are not based on the outcome of a particular simulated scenario, but rather 
are based on non-verbal dynamics in the game as expressed through movement. Movement 
parameters change according to individual games, so that contingent movement has to be 




Regardless of these changing aspects, affective game design influences movement (through 
mechanisms of amplification, modulation and bandwidth) because movement is affection 
(not as a subjective feeling, but as a non-human, “pre-personal intensity corresponding to the 
passage from one experiential state of the body to another”
1
) and the expression of thought, 
experience, the posthuman and its subjectivity in formation. This is why design matters (for) 
gaming experience: it has a direct impact on the way that it enables encounters, but it thereby 
also matters possible posthuman bodies based on these encounters and it creates the 
conditions for emerging subjectivities. The fact that design plays a decisive role in posthuman 
emergences led to a further analysis of it by acknowledging and theorising the political 
moment intrinsic to designing and gaming itself. The techno-political-event (TPE) was 
developed as a theoretical aid and sought to point out political practices on much smaller 
time-scales and on far less institutionalised levels than more traditional forms of politics. 
These levels and practices need to be taken into account because a posthuman politics is more 
fast-paced, prone to rapid capture and change than most conventional politics. In short, as a 
movement-event gaming encapsulates political moments, and these moments can even be 
moments of genuinely new experience.  
 
It is the TPE that is unique and pivotal in gaming (and other technologies of lived 
abstraction). The resonance of this political moment hinges upon whether or not this event 
can emerge as a moment of subjectivity. The interplay and interphase between TPE and 
possible emerging posthuman subjectivity (EPS) is a crucial point as it constantly oscillates 
between the sub-human, posthuman and the human realm as comprehended through the 
human senses and consciousness. Acknowledging and theorising this looping between the 
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two conditions is crucial in order to understand that a posthuman condition and a human 
condition do not work against each other and neither is it a case of having to commit to either 
of the two or a question of co-existence. Instead, the situation is that the human condition 
emerges out of a posthuman one. Looking at the posthuman generated by the swirling and 
rippling intensities in gaming dynamics that can sediment as lasting subjectivities, which 
eventually operate on a scale of the conscious human subject, was taken to be an instance of 
this human to posthuman dependency. Detailing EPS by means of desiring-production sought 
to show how prominent subjectivities exists as part of faciality, but also how what is 
consciously known as a political subject and wider notions of subjectivity can be produced 
differently to that. A posthuman subjectivity that emerges otherwise, producing probe-heads, 
is therefore the continuation of the TPE and through this perpetuation aligns the TPE as well 
as posthuman subjectivity as parts of explorative posthuman politics.  
 
The explorative aspect is found in the act of gaming itself and, more specifically, the 
possibility of ignoring one’s face and living outside one’s suit enables creative flight. This 
form of productivism is based on the playful aspect during gaming, which is a significant 
pedagogical strategy in gaming because playing other character traits destabilises personal, 
ordinary experience. It is a way of opening up the stable human subject so that encounter can 
happen and then deterritorialisation can occur. Creative flight is an important part of EPS that 
helps to produce probe-heads. Even on larger scales this is speculated to be a material 
process. The outline of how this mattering happens in speculative scientific terms lies beyond 
the scope of this research, but strongly indicates future research avenues into posthuman 




Nonetheless, this larger mattering process of political subjectivity can be traced at least in the 
abstract through the idea of the body politic as used by Protevi. His model as further 
developed in this project suggests that bodies politics can emerge on a scale as low as that of 
the gaming posthuman, but that it can have a rippling effects on larger formations. This 
happens through newly emerging posthuman bodies after and outside of the game that carry 
on intensities, not necessarily through modes of gaming. The link between scales was further 
substantiated through a more nuanced, twofold notion of experience, where the latter not only 
referred to the experience in the game, but was spilt into immediate experience (Erlebnis) and 
a later cognitive process that enters the realm of the conscious human subject, called 
Erfahrung, as an after-effect of the posthuman image of thought. Splitting experience is 
essential for it not only offers a way of understanding how scales can be abstractly connected, 
but it also connects the human to the posthuman.  
 
Gaming is not merely an analogue process, but switches between analogue and digital, and 
other electronic ways of existence. This adds challenging complexities to the theory of 
explorative posthuman politics as set out in this research. While analogue scenario-based 
games could have been used to trace a posthuman condition as well, it was imperative to 
outline these processes in reference to technologies of lived abstraction (technologically 
mediated gaming) in order to overcome misconceptions of different modalities and realms, 
such as that of the Virtual, which is infinite and potential, and that of the actual, which is 
finite, determinable and objectifiable. To make this theoretical clarification was important for 
three main reasons. First of all, the motivation was to show that the difference between the 
digital and analogue is just a case of reality materialising in different ways (electronic and 
less electronic), but not a case of one being less real (material) than the other. In order to 
develop posthuman micropolitics it was essential to remove this artificial hierarchy of 
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realness that often just pivots upon misunderstanding physics. In view of the fact that this is a 
problem that plays out through the human sensorium and cognition (as seen by following 
pain) this is a conceptual problem that can be explained by conventional Newtonian physics. 
Its significance with regard to explorative micropolitics during gaming is that it can explain 
why political moments involving the digital to a higher degree are not any less real or of 
lesser importance. Understanding this is a crucial step in taking gaming as a political practice 
and effort for change seriously because it is equally part of the actual realm. The second 
reason for this focus was that only the example of a technological event of lived abstraction 
such as political gaming illustrates the double-move of addressing and undoing the 
dichotomies between not only digital/real, but also between human/technology. The 
misconception of immersive gaming as an interaction between separate bodies/entities, where 
technology is the detached object from the human subject, offered the opportunity to outline 
the disappearing anthropocentric boundaries in a posthuman condition. Lastly, such 
misunderstanding about the ontology of reality as well as simple physics stands in the way of 
being able to seriously integrate political gaming into political training. In this sense, 
clarifying this misconception was crucial in the twofold defence of making a case for gaming 
regarding its real merits on a theoretical level as well as on a practical one. 
 
Developing this further necessitated more vigorous engagement with the ontological status of 
reality, which occurred through the exploration of the Virtual. Importantly, a theory of 
change needs to have conceptual room for the Virtual, given that this is the realm of an 
infinite pool of futures. Any political theory not grounded in the Virtual runs the risk of 
marginalising change and novelty and can become essentially a theory of repetition, 
recognition and representation. What is remarkable in understanding change within terms of 
the Virtual/actual connection is that posthuman politics operates at different speeds and that 
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digital becomings are identified as being able to transduce from the Virtual to the actual more 
rapidly than other abstract/transducing machines. Confronting the metaphysical challenges 
related to the production of reality is fundamental to understanding how the world and 
becoming operate in the first place, before speculations about actual political realms, 
including posthuman micropolitics can be made. 
 
In a posthuman condition the conceptual persona is determined and emerging out of pre-
personal experience itself, rather than a disembodied mind. More precisely, this happens 
through the continuous stretch between the Virtual and the actual that becomes apparent 
through non-linguistic expression in the form of creative movement. Given that thought 
cannot be attributed to ‘a person’, expression and conceptual practice cannot either. In terms 
of a posthuman conceptual persona, its thought can emerge, vibrate, resonate and come to 
expression anywhere. In the case of gaming this space-time is defined by a game’s 
architecture, so that thought finds its expression in movement, turning the perceptual persona 
into a highly mobile dynamic that allows for the possibility of continual variation due to its 
connection to the Virtual. This mobility and variation is reflected in new topological 
cartographies and metrics, where the latter describes singular moments and where there is 
always variation between one defined point and the next instantiation of it. This proliferation 
of concepts is fuelled by the repetition of gaming rounds, which is the increased exposure to 
encounters and possibilities for experience. In the same way that there is variation between 
rounds, because players arrive at the same coordinates, but experience the place anew and can 
know it again for the first time, conceptual persona is twisting and changing, producing 




The crucial difference is that this is not a cycle and neither the perceptual persona nor the 
posthuman arrive at the same coordinates as the same entity that started it in the previous 
round. This conceptual and material variation is rather a case of continual variation where 
one can only return as something different in order to begin anew. This is why political 
gaming is an open-ended reality-studio where (in some cases) concepts can become known 
and used in the form of lasting moments of subjectivity. This further characterizes reality-in-
the-making of political-becoming in the way that continual variation is not only tied to the 
movement of the posthuman and what this expresses, but also from round to round.  
Movement is mattered and it matters in multiple ways: thought is mattered; matter moves, 
pooled together as bodies that move; and the posthuman is moving mattered-
thought/thinking-matter. It was argued that a political theory of posthuman micropolitics 
needs to be able to account for movement and the change this can generate. Subsequently, the 
biogram was developed and used as the theoretical articulation of political posthuman space. 
It is sketched to be n dimensional in order to be able to capture the complexity of posthuman 
space that stretches from the Virtual to the actual through different modes of existence at 
non-human (possibly quantum) speed. In this biogram change in games happens through the 
topological transformation of the posthuman body (which is movement space between 
composing parts). Although this was only possible to investigate and approximate with the 
human example of 3D motion analysis (for the format of this research is very much 2/3D and 
human), it nonetheless suggested that gaming dynamics are directly expressed through 
motion and movement (before it even reaches conscious levels) and that this movement-space 
and according change is meaningful – as it is the expression of thought. As such, it can be 
analysed qualitatively, issuing the development of posthuman qualitative methods, inside and 




The centrality of thought in moving matter and its according movement-space, which 
stretches in-between the Virtual and the actual based on the analysis of a technology of lived 
abstraction, further stressed the vitality of moving matter and of emerging posthuman life 
through gaming experience. Consequently posthuman micropolitics was theorised as 
Erlebnispolitik. Apart from the aspect of ‘living through’ an experience, Erlebnispolitik is 
about life as productivism and change. The term is poignant because it encapsulates the 
Virtual through the aspect of Leben/life, given that the Virtual is the very basis for becoming-
life. Furthermore, Erlebnis stresses that it is not only about the conditions for political life 
and change, but the very mode of this politics is an emerging life, because the micropolitics 
plays out through the emergence of the posthuman and the production of its subjectivity. In 
short, Erlebnispolitik is about life-in-the-making and the posthuman politics of a posthuman 
life. The political concept for the intensive differences that drive molecular, atomic and 
subatomic syntheses that are the basis of this life was theorised as desire in a Deleuzian 
sense. In light of the fact that these processes can be scaled up, desire is understood to be the 
driver of desiring-production as well and a fundamental pillar of life-in-the-making 
(Erlebnispolitik). Politics as life and as a politics of life encapsulates a vitalism that adheres 
to affirmation and is thereby committed to change. This commitment was articulated as the 
utopian impulse. Erlebnispolitik not only happens in and through a posthuman space, but also 
in posthuman temporalities such as the fast-paced technologies of lived abstraction and the 
speed of matter movement and mattered-thought, which was conceptualised through rapid 
capture. This model provides the foundation for an explorative posthuman micropolitics of 
change and new political subjectivities based on technologies of lived abstraction. In this 
sense the defence and development of materialism and gaming ‘technology’ is a declaration 




The declaration of life works on such a fundamental ontological level that it has the potential 
to open up new areas of research for a wide range of subjects. Apart from challenging and 
developing contemporary political theory, the articulation of a posthuman condition raises 
very pragmatic issues, especially in the areas of game design/interactive computing and 
critical pedagogy. The output of this research is of particular interest to game developers 
(commercial and political games) that seek to design games that are fundamentally different 
in their structure, playing dynamics and outcome. In combining theories on flow experience, 
pre-subjective affect and movement, the thesis outlines gaming architectures that do not 
subscribe to conventional narrative structures, parameters of success and failure and 
teleological trajectories of movement. The research offers design suggestions for creative, 
innovative game behaviour and experiences (Erlebnis and Erfahrung). Similarly, gaming as a 
kinaesthetic way of learning is at the heart of current debates in critical pedagogy. The 
detailed account of how new experiences are triggered and can last beyond the scope of a 
game, with a particular focus on movement, adds greatly to current debates. In particular 
those related to new ways of teaching and learning and this may be in a conventional 
conscious sense or more subliminal, affective learning mechanisms. In this respect, the 
philosophy underpinning this research can be used to argue that posthuman pedagogy is a 
material and mattering process and political issue. It supports and contributes to recent 
multidisciplinary and cutting-edge scholarship concerned with new/posthuman modes of 
(educational) thought as expressed in very recent works such as Deleuze & Guattari, Politics 
and Education: For a People-Yet-to-Come and Pedagogy of Objects: Politics, Aesthetics, and 
the Project of Learning.
2
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In addition, the articulation of an alternative conception of life and a specific micropolitics 
through lived abstraction is one of the thesis’ main contributions to current debates on the 
question of what is (a) posthuman. Within its immediate academic circles, this work is part of 
posthuman interventions in IR that span a wide spectrum ranging from nonhuman animal 
studies to critical ecology and infrastructure to posthuman forms of harm and feral 
assemblages/‘governance’.
3
 In view that the thesis traces posthuman life on a material as well 
as conceptual/noological level, it specifically adds to scholarship interested in posthuman and 
other/alien ontology because the present research distinguishes itself from the posthuman as 
discourse. By reengaging the natural sciences and naturalist ontologies, this project 
demonstrates that it is possible to do political theory together with the so-called hard sciences 
without being merely a return to positivism or scientific realism. In contrast to a twentieth-
century mainstream “suspicion of science” in the social studies, especially in traditions that 
draw on continental philosophy, this research strengthens existing projects (for example work 
by Miguel Beistegui and Jeffrey Bell) that argue for a positive and beneficial relation 
between the sciences, philosophy, and social and political theory.
4
 This revived dialogue can 
directly inform timely and intensely debated issues such as technologies of war and the 
problem of locating agency and according responsibility in the employment of such 
technology.
5
 In this sense, the articulation of posthuman bodies particularly with regard to 
neuropsychology and neurosciences creates new opportunities and challenges. More 
specifically and recently, social scientists have applied theories of neuroplasticity to explain 
phenomena in international relations. The study of neuroplasticity is interested in behavioural 
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change on a neurological level due to drastic changes in the environment or directly to the 
body. Because games can work against behavioural habits, it seems imperative to further 
analyse how political gaming impacts upon habits and dispositions on a neurological level. 
One research avenue that academics such as Jairus Grove started looking into is how 
behaviour changes neurologically due to different torture methods. At this point and in 
reference to gaming’s de-subjectivising capacities
6
 the dystopian potential of games due to its 
modus operandi needs to be acknowledged. While it was outlined that gaming bears the 
promise for political change and new political subjectivities, the research area exploring how 
gaming could be abused for torture from the point of neuroplasticity would be important to 
explore further based on the theories provided in this work. Related to this, another crucial 
aspect where the posthuman condition and Erlebnispolitik would allow developing new 
research are those projects working on a theory of (political) plasticity that is not 
neurocentric, in the way that the neurological network extends beyond what is referred to as 
the brain. The idea of the posthuman body and its micropolitics would fit perfectly into this 
line of scholarship and be able to contribute to it significantly. On a more general level, the 
research on posthuman life can be used to approach similar questions in moral philosophy 
concerning longstanding debates over abortion, euthanasia and life-support. Put simply, the 
declaration of posthuman life and its micropolitics provides a fundamentally different lens to 
explore a range of subjects. This non-anthropocentric view has the potential to take existing 
legal, neuro-political, moral and ethical research further and outside its all-too-human limits. 
In conclusion, the main implication of posthuman life as set out in this research is the 
emergence of a new form of politics through new technologies. 
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